FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
March 29, 2010
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 09-1002
LIONEL FERREL,
Defendant - Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D. Ct. No. 1:07-CR-00283-REB -1)
Gregory M. Acton, Acton Law Office, PC, Albuquerque, New Mexico, appearing for
Appellant.
Paul Farley, Assistant United States Attorney (David M. Gaouette, United States
Attorney, with him on the brief), Office of the United States Attorney for the District of
Colorado, Denver, Colorado, appearing for Appellee.
Before TACHA, ANDERSON, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
TACHA, Circuit Judge.
Lionel Ferrel was indicted on and pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to
one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of a
substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, and a substance
containing a detectable amount of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1)
and (b)(1)(A). He was sentenced to 108 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, he
challenges the validity of his guilty plea and sentence, arguing that the district court: (1)
failed to inform him during the Rule 11 plea colloquy of the drug-quantity element of the
offense—namely, that the purpose of the conspiracy was to possess with intent to
distribute at least fifty grams of methamphetamine; (2) misinformed him during the Rule
11 plea colloquy of the statutory maximum sentence; and (3) should have submitted to a
jury the question of the quantity and purity of the methamphetamine involved in the
offense. We have jurisdiction under 21 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), and we
AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
In December 2006, Detective Jorge Villegas with the Denver North Metro Task
Force began investigating Mr. Ferrel’s involvement with drug trafficking. From
December 2006 through January 2007, he and other officials directed four controlled
purchases of methamphetamine from Mr. Ferrel by a confidential informant (“CI”).
During this time, Mr. Ferrel also provided the CI with a small sample representative of
methamphetamine being produced by Mr. Ferrel’s associate, a man named “Guero,” in
California. The total amount of methamphetamine Mr. Ferrel provided the CI through
these transactions was 110.7 grams.
In February 2007, Mr. Ferrel instructed the CI to fly to California to assist Guero
in transporting methamphetamine to Denver, Colorado. Mr. Ferrel told the CI that Guero
2
had two pounds of methamphetamine but did not have a driver’s license, so the CI should
meet Guero in California and drive his vehicle loaded with the methamphetamine to
Denver. The CI flew to California, but Guero insisted on driving. The vehicle was
ultimately stopped by the California Highway Patrol, and a subsequent search uncovered
1457 grams of 97.6% pure (or “actual”) methamphetamine.
That May, Mr. Ferrel sold 250 grams of cocaine to Detective Villegas.
Two months later, Mr. Ferrel was charged in a two-count indictment with
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of a substance
containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine and a substance containing a
detectable amount of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1) and
(b)(1)(A) (Count One), and distribution of a substance containing a detectable amount of
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) (Count Two).
Mr. Ferrel pleaded guilty to Count One. Using the Drug Equivalency Tables set
forth in the 2007 United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“Guidelines” or
“U.S.S.G.”), see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.10(E), the plea agreement outlined the
government’s position on sentencing. According to the government, the 110.7 grams of
methamphetamine that Mr. Ferrel provided to the CI equated to 221.4 kilograms of
marijuana; the 1457 grams of actual methamphetamine found in Guero’s vehicle equated
to 29,140 kilograms of marijuana; and the 250 grams of cocaine that Mr. Ferrel sold to
Detective Villegas equated to 50 kilograms of marijuana. The resultant 29,411.4
kilograms of marijuana equivalent produced a base offense level of 36. Mr. Ferrel
3
received a 2-level decrease under the “safety valve,” see U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(b)(11),
5C1.2, and a 3-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility, see id. § 3E1.1. The total
offense level was therefore 31, which, combined with Mr. Ferrel’s criminal history
category of I, produced an advisory Guidelines sentence of 108–135 months. The
government recommended a 108-month sentence.
In the plea agreement, Mr. Ferrel admitted to his conduct involving the 110.7
grams of methamphetamine and the 250 grams of cocaine, but he denied responsibility
for the 1457 grams of actual methamphetamine found in Guero’s vehicle. Instead, in his
objections to the PSR and in other pre-sentencing filings, Mr. Ferrel argued that he
believed only two pounds (or approximately 896 grams) of a less-pure methamphetamine
mixture would be delivered to him. Under the Guidelines, conduct involving
methamphetamine mixture results in a lower sentence than conduct involving actual
methamphetamine.1 Thus, Mr. Ferrel calculated his sentence according to the following
marijuana equivalents: the 116.3 grams of methamphetamine2 equated to 232.6 kilograms
of marijuana; the 896 grams of methamphetamine equated to 1792 kilograms of
marijuana; and the 250 grams of cocaine equated to 50 kilograms of marijuana. The
resultant 2074.6 kilograms of marijuana equivalent produced a base offense level of 32.
1
Specifically, one gram of methamphetamine is equivalent to two kilograms of
marijuana, while the one gram of actual methamphetamine is equivalent to twenty
kilograms of marijuana. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.10(E).
2
Although the plea agreement noted that Mr. Ferrel had provided the CI with 110.7
grams of methamphetamine, the parties agreed in the PSR that the amount was 116.3
grams. This difference is not relevant to the issues in this appeal.
4
After the safety-valve and acceptance-of-responsibility reductions, the total offense level
was 27 and the Guidelines range was 70–87 months.
At sentencing, the district court agreed with the government and found by a
preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Ferrel was responsible for the 1457 grams of
actual methamphetamine as relevant conduct. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1. Accordingly, the
court imposed a 108-month sentence, the lowest sentence within the applicable
Guidelines range.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Rule 11 Errors
The district court accepted the parties’ plea agreement after holding a Rule 11
hearing. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. On appeal, Mr. Ferrel argues that the district court
failed to comply with Rule 11 in two respects. First, he contends that the court did not
inform him of the drug-quantity element of the offense. Specifically, he maintains that
the court failed to inform him that the object of the conspiracy with which he was charged
was to possess with intent to distribute at least fifty grams of methamphetamine, as
opposed to an unspecified amount of the drug. Second, Mr. Ferrel argues that the court
misinformed him of the statutory maximum sentence.
1. Failure to Inform Mr. Ferrel of the Drug-Quantity Element
“Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ‘is designed to assist the
district judge in making the constitutionally required determination that a defendant’s
plea is truly voluntary.’” United States v. Gigot, 147 F.3d 1193, 1197 (10th Cir. 1998)
5
(quoting McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969)). Under Rule 11, the court
must inform the defendant of the nature of the charges to which he is pleading. See Rule
11(b)(1)(G). In most cases, this requires the court to recite the elements of the offense.
See Gigot, 147 F.3d at 1198.
Mr. Ferrel was charged with and pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess with intent
to distribute fifty grams or more of a substance containing methamphetamine under 21
U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A).3 21 U.S.C. § 846 prohibits conspiring to
commit an offense under § 841. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), in turn, makes it unlawful for any
person to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a);
United States v. Jones, 235 F.3d 1231, 1235 (10th Cir. 2000). Subsection (b) sets forth
the penalties for violations of § 841(a). See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b); Jones, 235 F.3d at 1235.
When no specific amount of the controlled substance is charged, § 841(b)(1)(C) provides
for a statutory maximum sentence of twenty years’ imprisonment. In contrast,
subsections (b)(1)(A) and (B) provide for higher maximum sentences depending on the
type and quantity of the substance. In Mr. Ferrel’s case, for example, possession of fifty
grams or more of methamphetamine carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.
See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). Because the type and quantity of drug are facts that
expose a defendant to a higher maximum sentence than the twenty-year maximum set
forth in § 841(b)(1)(C), we have held that such findings are essential elements of the
3
That count also included conspiracy with intent to distribute a substance
containing a detectable amount of cocaine, but Mr. Ferrel’s cocaine-related conduct is not
at issue in this appeal.
6
substantive offense under § 841(a). United States v. Montgomery, 468 F.3d 715, 719
(10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Cernobyl, 255 F.3d 1215, 1218 (10th Cir. 2001); Jones,
235 F.3d at 1236.
At Mr. Ferrel’s Rule 11 plea colloquy, the district court did not explicitly inform
him of any of the elements of the charged offense, including that the purpose of the
conspiracy was to possess with intent to distribute at least fifty grams of
methamphetamine. Instead, the court simply stated that the elements were listed in the
plea agreement under the section titled “Elements of the Offense of Conviction.”
Although the plea agreement included a recitation of the offense as charged in the
indictment and the factual basis for the plea, both of which clearly set forth the drug
amounts alleged by the government, the elements section did not mention the quantity of
methamphetamine involved. Instead, that section focused on the elements of conspiring
to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine and cocaine generally.4 Thus, the
district court did not satisfy its obligation under Rule 11 to inform Mr. Ferrel of the nature
4
The plea agreement listed the following three elements under the heading
“Elements of the Offense of Conviction”:
[1] [T]he defendant knowingly entered into an agreement or understanding
with at least one other person to commit the crime of possession with intent
to distribute methamphetamine and cocaine;
[2] At some time during the existence of the conspiracy, agreement, or
understanding, the defendant knew the purpose(s) of the agreement, and,
with that knowledge, then deliberately joined the conspiracy, agreement, or
understanding . . .; and,
[3] At some time during the existence or the life of the conspiracy,
agreement, or understanding, one of its alleged members knowingly
performed an overt act to further or advance the purpose of the agreement.
7
of the charges against him.
Mr. Ferrel, however, did not object to the court’s error, and as such, we review his
claim under the exacting plain-error standard. See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 59
(2002); United States v. Edgar, 348 F.3d 867, 871 (10th Cir. 2003). “To notice plain
error . . . the error must (1) be an actual error that was forfeited; (2) be plain or obvious;
and (3) affect substantial rights, in other words, in most cases the error must be
prejudicial, i.e., it must have affected the outcome.” Edgar, 348 F.3d at 871 (quotations
omitted). If all three conditions are met, we may then exercise our discretion to notice the
error, but only if it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Id. (quotations omitted).
Mr. Ferrel has not shown that the district court’s failure to inform him of the drug-
quantity element affected his substantial rights. In the context of a plea agreement, an
error affects substantial rights if it is prejudicial—that is, if the defendant can show that
he would not have pleaded guilty had the court complied with Rule 11. See id. at 872.
In this case, nothing in the record indicates that Mr. Ferrel would not have pleaded guilty
and would have instead exercised his right to trial had the district court properly informed
him of the quantity of drugs with which he was charged.
We have suggested that a Rule 11 error is not prejudicial when the defendant was
simply deprived of a mandated procedure as opposed to the substantive material
information contemplated by the rule. See Gigot, 147 F.3d at 1200. Thus, a defendant
who receives the information omitted by the district court from other sources generally
8
cannot demonstrate that he would not have pleaded guilty had the court also so informed
him. Cf. Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005) (“[W]e have never held that the
judge must himself explain the elements of each charge to the defendant on the record.
Rather, the constitutional prerequisites of a valid plea may be satisfied where the record
accurately reflects that the nature of the charge and the elements of the crime were
explained to the defendant by his own, competent counsel.”). Such is the case here. The
fact that Mr. Ferrel’s offense involved at least fifty grams of methamphetamine was
alleged in the indictment, the same language was repeated in the plea agreement and in
Mr. Ferrel’s Statement in Advance of Plea of Guilty, and Mr. Ferrel himself
acknowledged discussing the elements of the offense with his attorney prior to the Rule
11 hearing.
Nonetheless, Mr. Ferrel contends that he did not recognize the fifty-gram quantity
as an actual element of the offense but instead viewed the language referencing fifty
grams of methamphetamine in the aforementioned documents as simply descriptive or
superfluous. Furthermore, he emphasizes that the plea agreement section titled “Elements
of the Offense” did not include quantity as an element. Even so, however, Mr. Ferrel
does not demonstrate that his decision to plead guilty would have been different had the
court specifically informed him of the quantity element. Indeed, even now on appeal,
with full knowledge of his rights under Rule 11, Mr. Ferrel does not unequivocally seek
to withdraw his plea so that he may go to trial; rather, he primarily requests resentencing
without regard to the statutory minimum and maximum sentences set forth in
9
§ 841(b)(1)(A).5 Additionally, Mr. Ferrel consistently and repeatedly admitted prior to
the Rule 11 hearing that his § 841 offense involved at least fifty grams of
methamphetamine, and there is nothing in the record to suggest that he wanted a jury to
determine that issue.6 Thus, Mr. Ferrel has not satisfied his burden of showing that the
district court’s failure to adequately inform him of the quantity element during his Rule
11 colloquy affected his substantial rights.7
2. Misstating the Applicable Statutory Minimum and Maximum Sentence
Under Rule 11(b)(1)(H)–(I), the district court must inform the defendant of, and
ensure that he understands, the statutory minimum and maximum sentence he faces. Fed.
R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(H)–(I). A violation of § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A) carries a statutory
minimum of ten years’ imprisonment and a statutory maximum of life imprisonment. See
5
Interestingly, the district court’s application of the “safety valve” provision
rendered Mr. Ferrel’s ultimate sentence below the statutory minimum set forth in §
841(b)(1)(A). Accordingly, we fail to see how the relief Mr. Ferrel requests would have
any impact on his ultimate sentence.
6
Mr. Ferrel did dispute the quantity and purity of the methamphetamine found in
Guero’s car, see infra at p. 13–14, but that amount is irrelevant to his conviction because
he admitted in the plea agreement to delivering more than 110.7 grams of
methamphetamine to the CI in prior transactions. That amount alone was sufficient to
satisfy the fifty-gram element under § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). Thus, the quantity found
in Guero’s vehicle was used only for sentencing purposes as relevant conduct, see
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, and had no bearing on Mr. Ferrel’s conviction itself.
7
Although this particular instance of Rule 11 error does not warrant reversal, we
are reminded that “careful compliance with rule 11 best serves the fair and efficient
administration of criminal justice.” United States v. Barry, 895 F.2d 702, 705 (10th Cir.
1990). Thus, the most effective way to ensure satisfaction of Rule 11(b)(1)(G) is for the
district court to recite the elements of the offense on the record during the Rule 11
hearing.
10
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). At the Rule 11 hearing in this case, the district court
erroneously informed Mr. Ferrel of the Guidelines sentencing range urged by the
government rather than the statutory ten-years-to-life range under § 841(b)(1)(A).
Because Mr. Ferrel did not object to this error or otherwise raise this issue below,
we again review for plain error and again conclude that Mr. Ferrel has failed to show that
he would not have pleaded guilty had he correctly been informed of the statutory
minimum and maximum sentence. First, although the district court did not advise Mr.
Ferrel of the statutory minimum and maximum sentence, the record shows that he was
advised of the statutory range in both the indictment and the plea agreement. Thus, he
was not actually deprived of the substantive material information mandated by Rule 11.
Second, the district court did properly inform Mr. Ferrel of the applicable Guidelines
range, and his sentence ultimately fell at the bottom of that range. Thus, he cannot argue
that the court’s error led him to expect a sentence other than the one he received, which
might have influenced his decision to plead guilty. Finally, on appeal, Mr. Ferrel makes
absolutely no argument that absent the district court’s error he would not have pleaded
guilty. Instead, he states only in conclusory fashion that the district court’s error affected
his substantial rights. Accordingly, Mr. Ferrel has not shown that the district court’s
failure to inform him of the statutory minimum and maximum sentence constituted
reversible plain error.
B. Failure to Submit Drug Quantity and Quality to a Jury
Finally, Mr. Ferrel argues that the district court violated “his right to have the drug
11
quantity and purity submitted to a jury and to have that element proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Mr. Ferrel did not make this precise objection below; rather, his
objections appeared to focus on the use of the methamphetamine found in Guero’s
vehicle as relevant conduct for sentencing purposes.8 The contours of Mr. Ferrel’s
objections and our resultant standard of review, however, need not be definitively
resolved, because even if Mr. Ferrel properly raised the issue, we conclude that the
district court did not err.
First, to the extent Mr. Ferrel contends that the district court should have permitted
him to generally plead guilty to the offense but try the sole issue of drug quantity to a
jury, we disagree. A defendant has no right to plead guilty to some elements of an
offense but have a jury decide others. If a defendant wants a jury to decide an element, he
must go to trial. Second, in the plea agreement, Mr. Ferrel admitted to facts that satisfied
8
In the plea agreement, the parties stated that “[t]he only fact contested by Lionel
Ferrel is the knowledge of the amount and purity of methamphetamine which the
informant would bring back from California. Lionel Ferrel contends and reserves the
right to argue that he was unaware and did not expect that the confidential informant
would return to Colorado with 1457 grams of 97% pure methamphetamine.” Mr. Ferrel
repeated that objection verbatim in another document executed the same day as the plea
agreement. In the same document, he noted that “as mandated by [United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)], the defendant did not admit any fact, nor has any fact been
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, that would show that Mr.
Ferrel knew or had been informed that the informant would bring the amount or the purity
of Methamphetamine from California to Colorado.” And at the Rule 11 hearing, Mr.
Ferrel’s attorney stated, “[W]e have maintained the right to argue the amount of the meth
and the purity and the information given by the informant. That those are the things that
the court can take into consideration for [relevant] conduct.” He also recognized that “the
court has the option of sentencing to a lesser degree if in fact the court accepts the amount
as being different than the alleged amount, and we stand prepared to show that to the
probation, show that to the court.”
12
the drug-quantity element; thus, a jury finding on this issue would be superfluous.9 Third,
the indictment specifically alleged the drug-quantity element, which distinguishes Mr.
Ferrel’s cases from those he cites in which we held that a defendant cannot be convicted
and sentenced under § 841(b)(1)(A) or (B) when the indictment references only
§ 841(b)(1)(C). See, e.g., Jones, 235 F.3d at 1236–37; cf. Cernobyl, 255 F.3d at 1220–21
(same, but indictment charged a violation of § 841(b)(1)(D)). Finally, Mr. Ferrel’s
suggestion that only a jury, and not the court, could make relevant-conduct findings
regarding the amount and purity of the methamphetamine he reasonably foresaw Guero
and the CI transporting to Colorado is untenable. See United States v. Hall, 473 F.3d
1295, 1312 (10th Cir. 2007) (post-Booker, a district court may find sentencing facts,
including drug quantity for purposes of relevant conduct, by a preponderance of the
evidence). Therefore, the district court’s resolution of the drug quantity issue and its
failure to submit that issue to the jury was not error.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Mr. Ferrel’s conviction and sentence.
9
Mr. Ferrel contends that his admissions in the plea agreement are insufficient
because they were “not made pursuant to the protections for guilty pleas in Fed. Crim. P.
11.” Mr. Ferrel cites no authority, however, for the proposition that admissions relevant
to guilty plea are only effective when made in open court during the Rule 11 colloquy.
13