Respondent-mother ("respondent") appeals the orders terminating her parental rights to the minor children, G.D.H., D.G.H., and *813N.C.H. G.D.H. was born in 1999, D.G.H. in 2000, and N.C.H. in 2001. On 22 June 2006, the Davidson County Department of Social Services ("DSS") filed a petition alleging the children were abused and neglected. The children were placed in the nonsecure custody of DSS and have remained in DSS custody. On 27 February 2007, the children were adjudicated abused and neglected. Respondent appealed the orders and this Court affirmed the trial court's decision in an opinion filed 2 October 2007. See In the Matter of G.D.H., D.G.H., N.C.H., ___ N.C.App. ___, 650 S.E.2d 675 (2007) (unpublished).
On 31 January 2007, DSS filed petitions to terminate respondent's parental rights. The respective birth and legal fathers relinquished their rights and executed consents for adoption as to the children. On 18 January 2008, the trial court entered orders terminating respondent's parental rights, from which respondent now appeals.
Respondent argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because no summonses were issued in the juveniles' names as required by N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B-1106(a)(5) (2007). We find this Court's recent decision in In re J.A.P., I.M.P., ___ N.C.App. ___, 659 S.E.2d 14 (2008), controlling on this issue. In that case, the summonses issued named the juveniles in the case caption, but did not name the juveniles as respondents. A guardian ad litem had been appointed for the juveniles. The guardian ad litem was not served with a copy of the summonses; however, the attorney advocate for the guardian ad litem was served. We held that where a juvenile's guardian ad litem is represented by an attorney advocate, service of the summons on the attorney advocate constitutes service on the guardian ad litem. Further, service on the guardian ad litem constitutes service on the juvenile, which is sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction when combined with naming the juvenile in the caption of the summons. Id. at ___, 659 S.E.2d at 17.
In the case of In re S.D.J., ___ N.C.App. ___, ___, 665 S.E.2d 818, ___ (2008), filed simultaneously herewith, we found that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction even though a summons was not issued to the juvenile. Id. We reasoned that "the captions of the summonses naming the parents as respondents state the name of the juvenile, and the guardians ad litem for the juvenile certified that they accepted service of the petition on the juvenile's behalf[.]" Id. at ___, 665 S.E.2d at 821 (slip op. 4). In S.D.J. we adhered to the precedent set in J.A.P.
Here, the record before us shows summonses captioned as follows: "In the Matter of: [N.C.H.]"; "In the Matter of: [G.D.H.]"; and "In the Matter of: [D.G.H.]." The record also contains certifications from the guardian ad litem appointed for the juveniles that she was served with a copy of the summonses. We find that there are no significant distinctions between the facts of this case and those in J.A.P. or S.D.J. Therefore, in accordance with our holdings in those cases, we conclude that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over these proceedings. The orders are affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judge McGEE concurs.
Judge STROUD dissents in a separate opinion.