[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APRIL 3, 2002
THOMAS K. KAHN
No. 01-13212 CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 00-00434-CR-T-26
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CARLOS ACOSTA,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(April 3, 2002)
Before TJOFLAT, COX and RONEY, Circuit Judges.
RONEY, Circuit Judge:
This appeal concerns whether a prior adjudication, but not a conviction, for a
felony under New York’s youthful offender statute can be used for sentencing
enhancement. Carlos Acosta pled guilty in federal court to conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 846. At sentencing, the district court determined that Acosta’s prior youthful
offender adjudication from New York qualified as a prior conviction for purposes
of sentencing enhancement, and denied Acosta “safety valve” relief. Acosta
appeals. We affirm.
1. New York State Youthful Offender Adjudication.
In 1987, at the age of sixteen, Acosta sold cocaine to an undercover police
officer in New York. Acosta was prosecuted in New York state court for sale of a
narcotic drug, a third degree felony under New York law. He pled guilty and was
adjudicated under New York’s youthful offender statute, N.Y. Crim. Proc. §§
720.10-720.35, which explicitly provides that a youthful offender adjudication is
not a conviction. Pursuant to the youthful offender statute, all files relating to the
case were sealed.
In November of 2000, Acosta joined the conspiracy to distribute cocaine in
the instant case. He was arrested while arranging for the transport of several
hundred kilograms of cocaine from Columbia to Tampa, Florida.
Contemporaneously with an indictment for conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, the United States filed an information,
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851, seeking a statutory sentencing enhancement against
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Acosta based on his prior felony adjudication in New York. Acosta pled guilty to
the conspiracy charge, but objected to the court’s applying the enhanced sentence
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(1)(A).
Acosta makes two arguments: (A) that the state adjudication does not count
as a prior conviction under Federal Sentencing Law and (B) that in any event, it
was not properly proven.
(A) Does the felony drug offense adjudication under New York’s youthful
offender statute count as a prior conviction for sentencing enhancement purposes
under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)?
This appears to be a question of first impression as far as a youthful offender
is concerned. Section 841 (b)(1)(A) provides, inter alia, that “[i]f any person
commits [certain drug related crimes] after a prior conviction for a felony drug
offense has become final, such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment
which may not be less than 20 years . . . .” Accordingly, this issue turns on
whether a felony adjudication under New York’s youthful offender statute
qualifies as a “conviction” within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). The
word “conviction,” as it is used in section 841, will be defined according to federal
law. In United States v. Mejias, 47 F.3d 401 (11th Cir. 1995), this Court held that
the meaning of the word “conviction” in section 841 is governed by federal, rather
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than state law. We reasoned that to “decide otherwise would disrupt uniformity in
federal sentencing . . . .” Mejias, 47 F.3d at 404. Because our decision in this case
is governed by federal law, we are not bound by the fact that New York law does
not consider a youthful offender adjudication to be a conviction, and instead must
look to federal case and statutory law.
Section 841 does not provide a specific definition of the word “conviction”
which would permit us easily to determine whether the New York adjudication
meets the intent of the statute. No reported decision has been found addressing
whether any state’s youthful offender adjudication qualifies as a prior conviction
under section 841.
Nevertheless, this decision is controlled by analogous cases in which this
Court has held that a plea of nolo contendere in Florida state court with
adjudication withheld is a conviction that supports a section 841 sentence
enhancement. In United States v. Fernandez, 58 F.3d 593 (11th Cir. 1995),
defendant Fernandez was convicted of a federal drug offense and was given an
enhanced sentence based on a prior state drug offense, pursuant to section
841(b)(1)(B). Section 841(b)(1)(B) addresses marijuana convictions. It is
analytically indistinguishable from section 841(b)(1)(A), addressing cocaine
convictions, which is applicable to this case. Fernandez had previously pled nolo
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contendere to the state drug offense and adjudication had been withheld. Thus, he
was never “convicted” of the state offense. Nonetheless, this Court held that the
prior state offense constituted a “conviction” for purposes of section 841, even
though the state court never adjudicated him guilty. This Court reached the same
result in Mejias, holding that a prior plea of nolo contendere with adjudication
withheld in state court is a conviction within the meaning of section 841.
Fernandez and Mejias are controlling. If a defendant who is not even
adjudicated guilty is considered to have suffered a conviction within the meaning
of section 841, then a youthful offender who pleads guilty and is adjudicated must
also be considered to have suffered a prior conviction, even if the state law does
not consider him “convicted” and his record is sealed.
This result comports with the rationale behind youthful offender and
juvenile deferral statutes. Such programs are intended to provide young, first
offenders a chance to learn from a mistake and stay on the “straight and narrow”
thereafter. They are meant to provide a second chance, not a “technical legal
advantage if, not having learned a lesson, they continue their criminal conduct.”
United States v. Campbell, 980 F.2d 245, 251 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting United
States v. Petros, 747 F.Supp. 368 (E.D. Mich. 1990)). Furthermore, the purpose of
section 841(b)(1)(B), “to punish and deter recidivism,” would be frustrated if
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recidivist offenders were excused from enhanced sentencing merely because their
prior offenses are not deemed “convictions” under state law. See Mejias, 47 F.3d
at 404.
These considerations have been applied by at least one other circuit in
holding that a juvenile offense may be considered in calculating a defendant’s
criminal history under section 4A1.2(d) of the sentencing guidelines. In United
States v. Johnson, 28 F.3d 151 (D.C. Cir. 1994), the court reasoned that if an
immature offender persists in committing repeat offenses, the case for conferring
the benefits of the juvenile offender statute is outweighed by society’s stronger
interest in punishing an unrepentant criminal.
(B) Was the State adjudication properly proven?
Acosta argues that because the record of his prior adjudication is sealed, the
government did not meet its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
was convicted of a prior felony drug offense. There is ample evidence in the
record to support the district court’s conclusion that the Government met its burden
to prove Acosta’s prior conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Although the
Government could not produce a certified copy of the adjudication because
Acosta’s records were sealed, the uncertified copy the government did introduce
was identical. Additionally, Acosta’s counsel admitted at sentencing that Acosta
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was the defendant identified on the adjudication. In view of these facts, we hold
that the district court did not err in holding that the Government proved Acosta’s
prior New York state adjudication beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. Did the district court err in denying “safety valve” relief?
Acosta argued that, under what is known as the “safety valve” provision of
the sentencing guidelines, the district court should sentence him below the
statutory minimum because he fully cooperated with his arresting officers. The
“safety valve” provision allows district courts to sentence less-culpable defendants
without regard to the mandatory sentences, if certain criteria are met. U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5C1.1. The district court, after holding an
evidentiary hearing, concluded that Acosta was not truthful during his debrief with
law enforcement. The district court thus refused to apply the “safety valve”
provision. The district court did not err in finding that Acosta was not entitled to
“safety valve” relief. The district court was faced with conflicting evidence about
whether Acosta cooperated fully with arresting officers. There was no error in the
district court’s evaluation of Acosta’s demeanor and testimony, nor in its
conclusion that Acosta did not satisfy his burden of persuasion to convince the
court that he had provided truthful and complete information.
AFFIRMED.
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