[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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Nos. 00-11333 and 00-11639
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D.C. Docket No. 98-00506 CV-D-N
JACKIE LAURIE,
BARBARA LINDSEY,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
ALABAMA COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS,
SAM TAYLOR, in his official and
individual capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
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(July 12, 2001)
Before CARNES and MARCUS, Circuit Judges, and PROPST*, District Judge.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiffs Jackie Laurie and Barbara Lindsey filed this lawsuit on April 30,
*
Honorable Robert B. Propst, U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of Alabama,
sitting by designation.
1998 against the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals (“ACCA”) and Sam Taylor,
a former judge on the ACCA. The plaintiffs alleged that, while employed by the
ACCA, they suffered sexual harassment and were exposed to a hostile work
environment in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.1
The defendants in this action moved for summary judgment on various
grounds, including that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
action because, the defendants contended, the ACCA did not qualify as an
“employer” for purposes of Title VII in that it did not employ fifteen “employees,”
as defined by Title VII, during the relevant time period. See 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e(b) & (f). The plaintiffs argued in response that the ACCA should be
considered together with other Alabama courts and state agencies for purpose of
counting the number of employees and that, in any event, the ACCA employed
more than enough employees to qualify as an “employer.” On February 14, 2000,
the district court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of Taylor
for reasons not at issue in this appeal, but denied the ACCA’s motion for summary
judgment. The court agreed with the ACCA that it was a separate and distinct
entity for purposes of Title VII, but found that it had presented insufficient
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The plaintiffs also asserted several state law claims and claims under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623. Each of those claims
was dismissed, and the plaintiffs do not appeal those dismissals.
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evidence supporting its claim that it employed fewer than fifteen employees.
Following a renewed summary judgment motion and an evidentiary hearing,
however, the district court dismissed the Title VII claims against the ACCA and
Taylor based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Laurie v. Alabama Court
of Criminal Appeals, 88 F. Supp. 2d 1334 (M.D. Ala. 2000). In its opinion, the
district court found that the staff attorneys and junior staff attorneys employed by
the ACCA qualified as both “personal staff” and “immediate advisers” rather than
“employees” for purposes of Title VII, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f), and that, as a
result, the ACCA had fewer than fifteen “employees” during the relevant time
period.
Also involved in this appeal is the district court’s denial of the plaintiffs’
motion for leave to amend their complaint. On September 29, 1999, approximately
eleven months after the deadline in the district court’s scheduling order for
amendments, the plaintiffs sought to amend their complaint in order to assert a
Fourteenth Amendment claim against the defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
in order to add as a defendant the Clerk of the ACCA. The district court denied
that motion on the basis of undue delay, unfair prejudice to the defendants, and
futility.
The plaintiffs press four issues on appeal. The first three issues relate to the
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district court’s determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Title
VII claims against the ACCA. First, the plaintiffs argue that the district court erred
by determining that the ACCA was a separate and distinct entity from other
Alabama state courts or agencies for purposes of determining whether it qualified
as an “employer” under Title VII. We believe that the district court correctly
determined, under our opinion in Lyes v. City of Riviera Beach, 166 F.3d 1332
(11th Cir. 1999), that the ACCA is a separate and distinct entity under Alabama
law, and that its employees should not be aggregated with the employees of other
state courts or agencies for Title VII purposes. Therefore, we affirm that portion of
the district court’s decision on the basis of the well-reasoned discussion in sections
IV.A.3.a & b of that court’s February 14, 2000 opinion, that part of which is
attached hereto as Appendix A.
Second, the plaintiffs argue that the methodology employed by the district
court in counting the number of Title VII “employees” was inconsistent with the
Supreme Court’s decision in Walters v. Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc.,
519 U.S. 202, 117 S. Ct. 660 (1997), which held that the “payroll method” should
be used for determining whether an individual qualifies as an “employee.” We
disagree. The question addressed in Walters was “whether an employer ‘has’ an
employee [for purposes of Title VII] on any working day on which the employer
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maintains an employment relationship with the employee, or only on working days
on which the employee is actually receiving compensation from the employer.”
519 U.S. at 204, 117 S. Ct. at 662. Therefore, the issue addressed in Walters is
fundamentally different from the issue involved in this appeal. The Walters
decision does not stand for the proposition that all individuals paid by an entity,
including elected officials, “personal staff,” “immediate advisers” and others
expressly excluded from Title VII's definition of “employee,” must nonetheless be
counted for purposes of determining the number of “employees” of an entity,
simply because those individuals appear on the entity’s payroll. Such an approach
would be contrary to the plain meaning of the statute. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b)
& (f). Therefore, we conclude that the district court’s decision is not contrary to
Walters.
Third, the plaintiffs argue that the district court erred by finding that the staff
attorneys and junior staff attorneys employed by the ACCA were “personal staff”
and “immediate advisers,” rather than “employees” for purposes of Title VII. We
disagree, and affirm on the basis of the district court’s well-reasoned opinion,
published at 88 F. Supp. 2d 1334. There was no error in the district court’s
dismissal of the plaintiffs’ Title VII claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Finally, the plaintiffs argue that the district court abused its discretion by
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denying the plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend the complaint. We disagree, and
conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion based on
the reasons explained in its March 14, 2000 opinion, attached hereto as Appendix
B.
AFFIRMED.
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