dissenting.
The facts recited in the majority’s opinion do not support any reasonable inference that Wade arguably could have armed himself once he was outside the dwelling. The jury’s return of a verdict finding Wade guilty of burglary .of a dwelling, rather than of armed burglary, can only logically be explained in terms of the jury’s undoubted power to grant a jury pardon to Wade by finding him guilty of a lesser offense necessarily included within that of the offense charged. See discussion in State v. Bruns, 429 So.2d 307, 310 (Fla.1983).
Gragg v. State, 429 So.2d 1204, 1206-07 (Fla.1983) requires “a court [, in determining whether collateral estoppel applies, to] limit its inquiry to whether there was a factual basis, rather than an emotional basis, upon which the jury’s verdict could have rested.” This I think the lower court properly did. I would therefore affirm the order of dismissal.