Mitek Holdings v. Arce Engineering

PUBLISH IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED _______________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 12/20/99 No. 98-5257 THOMAS K. KAHN _______________ CLERK D. C. Docket No. 91-2629-CIV-KMM MITEK HOLDINGS, INCORPORATED and MITEK INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED Plaintiffs-Counter-Defendants-Appellants, versus ARCE ENGINEERING COMPANY, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellee, EMILIO SOTOLONGO, Defendant-Appellee. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ______________________________ (December 20, 1999) Before BIRCH and DUBINA, Circuit Judges, and SMITH*, Senior District Judge. BIRCH, Circuit Judge: * Honorable C. Lynwood Smith, U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of Alabama, sitting by disignation. Plaintiffs MiTek Holdings, Inc. and MiTek Industries, Inc. (“MiTek”) appeal from an order awarding attorney's fees pursuant to the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 505,1 to Defendant Arce Engineering Co., Inc. (“Arce”). We VACATE and REMAND for reevaluation of the attorney's fees issue. I. Procedural History On November 15, 1991, MiTek filed its complaint alleging copyright infringement under the Copyright Act,17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. Following a bench trial, the district court entered judgment for Arce on MiTek's claim for copyright infringement and denied MiTek's motion of a preliminary injunction. We affirmed the entry of judgment in favor of Arce. See MiTek Holdings, Inc. v. Arce Eng’g Co., 89 F.3d 1548 (11th Cir. 1996) (“MiTek I”). While MiTek I was pending in this court, the district court referred Arce's request for attorney's fees and costs to a magistrate judge, who recommended that Arce be awarded the full amount of fees requested. In discussing whether MiTek had brought the lawsuit in good faith, the magistrate judge noted: [A] review of the record indicates that this case was closely contested and required the consideration of sophisticated issues of fact and law. The question of the scope of copyright protection for non-literal 1 Section 505 states, in relevant part: “Except as otherwise provided by this title, the court may . . . award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs. 2 elements of computer programs is relatively new, has been litigated only a few times, and has produced varying results in different courts. R5-145-4-5. The magistrate judge noted that fees could be awarded to a prevailing defendant despite the lack of bad faith on the part of the plaintiff and that the relative abilities of the different parties to pay for the requested attorney's fees could also be considered. See R5-145-5. Because MiTek “appear[s] to be more than capable of funding an award” and because Arce “is a small family owned company with limited resources,” the magistrate judge found that “considerations of compensation tip the balance in favor of an award to” Arce. R5-145-5. While Arce had sought attorney's fees to cover 553 hours of work at $250.00 per hour, the magistrate judge recommended that the district court award Arce attorney's fees to cover 550 hours of work at $200.00. See R-5-145-7-8. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation in its entirety. See R-5-159. MiTek then brought the instant appeal. II. Analysis In reviewing a district court's decision to grant or deny fees under the Copyright Act, we first determine whether “the district court weighed the relevant factors and exercised its discretion.” Montgomery v. Noga, 168 F.3d 1282, 1303 (11th Cir. 1999) (footnote omitted). If the district court weighed the proper 3 factors, then “we will not question the court's decision to grant or deny fees absent an abuse of that discretion.” Id. In Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., the Supreme Court stated: [W]e reject both the “dual standard” adopted by several of the Courts of Appeals and petitioner's claim that § 505 enacted the British Rule for automatic recovery of attorney's fees by the prevailing party. Prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants are to be treated alike, but attorney's fees are to be awarded to prevailing parties only as a matter of the court's discretion. 510 U.S. 517, 534, 114 S. Ct. 1023, 1033 (1994). See also Sherry Mfg. Co. v. Towel King of Fla., Inc., 822 F.2d 1031, 1034 (11th Cir. 1987) (applying same rule to prevailing plaintiffs and defendants). Fogerty cited with approval the Third Circuit's list of “several nonexclusive factors that courts should consider in making awards of attorney's fees to any prevailing party” in a Copyright Act case; these factor include “