UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 95-10419
Summary Calendar
WILLIE JAMES WASHINGTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
CITY OF LUBBOCK; LUBBOCK CTY TX, Sheriff of;
TRAVIS WARE; JENNIFER BENNETT; UNKNOWN JUDGE, 364th
State Court District Judge; UNKNOWN, Lubbock Police Officer;
UNKNOWN, Lubbock City Police Officer; BRADLEY S. UNDERWOOD,
364th District Court Judge,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Northern District of Texas
(5:95CV00060)
August 25, 1995
Before THORNBERRY, DAVIS, AND SMITH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Appellant, Willie James Washington, is an inmate currently
incarcerated in the New Mexico state prison system. He appeals the
*
Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that
have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on
the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless
expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."
Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion
should not be published.
dismissal of his pro se, in forma pauperis civil rights action. We
will affirm.
BACKGROUND
Washington is presently imprisoned on charges unrelated to the
instant suit. In this complaint he asserted the defendants
violated his civil rights by falsely arresting and imprisoning him
in December of 1989 on charges of forgery, which he contends were
dismissed in 1995. He complained that Defendant Keesee wrongfully
failed to prevent his imprisonment from extending past the "six-
month speedy trial period."1 In addition, Washington alleged that
Judge Underwood and assistant district attorney Bennett, with
defendant Ware's knowledge, wrongfully issued a detainer against
him in December 1994 while he was imprisoned in New Mexico.
The district court determined that Washington's claims
regarding his 1990 incarceration in the Lubbock County Jail were
barred by limitations, and that Judge Underwood and the two
prosecutors were absolutely immune from liability in connection
with issuance of the detainer. The court dismissed the suit as
frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), holding these claims
1
Complaints based on Texas' speedy trial act must fail
because the statute, Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 32A.02, was
stuck down as violative of the state constitution's separation of
powers doctrine. Meshell v. State, 739 S.W. 2d 246 (Tex.Crim.App.
1987).
2
were malicious and warning Washington that he would face sanctions
if he filed another frivolous complaint.2
Discussion
An in forma pauperis complaint may be dismissed under
§ 1915(d) if the district court finds the action is frivolous or
malicious. Booker v. Koonce, 2 F.3d 114, 115 (5th Cir. 1993).
This Court reviews such a dismissal under an abuse of discretion
standard. Ibid.
On appeal Washington argues that Judge Underwood enjoyed no
immunity because he acted without subject matter jurisdiction to
issue the detainer since the five-year statute of limitations had
run prior to its issuance. We disagree. Except in the clear
absence of jurisdiction, a judge is not deprived of jurisdiction
because his action was done in error, maliciously or in excess of
his authority. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57, 98 S.Ct.
1099, 1104-05 (1978). Therefore if Judge Underwood merely acted in
excess of his authority, he would still have had subject-matter
jurisdiction and thus was protected. Malina v. Gonzales, 994 F.2d
1121, 1125 (5th Cir. 1993).
The Texas Legislature has placed no limitation on a district
judge's power to issue a state detainer. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc.
Ann. art. 51.14. In addition, since the statute of limitations for
2
The district judge noted that in 1990 alone, Washington
filed six suits in the northern district, unsuccessfully attempted
to intervene in another, and filed a writ of mandamus and an
interlocutory appeal in this Court.
3
forgery is ten, not five years, see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.
12.01(2)(c), then it was perfectly permissible for Judge Underwood
to issue a detainer because the arrest and incarceration occurred
in 1989, and the detainer was issued five years later in 1994.3
Judge Underwood was not acting in the absence of jurisdiction and,
therefore, the district court did not err in determining that he
was immune from suit.
The district court was also correct in holding the state
prosecutors were immune from liability. Prosecutors are absolutely
immune from a suit for damages where acts complained of are those
performed solely within the scope of their official duties. See
Young v. Biggers, 938 F.2d 565, 569 (5th Cir. 1991). Immunity
applies to acts within the judicial phase of criminal proceedings,
even if the prosecutor acted maliciously, wantonly, or negligently.
Rykers v. Alford, 832 F.2d 895, 897 (5th Cir. 1987).
As to the limitations issue, the district court correctly held
that Washington's complaints regarding his incarceration were time-
barred.4 In federal court a cause of action accrues when the
plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which forms the
basis of the action. Gartrell v. Gaylor, 981 F.2d 254, 257 (5th
Cir. 1993). A cause of action for a claim of false imprisonment
3
The district judge also noted that because Washington was
indicted in state court, his false imprisonment claim is meritless.
4
Because there is no statute of limitations for civil rights
actions, the federal court gives effect to the forum state's
tolling provisions. Gartrell v. Gaylor, 981 F.2d 254, 256 (5th
Cir. 1993). The Texas personal injury limitations period of two
years applies to Washington's claims of false arrest and
imprisonment. Ibid.
4
presumably begins to accrue after the individual has been released.
See Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 529 (5th Cir. 1974),
judgment vacated on other grounds, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). The cause
of action began to accrue when Washington was released from prison,
on or about seven and one-half months from December 1989, and this
complaint was not filed until April 1995. His false arrest claim
was likewise time-barred because his allegations suggest that he
knew or should have known of his injury at the time of the arrest
in December 1989. See Pete v. Metcalf, 8 F.3d 214, 217 (5th Cir.
1993). Thus, these claims were properly dismissed pursuant to
§ 1915(d). Gartrell v. Gaylor, 981 F.2d at 256.
Conclusion
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing
Washington's complaint as frivolous. Therefore, the judgment is
AFFIRMED.
5