UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 94-30485
IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPLAINT OF INGRAM TOWING COMPANY
AND INGRAM BARGE COMPANY, AS OWNER AND OWNER PRO HAC VICE
RESPECTIVELY, OF THE M/V DAVE BRASELL AND THE IB-2629,
PETITIONING FOR EXONERATION FROM OR LIMITATION OF LIABILITY:
INGRAM TOWING COMPANY, as owner and owner pro hac vice,
respectively of the M/V Dave Brasell and the IB-2629, and INGRAM
BARGE COMPANY, as owner and owner pro hac vice, respectively, of
the M/V Dave Brasell and the IB-2629,
Appellees,
VERSUS
ADNAC INC., ET AL., the owner and/or operator of the Destrehan
Elevator in Destrehan, LA,
Claimants,
ROSE WASHINGTON, ET AL.,
Claimants-Appellants
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
(July 13, 1995)
Before SMITH, WIENER, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
DeMOSS, Circuit Judge:
This is an interlocutory appeal from the district court's
order interpreting and enforcing its previous injunction. Finding
that we do not have appellate jurisdiction to hear this
interlocutory appeal, we DISMISS the appeal.
BACKGROUND
This case concerns an allision between the M/V DAVE BRASELL
and its tow with the Sunshine Bridge near Donaldsonville, Louisiana
on April 9, 1993. The allision caused the spill of fuel oil into
the Mississippi River. The M/V DAVE BRASELL and its tow were owned
and operated by Ingram Towing Company and Ingram Barge Company
(collectively "Ingram").
Several months after the allision, Ingram began receiving
notices from individuals alleging they had upset stomachs, diarrhea
and similar symptoms due to drinking and breathing the spilled fuel
oil. In September 1993, Ingram was served with a petition,
purported to be a class action, brought on behalf of Rose
Washington and all others similarly situated ("Rose Washington
Claimants"), alleging injuries from the spilled fuel oil.
In October 1993, Ingram filed an action seeking exoneration
from or limitation of liability pursuant to Rule F of the
Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims,
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-189. The
District Court then entered a restraining order ("October 1993
Order") prohibiting "the commencement and/or further prosecution of
any action or proceeding against the petitioners and/or their
underwriters . . . arising out of or connected in any way with" the
allision.
In January 1994, the federal district court remanded to state
court that part of the original class action that concerned claims
against defendants other than Ingram and allowed those claims to
2
proceed ("January 1994 Order").
In March 1994, the Rose Washington Claimants amended their
state court suit and added Tennessee Insurance Company ("TIC"),
Ingram's insurer, as a defendant. The Rose Washington Claimants
sued TIC for, inter alia, breach of its duty of good faith and fair
dealing due to its categorical denial of all personal injury claims
relating to the fuel oil spill.
In May 1994, Ingram sought to enforce the stay in the District
Court and stop the proceedings against TIC. In its August 1994
order ("August 1994 Order"), the district court said that its
October 1993 Order prohibited suits against TIC. The district
court also found that the January 1994 Order did not allow suits
against TIC, but rather, only against certain local officials.
Therefore, the district court held that its October order was still
in effect and that it prohibited suits by the Rose Washington
Claimants against TIC. The district court stayed the state
proceedings against TIC.
The Rose Washington Claimants filed a timely interlocutory
appeal of this order.
JURISDICTION
Congress vests the courts of appeals with jurisdiction over
appeals from "all final decisions of the district courts of the
United States . . . except where a direct review may be had in the
Supreme Court." 28 U.S.C. § 1291. "[A]n order is final only when
it 'ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the
court to do but execute the judgment.'" United States v. Garner,
3
749 F.2d 281, 285 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 373 (1981)). "The purpose behind
[the final judgment rule] is to avoid piecemeal appeals, which in
turn conserves 'judicial energy' and may help eliminate delay."
Sherri A.D. v. Kirby, 975 F.2d 193, 201 (5th Cir. 1992); see
Flanagan v. United States, 104 S.Ct. 1051, 1054 (1984); Firestone,
449 U.S. at 374. The Rose Washington Claimants' appeal is not from
a final judgment and is, therefore, interlocutory.
Interlocutory appellate jurisdiction is the exception rather
than the rule. Garner, 749 F.2d at 285. Congress has given the
courts of appeals jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals only in
certain, limited circumstances. Dardar v. Lafourche Realty Co.,
Inc., 849 F.2d 955, 957 (5th Cir. 1988). The Rose Washington
Claimants raise two exceptions to the general limitation on
appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals; the exceptions
are found at 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) and (3)1. These exceptions
allow interlocutory appeals from certain injunctions and admiralty
claims. Because this appeal fits neither of the exceptions we find
that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
1
The statute reads, in relevant part:
(a) [T]he courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from:
(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the
United States . . . granting, continuing, modifying,
refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to
dissolve or modify injunctions . . . ;
. . . .
(3) Interlocutory decrees of such district courts or
the judges thereof determining the rights and
liabilities of the parties to admiralty cases in which
appeals from final decrees are allowed.
28 U.S.C. § 1292 (a)(1) & (3).
4
Interlocutory appeals are not favored and the statutes
allowing them must be strictly construed. Sierra Club v. Marsh,
907 F.2d 210, 214 (1st Cir. 1990); see E.E.O.C. v. Kerrville Bus
Co., Inc., 925 F.2d 129, 139 (5th Cir. 1991). "We must 'approach
this statute somewhat gingerly lest a floodgate be opened that
brings into the exception many pretrial orders.'" Switzerland
Cheese Ass'n., Inc. v. E. Hornes Market, Inc., 385 U.S. 23, 24
(1966).
Section 1292(a)(1)--Injunctions
Section 1292(a)(1) allows interlocutory appeals when a court
grants, continues, modifies, refuses or dissolves an injunction, or
when it refuses to modify or dissolve an injunction. However,
interlocutory appeals are not allowed when a court merely enforces
or interprets a previous injunction2. Mikel v. Gourley, 951 F.2d
166, 168 (8th Cir. 1991) ("A mere clarification of an injunction is
not an appealable order); Motorola, Inc. v. Computer Displays
Intern., 739 F.2d 1149, 1155 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Orders that merely
interpret or clarify an injunction are not appealable under §
1292(a)(1)."); Major v. Orthopedic Equipment Co., 561 F.2d 1112,
1115 (4th Cir. 1975) ("[The order] is simply an interpretation, not
appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)."); Int'l Assoc. of Mach.
& Aerospace Workers v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 849 F.2d 1481, 1485
2
The cases that the Rose Washington Claimants cite are all
inapposite, in that they concern the issue of whether an order
that continues or modifies an injunction is interlocutorily
appealable. The cases do not concern whether this order
continued or modified an injunction, nor do they concern whether
an order interpreting an injunction should be treated as
continuing or modifying an injunction.
5
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (distinguishing between orders that are "mere
interpretation[s]" and orders that modify injunctions). 9 MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 110.20[2] n.3 (1995).
The district court's August 1994 Order did not grant,
continue, modify, refuse or dissolve an injunction3. Instead, the
district court merely explained that the Rose Washington Claimants
had misinterpreted the January 1994 Order. The district court made
clear that the October 1993 Order was still in effect and suits
against Ingram's insurers were still enjoined4.
Because the order does not fall under § 1292(a)(1), we do not
have jurisdiction under that exception to hear an interlocutory
appeal from the order. We will now consider whether we have
jurisdiction under § 1292(a)(3).
Section 1292(a)(3)--Admiralty
3
Both the October 1993 Order and the January 1994 Order were
interlocutorily appealable, as they granted and modified
injunctions. However, under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
4(a), the Rose Washington Claimants had thirty days from the date
of the order in which to appeal. They did not file their notice
of appeal until August 25, 1994. Therefore, appeals from the
October 1993 Order and the January 1994 Order would be untimely.
Of course, the appeal from the August 1994 Order is timely.
4
The August 1994 order, from which the Rose Washington
Claimants appeal, reads in relevant part:
The Rose Washington [Claimants] further allege that the
January 10, 1994 order of this court which stated,"[W]hen
remanded, the state court action will be stayed as to Ingram
Barge Company and the vessel regarding claims subject to
limitation but may proceed against the other defendants[,]"
allows them to proceed against a new defendant, TIC. The
[Rose Washington Claimants] have misinterpreted the order.
The "other defendants" were the St. James Parish officials
already parties to the state claim and not subject to the
limitation proceeding. As stated above, the claim against
TIC is "subject to limitation."
Emphasis in original.
6
Section 1292(a)(3) allows interlocutory appeals from orders in
admiralty cases which "determin[e] the rights and liabilities of
the parties." This section
was designed to apply in circumstances distinctive to
admiralty where it is not uncommon for a court to enter an
order finally determining the issues of liability between the
parties and then to refer the case to a master for a
determination of damages. Courts have tended to construe this
provision rather narrowly and it has not been read to permit
interlocutory appeals in admiralty except where the order,
regardless of the label affixed to it had the effect of
determining the rights and obligations of the parties.
Treasure Salvors v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing
Vessel, 640 F.2d 560, 564 (1981). See Hollywood Marine, Inc. v.
M/V ARTIE JAMES, 755 F.2d 414, 416 (5th Cir. 1985); Francis v.
Forest Oil Corp., 798 F.2d 147, 149 (5th Cir. 1986).
"Orders which do not determine parties' substantive rights or
liabilities, however, are not appealable under section 1292(a)(3)
even if those orders have important procedural consequences."
Francis, 798 F.2d at 150; 9 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 110.19[3] n.27.
The August 1994 Order did not determine the rights and
liabilities of the parties. The order only stayed the state court
suit against TIC until the federal limitation of liability
proceeding was finished. The district court did not determine that
TIC was not liable to the Rose Washington Claimants, nor did it
determine the claimants could never sue TIC. All the district
7
court did was determine when the claimants could sue TIC. The
district court did not determine the rights and liabilities of the
parties, it "merely settled how and where the rights and
liabilities would be determined." State Establishment v. M/V
WESERMUNDE, 770 F.2d 987, 990 (11th Cir. 1985).
Because the August 1994 Order did not determine the rights and
liabilities of the parties, it is not appealable under the
admiralty interlocutory appeal exception. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3).
CONCLUSION
The Rose Washington Claimants' appeal from the August 1994
Order is interlocutory. This Court generally only has appellate
jurisdiction over appeals from final orders and thus interlocutory
appeals must fall under one of the exceptions to the final judgment
rule. The Rose Washington Claimants allege that we have appellate
jurisdiction under two exceptions, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) and (3).
However, for the above stated reasons, we determine that their
appeal does not fall under either of these exceptions and,
therefore, their appeal is DISMISSED for lack of appellate
jurisdiction.
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