[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUNE 19, 2001
THOMAS K. KAHN
No. 99-8307 CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 97-03581-1-CV-ODE
PAUL SHIELDS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BELLSOUTH ADVERTISING AND PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(June 19, 2001)
Before CARNES, BARKETT and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
MARCUS, Circuit Judge:
In this appeal, Plaintiff Paul Shields challenges the dismissal of his wrongful
termination suit against Defendant BellSouth Advertising and Publishing Corp.
(“BAPCO”) pursuant to Georgia’s doctrine of collateral estoppel. As we explained
in our earlier opinion in this case, 228 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2000), prior to bringing
suit in federal court, Shields sought unemployment benefits through the Georgia
state courts. During those state proceedings, a Georgia Superior Court found that
there was no record evidence that Shields was fired because of his protected status
as an HIV-positive male. Based on this state court finding, the federal district
court dismissed the lawsuit, which alleges wrongful termination on the basis of
disability in violation of Title I of the American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §
12101, et seq. The district court concluded that the gravamen of Shields’s suit --
his allegation that he was terminated because of his HIV-positive status -- already
was litigated in his state unemployment benefits proceedings, and that those
proceedings offered him a full and fair opportunity for hearing in compliance with
federal due process standards.
In our earlier opinion, we agreed with the district court that Georgia’s
unemployment benefits proceedings, on the face of this record, comport with the
procedural rigors of federal due process. We left open, however, whether as a
matter of Georgia law Shields’s claim would be barred by collateral estoppel.
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Specifically, we certified that dispositive issue to the Georgia Supreme Court,
seeking the answer to the following question:
Under the circumstances of this case, would a Superior
Court’s finding in an unemployment compensation
appeal that there is no evidence the decisionmaker who
terminated the employee knew of his protected status and
no evidence that his protected status motivated his
discharge, collaterally estop the employee as a matter of
Georgia law from establishing in a subsequent wrongful
termination lawsuit in state court that he was terminated
because of his protected status?
The Georgia Supreme Court has now answered that question in the
affirmative, ruling that “collateral estoppel bars revisiting the alleged reasons
behind Shields’s dismissal.” -- S.E.2d --, No. S01Q0116 (Ga. Apr. 30, 2001). In
light of that answer, we conclude that Shields’s ADA claim is barred by collateral
estoppel, and accordingly affirm the district court in full.
AFFIRMED.
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