United States v. Robert Dale Holloway

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAY 10, 2002
No. 01-13607 THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
________________________

D. C. Docket No. 00-00180-CR-E

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ROBERT DALE HOLLOWAY,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
_________________________
(May 10, 2002)

Before BLACK and HULL, Circuit Judges, and HANCOCK*, District Judge.

BLACK, Circuit Judge:

*
Honorable James H. Hancock, U. S. District Judge
for the Northern District of Alabama, sitting by
designation.
 This case arises from a 911 call reporting gunshots and arguing originating

from Appellant Robert Dale Holloway’s residence. Investigating the emergency

call, law enforcement officers conducted a warrantless search of the residence.

Although no victims were found by the officers, the search uncovered the firearm

used to cause the disturbance. Appellant subsequently was indicted and convicted

for unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. On appeal, he argues the firearm

and other evidence seized by the officers should have been suppressed as fruits of

an unconstitutional search. Upon review of the record, we conclude the district

court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress and affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

At 10:22 p.m. on August 4, 1999, Officer Norman Bernard of the Alexander

City Police Department received a dispatch from a 911 operator to investigate a

report of gunshots and arguing emanating from 3785 Washington Street. Officer

Bernard proceeded immediately to the location of the disturbance. En route, the

officer received a second dispatch from the 911 operator indicating the caller was

reporting continued gunshots and arguing. Officer Bernard arrived at the

designated address at approximately 10:29 p.m., within a minute of the second

dispatch from the emergency operator. Providing back-up in a separate patrol car

was Officer Marcus Billips, who also responded to the emergency dispatch.

2
 Upon arrival, Officer Bernard pulled into the driveway of the residence

located at 3785 Washington Street, a mobile home occupied by Appellant. The

officer illuminated the residence with his headlights and spotlight. On the porch of

the residence were Appellant and his wife, Lena Holloway. Due to the high-risk

nature of the 911 call, Officer Bernard drew his service weapon as he exited his

vehicle. From behind his car door, Officer Bernard instructed Appellant and his

wife to raise their hands into view. Appellant complied; his wife did not. As

directed, Appellant stepped off the porch and walked towards Officer Bernard and

Officer Billips. As Appellant proceeded towards the officers, a third individual,

later identified as neighbor Mike Machado, emerged from behind a horse trailer

parked in the yard. The neighbor also was ordered to raise his hands and walk

towards the officers. Both Appellant and his neighbor were instructed to lie on the

ground facing away from the officers, their palms facing up.

Although the two men were compliant, Mrs. Holloway refused to leave the

porch, and instead sat down on a chair. Despite several verbal commands, Mrs.

Holloway refused to move. Suddenly, a child appeared in the doorway of the

residence. The child was ordered back into the house. Ultimately, because of

Mrs. Holloway’s unresponsiveness, Officer Bernard threatened to employ his

pepper spray. Finally, with encouragement from Appellant, Mrs. Holloway stepped

3
off the porch, but refused to raise her hands. By this time, Sergeant Randy Walters,

who had arrived on the scene to provide additional support, stepped in to secure

Mrs. Holloway.

After Mrs. Holloway was placed under control, Officer Bernard turned his

attention to Appellant. The officer handcuffed Appellant and quickly patted him

down to see if he was concealing a weapon. Officer Billips then engaged in the

same procedure with respect to Mr. Machado. Once they were secured, the two

men were placed separately in the officers’ patrol cars. Altogether, approximately

ten minutes elapsed from the time the officers arrived on the scene to the time

those present were secured.

Having placed Appellant safely into his patrol car, Officer Bernard

approached the residence to check for victims and weapons on the premises. In

doing so, the officer observed several beer cans strewn about the yard and porch.

As he stepped onto the porch, Officer Bernard saw a shotgun shell on top of the

picnic table. Glancing around for a corresponding weapon, the officer located a

model 870 Remington shotgun leaning against the side of the mobile home,

approximately three feet from where Appellant had been standing when the

officers first arrived. The safety was disengaged. Additional shotgun shells, two

expended and one live, were found lying in the grass by the side of the residence.

4
Officer Bernard locked the weapon in the trunk of his patrol car and returned to the

house to continue his search for victims and investigate the disturbance. No victims

were found.

After ensuring that everyone on the scene was safe, Officer Bernard

approached Appellant to inform him of the 911 call and to explain the officers’

reasons for securing those present on the premises. As Officer Bernard was

explaining the officers’ actions, Appellant interrupted to describe what had

transpired earlier that evening. According to Appellant, the commotion began

when three males standing on the railroad tracks behind Appellant’s mobile home

started throwing rocks at his house and horses. In an effort to ward off the men,

Appellant fired his shotgun into the air above the railroad tracks.

In light of his conversation with Appellant, Officer Bernard left to speak

with Sergeant Walters. According to Sergeant Walters, Appellant’s account of the

evening’s events matched an account given by Mrs. Holloway. Based on this

information, Sergeant Walters determined there was sufficient cause to arrest

Appellant.1 Appellant was then placed under arrest by Officer Bernard at

approximately 11:05 p.m., 36 minutes after the officers first arrived on the scene.

1
Although it is not clear from the record, the
Government stated at oral argument that Appellant was
arrested for reckless endangerment and disorderly
conduct.
5
 Following his arrest, Appellant was indicted by a federal grand jury for

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).2

The firearm at issue was the model 870 Remington shotgun discovered by Officer

Bernard at Appellant’s residence on August 4, 1999. Claiming the search of his

home violated the Fourth Amendment, Appellant moved the district court to

suppress the firearm and any other evidence seized by Officer Bernard.

Appellant’s motion to suppress was denied. Thereafter, Appellant pled guilty,

preserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. This appeal

followed.3

2
Appellant was convicted of first degree assault on
August 11, 1983.
3
In addition to appealing the denial of his motion
to suppress the firearm and other evidence seized by
Officer Bernard, Appellant also appeals the district
court’s denial of his motion to suppress incriminating
statements made to Officer Bernard concerning the
events of August 4, 1999. He argues these statements
were made in violation of the Fifth Amendment and
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602
(1966). Having considered Appellant’s arguments as to
this issue in light of the record, we affirm without
discussion the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress statements. See 11th Cir. R. 36-1.
6
 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Review of a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence is a

mixed question of law and fact. United States v. Alexander, 835 F.2d 1406, 1408

(11th Cir. 1988). The district court’s findings of fact are reviewed under the

clearly erroneous standard, whereas its application of the law is subject to de novo

review. Id. In reviewing the district court’s ruling, this Court must construe the

facts in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below, which, in this case,

is the Government. United States v. Wilson, 894 F.2d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir. 1990).

III. DISCUSSION

This case presents an issue of first impression to this Circuit concerning

whether law enforcement officials may conduct a warrantless search of a private

residence in response to an emergency situation reported by an anonymous 911

caller. We conclude that when exigent circumstances demand an immediate

response, particularly where there is danger to human life, protection of the public

becomes paramount and can justify a limited, warrantless intrusion into the home.

Once in the home, officers may seize any evidence found within plain view.

A. Warrantless Search of Appellant’s Residence

The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States sets forth a

general proscription on warrantless searches of a person’s home: “The right of the

7
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” U.S. Const. amend.

IV. The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of warrantless searches, however, is not

absolute. Although there is a strong preference for searches and entries conducted

under the judicial auspices of a warrant, the United States Supreme Court has

crafted a few carefully drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement to cover

situations where “the public interest require[s] some flexibility in the application of

the general rule that a valid warrant is a prerequisite for a search.” Arkansas v.

Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759, 99 S. Ct. 2586, 2590 (1979). One such exception is

that the police may enter a private premises and conduct a search if “exigent

circumstances” mandate immediate action. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499,

509, 98 S. Ct. 1942, 1949-50 (1978).

The exigent circumstances exception recognizes a “warrantless entry by

criminal law enforcement officials may be legal when there is compelling need for

official action and no time to secure a warrant.” Michigan, 436 U.S. at 509, 98 S.

Ct. at 1949. The exception encompasses several common situations where resort

to a magistrate for a search warrant is not feasible or advisable, including: danger

of flight or escape, loss or destruction of evidence, risk of harm to the public or the

police, mobility of a vehicle, and hot pursuit. See Johnson v. United States, 333

8
U.S. 10, 14-15, 68 S. Ct. 367, 369 (1948) (listing situations falling within exigent

circumstances exception); see also United States v. Reid, 69 F.3d 1109, 1113-14

(11th Cir. 1995) (upholding warrantless search of residence based on exigent

circumstances arising from risk of losing evidence, risk of flight, and danger of

harm to public or officers); United States v. Forker, 928 F.2d 365, 368-69 (11th

Cir. 1991) (upholding warrantless search of vehicle based on mobility); United

States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1510-11 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (upholding

warrantless search of residence based on danger narcotics would be destroyed or

removed); United States v. Burgos, 720 F.2d 1520, 1525-26 (11th Cir. 1983)

(upholding warrantless search of residence based on threat of injury to

neighborhood arising from defendant’s stash of weapons); United States v. Blasco,

702 F.2d 1315, 1326 (11th Cir. 1983) (upholding warrantless search based on

imminent danger of flight or escape); United States v. Kreimes, 649 F.2d 1185,

1192 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (upholding warrantless search based on hot pursuit

and danger posited by possibility of armed fugitive remaining at large).4

4
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209
(11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this Court adopted as
binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth
Circuit handed down prior to close of business on
September 30, 1981.
9
 One of the most compelling events giving rise to exigent circumstances is

the occurrence of an emergency situation. The Supreme Court has long recognized

that emergencies sometimes obviate the need to obtain a search warrant prior to

entering a private residence. See, e.g., Michigan, 436 U.S. at 509, 98 S. Ct. at 1950

(“A burning building clearly presents an exigency of sufficient proportions to

render a warrantless entry ‘reasonable.’ Indeed, it would defy reason to suppose

that firemen must secure a warrant or consent before entering a burning structure to

put out the blaze.”); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35, 90 S. Ct. 1969, 1972

(1970) (noting warrantless search could not be justified based on exigent

circumstances, where police officers were not responding to an emergency);

McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454, 69 S. Ct. 191, 193 (1948) (“Where,

as here, officers are not responding to an emergency, there must be compelling

reasons to justify the absence of a search warrant.”).

The most urgent emergency situation excusing police compliance with the

warrant requirement is, of course, the need to protect or preserve life. Mincey v.

Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 2413 (1978). In Mincey, an

undercover police officer who had arranged a narcotics transaction with the

defendant arrived at the defendant’s apartment with several other officers. Id. at

387, 98 S. Ct. at 2410-11. When the door to the apartment was opened in response

10
to his knocks, the undercover officer slipped inside and moved quickly into the

bedroom. Id., 98 S. Ct. at 2411. As the other officers entered the apartment, they

heard a volley of gunshots emanating from the bedroom. Id., 98 S. Ct. at 2411.

The undercover officer emerged from the bedroom and collapsed on the floor. Id.,

98 S. Ct. at 2411. The other officers then entered the bedroom, where they found

the defendant lying on the floor, wounded and semiconscious. Id., 98 S. Ct. at

2411. A search for victims revealed an injured woman in the closet and three

accomplices, one of whom was wounded in the head. Id. at 388, 98 S. Ct. at 2411.

After the scene was secured, homicide detectives arrived at the apartment to search

for evidence. Id. at 388-89, 98 S. Ct. at 2411. Although the search lasted four

days, no warrant was ever obtained. Id. at 389, 98 S. Ct. at 2411.

On appeal, the defendant argued the evidence seized during the homicide

detectives’ four-day search of his apartment should be suppressed as the product of

an unlawful warrantless search. 437 U.S. at 388, 98 S. Ct. at 2411. The Supreme

Court agreed, holding there is no general “murder scene” exception to the Fourth

Amendment. Id. at 395, 98 S. Ct. at 2415. Although the four-day search of the

defendant’s apartment was unlawful because it was not strictly circumscribed by

the exigencies which justified its initiation, the Supreme Court nevertheless

11
endorsed the authority of police officers to make warrantless entries and searches

based on emergency circumstances:

We do not question the right of the police to respond to emergency
situations. Numerous state and federal cases have recognized that the
Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making
warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a
person within is in need of immediate aid. Similarly, when the police
come upon the scene of a homicide they may make a prompt
warrantless search of the area to see if there are other victims or if a
killer is still on the premises. Cf. Michigan v. Tyler, supra, 436 U.S.,
at 509-510, 98 S. Ct. at 1950-1951. “The need to protect or preserve
life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise
illegal absent an exigency or emergency.” Wayne v. United States,
115 U.S. App. D.C. 234, 241, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (opinion of Burger,
J.).

Id. at 392-93, 98 S. Ct. at 2413.

The Supreme Court’s endorsement of warrantless searches based on an

endangerment to life also is evident in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S. Ct.

1642 (1967). In Hayden, two taxi drivers reported seeing an armed robber run into

a residence at 2111 Cocoa Lane. 387 U.S. at 297, 107 S. Ct. at 1645. Within

minutes, police arrived at the house. Id., 107 S. Ct. at 1645. During a search of the

premises, the defendant was discovered in an upstairs bedroom and arrested. Id. at

298, 107 S. Ct. at 1645. A shotgun and pistol, located in an adjoining bathroom’s

flush tank, were seized. Id., 107 S. Ct. at 1645. Also seized were a jacket and

12
trousers of the type the robber was said to have worn, which were found in the

washing machine. Id., 107 S. Ct. at 1645.

On appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether the warrantless search of

the residence was constitutional. Based on the exigencies of the situation, the

Court upheld the search:

We agree with the Court of Appeals that neither the entry
without warrant to search for the robber, nor the search for him
without warrant was invalid. Under the circumstances of this case,
“the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.”
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456, 69 S. Ct. 191, 193, 93
L. Ed. 153. . . . The Fourth Amendment does not require police
officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would
gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others. Speed here was
essential, and only a thorough search of the house for persons and
weapons could have insured that Hayden was the only man present
and that the police had control of all weapons which could be used
against them or to effect an escape.

387 U.S. at 298-99, 87 S. Ct. at 1645-46.

Following the reasoning of the Supreme Court, numerous federal and state

courts have upheld warrantless emergency entries and searches based on

endangerment to life. See, e.g., United States v. Hughes, 993 F.2d 1313 (7th Cir.

1993) (report of woman and child in danger in crack house); United States v.

Gillenwaters, 890 F.2d 679 (4th Cir. 1989) (stabbing victim); United States v.

Martin, 781 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1985) (explosion in apartment); Mann v. Cannon,

731 F.2d 54 (1st Cir. 1984) (open access to controlled substances by children);

13
United States v. Riccio, 726 F.2d 638 (10th Cir. 1984) (medical aid to defendant

shot by police); United States v. Jones, 635 F.2d 1357 (8th Cir. 1980) (report of

gunshots); United States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1964) (screams in the

night); United States v. Searle, 974 F. Supp. 1433 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (report of

gunshots); United States v. Herndon, 390 F. Supp. 1017 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (report of

gunshots); United States v. Hogue, 283 F. Supp. 846 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (report of

dead body); Johnson v. State, 386 So. 2d 302 (Fla. App. 1980) (report of dead

body); State v. Carlson, 548 N.W.2d 138 (Iowa 1996) (missing person); State v.

Butler, 676 S.W.2d 809 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) (gunshot victim); State v. Mackins,

266 S.E.2d 694 (N.C. App. 1980) (gunshots); State v. Max, 263 N.W.2d 685 (S.D.

1978) (gunshots).

Although this Court has not directly addressed emergency searches based on

endangerment to life, we have on at least two occasions generally endorsed the

validity of such searches. See United States v. Brand, 556 F.2d 1312 (5th Cir.

1977) (noting defendant’s concession that police officer who assisted ambulance

attendants with medical emergency legally entered home); United States v. Green,

474 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1973) (indicating deputy fire marshal could validly search

apartment to determine cause of fire where ascertaining cause was necessary to

assure fire was completely extinguished). Furthermore, upholding warrantless

14
searches in such situations is consistent with our jurisprudence concerning the

exigent circumstances exception.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude emergency situations involving

endangerment to life fall squarely within the exigent circumstances exception. It is

difficult to imagine a scenario in which immediate police action is more justified

than when a human life hangs in the balance. Although the Fourth Amendment

protects the sanctity of the home, its proscription against warrantless searches must

give way to the sanctity of human life. When the police reasonably believe an

emergency exists which calls for an immediate response to protect citizens from

imminent danger, their actions are no less constitutional merely because the

exigency arises on the wooden doorsteps of a home rather than marble stairs of a

public forum.

Of course, the burden of proving an exception to the warrant requirement

lies with the Government. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51, 72 S. Ct. 93,

95 (1951). In validating a warrantless search based on the existence of an

emergency, as with any other situation falling within the exigent circumstances

exception, the Government must demonstrate both exigency and probable cause.

See United States v. Blasco, 702 F.2d 1315, 1324 (11th Cir. 1983) (“The Supreme

Court . . . has recognized that circumstances sometimes preclude the preferred

15
route of obtaining a warrant, and consequently, has allowed warrantless searches

and seizures of a residence where both probable cause and exigent circumstances

exist.”); see also United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1510-11 (11th Cir. 1991)

(en banc) (noting warrantless search of home can be justified based on exigent

circumstances where there is both exigency and probable cause).

In the typical case, probable cause exists where the circumstances would

lead a reasonable person to believe a search will disclose evidence of a crime.

United States v. Burgos, 720 F.2d 1520, 1525 (11th Cir. 1983). In emergencies,

however, law enforcement officers are not motivated by an expectation of seizing

evidence of a crime. Rather, the officers are compelled to search by a desire to

locate victims and the need to ensure their own safety and that of the public. See

generally Note, The Emergency Doctrine, Civil Search and Seizure, and the Fourth

Amendment, 43 Fordham L. Rev. 571, 582 (1975) (“Generally it is not difficult to

determine when the emergency doctrine is being applied. The police usually are

acting to help a person in distress, not to find evidence of criminal acts.”). Thus, in

an emergency, the probable cause element may be satisfied where officers

reasonably believe a person is in danger. See Koch v. Town of Brattleboro, 287

F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2002) (stating probable cause for forced entry in response to

exigent circumstances requires probability a person is in danger); Tierney v.

16
Davidson, 133 F.3d 189, 196-97 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding police officers may enter

dwelling without warrant if, based on objective standard, they reasonably believe

individual is in distress); Root v. Gauper, 438 F.2d 361, 364-65 (8th Cir. 1971)

(holding warrantless search based on emergency requires assessment of whether

officers reasonably believe such action is necessary).

In light of these principles, we conclude the Alexander City police officers

in this case did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they conducted a

warrantless search of Appellant’s home. Late into the evening on August 4, 1999,

Officer Bernard received a dispatch from a 911 operator relaying a report of

gunshots and arguing at Appellant’s address. Immediately thereafter, he received a

second dispatch indicating continued gunshots and arguing. Officer Bernard and

Officer Billips promptly proceeded to the residence, arriving within minutes of the

first dispatch. Upon arrival, nothing at the mobile home dissuaded the officers

from believing the veracity of the 911 calls. Rather, the presence of Appellant and

his wife on the front porch supported the information conveyed by the 911 caller.

Under the circumstances known to them at that time, the officers reasonably

believed an emergency situation justified a warrantless search of Appellant’s home

for victims of gunfire. The possibility of a gunshot victim lying prostrate in the

dwelling created an exigency necessitating immediate search. Additionally, based

17
on the information conveyed by the 911 caller and the personal observations of the

officers, there was probable cause to believe a person located at the residence was

in danger. Under the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment,

the officers were not required to obtain a warrant before entering Appellant’s

home.

In reaching this conclusion, we do not overlook the holding of Florida v.

J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 120 S. Ct. 1375 (2000). In J.L., an anonymous caller reported

that a young man fitting a certain description and located at a specific place was

carrying a firearm. 529 U.S. at 268, 120 S. Ct. at 1377. Responding to the tip,

police officers conducted an investigatory stop of a man fitting the caller’s

description. Id., 120 S. Ct. at 1377. During a pat-down of the man, a firearm was

discovered and seized. Id., 120 S. Ct. at 1377. On appeal, the Supreme Court held

the investigatory stop was unconstitutional because it was based solely on an

anonymous tip which lacked sufficient indicia of reliability. Id. at 270-71, 120 S.

Ct. at 1378-79.

Appellant’s assertions notwithstanding, the holding in J.L. does not preclude

our decision in this case. A crucial distinction between J.L. and this case is the fact

that the investigatory stop in J.L. was not based on an emergency situation. This

difference was expressly contemplated by J.L.:

18
 The facts of this case do not require us to speculate about the
circumstances under which the danger alleged in an anonymous tip
might be so great as to justify a search even without a showing of
reliability. We do not say, for example, that a report of a person
carrying a bomb need bear the indicia of reliability we demand for a
report of a person carrying a firearm before the police can
constitutionally conduct a frisk.

529 U.S. at 273-74, 120 S. Ct. at 1380. Thus, when an emergency is reported by an

anonymous caller, the need for immediate action may outweigh the need to verify

the reliability of the caller. Id., 120 S. Ct. at 1380.

In this case, the warrantless search of Appellant’s residence was based

largely on information provided by an anonymous caller.5 However, the

information given by the caller involved a serious threat to human life.

Furthermore, the information concerned an on-going emergency requiring

immediate action. In light of the nature of the 911 call, a lesser showing of

reliability than demanded in J.L. was appropriate in order to justify the search of

Appellant’s home. Because the police had no reason to doubt the veracity of the

911 call, particularly in light of the personal observations of the officers once they

arrived on the scene, their warrantless search for victims was constitutional.

5
The record is actually unclear regarding whether
the 911 caller provided any identifying information.
For purposes of this appeal, however, it is assumed the
911 caller was anonymous.
19
 This result makes sense. Not surprisingly, 911 calls are the predominant

means of communicating emergency situations.6 United States v. Richardson, 208

F.3d 626, 630 (7th Cir. 2000) (“A 911 call is one of the most common — and

universally recognized — means through which police and other emergency

personnel learn that there is someone in a dangerous situation who urgently needs

help.”). Such calls are distinctive in that they concern contemporaneous

emergency events, not general criminal behavior. Additionally, the exigencies of

emergency situations often limit the ability of a caller to convey extraneous details,

such as the identifying information.7 Furthermore, some callers, particularly

neighbors, may be understandably reticent to give identifying information for fear

of retaliation or danger. Thus, the fact that a 911 caller chooses — or is forced —

6
Many emergency searches arise from information provided by 911 callers.
See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 208 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 2000) (upholding
warrantless search of apartment based on 911 call reporting woman had been raped
and murdered in apartment); United States v. Cunningham, 133 F.3d 1070 (8th Cir.
1998) (upholding search arising from 911 call indicating occupant of home was
being held against her will); United States v. Gwinn, 46 F. Supp. 2d 479 (S.D.W.
Va. 1999) (upholding warrantless search of mobile home where police responded
to emergency call stating man was threatening someone with gun); United States v.
Guarente, 810 F. Supp. 350 (D. Me. 1993) (upholding warrantless entry into
residence based on 911 call about domestic dispute involving weapon).
7
Either injury, the sheer need to seek shelter or
cover, or simply the exigencies of the moment, may very
well prevent an individual placing a 911 call from
providing standard identifying information.
20
to remain anonymous may very well have little bearing on the veracity of the

caller. If law enforcement could not rely on information conveyed by anonymous

911 callers, their ability to respond effectively to emergency situations would be

significantly curtailed.

Once presented with an emergency situation, the police must act quickly,

based on hurried and incomplete information. Their actions, therefore, should be

evaluated “by reference to the circumstances then confronting the officer,

including the need for a prompt assessment of sometimes ambiguous information

concerning potentially serious consequences.” 3 Wayne LaFave, Search and

Seizure § 6.6(a), at 391 (3d ed. 1996). As illustrated in an oft-quoted commentary

from Chief Justice (then Judge) Burger, police officers must be given the authority

and flexibility to act quickly, based on limited information, when human life is at

stake:

[A] warrant is not required to break down a door to enter a burning
home to rescue occupants or extinguish a fire, to prevent a shooting or
to bring emergency aid to an injured person. The need to protect or
preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be
otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency. Fires or dead
bodies are reported to police by cranks where no fires or bodies are to
be found. Acting in response to reports of “dead bodies,” the police
may find the “bodies” to be common drunks, diabetics in shock, or
distressed cardiac patients. But the business of policemen and firemen
is to act, not to speculate or meditate on whether the report is correct.
People could well die in emergencies if police tried to act with the

21
 calm deliberation associated with the judicial process. Even the
apparently dead often are saved by swift police response.

Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1963).

The fact that no victims are found, or that the information ultimately proves

to be false or inaccurate, does not render the police action any less lawful. Wayne,

318 F.2d at 212 (“When policemen, firemen or other public officers are confronted

with evidence which would lead a prudent and reasonable official to see a need to

act to protect life or property, they are authorized to act on that information, even if

ultimately found erroneous.”). As long as the officers reasonably believe an

emergency situation necessitates their warrantless search, whether through

information provided by a 911 call or otherwise, such actions must be upheld as

constitutional.

B. Warrantless Seizure of Appellant’s Firearm and Other Evidence

In conducting their search for victims, Officer Bernard and the other officers

on the scene had reasonable cause to believe they were entering a volatile and

potentially dangerous situation based on the prior report of gunshots. As a result,

officer safety demanded the individuals present on the premises be temporarily

secured prior to conducting their search. See generally Maryland v. Wilson, 519

U.S. 408, 413, 117 S. Ct. 882, 885 (1997) (holding police officer making traffic

stop may order passengers out of car pending completion of investigatory stop for

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protection of his own safety); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702-03, 101 S.

Ct. 2587, 2594 (1981) (holding police officers effectuating in-home search warrant

could detain occupant of premises during search based, in part, on potential risk of

harm to officers). Once those individuals were under control, Officer Bernard was

able to conduct a limited search of the residence.

During his search, Officer Bernard located a shotgun, which was likely the

cause of the disturbance, in plain view. Because his warrantless presence on

Appellant’s property was justified by the exigencies of the situation, the officer

was authorized to seize the shotgun without a warrant. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437

U.S. 385, 392, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 2413 (1978) (“[T]he police may seize any evidence

that is in plain view during the course of their legitimate emergency activities.”);

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2037 (1971)

(“Where the initial intrusion that brings the police within plain view of such an

article is supported, not by a warrant, but by one of the recognized exceptions to

the warrant requirement, the seizure is also legitimate.”). The seizure of the

firearm and other evidence, therefore, was constitutional.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the exigent circumstances of gunshots and arguing originating

from Appellant’s residence, the police officers were justified in conducting a

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warrantless search of the premises. While validly on the property, the officers

were authorized to seize any evidence in plain view. As a result, neither the

emergency search of Appellant’s residence nor the seizure of the shotgun violated

the Fourth Amendment’s proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.

AFFIRMED.

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