Benjamin D. Jones v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APRIL 11, 2002
No. 01-14786
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK

D. C. Docket No. 90-00228 CV-AAA-5

BENJAMIN D. JONES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

CSX TRANSPORTATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

________________________

No. 01-14787
________________________

D. C. Docket No. 91-00226 CV-AAA-5

JAMES EMERY O’STEEN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

CSX TRANSPORTATION,

Defendant-Appellee.
 ________________________

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
_________________________
(April 11, 2002)

Before TJOFLAT and COX, Circuit Judges, and HANCOCK*, District Judge.

COX, Circuit Judge:

Benjamin D. Jones and James Emery O’Steen (“the plaintiffs”) sued CSX

Transportation, Inc. under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”), 45 U.S.C.

§ 51 et seq., for personal injuries allegedly sustained as a result of their exposure to

asbestos. The district court entered partial summary judgment in favor of CSX on the

plaintiffs’ claims for emotional distress damages based on their fear of contracting

cancer. The district court also denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial

challenging the jury’s comparative negligence finding. Because the plaintiffs made

no showing of any objective manifestations of their emotional distress, and because

we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of their motions for a new

trial, we affirm.

*
Honorable James H. Hancock, U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of Alabama,
sitting by designation.

2
 I. Background

The plaintiffs were employed by CSX in various capacities for many years,

during which they worked with and around products containing asbestos. The

plaintiffs sued CSX and several other defendants, alleging among other things

negligence on the part of CSX, and seeking damages under the FELA as a result of

that negligence for physical injuries to their respiratory systems and emotional

distress from their fear of contracting cancer.1 Over the lengthy course of the

proceedings, all of the other defendants either settled or were dismissed, leaving CSX

as the sole remaining defendant. Prior to trial, CSX filed a motion seeking partial

summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ claims for emotional distress damages. The sole

ground advanced by CSX for partial summary judgment was the plaintiffs’ failure to

show an objective manifestation of their emotional distress.2 Agreeing with CSX that

the plaintiffs were required to demonstrate some objective manifestation of their fear

1
The plaintiffs seek recovery for emotional distress as an element of damages resulting
from CSX’s negligence in exposing the plaintiffs to asbestos. The complaints contain no
independent tort claims under the FELA for negligently inflicted emotional distress, nor do they
contain any state law tort claims against CSX.
2
CSX’s motions argued that “[b]ecause . . . none of the instant Plaintiffs has shown an
‘objective manifestation’ of their alleged fear of cancer, [CSX] respectfully submits that it is
entitled to summary judgment on this issue. . . .” (Appeal No. 01-14786, R.1-44 at 1; Appeal No.
01-14787, R.2-43 at 1.)

3
of contracting cancer, and finding that they failed to do so, the district court granted

CSX’s motion.

The cases proceeded to trial on the plaintiffs’ remaining claims against CSX,

at which several medical experts testified about the plaintiffs’ respiratory problems.

Two medical experts opined that Jones suffered from asbestosis, an asbestos-related

disease, and one medical expert gave a similar opinion with regard to O’Steen. Three

other medical experts, however, opined that Jones did not suffer from an asbestos-

related disease, and four medical experts opined that O’Steen did not suffer from an

asbestos-related disease. Additionally, several of the physicians, including all of

those called by the plaintiffs, testified that both of the plaintiffs had a significant

smoking history that could have caused or contributed to their respiratory problems.

Jones smoked between half a pack and a pack and a half a day for a total of thirty-

three years, and O’Steen smoked up to a pack a day for approximately twenty-five

years.

The jury returned verdicts finding that CSX had been negligent and that such

negligence caused injury to both Jones and O’Steen. The jury additionally found,

however, that each of the plaintiffs had been negligent and that their own negligence

also caused their respective injuries. The jury attributed 5% of each of the plaintiffs’

injuries to CSX, the remaining 95% in each case being attributed to the plaintiff

4
himself. The jury found Jones’s total damages, without adjustment for comparative

negligence, to be $46,215, and it found O’Steen’s total damages, without adjustment

for comparative negligence, to be $37,595.3

The district court subsequently entered judgment on the jury’s verdicts. After

reducing by 95% the amounts found by the jury for each of the plaintiffs, the district

court awarded $2,310.75 to Jones and $1,879.75 to O’Steen. The plaintiffs moved

for a new trial, asserting among other things that the jury’s findings that Jones and

O’Steen were 95% negligent were contrary to the evidence, were against the weight

of the evidence, and resulted from mistake or prejudice. On the same day that the

plaintiffs filed these motions, CSX filed a motion to amend the judgments by

offsetting the amounts awarded to the plaintiffs by their combined settlements with

the other defendants, who allegedly were CSX’s joint tortfeasors. The district court

denied the plaintiffs’ motions for a new trial and granted CSX’s request to offset the

judgments. The court then entered an amended judgment awarding Jones $2,319.82

in costs and $0 in damages, and an amended judgment awarding O’Steen $3,727.46

in costs and $0 in damages.

3
The special interrogatories answered by the jury asked: “ . . . [W]hat sum of money do
you find from a preponderance of the evidence to be the total amount of the Plaintiff’s damages
without adjustment by application of any percentages you may have given in the answer to
Question No. 3 [concerning comparative negligence]?” (Appeal No. 01-14786, R.16-97 at 2;
Appeal No. 01-14787, R.13-103 at 2.)

5
 On appeal, the plaintiffs challenge the district court’s grant of partial summary

judgment in favor of CSX on their claims for damages based on their fear of cancer,

as well as the district court’s denial of their motions for a new trial.

II. Standard of Review

We review de novo the grant of partial summary judgment, applying the same

standards as the district court. See O’Neal v. United States, 258 F.3d 1265, 1270

(11th Cir. 2001). We review the district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial for

abuse of discretion. See Lambert v. Fulton County, 253 F.3d 588, 595 (11th Cir.

2001).

III. Discussion

A. Denial of New Trial Motions

The plaintiffs contend that the court should have granted their motions for a

new trial because the jury’s finding that they each were 95% comparatively negligent

was against the great weight of the evidence, was contrary to the evidence, and was

the result of mistake, prejudice or compromise. CSX, however, argues that the

plaintiffs waived review of this issue by not filing with the district court a motion for

judgment as a matter of law on comparative negligence. Alternatively, CSX asserts

that there was ample evidence to support the jury’s comparative negligence finding.

Having considered the plaintiffs’ arguments as to this issue in light of the record, we

6
find no abuse of discretion and affirm the district court’s denial of the motions for a

new trial without further discussion. See 11th Cir. R. 36-1.

B. Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Fear of Cancer

Additionally, the plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in granting

partial summary judgment on their claims for damages based on their fear of

contracting cancer. Specifically, the plaintiffs assert that their recovery for emotional

distress is allowed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Metro-North Commuter R.R.

Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 117 S. Ct. 2113 (1997), which held that a worker

exposed to asbestos could not recover for negligently inflicted emotional distress

based on his fear of contracting cancer until he exhibited symptoms of a disease. The

plaintiffs argue that they have exhibited symptoms of an asbestos-related disease, i.e.

asbestosis, and therefore may recover for their fear of cancer under Buckley. The

plaintiffs also argue that, because Buckley contains no requirement that a plaintiff

show objective manifestations of his emotional distress, the district court erred in

requiring the plaintiffs to make such a showing. CSX, on the other hand, argues that

the plaintiffs cannot recover for their fear of cancer until they exhibit symptoms of

cancer itself. Additionally, CSX maintains that the district court correctly required

a showing of objective manifestations of the plaintiffs’ emotional distress.

7
 We are thus presented with two questions related to the plaintiffs’ ability to

recover for their fear of contracting cancer. First, we are asked to decide whether the

Supreme Court’s decision in Buckley permits recovery for the plaintiffs’ fear of

contracting cancer when they have exhibited symptoms of an asbestos-related disease

but not of cancer specifically. Second, we are asked to decide whether the plaintiffs

must produce some objective evidence of their emotional injuries to recover for their

fear of contracting cancer. Because the sole ground of CSX’s motion was the

plaintiffs’ failure to show objective manifestations of their emotional distress, and

because the district court granted partial summary judgment on this basis alone, we

will not address the first question and limit our discussion to answering the second

question.4 After reviewing the relevant decisions of the Supreme Court, as well as

the common law and the decisions of other federal courts, we conclude that the

plaintiffs were required to make a showing of objective manifestations of their

emotional distress to recover for that distress under the FELA. Because they failed

to do so, the district court properly granted partial summary judgment to CSX.

4
The plaintiffs did not submit any medical evidence concerning symptoms of cancer or
the likelihood that they might contract that disease, and in light of the argument advanced by
CSX in support of its motion for partial summary judgment, they were not obligated to do so.

8
 1. Gottshall and Buckley

In recognizing that emotional injuries are compensable under the FELA, the

Supreme Court has not decided whether objective manifestations of those injuries are

required. Nonetheless, we think that the Court’s decisions in Consolidated Rail Corp.

v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994) and Metro-North Commuter R.R.

Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 117 S. Ct. 2113 (1997) are instructive.

In Gottshall, two railroad workers sued their employer under the FELA for

negligent infliction of emotional distress. The first plaintiff, Gottshall, based his

claim on witnessing the death of a co-worker, and being made to work within sight

of his body, while performing strenuous work in extremely hot and humid conditions.

Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 535-36, 114 S. Ct. at 2400-01. The second plaintiff, Carlisle,

based his claim on being made to work long hours under stressful conditions. Id. at

539, 114 S. Ct. at 2402. The Third Circuit allowed both claims, applying its own

“genuineness” test rather than any of the common law doctrines pertaining to

recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress. Under the Third Circuit’s

standard, the district courts were to review the circumstances underlying such claims

to determine whether they were authentic, serious, and foreseeable. See id. at 538-40,

114 S. Ct. at 2401-02.

9
 The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit in both instances. The Court

first faulted the Third Circuit for refusing to adopt any of the common law standards

concerning emotional distress, explaining that “the common-law background of this

right of recovery must play a vital role in giving content to the scope of an employer’s

duty under FELA to avoid inflicting emotional injury.” Id. at 551, 114 S. Ct. at 2408.

The Court also rejected the Third Circuit’s “genuineness” test on two grounds: (1) it

addressed only the potential for fraudulent and trivial claims, but failed to provide a

solution to the “more significant problem” of genuine claims leading to

“unpredictable and nearly infinite liability for defendants,” id. at 551-52, 114 S. Ct.

at 2408-09; and (2) it would force judges “to make highly subjective determinations

concerning the authenticity of claims for emotional injury”, id. at 552, 114 S. Ct. at

1409. Finally, the Court found the concept of foreseeability to place no meaningful

limitation on liability, and it found no support in the common law for imposing a duty

on employers to avoid creating a stressful work environment. Id. at 552-54, 114 S.

Ct. at 2409.

Having rejected the Third Circuit’s approach, and having already concluded

that claims for damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress are cognizable

under the FELA, see id. at 550, 114 S. Ct. at 2407, the Court had to decide the proper

standard for evaluating such claims. The Court reviewed the three primary tests at

10
common law for analyzing claims based on negligently inflicted emotional distress:

(1) the “physical impact” test, which limits recovery to those plaintiffs who sustain

a contemporaneous physical impact or injury due to the defendant’s negligent

conduct; (2) the “zone of danger” test, which limits recovery to those plaintiffs who

sustain a physical impact as a result of the defendant’s negligent conduct or who are

placed in immediate risk of physical harm by that conduct; and (3) the “relative

bystander” test, which limits recovery to those plaintiffs whose injuries could

reasonably be foreseen by the defendant, considering such factors as the plaintiff’s

proximity to the accident, the manner in which the plaintiff knows about the accident,

and the plaintiff’s relation to the victim of the accident. See id. at 546-49, 114 S. Ct.

at 2406-07. The Court then adopted the zone of danger test as the proper standard for

evaluating emotional distress claims under the FELA, finding that it best comported

with the Court’s understanding of the FELA and the concerns motivating FELA

jurisprudence.

In adopting the zone of danger test, the Gottshall Court did not expressly

require proof that the plaintiffs’ emotional distress had manifested itself in some

objective or verifiable way. Nonetheless, the Court acknowledged that many

jurisdictions following the zone of danger test, as well as many of those following the

relative bystander test, “also require that a plaintiff demonstrate a ‘physical

11
manifestation’ of an alleged emotional injury, that is, a physical injury or effect that

is the direct result of the emotional injury, in order to recover.” Id. at 549 n.11, 114

S. Ct. at 2407 n.11. It is also important to note that both of the plaintiffs in Gottshall

demonstrated objective manifestations of their distress. Gottshall, for example,

experienced nausea, insomnia, cold sweats, repetitive nightmares, weight loss, and

suicidal preoccupation. Moreover, he had been formally diagnosed as suffering from

major depression and post-traumatic stress disorder. See id. at 536-37, 114 S. Ct. at

2401. Similarly, Carlisle experienced insomnia, headaches, depression, and weight

loss, and he suffered a nervous breakdown that his medical experts attributed in part

to his job-related stress. See id. at 539, 114 S. Ct. at 2402. Thus, while the Court did

not decide the issue, it did not foreclose the possibility that objective manifestations

of emotional injury are required for recovery under the FELA.5

The same is true with regard to the Court’s opinion in Buckley, where the

plaintiff claimed recovery under the FELA for his fear of contracting asbestos-related

cancer. Applying Gottshall, the Court held that the plaintiff’s simple contact with

5
At least one commentator believes that the Court in Gottshall “did indeed intend a
physical manifestation requirement,” and for this reason believes that the rule in Gottshall should
be reconsidered. See William T. Krizner, Is There a Better Standard Than the Zone of Danger
Test for Negligent Emotional Distress Claims Under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act?, 34
Tort & Ins. L. J. 907, 917 (1999). Even while criticizing the physical manifestation requirement,
however, this commentator would require “credible evidence” of the emotional injury, such as
testimony from family members, personal physicians, and psychological experts. See id. at 918.

12
asbestos, which had not produced a disease, did not constitute a “physical impact”

within the meaning of the zone of danger test. Buckley, 521 U.S. at 432, 117 S. Ct.

at 2118. In reaching this conclusion, the Court seemed particularly concerned with

one of the policy reasons underlying the common law’s limits on recovery for

emotional harm — separating “meritorious” claims from those that are “invalid or

trivial.” Id. at 433, 117 S. Ct. at 2119. Acknowledging the difficulty in making this

distinction, the Court observed that the district court and the court of appeals had

disagreed about whether the plaintiff had presented sufficient objective evidence of

his emotional distress. The district court had concluded that the evidence was

insufficient because it amounted to little more than the plaintiff’s own testimony. See

Buckley, 521 U.S. at 433, 117 S. Ct. at 2119. The court of appeals, on the other hand,

concluded that the plaintiff’s complaints to supervisors and investigative entities

constituted objective corroborating evidence of his emotional injury. See id. Without

resolving the conflict, the Supreme Court remarked that, “given the difficulty of

separating valid from invalid emotional injury claims, the evidence before us may

typify the kind of evidence to which parties and the courts would have to look.” Id.

at 434, 117 S. Ct. at 2119.6 As in Gottshall, without the deciding the issue, the

6
In concurrence, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Stevens, went one step further,
concluding that the plaintiff’s failure to present any “objective evidence of severe emotional
distress” precluded his recovery for emotional injury. Id. at 445, 117 S. Ct. at 2124-25

13
Buckley Court did not foreclose the possibility that objective manifestations of

emotional injury might be required to recover for such injury under the FELA.

2. The Common Law

Given the importance placed on the common law in both Gottshall and

Buckley, we look to the common law for guidance on the issue before us. See

Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 544, 114 S. Ct. at 2404 (“Because FELA is silent on the issue

of negligent infliction of emotional distress, common-law principles must play a

significant role in our decision.”); see also id. at 551, 114 S. Ct. at 2408 (stating that

“the ‘merit’ of a FELA claim of this type cannot be ascertained without reference to

the common law”). Unfortunately, the common law’s approach to recovery for

negligently inflicted emotional distress is anything but clear. As one court has

explained, “[a]ny attempt at a consistent exegesis of the authorities is likely to break

down in embarrassed perplexity.” Hunsley v. Giard, 553 P.2d 1096, 1098 (Wash.

1976) (citing W. E. Shipley, Annotation, Right to Recover for Emotional Disturbance

or Its Physical Consequences, in the Absence of Impact or Other Actionable Wrong,

64 A.L.R.2d 100, 103 (1959)). Because the common law’s development in this area

has been defined largely by policy concerns aimed at avoiding invalid claims and

unpredictable liability, while at the same time compensating real emotional injuries

(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

14
caused by the wrongful conduct of another, a variety of rules have been formulated

in various jurisdictions to deal with claims based on emotional distress. This variety

renders impossible any effort to define a single common law standard for evaluating

emotional distress claims.

Nonetheless, we think that an objective manifestation requirement is well-

grounded in the common law. The American Law Institute, for example, indicates

that a negligent defendant is liable to a plaintiff who suffers physical harm resulting

from the internal operation of fright or other emotional disturbance. See Restatement

(Second) of Torts § 436 (1965); see also id. cmt. a, illus. 1 & cmt. b, illus. 2. Where

the defendant’s negligence results in emotional disturbance alone, however, “without

bodily harm or other compensable damage,” the Restatement indicates that the

defendant is not liable. See id. § 436A. These statements, along with the

accompanying commentary and illustrations, indicate that recovery for emotional

distress requires a showing that the distress has manifested itself through physical

symptoms. A leading commentator in the field similarly indicates that “the great

majority of courts” allow recovery where “the mental distress [is] certified by some

physical injury, illness or other objective physical manifestation.” W. Page Keeton,

et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 54, at 364 (5th ed. 1984). See also

Douglas Bryan Marlowe, Comment, Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress: A

15
Jurisdictional Survey of Existing Limitation Devices and Proposal Based on an

Analysis of Objective Versus Subjective Indices of Distress, 33 Vill. L. Rev. 781, 796-

98 & n.91, 808 & n.146 (1988) (identifying seventeen jurisdictions following zone

of danger approach, and six jurisdictions following relative bystander approach, that

also require physical manifestations of emotional distress).

We find further support for an objective manifestation requirement in the case

law of several states. In doing so, we note that the recovery of damages for

negligently inflicted emotional distress sometimes is sought in what may be described

as an independent tort action, while at other times, such recovery is characterized

simply as an element of damages in an ordinary negligence action. Compare, e.g.,

Lickteig v. Alderson, Ondov, Leonard & Sween, P.A., 556 N.W.2d 557, 560 (Minn.

1996) (referring to emotional distress as “element of damages”) with Engler v.

Wehmans, 633 N.W.2d 868, 872 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (referring to “tort of negligent

infliction of emotional distress”). With regard to the requirement that a plaintiff

demonstrate objective manifestations of his emotional distress, however, the

distinction seems unimportant. See, e.g., Thorpe v. N.H. Dep’t of Corrections, 575

A.2d 351, 353 (N.H. 1990) (rejecting distinction between cause of action for

bystander distress and emotional distress as element of damages in negligence action,

and requiring physical manifestations in each); see also Bagwell v. Peninsula

16
Regional Med. Ctr., 665 A.2d 297, 320 (Md. Ct. App. 1995) (explaining that

emotional distress is compensable only as element of damages for negligence and

only where plaintiff can show physical manifestations that are “capable of objective

determination”); Evans v. Twin Falls County, 796 P.2d 87, 95 (Idaho 1990) (referring

to “tort” of negligent infliction of emotional distress and requiring physical

manifestation of injury caused by distress).

A large number of jurisdictions appear to require some type of physical

manifestation or physical consequence of the alleged emotional harm before recovery

is allowed. See, e.g., Keck v. Jackson, 593 P.2d 668, 669-70 (Ariz. 1979); Towns v.

Anderson, 579 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Colo. 1978); Robb v. Pa. R.R. Co., 210 A.2d 709,

714-15 (Del. 1965); Brown v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 468

So.2d 903, 904 (Fla. 1985); Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat’l

Bank, N.A., 804 P.2d 900, 906 (Idaho 1991); Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 107-

08 (Iowa 1981); Anderson v. Scheffler, 752 P.2d 667, 669 (Kan. 1988); Vance v.

Vance, 408 A.2d 728, 733-34 (Md. 1979); Sullivan v. Boston Gas Co., 605 N.E.2d

805, 809-10 (Mass. 1993); Daley v. LaCroix, 179 N.W.2d 390, 395 (Mich. 1970);

K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 557 (Minn. 1995); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.

Young, 384 So.2d 69, 71 (Miss. 1980); Thorpe v. N.H. Dep’t of Corrections, 575

A.2d 351, 353 (N.H. 1990); Muchow v. Linblad, 435 N.W.2d 918, 921-22 (N.D.

17
1989); McMeakin v. Roofing & Sheet Metal Supply Co., 807 P.2d 288, 290 (Okla. Ct.

App. 1990); Houston v. Texaco, Inc., 538 A.2d 502, 504 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988);

Swerdlick v. Koch, 721 A.2d 849, 864 (R.I. 1998); Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply

Co., 858 P.2d 970, 982-83 (Utah 1993). Additionally, some jurisdictions, while not

specifically requiring that the distress manifest itself physically, nonetheless require

some form of objective evidence for the plaintiff to recover. See, e.g., Jones v.

Howard Univ., Inc., 589 A.2d 419, 424 (D.C. 1991) (requiring that mental distress

be “serious and verifiable”); Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758, 767 (Haw. 1974)

(stating that plaintiff must “prove medically the damages occasioned by his mental

responses to defendant’s negligent act”); Hegel v. McMahon, 960 P.2d 424, 431

(Wash. 1998) (requiring plaintiff’s emotional distress to “be susceptible to medical

diagnosis and proved through medical evidence”). Moreover, these objective

manifestation requirements have been applied in cases, like this one, where the

plaintiff seeks to recover for his fear of contracting cancer. See, e.g., Dodge v. Cotter

Corp., 203 F.3d 1190, 1201-02 (10th Cir. 2000) (applying Colorado law); Sites v.

Sundstrand Heat Transfer, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 1516, 1526-27 (W.D. Mich. 1987)

(applying Michigan law); Hansen, 858 P.2d at 973-75 & 982-83; see also Fournier

J. Gale III & James L. Goyer III, Recovery for Cancerphobia and Increased Risk of

Cancer, 15 Cumb. L. Rev. 723, 735 (1984-85) (stating that “obstacles to recovery for

18
cancerphobia . . . are primarily the same restrictions placed on recovery for [other]

emotional harm”).

We acknowledge that the objective manifestation requirement has been subject

to criticism and that it has been rejected by some courts. See, e.g., Culbert v.

Sampson’s Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433, 437 (Me. 1982); Camp v. Minor, 915

S.W.2d 437, 446 (Tenn. 1996); Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 517 N.W.2d

432, 443 (Wis. 1994). Nevertheless, the large number of jurisdictions that require

some type of objective or verifiable evidence of a plaintiff’s emotional injury

convinces us that the requirement continues to be an appropriate limitation on the

recovery for such injury.

Moreover, our decision is informed by the general policy concerns underlying

the common law restrictions on recovery for the negligent infliction of emotional

distress: “the potential for a flood of trivial suits, the possibility of fraudulent claims

that are difficult for judges and juries to detect, and the specter of unlimited and

unpredictable liability.” Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 557, 114 S. Ct. at 2411. Requiring

objective evidence of a plaintiff’s emotional distress helps to alleviate these concerns

and accords with the common law’s cautious approach to recovery for emotional and

mental injuries. See Keeton, supra, § 54, at 360-61 (explaining that concerns

underlying common law’s doctrinal limitations can be met by “allow[ing] recovery

19
only upon satisfactory evidence and deny[ing] it when there is nothing to corroborate

the claim”). By categorically limiting recovery to those plaintiffs able to show

objective manifestations of their emotional harm, the requirement avoids

“unpredictable and nearly infinite liability,” with which the Gottshall Court was so

concerned, see 512 U.S. at 552, 114 S. Ct. at 2408, and it helps to ensure that

recovery is allowed for genuine claims, a major concern of the Court in Buckley, see

521 U.S. at 433-36, 117 S. Ct. at 2119-20. See also id. at 436, 117 S. Ct. at 2120

(explaining that common law does not examine genuineness of claim case by case,

but rather does so categorically based on “abstract general policy concerns”). Finally,

an objective manifestation requirement avoids the problem of judges being forced to

make “highly subjective determinations” about the validity of emotional distress

claims. See Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 552, 114 S. Ct. 2409.

3. Federal Court Decisions

Our decision is also informed by decisions of other federal courts that have

been faced with this issue in the context of the FELA or analogous federal law.

Although we have found no decision from our sister circuits deciding whether the

FELA requires an objective manifestation for the recovery of negligently inflicted

emotional distress, the Fifth Circuit has imposed such a requirement on claims for

intentionally inflicted emotional distress under the Jones Act. See Martinez v. Bally’s

20
Louisiana, Inc., 244 F.3d 474, 477-78 (5th Cir. 2001).7 Similarly, the weight of

authority among the district courts in FELA, Jones Act, and general maritime cases

seems to favor a requirement that a plaintiff make some showing of objective

manifestations of his emotional disturbance. See, e.g., Williams v. Carnival Cruise

Lines, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 403, 406-07 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (applying Gottshall’s zone of

danger test under general maritime law and requiring objective physical

manifestations); Nelsen v. Research Corp. of Univ. of Haw., 805 F. Supp. 837, 849

(D. Haw. 1992) (requiring in Jones Act case that distress be “serious” and finding

requirement satisfied because plaintiff suffered sleep impairment, weight gain,

impotence, bruxism, chronic fatigue, social withdrawal, suicidal ideation, and marital

problems); Masiello v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 748 F. Supp. 199, 205

(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding valid emotional distress claim under FELA where distress

resulted in ulcer); Elliott v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 722 F. Supp. 1376, 1377-78 (S.D.

W. Va. 1989) (following “weight of authority” in not permitting recovery under

FELA “without a physical cause and/or physical manifestation”), aff’d on other

grounds, 910 F.2d 1224 (4th Cir. 1990); Teague v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 708

F. Supp. 1344, 1350 (D. Mass. 1989) (adopting in FELA case requirement that

7
The Jones Act incorporates and makes applicable to seamen the substantive recovery
provisions of the FELA. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32, 111 S. Ct. 317, 325
(1990).

21
plaintiff show “objective symptomatology of the mental distress”); Amendola v. Kan.

City S. Ry. Co., 699 F. Supp. 1401, 1410 (W.D. Mo. 1988) (requiring in FELA case

that plaintiff show “physical harm as a result of the conduct which caused the

emotional distress”); Halko v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 135,

139 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (applying physical manifestation requirement to FELA claim).

But see Hutton v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 144 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1328 (S.D. Fla.

2001) (rejecting physical manifestation requirement under general maritime law as

“inconsistent” with Gottshall); Marriott v. Sedco Forex Int’l Res., Ltd., 827 F. Supp.

59, 75 (D. Mass. 1993) (allowing recovery under Jones Act based on plaintiff’s direct

exposure to HIV-positive vaccine even though plaintiff showed no physical

manifestations of distress); Anselmi v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 813 F. Supp. 436, 442

(E.D. La. 1993) (concluding that plaintiff can recover under Jones Act for “purely

emotional harm”).8

8
The plaintiffs cite to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Hagerty v. L & L Marine Services,
Inc., 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1986), in which the court rejected the defendant’s argument that the
plaintiff could not recover under the Jones Act for his fear of cancer without an accompanying
“physical manifestation.” Despite its reference to “physical manifestation,” however, the court in
Hagerty actually rejected the common law physical impact or injury requirement — that is, a
physical impact or injury preceding and causing the distress — and not an objective
manifestation requirement — that is, a physical or other similar consequence following and
caused by the distress. See id. at 318-19. Moreover, the court’s discussion of this issue
constituted dicta, since the court itself acknowledged that the plaintiff had suffered both an
impact and an injury and would therefore meet those requirements. See id. at 318 n.1; see also
Gaston v. Flowers Transp., 866 F.2d 816, 819 (5th Cir. 1989) (recognizing Hagerty’s discussion
of impact and injury as dicta). The precedential value of Hagerty is further clouded by a
subsequent modification in which the panel stated that it assumed “an actionable injury” under

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 4. The Plaintiffs’ Claims

For all of the foregoing reasons, we hold that a plaintiff must make some

showing of an objective manifestation of his or her emotional injury to recover for

negligently inflicted emotional distress under the FELA. Although we doubt that the

requisite showing need be great, we are not required in this case to decide the specific

nature or degree of the manifestation required because the plaintiffs made no showing

at all of any objective manifestation or consequence of their emotional injuries. In

response to CSX’s motion for partial summary judgment, the plaintiffs proffered only

their own deposition testimony, and that testimony does not reveal any objective

manifestations, of any nature or degree, resulting from their fear of contracting

cancer.9 Nor do the plaintiffs suggest otherwise, arguing only that there

the Jones Act and “intended no opinion as to the nature of the injury required to give rise to an
actionable claim.” See Hagerty v. L & L Marine Services, Inc., 797 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1986). As
noted by Judge Jolly in his dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc, this modification seems
to indicate that a seaman must in fact show “either physical injury or a traumatic event” before
recovering for his fear of contracting cancer. See id. (Jolly, J., dissenting). Finally, we note that
Hagerty was not mentioned by the Fifth Circuit in Martinez, where as explained above, the court
required a physical manifestation to recover for intentionally inflicted emotional distress under
the Jones Act. See Martinez, 244 F.3d at 477-78. For these reasons, we do not think that
Hagerty informs our decision on the issue of whether objective manifestations are required to
recover for emotional harm under the FELA.
9
The portion of Jones’s desposition proffered at summary judgment reads in its entirety
as follows:
Q Okay. Since that time, have you had any fears or concerns of any of your
symptoms possibly getting worse or any possibility that you might contract any
other asbestos-related illness other than what you have been diagnosed with?
A Yes. There is always a concern that you are not improving. I mean, you’re

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 digressing. I haven’t — I haven’t contacted anybody in particular. I’m waiting to
go back for my annual tests.
Q Okay. Since May the 6th of 1991, have you ever thought about — specifically
about the possibility that as a result of past exposure to asbestos you might
contract any other potentially asbestos-related disease or condition, other than
what you have been diagnosed with already in the future and thinking about that,
has that ever made you feel physically ill to the point where you have actually
thrown up?
A No, not to that point. You’re concerned about your health, of course, but I — I
haven’t been that emotional about it.
Q Thinking about that possibility, has that ever caused you since your deposition
was taken last time, May of ‘91, caused you to miss an entire night of sleep, go
more than 24 hours without any sleep?
A I don’t sleep well, but it — it hasn’t caused me . . . .
(Appeal No. 01-14786, R.3-49 at Ex. B, p. 29.)

The portion of O’Steen’s deposition proffered at summary judgment reads in relevant part
as follows:
....
Q Did she tell you whether you had anything wrong with your lungs or not?
A She said I had asbestos.
Q That’s what she said?
A Uh-huh.
Q Did she say anything to you about what might happen in the future because you
had asbestosis?
A No. You mean turning into cancer somewhere?
Q Yeah.
A No.
Q Have you heard anything about asbestos and cancer?
A It could be cancerous, yes, but mine is not the last time he went in my lungs. It
could turn into it. It’s not ruled out but it’s not right now.
Q Does it concern you?
A About it turning into cancer?
Q Yeah.
A Sure, yeah, it concerns me. Getting shorter and shorter of breath is concerning
me.
Q Does that being concerned about it turning into cancer, has that caused you to lose
any sleep?
A No. I lose sleep, enough sleep by being congested, yeah.
Q But not the cancer issue?
A As far as mentally, no. It don’t work on me.
....

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is no objective manifestation requirement under the FELA. For the reasons stated,

we disagree with the plaintiffs’ position and conclude that the district court correctly

granted partial summary judgment to CSX on the plaintiffs’ fear of cancer claims.

IV. Conclusion

Because the plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence of an objective

manifestation of their emotional distress from the fear of contracting cancer, we

affirm the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment to CSX. Because we

find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ motions for

new trial, we affirm the denial of those motions.

AFFIRMED.

(Appeal No. 01-14787, R.2-51 at Ex. E, pp. 79-80.)

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