Virgil Lee Brownlee v. Michael Haley

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
September 16, 2002
THOMAS K. KAHN
No. 00-15858 CLERK
________________________

D.C. Docket No. 96-00279 CV-BU-S

VIRGIL LEE BROWNLEE,
Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

MICHAEL HALEY, Commissioner,
Alabama Department of Corrections,
Respondent -Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_________________________
(September 16, 2002)

Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, and MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

MARCUS, Circuit Judge:

Virgil Lee Brownlee appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for a

writ of habeas corpus challenging both his 1987 conviction for the murder of
Lathen Aaron Dodd and the death sentence imposed as a result of that conviction

by the Circuit Court for Jefferson County, Alabama. Although we agree with the

district court that the underlying conviction was constitutionally firm, Brownlee

plainly received ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing in light of his

attorneys’ failure to investigate, obtain, or present to the jury any evidence in

mitigation of the death penalty, violating the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution.

Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order regarding sentencing and remand

the case with instructions to issue a writ vacating Brownlee’s death sentence.

I.

The facts surrounding the death of Lathen Aaron Dodd are undisputed. At

approximately 8:30 or 9:00 p.m. on Monday, May 19, 1986, three gun-wielding

men stormed into Jodie’s Lounge in North Birmingham, Alabama, yelling

obscenities, firing their pistols, and ordering the bar’s fourteen to eighteen

customers to get down onto the floor. One of the three perpetrators remained by

the door of the bar keeping guard over a man whom he had dragged in with him.

The other two perpetrators went further into the bar. There, any patrons who

were not already lying down were forced to the ground. One patron suffered a

broken shoulder from being thrown to the floor. After forcing all of the customers

to the ground, the perpetrators continued to abuse them physically -- patrons were

2
hit on the head, kicked in the neck, hit with a gun, and pistol whipped. Once all of

the customers were secured on the ground, two of the assailants robbed them of

their possessions, including billfolds, money, jewelry, watches, identification

cards, keys, credit cards, wallets, a duffel bag, a knife, and a gun. As the patrons

were being robbed of their possessions, one of the perpetrators, who seemed to one

witness to be in charge of the operation, demanded to know who the owner of the

bar was. When Dodd identified himself, the robber ordered him to go to the cash

register and give him its contents. After receiving the contents, this robber

demanded to know where the rest of the money was. When he was told that there

was no more money, the robber jumped on the bar and fired two shots, one of

which sounded to one patron like it made a “body impact.” After they had been

robbed, the patrons were forced to crawl to the restroom at the back of the bar.

While they were on the way to the bathroom, more shots were fired, one of which

grazed a customer’s head.

The perpetrators then left the scene. When the patrons emerged from the

restroom, they discovered that Dodd had been shot in the abdomen. Dodd was

then taken to the hospital, where he died on an operating table at 10:53 p.m. The

cause of death was bleeding that resulted from a gunshot wound to the chest and

abdomen.

3
 A.

Shortly after the crime, the State of Alabama charged Virgil Lee Brownlee,

Willie Irving Goodgame, and Robert Harris with the capital offense of murder

during the course of robbery in the first degree, a violation of Ala. Code § 13A-5-

40(a)(2). Goodgame pled guilty and received a sentence of life imprisonment, and

the State proceeded to trial first against Brownlee, and later against Harris.1

Initially, attorney Herbert Massie was appointed to represent Brownlee, but his

representation ended when Massie was suspended from the practice of law for

failing to comply with his continuing legal education requirements. In October

1986, Circuit Court Judge James H. Hard IV appointed attorneys Burton Dunn and

James Kendrick to represent Brownlee.

At the three-day trial, which lasted from January 5-7, 1987, the State’s

witnesses included nine patrons of Jodie’s Lounge, who described the robbery.

None of these individuals linked Brownlee to the crime. Although four of the

patrons identified Goodgame as one of the perpetrators and one identified Harris,

nobody who was in the bar could identify Brownlee as being present. One

customer testified that he thought he had seen Brownlee somewhere before, but he

1
Following his separate trial, Harris was convicted of a capital offense for the robbery-
murder and received a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. See Harris
v. State, 545 So. 2d 146 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (affirming conviction).

4
was not positive and could not say that Brownlee was at Jodie’s Lounge. Notably,

none of the patrons could say who shot and killed Dodd. In addition to the lack of

any eyewitness testimony implicating Brownlee, the State presented no forensic

evidence linking Brownlee to the crime in any way, and no bullet was recovered

from Dodd’s body.

The evidence implicating Brownlee consisted entirely of the testimony of

co-defendant Goodgame and two uncharged individuals who claimed to be with

Brownlee before and after (but not during) the crime: James “Sonny” Warren and

Reavor Jones. Goodgame, who said that he had known Brownlee for about ten

years at the time of the crime, testified that on the night of May 19, 1986, he was at

Jones’s apartment with Brownlee, Harris, Warren, Jones, and another man,

Reginald Poe. According to Goodgame, Brownlee had sent Warren to pick up the

other men and bring them back to Jones’s, where they all used drugs. At around

7:00 or 7:30 that evening, Goodgame, Brownlee, and Harris went into a separate

room of the apartment, at which time Brownlee told them that he knew of a “lick,”

meaning a place where they could get money. After discussing the plan, the three

men equipped themselves with firearms, including a nickel-plated .357 Magnum

with a brown handle for Brownlee and a silver, sawed-off .38 caliber pistol for

Goodgame. Brownlee asked Warren if they could take his car, a blue Buick, but

5
Warren declined to loan them the vehicle and instead drove them to their

destination.

Goodgame testified that the men arrived in Warren’s car at an alley behind

Jodie’s Lounge, but that Warren became nervous and drove them all back to

Jones’s apartment, where they talked before returning to the alley behind the

lounge. Fifteen minutes before the men entered the bar to commit the robbery,

Goodgame went in to look it over, at which time he bought two bags of potato

chips. Once he returned outside and as the three men waited to enter the lounge, a

man pulled up in a van. Goodgame testified that he, along with Brownlee and

Harris, decided to take this man into the bar with them. After the man broke free

from their initial grasp and tried to run away, Goodgame caught him. By this time,

according to Goodgame’s testimony, Brownlee and Harris were already in the bar.

Therefore, Goodgame brought the man to the door of the bar and threw him onto

the floor inside.

Goodgame testified that he remained at the door of the lounge throughout

the course of the robbery, which lasted about ten minutes. Although he said that he

saw Brownlee in the middle of the bar’s floor area, Goodgame acknowledged that

he did not see anybody shoot Dodd. He said that when the robbery ended, the men

left the bar, with Brownlee carrying a tote bag, and returned to the car, where

6
Warren was waiting. Upon returning to Jones’s apartment, Brownlee, Goodgame,

and Harris went into the bedroom and started dividing up the contents of

Brownlee’s bag, including clothes, billfolds, rings, watches, and $500 to $600 in

cash. Goodgame said that he received a necklace and some money, and that there

was a .38 caliber firearm lying on the bed.

According to Goodgame, the men then sent Jones to buy cocaine, and

everyone in the apartment used cocaine, as well as “T’s and blues.”2 Goodgame

testified that he was in the bedroom with Jones for some of this time, but that when

he emerged he heard Poe saying “I didn’t know you all had shot nobody.”

Goodgame asked, “who got shot?,” and Poe explained, “Harris just told Brownlee

that he didn’t have to shoot,” to which, according to Goodgame, Brownlee

responded “I had to shoot the mother fucker cause he went for his pistol.”

Goodgame also testified that, on the following day, in a conversation with Warren,

Jones, and Goodgame about a newspaper article, Brownlee made such statements

as, “if I wouldn’t have shot him, he would have shot me.” Goodgame said that he

and Brownlee went to the creek behind Jones’s apartment and threw in the

2
“T’s and blues” refers to a combination of talwin, an addictive pain reliever, and an
antihistamine.

7
billfolds, identification cards, and other items of no value. He also said that he

went with Brownlee to sell the pistols to an individual named “Big Bull.”3

On cross-examination, Goodgame, who was identified by four patrons

(Simon Hill, Jannie Surovec, B.A. Tidwell, and John Brown) as having been seen

inside Jodie’s Lounge, insisted that he did not actually go into the bar, but rather

stayed outside and pushed the captive man inside. He also said that Brownlee’s

gun was black, after observing on direct examination that it was nickel-plated.

Goodgame further testified on cross-examination that he told the police on the day

of his arrest, June 5, 1986, that Brownlee had a .357, even though the police report

indicated that Goodgame said Brownlee carried a short-barrel silver .38.

Goodgame conceded that he was high on cocaine when he heard Brownlee admit

to the shooting and that he had initially told the police that Brownlee carried stolen

goods in his pocket upon leaving the crime scene, although he said at trial that

Brownlee had a tote bag.

3
At trial, Birmingham police officer Jimmy Brown testified that the patrons’ items were
indeed recovered from the creek, but no finger prints could be obtained from any of them. Also
at trial, a man named Booker T. Harris testified that he obtained pistols from Goodgame some
time before the summer of 1986. Another person was with Goodgame, but Harris did not really
see him. Officer Roosevelt Smith of the Birmingham police obtained the pistols from Harris,
and they were admitted into evidence. Police investigating the crime scene at Jodie’s Lounge
recovered a .38 caliber bullet, but the parties stipulated that the bullet was not fired from either
of the guns introduced in the case.

8
 Some portions of Goodgame’s testimony were corroborated by Warren and

Jones, but other material portions were contradicted. Warren testified that, around

3:30 or 4:00 p.m., he went to Jones’s apartment to get money that he was owed by

Brownlee, Harris, and Goodgame. At Brownlee’s request, he drove to pick up

Goodgame, Poe, and Harris, arriving back at the apartment around 5:00 or 5:30.

Warren said that, at approximately 8:30 or 9:00 p.m., Brownlee, Harris, and

Goodgame left in his car. Contrary to Goodgame’s testimony, Warren said that he

stayed at the apartment. According to Warren, no drugs were consumed before the

other men left. When they left, Brownlee carried a .357, Goodgame had a sawed-

off .38, and Harris had a standard .38.

Warren testified that the men returned approximately two hours later, with

Goodgame carrying a gym bag and Brownlee carrying a paper bag. Brownlee,

Goodgame, and Harris went into the bedroom, where they stayed for 45 minutes.

When Warren went into the bedroom, he saw identification cards, jewelry, and

money on the floor and bed. When the men came out of the room, he saw a gun

that they did not have with them when they left. Brownlee and Harris initially

argued about a necklace, but they resolved their dispute and everyone began using

cocaine and T’s and blues. Warren first claimed that he used only marijuana, but

admitted later in his testimony that he also used cocaine that night. After Harris

9
almost overdosed on drugs, Warren decided to stay at the apartment overnight, so

Jones drove him to work in the morning.

Warren further testified that on the following Friday, four days after the

crime, he asked Brownlee about the Jodie’s Lounge murder, which he had read

about in a newspaper article entitled “Bar robbed, owner killed.” After Warren

said to Brownlee, “I know you -- that didn’t happen with my car,” Brownlee

responded, “it’s good that you was that observant.” Warren testified that Harris

was present for this conversation, which took place at Jones’s apartment, and that

Goodgame came in later. The men told Warren not to worry because his car was

not seen. Warren also testified that he heard nothing about any murder on the day

of the crime, although he did notice that two rounds were missing from Harris’s

blue .38 after the incident. When Warren asked Harris about this, Harris said, “oh,

yeah, about that capping,” and then cut himself off and said, “forget it.” Warren

stated at trial that he received some money from Brownlee on the night of the

crime as compensation for an auto transmission problem that began when

Goodgame had been using the car on a previous day. When Brownlee had asked

Warren for the car on the night of the crime, he told Warren that he would make

sure that Goodgame paid him.

10
 Jones, who is Warren’s cousin and was Brownlee’s girlfriend at the time,

testified that Brownlee, Harris, Goodgame, Warren, and another man were all at

her apartment around 5:00 p.m.4 At some point, Brownlee, Harris, and Goodgame

left in Warren’s car. Also undermining Goodgame’s testimony, Jones said that

Warren stayed at the apartment. She said that when the three men returned

between one hour and ninety minutes later, Goodgame had a brown paper sack and

a gun, and there was nothing in Brownlee’s hands. The three men went into a

room for fifteen to twenty minutes, and they emerged carrying jewelry, as

Brownlee and Harris argued about a necklace. Jones testified that all three men

discussed shooting into the air. Although Jones denied that she obtained any

drugs, she stated that she used drugs along with Warren, Brownlee, Harris,

Goodgame, and the other individual at her house for almost the whole night.

Finally, Jones testified that Brownlee stayed at her apartment after everyone else

left, but that there was no discussion about what had happened.5

4
Jones was unclear in her testimony about the identity of the fifth man. Although she
said early in her testimony that it was Reginald Poe, she said later that she was not sure of his
name since that was the first time she had met him.
5
Neither Warren nor Jones was asked about the conversation on the day after the crime
during which, according to Goodgame, Brownlee allegedly said “if I wouldn’t have shot him, he
would have shot me.”

11
 At trial, Brownlee did not testify and the defense offered no evidence. On

January 7, 1987, the jury returned a verdict finding Brownlee guilty of capital

murder. Separate sentencing proceedings commenced the following morning.

B.

In Alabama, the jury that decides a defendant’s guilt also sits in the first

phase of a bifurcated sentencing proceeding, in which it issues an advisory

sentencing verdict based on its evaluation of aggravating and mitigating

circumstances. See Ala. Code § 13A-5-46. If the jury finds that no aggravating

circumstances exist, or that any aggravating circumstances do not outweigh the

mitigating circumstances, it must return an advisory verdict recommending life

imprisonment without parole. See id. § 13A-5-46(e)(1)-(2). If, on the other hand,

the jury finds one or more aggravating circumstances and determines that they

outweigh the mitigating circumstances, it must recommend the death penalty. See

id. § 13A-5-46(e)(3). Any verdict recommending death must be based on a vote of

at least ten jurors, while a recommendation of life imprisonment requires only a

majority. See id. § 13A-5-46(f). If the jury can reach neither verdict, a mistrial is

declared and another sentencing jury is empaneled. See id. § 13A-5-46(g).

After the jury has returned its advisory verdict at the sentencing phase, the

trial judge orders and receives a presentence investigation report, hears further

12
arguments, and may receive additional evidence concerning the aggravating and

mitigating factors. Taking into account all of the evidence, including that

introduced at trial and in the sentencing proceeding before the jury, the court must

then enter written findings with regard to the aggravating and mitigating

circumstances. See id. § 13A-5-47(d). Like the jury, the trial judge must determine

whether any aggravating circumstances exist and, if so, whether those aggravating

circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances that it may find. In reaching

its ultimate decision, the trial court “shall consider the recommendation of the jury

contained in the advisory verdict, unless such a verdict has been waived” by the

defendant. Id. § 13A-5-47(e).

At the time of Brownlee’s sentencing, Alabama’s criminal code enumerated

eight aggravating circumstances, see Ala. Code § 13A-5-49,6 as well as seven non-

6
The eight statutory aggravating factors were: “(1) The capital offense was committed by
a person under sentence of imprisonment; (2) The defendant was previously convicted of another
capital offense or a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person; (3) The
defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons; (4) The capital offense was
committed while the defendant was engaged or was an accomplice in the commission of, or an
attempt to commit, or flight after committing, or attempting to commit, rape, robbery, burglary
or kidnapping; (5) The capital offense was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a
lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody; (6) The capital offense was committed for
pecuniary gain; (7) The capital offense was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of
any governmental function or the enforcement of laws; or (8) The capital offense was especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel compared to other capital offenses.”

13
exclusive mitigating circumstances, see id. § 13A-5-51.7 In addition to the listed

mitigating factors, the statute explains that “mitigating circumstances shall include

any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the

offense that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence of life imprisonment

without parole instead of death.” Id. § 13A-5-52.

In this case, the State offered evidence of two aggravating circumstances at

the sentencing proceeding before the jury. First, in order to show that “[t]he

defendant was previously convicted of another capital offense or a felony

involving the use or threat of violence to the person,” id. § 13A-5-49(2), the State

presented a stipulation, agreed to by defense counsel, that Brownlee had previously

been convicted of four counts of robbery, one on June 23, 1980, and three on

October 9, 1980.8 Second, in order to show that “[t]he capital offense was

7
The seven statutory mitigating factors were: “(1) The defendant has no significant
history of prior criminal activity; (2) The capital offense was committed while the defendant was
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; (3) The victim was a participant
in the defendant’s conduct or consented to it; (4) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital
offense committed by another person and his participation was relatively minor; (5) The
defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person; (6)
The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired; and (7) The age of the defendant
at the time of the crime.”
8
Defense attorney Burton Dunn decided to stipulate to the prior convictions after
realizing that his name appeared as the prosecutor on the case action sheets for the prior cases.
Evidence produced in the post-conviction proceedings, discussed below, indicated that Dunn
was not actually involved in the prior cases, but was listed only because he held a supervisory
position at the district attorney’s office. Nevertheless, Dunn testified later that he stipulated to
the convictions in part to prevent the jury from seeing his name on the documents and to avoid

14
committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment,” id. § 13A-5-49(1), the

State presented the testimony of Billy Cox, Brownlee’s parole officer, who said

that Brownlee had been placed on parole on March 31, 1986, and that he remained

on parole on the date of the crime.9

At the sentencing hearing before the jury, Brownlee’s counsel presented no

evidence. Instead, each of his lawyers offered only a very brief closing argument.

Together, the statements of defense attorneys Dunn and Kendrick take up just over

five pages of the trial transcript. Dunn, who spoke first, began his argument by

saying, “I am not going to rehash or go back over the trial. You have obviously

resolved the issue of guilt against us. I am simply standing up here before you at

this time to ask for Virgil Brownlee’s life.” After conceding that Brownlee had

prior convictions and was on parole at the time of the crime, Dunn explained to the

jury that, despite his involvement in this crime and his own series of prior

convictions, co-defendant Goodgame was receiving only life imprisonment, with

the possibility of parole, while Brownlee was facing the death penalty. Dunn then

said that

any confusion or negative inferences that might have been drawn therefrom.
9
The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals has held that the phrase “under sentence of
imprisonment” includes being on parole. See Tarver v. State, 500 So. 2d 1232, 1250-51 (Ala.
Crim. App.), aff’d, 500 So. 2d 1256 (Ala. 1986).

15
 the State of Alabama on Virgil Brownlee, under the same facts that
Goodgame participated in, is asking you to sentence this man to the
electric chair. I don’t say it is easy, but it isn’t hard for [Assistant
District Attorney Donald] Russell to do that, because Mr. Russell
doesn’t know that man. He is just an object. Just like he is to you.
You have never had the opportunity to talk to him, be around him or
to know him as a human being, and the lawyers have. So, he is not
just an object to us. He is a person.

Sure, he has done wrong. Hasn’t always obeyed the law, lived
outside of the law a good part of his life. But he is still a person. A
living, breathing, human being.

And regardless of the fact that he has committed a crime, I still
feel for him.

Dunn went on to observe that “killing [Brownlee] is not going to bring Mr. Dodd

back,” that “[l]ife without parole in this State means just exactly that,” and that

state prisons are “pretty terrible.” Finally, he said that there is “[n]o point in

haranguing you. You are either going to do it or you’re not. I just beg you not to. . .

. Virgil’s family is back there. They feel for him. They love him, just like Mr.

Dodd’s folks loved him,” before concluding “please don’t kill him. That is all I can

say. Thank you.”

Speaking after Dunn, Kendrick emphasized that even though they had

“already made [the] decision as far as the guilt or innocence,” the jurors should

note not only that Goodgame received a lighter sentence than death, but also that

Warren was not charged at all despite being “an accomplice to this crime.”

16
Kendrick explained that “the evidence established there is no question [Goodgame]

was in that bar. He could just as easily have been the trigger man as any of the

other two,” and that the disparate treatment of the co-participants in the crime “is

just inherently unfair.” Like Dunn, Kendrick noted that Brownlee’s family was

sitting in the courtroom and that “Mr. Brownlee’s family loves him just like Mr.

Dodd’s family loved him, and they’ll be just as devastated at his death as Mr.

Dodd’s family was when he died.” Kendrick concluded, “I don’t know anything

else I can add. I just say under the circumstances, I don’t see how you can

sentence this man to the electric chair.”

After hearing the prosecutor’s final statement and the court’s penalty phase

instructions, the jury deliberated for 38 minutes before recommending a sentence

of death by an 11-1 vote.

Prior to the second phase of the sentencing proceeding, Judge Hard

suggested that defense counsel contact Dr. William Beidleman, a clinical

psychologist, to conduct an examination of Brownlee. At the February 24, 1987

judicial sentencing hearing, the defense presented Dr. Beidleman and two of

Brownlee’s sisters as witnesses. Dr. Beidleman, who examined Brownlee at the

17
county jail nine days before the hearing and performed a variety of tests,10 opined

that “Mr. Brownlee has a mixed substance abuse disorder, in remission [due to his

incarceration], a mixed personality disorder, and borderline intellectual

functioning.” The doctor explained that Brownlee had an IQ of 70, which is

classified as “in the mild mental retardation range,” but that his adaptive

intelligence indicated that “his skills were somewhat higher.” Therefore, he

classified Brownlee as having borderline intellectual functioning, “which is out of

the retarded range, but still impaired.” The doctor also noted that Brownlee was

“not actively psychotic” and that “[t]here was no evidence of a thought disorder or

severe mood disturbance” even though he was “somewhat suspicious and

paranoid.”

Based on Brownlee’s statements and interviews with Brownlee’s sisters, Dr.

Beidleman reported that Brownlee had seen visions and suffered from “hypnagogic

hallucinations,” which consist of “experiences right before you fall asleep or right

upon awakening of seeing threatening figures or animals.” He also observed

physical complaints such as hot flashes in the chest, which “were sort of strange

and often go along with psychosis.” Dr. Beidleman saw some indication that

10
The tests included the Ammons & Ammons Quick Test, the Minnesota Multiphasic
Personality Inventory (“MMPI”), the critical items scale, incomplete sentences blank adult
forms, and the Rogers Criminal Responsibility Assessment scale.

18
Brownlee exaggerated in order to portray himself in a negative light, and he also

noted hypervigilance and paranoia common in convicted individuals. In addition,

Dr. Beidleman testified about Brownlee’s extensive history of drug abuse and

stated that, if Brownlee’s reports were true, “his level of intoxication would [have

been] significant” at the time of the crime. He also noted that Brownlee had

received an undesirable discharge from the army for drug abuse and related

conduct, and that Brownlee had undergone past treatment for psychiatric problems

and seizures.

Dr. Beidleman was followed by two of Brownlee’s sisters, Maryann

Andrews and Gail Brownlee. Andrews testified that shortly after Brownlee left the

military, he was taken to a psychiatric hospital following an incident in which he

chased his family members out of the apartment, threw a television out the

window, and jumped out of the second floor apartment window. When family

members got to him, Brownlee “was on the floor with his chest all cut up.”

Brownlee did not stay at the psychiatric hospital following his visit because his

mother could not afford the costs. Andrews also testified that her brother “has

always had mood changes” since leaving the military, but that he has never hurt

anyone and had helped raise his niece. Gail Brownlee also testified about her

brother’s seizures, which occurred between 1973 and 1975, when he was around

19
twenty years old, and included forcing family members out of the apartment and

harming himself by jumping out the window and cutting himself in the chest.

Before trying to harm himself, Brownlee complained about headaches and said that

“he couldn’t take the pain anymore.”

After hearing this testimony and receiving a presentence investigation

report, the trial court found the existence of three aggravating circumstances and

no mitigating factors. The aggravating circumstances were Brownlee’s four prior

convictions, the fact that he was on parole at the time of the crime, and the fact that

“[t]he capital offense was committed while the defendant was engaged in . . . the

commission of . . . robbery.” Ala. Code § 13A-5-49(4). Based on this

determination, the judge sentenced Brownlee to die.

After his sentencing, Brownlee moved the trial court for a new trial based on

newly-discovered evidence. The new evidence consisted of the testimony of two

women, Angie Flowers and Eveolene Fowler, who claimed to have seen Brownlee

across town from Jodie’s Lounge right before and right after the robbery and

shooting. In response, the state presented the testimony of Assistant District

Attorney Russell, who said that Brownlee had told him in a post-conviction

meeting that he was in fact in Jodie’s Lounge during the shooting, but that he was

20
under a pool table robbing a patron of his beeper when the fatal shots were fired.

The trial court denied the motion for a new trial.

Judge Hard appointed Kendrick alone to represent Brownlee on appeal after

Dunn asked to be relieved from further duties on the case. Kendrick raised seven

issues on appeal,11 but the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the

conviction and sentence on June 28, 1988. See Brownlee v. State, 545 So. 2d 151

(Ala. Crim. App. 1988). The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed this ruling on

March 10, 1989, see Ex parte Brownlee, 545 So. 2d 166 (Ala. 1989), and the

United States Supreme Court denied Brownlee’s petition for a writ of certiorari on

October 2, 1989, see Brownlee v. Alabama, 493 U.S. 874, 110 S. Ct. 208, 107 L.

Ed. 2d 161 (1989), as well as his request for rehearing the following month, see

Brownlee v. Alabama, 493 U.S. 986, 110 S. Ct. 527, 107 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1989).

11
These seven issues were: (1) whether the trial court erred by striking for cause jurors
who said that they would be reluctant to impose the death penalty, but could under the right
circumstances; (2) whether the testimony of the accomplices was sufficiently corroborated by
other evidence, as required by Alabama law; (3) whether Brownlee was so intoxicated at the
time of the offense that he could not be held accountable; (4) whether the evidence was sufficient
to sustain a capital conviction; (5) whether the trial court should have granted a new trial based
on newly-discovered alibi evidence; (6) whether the trial court erred in failing to remove for
cause a juror who had personal contact with the victim; and (7) whether the state improperly
called attention at trial to Brownlee’s decision to remain silent after his arrest.

21
 C.

Assisted by new counsel, Brownlee then filed a petition for post-conviction

relief in the state court pursuant to Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal

Procedure.12 The petition’s 37 grounds for relief included, inter alia, claims that

defense counsel performed ineffectively during the trial, sentencing, and appeal;

that Goodgame’s admission that he lied in his testimony required a new trial; that

Dunn operated under a conflict of interest because of his prior prosecution of

Brownlee; that portions of the trial were not transcribed; and that Goodgame was

not sworn before he testified. Brownlee also raised various arguments regarding

the alleged unconstitutionality of the Alabama death penalty law, both facially and

as applied to him. Judge Hard conducted extensive hearings regarding the petition.

In order to support his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Brownlee

sought to show that counsel devoted little time to preparing for either the guilt or

sentencing phases. Brownlee testified at the Rule 32 hearing that, before the trial,

Dunn met with him only two times for 10 to 15 minutes each, and Kendrick met

with him three or four times for 15 to 20 minutes each. Neither attorney asked him

anything about his personal background, his psychiatric disorders, his limited

12
The petition was filed pursuant to Rule 20 of the Temporary Alabama Rules of Criminal
Procedure, but the permanent rules became effective during the pendency of the petition, and
Rule 20 became Rule 32.

22
intellectual ability, his extensive drug and alcohol abuse, his family history, or his

extensive history of blackouts and seizures. In addition, neither attorney

investigated his alibi claim that he was robbing a drug house at the time of the

Jodie’s incident, and neither attorney discussed with him the trial procedure or

evidence for the sentencing phase.

When they testified, Dunn and Kendrick acknowledged that they had

conducted no pre-trial discovery, but they explained that such actions would have

been unnecessary since they had full access to all of the district attorney’s files,

including witness statements. The attorneys also acknowledged that they

conducted virtually no investigation into Brownlee’s personal history, having had

only one conversation with one of Brownlee’s sisters, which Mary Ann Andrews

said was not until just prior to the sentencing proceeding before Judge Hard. The

lawyers did not have Brownlee examined by a psychologist until the court

suggested it after the jury sentencing phase because they did not believe that

Brownlee had any mental problems. In fact, Dunn observed his client to be of

“above average intelligence.” Furthermore, counsel did not probe Brownlee’s

drug problems because they believed that a Jefferson County jury would not be

sympathetic to an account of voluntary drug use.

23
 Brownlee also introduced evidence to suggest that trial counsel could have

offered substantial evidence of mitigating circumstances if they had investigated

their client’s background. Mary Ann Andrews and Gail Brownlee, the sisters who

testified at the sentencing proceeding before the trial court, testified in more detail

about Brownlee’s personal history, and Brownlee himself testified as well. The

testimony showed that, from the time he was nine or ten years old, Brownlee lived

in the Kingston housing project, a high-crime area of Birmingham. One morning,

soon after moving to Kingston, Brownlee was stabbed in the chest while on his

way to the store to buy bread, and he had to be taken to the hospital. On another

occasion, in the mid-1970s, Brownlee was shot multiple times and taken to a local

hospital, where his sisters and mother went to see him.

Both sisters discussed in detail the multiple seizures that they had already

described in the judicial sentencing proceeding. They also provided more

information about the incident in which, as described by Andrews, Brownlee threw

the television out the window, “tore up” everything in the house, “cut his chest like

criss-crossed all the way down,” and ended up convulsing on the floor with “his

eyes rolled back in his head.” Gail Brownlee described another incident in which

her brother tried to jump out the window of the apartment and their mother

attempted to grab him by a foot and arm to keep him inside. Despite her efforts,

24
Brownlee fell to the ground, suffering injuries. On the whole, Gail Brownlee

witnessed a number of her brother’s seizures, which occurred as often as once a

month and included uncontrollable shaking and foaming at the mouth. Along with

the sisters’ accounts, Brownlee presented the testimony of Maxine Maguire Driver,

a nurse who lived next door to the family. Driver saw Brownlee suffer seizures

three times. On the first occasion, she had to use a spoon to prevent him from

swallowing his tongue. Aside from their discussions of his seizures, both sisters

described Brownlee as a devoted member of the family who was particularly close

to and helpful in raising Gail’s daughter Daphne. Despite Brownlee’s

incarceration, Gail described him as the closest thing Daphne has to a father.

Like the sisters, Dr. Beidleman offered a far more detailed version of his

earlier testimony. Based on additional tests administered in preparation for the

Rule 32 hearing, including the full MMPI, the critical items scale, and the

competency screening test, as well as his earlier analysis and a review of

psychiatric records and prison files, Dr. Beidleman diagnosed Brownlee as having

either mild mental retardation or borderline intellectual functioning and suffering

from various mental disorders, including schizotypal personality disorder,

antisocial personality disorder, multiple drug dependencies, and seizure disorder or

25
epilepsy.13 With regard to Brownlee’s intellectual functioning, Dr. Beidleman

explained that Brownlee’s IQ is “in the range of 67, 68, 75,” which is “right on the

borderline between having severe social and occupational impairment due to

limited intellectual resources and being able to cope in a sort of mildly adaptive

manner.” He emphasized that Brownlee was “right on the edge.” The doctor

described schizotypal personality disorder as an illness marked by thought

disturbance, paranoid ideation, suspiciousness, and social anxiety, and often

including unusual physical experiences, poor interpersonal relationships, and

depressed, flat speech. He described antisocial personality disorder as a “chronic

pervasive condition” involving a history of rule-breaking dating back to childhood,

followed by irresponsibility and antisocial behavior later in life, often including

drug and alcohol abuse.

Based on Brownlee’s long history of drug and alcohol abuse, which,

according to Brownlee, included cocaine, heroin, and other hallucinogenic drugs

dating to his teenage years, Dr. Beidleman diagnosed him as a “polypharmacy

individual” who “will take anything he can get.” In his testimony, Dr. Beidleman

13
The psychiatric records included documents from Cooper Green and Mercy Hospital
and from a private psychiatrist, Dr. Green. Brownlee went to the hospital and was seen by Dr.
Green in the mid-1970s, when his family members took him for treatment following his seizures.
Gail Brownlee testified that her brother stopped seeing the private doctor because the treatment
was too expensive.

26
explained that Brownlee’s serious problems with drugs compounded the problems

caused by his substantial intellectual limitations and other psychiatric disorders,

and even possibly diminished his mental capacity at the time of the crime. The

doctor stated that “it is quite possible” that his seizure disorder and other

personality disorders are related to alcohol and drug abuse. He also noted that the

seizures, which were confirmed by hospital records from the mid-1970s, could

have been connected to an earlier head injury, especially in light of hospital records

indicating that Brownlee was shot in the head around that time.

Dr. Beidleman further testified that he believed Brownlee was unlikely to

engage in violent behavior in prison, where the ability to make his own decisions

would be confined and access to alcohol and drugs would be limited. A similar

opinion was offered by Frederick Freeman, a correctional officer who supervised

Brownlee in 1983 and 1984 and observed that “[h]e conducted himself as a model

inmate” who posed no security threat.

Aside from the testimony regarding the claims of ineffective assistance,

much of the evidence presented at the Rule 32 proceedings concerned Goodgame’s

recantation and Dunn’s alleged conflict of interest. Regarding the recantation, the

central piece of evidence considered by the court was deposition testimony in

which Goodgame said that he was pressured by the district attorney and his own

27
attorney to implicate Brownlee in order to avoid being sentenced to death himself.

After first refusing to provide any information, Goodgame said in the deposition

that he robbed Jodie’s Lounge not with Brownlee and Harris, but rather with two

other individuals from out of town, one of whom was named Ron.

Additionally, Brownlee presented the testimony of Marty Lee George and

James Louis Threat, two inmates who served in prison with Goodgame and heard

him say that Brownlee was not involved in the crime and that he lied in order to

avoid the electric chair. Despite his claims of official pressure, however,

Goodgame testified that the assistant district attorney did not tell him to lie, and he

also said that he never told his attorney about the involvement of the men from out

of town. At the hearing, both of Goodgame’s attorneys, Assistant District Attorney

Russell, District Attorney David Barber, and Lieutenant Carl Quinn all testified

that they did not tell Goodgame to testify untruthfully in order to avoid the death

penalty.

As for the alleged conflict of interest, the state presented evidence showing

that, despite being listed on the case action sheets, defense counsel Dunn did not

actually prosecute Brownlee earlier, in 1980. Dunn testified that, as a deputy

district attorney at the time, he supervised three attorneys in his division, including

Doug Valeska and Don Colee, and the fact that the cases were assigned to those

28
lawyers could explain why his name appeared on the documents. Dunn said that

he was “a hundred percent positive” that he had “absolutely no contact” with

Brownlee prior to his appointment in the instant case. A court reporter reviewed

his notes from the earlier proceedings and testified that Brownlee was prosecuted

by Colee in February 1980 and Valeska in May 1980, and that Dunn was not at

counsel table for the state. In an affidavit submitted to the court, Valeska said that

he prosecuted Brownlee himself and that Dunn did not assist him or participate.

Furthermore, Brownlee’s defense attorney from that time, Charles Howard,

recalled having no dealings with Dunn.

After hearing all of the evidence, the trial court denied Brownlee’s Rule 32

petition. Judge Hard’s opinion included a determination that counsel did not

perform ineffectively at either trial or sentencing. With regard to the sentencing

hearing, the judge determined that counsel had a strategy for the sentencing phase

“centered around the weakness of the State’s case and the emotional and personal

plea to spare [Brownlee’s] life,” and held that “[c]onsidering trial counsel’s

knowledge of Brownlee’s background there simply were no mitigating

circumstances that could be presented by him to the jury and the strategy of

counsel was the most reasonable under the circumstances.” The trial court further

opined that the testimony of Dr. Beidleman and Brownlee’s sisters, if presented to

29
the jury, “would only have conflicted with and weakened the credibility of trial

counsel’s strategy which was based on the weakness of the State’s case.” The

court also noted that the evidence of Brownlee’s drug use would not have changed

the outcome of the proceedings and that the evidence of good behavior in prison

was undermined by his admission in the Rule 32 proceeding that he had used drugs

during his current incarceration. The court’s discussion of Brownlee’s numerous

other claims included the factual finding that Goodgame’s trial testimony was not

perjured, a determination that Dunn had no conflict of interest, and the conclusion

that Brownlee had procedurally defaulted his claims alleging that Goodgame was

not sworn in for his testimony and that parts of the trial were not transcribed.

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of

the Rule 32 petition on January 13, 1995, see Brownlee v. State, 666 So. 2d 91

(Ala. Crim. App. 1995), and the Alabama Supreme Court denied his petition for

certiorari on July 21, 1995.

On February 6, 1996, Brownlee filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas

corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. In

an amended petition, he raised the same 37 claims that he had raised in his state

Rule 32 motion. The district court denied Brownlee’s motion on August 9, 2000.

After rejecting Brownlee’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in the guilt

30
or innocence phase of the trial, the court discussed in detail the claim that counsel

performed ineffectively at sentencing. Determining that counsel’s failure to

investigate or present mitigating evidence to the jury was not based on any

reasonable strategy, the court held that counsel’s performance was deficient under

the first prong of the test established by the Supreme Court in Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). The district

court held, however, that Brownlee was not entitled to any relief since he could not

show prejudice under the second prong of Strickland. Specifically, the court held

that the trial judge’s subsequent consideration and rejection of the mitigating

evidence cured any defects in the jury phase, especially in light of the strong

evidence of aggravating factors and the central role afforded to judges in

Alabama’s capital sentencing scheme. The court noted that most of the mitigating

evidence presented by Brownlee was in fact before Judge Hard at the time of

sentencing and that this evidence was not so significantly mitigating that the failure

to present it to the jury undermined confidence in the outcome of Brownlee’s

sentencing, as required by Strickland. After rejecting the ineffective assistance

claim regarding sentencing, the district court went on to deny the claim of

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

31
 The district court also rejected the claim regarding Goodgame’s recantation

and Dunn’s conflict of interest in light of the state trial court’s findings of fact in

the Rule 32 proceeding. It further dismissed as procedurally defaulted a number of

Brownlee’s other claims, including those involving the alleged failures to swear

Goodgame or transcribe a portion of the trial.

Appealing the district court’s denial of habeas corpus relief, Brownlee now

raises six claims regarding his conviction and five claims regarding the imposition

of the death penalty. Challenging his conviction, Brownlee argues that: (1) he

received ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt/innocence stage of his trial

and on appeal; (2) the district court violated his rights by failing to inquire on the

record about Dunn’s conflict of interest; (3) the district court wrongly determined

that Goodgame’s recantation was not a basis for a new trial; (4) the district court

erroneously decided that he had procedurally defaulted the claim that Goodgame

was not sworn before testifying; (5) the district court incorrectly determined that

his claim that the trial was not fully transcribed was procedurally defaulted; and (6)

the trial was tarnished by racial discrimination.

Challenging the death sentence, Brownlee contends that: (1) he received

ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of the state court proceedings;

(2) the sentencing proceeding was tarnished by racial discrimination; (3) the death

32
penalty is applied in Alabama in an arbitrary and racially discriminatory manner;

(4) the Constitution prohibits the execution of mentally retarded individuals; and

(5) the Constitution bars execution by electrocution.

II.

We examine the claims regarding Brownlee’s conviction before turning to

his death sentence. In so doing, we review the district court’s denial of habeas

corpus relief de novo. See Dorsey v. Chapman, 262 F.3d 1181, 1185 (11th Cir.

2001). As in other contexts, the district court’s findings of fact are reviewed for

clear error, see O’ Ryan Castro v. United States, 290 F.3d 1270, 1272 (11th Cir.

2002), while legal questions and mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed de

novo, see Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1332 (11th Cir. 2001). Whether a

defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and

fact, and we therefore review it de novo. See Hagins v. United States, 267 F.3d

1202, 1204 (11th Cir. 2001). Similarly, we analyze de novo the mixed question of

whether an attorney labored under a conflict of interest. See Freund v.

Butterworth, 165 F.3d 839, 862 (11th Cir. 1999). We also conduct de novo review

of a district court’s decision to deny habeas corpus relief on the basis of a

procedural default. See Caniff v. Moore, 269 F.3d 1245, 1246 (11th Cir. 2001).

33
 Further, although this appeal is not governed by the more stringent standards

established by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), 28 U.S.C. § 2241, et

seq., because it was filed prior to the April 24, 1996 effective date of that law,

findings of fact made by the state trial court in the Rule 32 proceedings are

nevertheless entitled to a “presumption of correctness,” Freund, 165 F.3d at 861.

This presumption, which is based on the principle of comity and the understanding

that federal habeas review is limited to analyzing claims of constitutional error,

mandates considerable deference to state court findings of fact. See Marshall v.

Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 432, 103 S. Ct. 843, 850, 74 L. Ed. 2d 646 (1983) (“This

deference requires that a federal habeas corpus court more than simply disagree

with the state court before rejecting its factual determinations. Instead, it must

conclude that the state court’s findings lacked even fair support in the record.”)

(internal quotations omitted).

A.

Brownlee first argues that his conviction should be overturned because his

counsel performed ineffectively by failing to prepare adequately for the

guilt/innocence phase of his trial and by committing various unprofessional errors

during that proceeding. We examine claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

34
under the Sixth Amendment through the two-part analysis set forth by the Supreme

Court in Strickland. Under this test, the petitioner must first show that “counsel

made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed

. . . by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. If

this substantial showing is made, the petitioner must then demonstrate that “the

deficient performance prejudiced the defense,” which “requires showing that

counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial

whose result is reliable.” Id. As the Supreme Court has explained, “[u]nless a

defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction . . . resulted

from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.” Id.

In evaluating the first, or “performance,” prong of Strickland, “[j]udicial

scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.” Id. at 689, 104 S.

Ct. at 2065. Because retrospective evaluation of a lawyer’s performance can be

difficult, “a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant

must overcome the presumption that . . . the challenged action might be considered

sound trial strategy.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). A petitioner must identify

specific acts or omissions that were not the result of reasonable professional

judgment, and a court should deem these acts or omissions deficient only if they

35
“were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Id. at 690,

104 S. Ct. at 2066. Simply put, the deference afforded an attorney’s decision is

great and the bar for proving a Sixth Amendment violation is high. In light of the

“strong presumption in favor of competence,” we have held that in order to prove

deficient performance, “a petitioner must establish that no competent counsel

would have taken the action that his counsel did take.” Chandler v. United States,

218 F.3d 1305, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

Under the second, or “prejudice,” prong of Strickland, a petitioner must

“affirmatively prove prejudice” by showing that counsel’s errors “actually had an

adverse effect on the defense.” 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2067. This requires a

showing of more than “some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.”

Id. Instead, the petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. Although this standard

is difficult to meet, it is significant that a petitioner must show only a reasonable

probability that the outcome would have been different; he “need not show that

counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case.”

Id. at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. When evaluating this probability, “a court hearing

36
an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge

or jury.” Id. at 695, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.

Brownlee argues that his attorneys, Dunn and Kendrick, performed

ineffectively before trial by failing to: (1) speak with his initial attorney, Herbert

Massie, who had apparently done significant preparatory work; (2) obtain a

ballistics expert; (3) visit the scene of the crime; (4) talk to witnesses; (5)

investigate the criminal records of the alleged co-participants in the offense; and

(6) investigate Brownlee’s alibi. He emphasizes that, by their own admissions,

Dunn and Kendrick spent little time preparing for the trial and made only minimal

efforts to obtain discovery materials.

As the district court determined, however, none of the alleged pre-trial errors

can meet the demanding standard set forth in Strickland and Chandler. First, with

regard to Brownlee’s claim that counsel failed to speak with his initial attorney or

conduct adequate pre-trial investigation, the record reveals that, even though they

did not file any discovery motions, Dunn and Kendrick had complete access to all

of the State’s evidence and investigative materials as a result of the district

attorney’s office’s “open file” discovery policy. This evidence was extensive, and

Brownlee does not identify any information that counsel would have obtained if

they had conducted more pre-trial discovery. Without doing any investigative

37
work of their own, Dunn and Kendrick had access to all statements given to the

police by the patrons of Jodie’s Lounge, the statements of Goodgame, Jones, and

Warren, photographs and a diagram of the crime scene, and transcripts of the

preliminary hearing. Counsel was clearly able to prepare for trial based on the

large volume of materials made available by the State. Indeed, Dunn and Kendrick

testified in the post-conviction proceedings that they were not surprised by any of

the evidence or testimony presented by the prosecution at trial.

Quite simply, Brownlee’s claims do not satisfy either prong of Strickland.

Counsel’s decision to rely on the extensive material made available by the district

attorney’s office did not fall outside the wide range of professional competence,

and Brownlee’s failure to demonstrate that further discovery would have helped

the defense clearly bars a finding of prejudice. As we have explained,

“[s]peculation is insufficient to carry the burden of a habeas corpus petitioner as to

what evidence could have been revealed by further investigation.” Aldrich v.

Wainwright, 777 F.2d 630, 636 (11th Cir. 1985).

Similarly, the district court correctly held that counsel was not ineffective

for failing to investigate or present Brownlee’s alibi that he was robbing a “dope

house” at the time of the Jodie’s Lounge incident. As we explained in Chandler,

“counsel need not always investigate before pursuing or not pursuing a line of

38
defense. Investigation (even a nonexhaustive preliminary investigation) is not

required for counsel reasonably to decline to investigate a line of defense

thoroughly.” 218 F.3d at 1318. The decision whether to present a line of defense,

or even to investigate it, “is a matter of strategy and is not ineffective unless the

petitioner can prove that the chosen course, in itself, was unreasonable.” Id.

The evidence adduced at the state post-conviction proceedings reveals that

sound strategy supported counsel’s decision not to pursue the alibi. First, as

Kendrick testified, counsel considered the claim particularly weak in light of

Brownlee’s initial assertion that the people robbing the dope house with him were

Goodgame and Harris. Goodgame admitted that he was at Jodie’s Lounge at the

time of the robbery, and both he and Harris were identified by bar patrons as being

there during the crime. Although Brownlee testified in the Rule 32 hearing that

men named Kenny and Gene could corroborate his alibi, the trial court credited

Kendrick’s testimony that Brownlee never told him about these individuals. The

state court’s credibility determination is entitled to a presumption of correctness on

habeas review, see, e.g., Coulter v. Herring, 60 F.3d 1499, 1503 (11th Cir. 1995),

and Brownlee offers no reason to disregard this presumption. The weakness of

Brownlee’s alibi is further revealed by his failure to provide the location of the

dope house he was purportedly robbing, and by the fact that, after trial, he told

39
Kendrick and the assistant district attorney that he was in fact present at Jodie’s

Lounge during the crime, but that he did not shoot Dodd. The attorneys’ decision

not to pursue Brownlee’s alibi defense after deeming it implausible and unlikely to

succeed is precisely the kind of strategic decision on which a court should defer to

the judgment of counsel. See Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1318.

In addition to his claims of error before the trial, Brownlee contends that

counsel committed a number of errors during the trial itself, including failing to:

(1) object to Goodgame’s testifying without being sworn; (2) have the whole trial

transcribed; (3) object to the exclusion of Goodgame’s conviction for unlawful

possession of a handgun; and (4) inform the jury that Goodgame could have been

convicted under Alabama’s habitual offender statute. We are unpersuaded by these

claims, either standing alone or in concert. First, the claim regarding the fact that

Goodgame was not sworn fails because the Rule 32 court found, after reviewing

the court reporter’s notes and cassette tape, that Goodgame was in fact sworn

before giving his testimony. This factual finding is entitled to a presumption of

correctness, see Freund, 165 F.3d at 861, and Brownlee has offered no basis on

which to conclude that the finding lacks “fair support in the record,” Marshall, 459

U.S. at 432, 103 S. Ct. at 850.

40
 Brownlee’s second claim of ineffective assistance at trial also fails. Even if

we assume that Dunn and Kendrick knew that portions of the proceedings were not

transcribed and that their failure to rectify the situation somehow rose to the level

of deficient performance, Brownlee has not shown, and indeed cannot show, that

any omissions from the trial transcript hindered his ability to defend himself or

appeal his conviction, or that the omissions in any way undermine confidence in

the outcome of the proceedings. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069

(“[A] court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient

before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged

deficiencies. . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground

of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should

be followed.”).

As for the third claim of ineffective assistance during the trial, the State does

not deny that the jury was not informed about Goodgame’s 1984 conviction for

attempted possession of a handgun by a person convicted of a crime of violence, in

violation of Ala. Code § 13A-11-72(a). The district court correctly determined,

however, that, even if the defense lawyers were deficient for failing to bring this

conviction to the jury’s attention, Brownlee suffered no prejudice. Despite not

hearing about that one conviction, the jury knew about Goodgame’s two other

41
convictions for theft of property in the third degree, in violation of Ala. Code §

13A-8-5, his participation in the Jodie’s Lounge robbery, and the fact that he was

testifying pursuant to a plea agreement that covered not only the Jodie’s Lounge

incident, but also eight other pending charges (including four robbery charges, two

burglary charges, a theft charge, and a receipt of stolen property charge).

Especially in light of concerns about Goodgame’s motivations raised by defense

counsel during cross-examination and closing argument, this information provided

a strong basis for the jurors to question the credibility of the State’s key witness.

Moreover, the cross-examination brought out several material factual discrepancies

in Goodgame’s testimony, including whether Goodgame had entered the bar

during the robbery and murder. Because so much evidence about Goodgame’s

past bad acts, incentives to testify for the State in this case, and questionable

credibility had been presented, we are satisfied that evidence of one additional

conviction was not likely to have had a meaningful impact at trial.

Similarly, Brownlee did not suffer any prejudice as a result of counsel’s

alleged failure to bring to the jury’s attention that, had he not reached a plea

agreement with the State, Goodgame could have been sentenced to life

imprisonment without parole (even if not convicted of a capital offense) pursuant

to Alabama’s Habitual Felony Offender Act (“HFOA”), Ala. Code § 13A-5-9.

42
First, as the district court noted, Brownlee’s argument is legally incorrect because

Goodgame’s prior convictions all involved misdemeanors and therefore did not

render him subject to mandatory life imprisonment under the HFOA, which

specifically applies only to offenders with multiple felony convictions. Second,

even if Goodgame had avoided the HFOA by pleading guilty, Brownlee suffered

no prejudice from his lawyers’ failure to present this fact to the jurors, who plainly

were informed about Goodgame’s past crimes and his incentive to testify in the

instant case in order to avoid the death penalty. Thus, as with Brownlee’s other

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, we remain unpersuaded.14

Brownlee also asserts that he received ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel. However, he provides no support for this argument and points to no

arguments that Kendrick should have raised in challenging his conviction. We

therefore have no basis on which to grant relief, especially in light of the

14
Brownlee also contends that his lawyers were ineffective for failing to take steps to
have Warren and Jones charged with participation in the crime. This claim clearly fails. First, it
is not apparent how Dunn and Kendrick, as defense attorneys, could have had these individuals
charged. The power to prosecute is reposed in the executive branch of government. See, e.g.,
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364, 98 S. Ct. 663, 668, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1978)
(explaining that prosecutor has broad authority to decide “whether or not to prosecute” an
individual, and that the decision “generally rests entirely in his discretion”); Crawford v. State,
548 So. 2d 615, 618 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (discussing broad authority of district attorney in
deciding whom to prosecute). Second, as the Court of Criminal Appeals explained, Warren and
Jones were not accomplices as a matter of law, so Brownlee could not have benefitted from the
Alabama law prohibiting convictions based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of
accomplices. See Brownlee, 545 So. 2d at 159-61.

43
significant latitude afforded appellate counsel in “winnowing out weaker

arguments on appeal and focusing on those more likely to prevail, [which,] far

from being evidence of incompetence, is the hallmark of effective appellate

advocacy.” Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 536, 106 S. Ct. 2661, 2667, 91 L. Ed.

2d 434 (1986) (internal quotations omitted).

B.

In a claim related to his argument that he received ineffective assistance of

counsel, Brownlee also says that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right

to counsel by failing to conduct an on-the-record inquiry into Dunn’s alleged

conflict of interest. Although the case action sheets listing Dunn as Brownlee’s

prosecutor in the 1980 cases were not brought to the trial court’s attention until the

sentencing stage, Brownlee appears to argue that Dunn’s representation was tainted

throughout the proceedings. According to Brownlee, the trial court erred by

conducting only an off-the-record conversation with counsel at which it was

decided that the jury should not see the case action sheets. Brownlee argues that

the court was required by Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S. Ct. 1173, 55

L. Ed. 2d 426 (1978), and Duncan v. Alabama, 881 F.2d 1013 (11th Cir. 1989), to

advise him of the conflict, its potential effect, and his right to new counsel, and to

44
inquire whether he wished to obtain new counsel or waive the conflict. We remain

unpersuaded.15

Although judges are required to inform defendants and inquire about their

preferences if they learn of conflicts of interest at trial, no such obligation exists if

there is in fact no conflict. See, e.g., Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347, 100 S.

Ct. 1708, 1717, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1980) (“Unless the trial court knows or

reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists, the court need not initiate

an inquiry.”). A conflict exists when counsel “actively represented conflicting

interests.” Id. at 350, 100 S. Ct. at 1719.

In this case, Brownlee simply cannot show that a conflict of interest existed

because the state trial court squarely rejected the factual predicate that Dunn

prosecuted Brownlee in the earlier criminal proceedings. Although Dunn’s name

appeared on the case action sheets, he explained, in testimony credited by the trial

judge, that he was listed on the sheets simply because he was serving at the time as

a deputy district attorney with supervisory responsibility for the attorneys who

actually handled the prosecutions. Dunn testified in the Rule 32 proceedings that

15
The State suggests that Brownlee’s conflict of interest claim is procedurally defaulted
because Brownlee never raised it at trial or on direct appeal. We disagree, as this claim was in
fact raised to the trial court and again to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals in the Rule 32
proceedings. The Court of Criminal Appeals, like the district court on the instant petition,
addressed the claim on the merits without deeming it procedurally defaulted. See Brownlee, 666
So. 2d at 95-97.

45
he was “positive” that he had no contact with Brownlee during the earlier cases,

and the court reporter testified, based on his trial notes, that Assistant District

Attorney Colee prosecuted Brownlee in February 1980, and Assistant District

Attorney Valeska did so in May 1980. In an affidavit, Valeska said that Dunn did

not assist or participate in the May 1980 case. Furthermore, Brownlee’s attorney at

the time recalled no dealings with Dunn, and even Brownlee has never said that

Dunn was involved in his earlier case.

Based on the overwhelming evidence, we have no basis to disturb the

presumption of correctness afforded the state court’s factual determination that

Dunn was never personally involved in prosecuting Brownlee.16 We therefore

agree, as a matter of law, that no conflict of interest existed. Brownlee has made

no showing that Dunn had inconsistent interests simply because he worked in the

district attorney’s office at a time when Brownlee was prosecuted years earlier.

See, e.g., Freund 165 F.3d at 859 (“An actual conflict occurs when a lawyer has

inconsistent interests.”) (internal quotations omitted). Clearly, Brownlee has

shown nothing more than a “speculative or merely hypothetical conflict,” which

“does not suffice” to establish a Sixth Amendment violation. Mills v. Singletary,

16
Although we review the ultimate determination regarding a conflict of interest de novo,
we still afford a presumption of correctness to the state court’s findings of historical facts related
to the alleged conflict. See Freund, 165 F.3d at 862.

46
161 F.3d 1273, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting Lightbourne v. Dugger, 829 F.2d

1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 1987)). His claim therefore fails.17

17
Even if Brownlee could show that Dunn operated under a conflict of interest, he would
still not prevail on his Sixth Amendment claim. In order to void a conviction on the basis of a
conflict of interest, “it [is] at least necessary . . . for [a] petitioner to establish that the conflict of
interest adversely affected his counsel’s performance.” Mickens v. Taylor, -- U.S. --, 122 S. Ct.
1237, 1245, 152 L. Ed. 2d 291 (2002). In order to prove adverse effect, a petitioner must show
(1) a plausible alternative defense strategy that counsel might have pursued; (2) that the
alternative strategy was reasonable; and (3) some link between the actual conflict and the
decision to forego that strategy. See Freund, 165 F.3d at 860. Brownlee does not even attempt to
link counsel’s alleged conflict with any deficiencies in the pre-trial or guilt/innocence stages of
his case. Therefore, any presumed conflict would not present a basis on which to overturn
Brownlee’s conviction.

47
 C.

As he did throughout the Rule 32 proceedings, Brownlee argues again that

he is entitled to relief because Goodgame, the key witness against him, has

disavowed his testimony implicating Brownlee. In his deposition and in the Rule

32 hearing, Goodgame testified that he lied about Brownlee’s involvement in order

to save his own life and that he committed the Jodie’s robbery with two men from

out of town, not Brownlee and Harris. Brownlee’s argument fails for two simple

reasons. First, the state court has already considered Goodgame’s recantation and

rejected it as not being credible. Second, the recantation of testimony against a

petitioner is not a basis for federal habeas corpus relief.

After considering Goodgame’s testimony and that of the other witnesses

presented, the state trial judge found Goodgame’s recantation “unworthy of belief.”

This conclusion is amply supported by the record. As the trial judge noted in

denying Brownlee’s Rule 32 petition, Goodgame’s recantation was vague and

riddled with implausibilities. Despite claiming that he was directed to lie by his

attorney and attorneys for the State, Goodgame ultimately admitted that he was

never told to say anything other than the truth at trial. Goodgame also

acknowledged that he never told his attorney that anybody from out of town was

involved in the crime, that he knew only the first name of one of his purported co-

48
participants, and that he did not know even the first name of the other man. The

state trial court also questioned the credibility of James Threatt and Marty Lee

George, the two inmates who testified that Goodgame told them in prison that

Brownlee was not involved in the crime. On the other hand, the court found

credible the testimony of Kendrick and Russell that Brownlee told them he was in

fact in Jodie’s Lounge, even though he denied shooting Dodd, as well as the

testimony of Goodgame’s lawyers, who said that Goodgame was not told to lie on

the stand. As the district court observed, there is absolutely no reason to disturb

the state court’s finding that Goodgame’s trial testimony was not perjured and that

his recantation was not credible.

Finally, even if Goodgame’s recantation were credible (and the trial court

has squarely found that it was not), the Supreme Court has held that “[c]laims of

actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never been held to state

a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation

occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding.” Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S.

390, 400, 113 S. Ct. 853, 860, 122 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1993). It is not our role to make

an independent determination of a petitioner’s guilt or innocence based on

evidence that has emerged since the trial. “This rule is grounded in the principle

that federal habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in

49
violation of the Constitution -- not to correct errors of fact.” Id. Brownlee alleges

no independent constitutional violation relating to Goodgame’s recantation, and he

is therefore entitled to no federal habeas relief on this claim.

D.

Brownlee’s claims that Goodgame was not sworn before testifying, that the

trial was not fully transcribed, and that the trial was tarnished by racial prejudice

are procedurally defaulted. Under the procedural default doctrine, we will not

consider on federal habeas corpus review a claim that was not adequately presented

to the state court in compliance with the state’s procedural requirements. See

Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451, 120 S. Ct. 1587, 1591, 146 L. Ed. 2d

518 (2000). This doctrine is “grounded in concerns of comity and federalism,”

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554, 115 L. Ed. 2d

640 (1991), and is based on the principle that “a habeas petitioner who has failed to

meet the State’s procedural requirements for presenting his federal claims has

deprived the state courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first

instance,” id. at 732, 111 S. Ct. at 2555.

There are only two ways for a petitioner to overcome a procedural default

and receive federal review of claims not properly presented to the state court.

Under the “cause and prejudice” exception, we require a petitioner to “demonstrate

50
cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of

federal law.” Id. at 750, 111 S. Ct. at 2565. Under the “fundamental miscarriage of

justice” exception, we will review a claim only if “the habeas petitioner can

demonstrate a sufficient probability that our failure to review his federal claim will

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Edwards, 529 U.S. at 451, 120 S.

Ct. at 1591. The latter exception applies only in the “narrow class of cases,”

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 315, 115 S. Ct. 851, 861, 130 L. Ed. 2d 808 (1995)

(quotations omitted), in which the petitioner can show that “a constitutional

violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent,”

id. at 327, 115 S. Ct. at 867 (quotations omitted).

The Alabama procedural rules relevant to this case are codified as part of

Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, which establishes and sets

forth the rules for post-conviction relief in the state courts. At the time Brownlee’s

Rule 32 petition was reviewed, Rule 32.2(a)(3) stated that a petitioner cannot

receive post-conviction relief based on any ground “[w]hich could have been but

was not raised at trial,” and Rule 32.2(a)(5) barred relief based on any ground

“[w]hich could have been but was not raised on appeal.” Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)

(1995). If an Alabama court has denied post-conviction relief based on the

petitioner’s failure to raise a claim at trial or on direct appeal, a federal court

51
cannot review that claim unless it determines either (1) that the petitioner had cause

for his failure to raise the claim and suffered prejudice as a result, or (2) that

denying federal habeas review of the claim would result in a fundamental

miscarriage of justice -- namely the conviction and punishment of one who is

actually innocent.

The district court correctly determined that the claims regarding the alleged

failures to swear Goodgame and transcribe the full trial are procedurally defaulted

under Rules 32.2(a)(3) and (5) because they were not raised either at trial or on

appeal. Recognizing this default, Brownlee argues that the “cause and prejudice”

exception should apply because ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel

prevented him from raising the claims. In order to receive the “cause and

prejudice” exception based on a claim of ineffective assistance, a petitioner must

show that counsel’s performance was “so ineffective as to violate the Federal

Constitution.” Edwards, 529 U.S. at 451, 120 S. Ct. at 1591. In other words, a

petitioner seeking to show ineffective assistance as the cause of a default must

prove that his counsel was ineffective under the exacting Strickland standard. If he

cannot prevail on a separate ineffective assistance of counsel claim, then he cannot

prevail on an argument that ineffective assistance caused the procedural default.

See id. It is abundantly clear, for the reasons discussed above, that Brownlee

52
cannot show that his lawyers were ineffective for failing to raise claims about the

alleged failures to swear Goodgame or transcribe the full trial. Therefore,

Brownlee’s failure to present the issues in the state court cannot be excused, and

the procedural default applies.

The procedural default governing the racial bias claim is slightly different,

but equally valid. Although it is true that, like the other procedurally defaulted

claims, this claim was not raised at trial or on direct appeal, the Court of Criminal

Appeals rejected it on the ground that it was abandoned. Brownlee did raise the

issue before the trial court in the Rule 32 proceedings, but he did not expressly

include it in his appellate brief challenging the denial of his Rule 32 motion.

Instead, he stated in a footnote of the brief that he was preserving all of the issues

raised in his initial Rule 32 petition. As the Court of Criminal Appeals noted, this

footnote was insufficient to preserve an issue under Alabama law. See Brownlee,

666 So. 2d at 93; see also Burks v. State, 600 So. 2d 374, 380 (Ala. Crim. App.

1991) (“Errors assigned and not argued will be treated as abandoned. Issues listed

in [a] brief but not argued will not be reviewed on appeal. Allegations not

expressly argued on appeal are deemed by us to be abandoned.”) (citations,

quotations, and punctuation omitted). Plainly, this ruling constituted a dismissal of

the claim on a procedural ground, thus barring federal habeas review.

53
 Brownlee does not contest the determination that the claim was abandoned.

Instead, as with the other claims, he argues that the “cause and prejudice”

exception should apply because counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve

properly his racial bias claims, which include contentions that the prosecutor made

prejudicial remarks and that African-Americans were improperly stricken from the

jury in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d

69 (1986). We disagree. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise these

issues because they clearly lack merit. As the trial court found in its Rule 32

ruling, and the district court agreed, nothing in the prosecutor’s remarks during the

trial indicates any sign of racial bias. Furthermore, trial counsel stated in post-

conviction testimony credited by the trial judge that there appeared to be no basis

for a Batson challenge. Since Brownlee cannot show that counsel was ineffective

for failing to preserve this issue, he cannot overcome the procedural default.18

Because all of the claims challenging the conviction are either without merit

or procedurally defaulted, we agree with the district court that Brownlee is not

entitled to habeas corpus relief vacating the conviction.19

18
As an additional matter, we note that even if Brownlee could show that his trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to preserve these claims, he has made no attempt to excuse his post-
conviction counsel’s apparent failure to raise the issue in the Rule 32 appellate brief.
19
We reject Brownlee’s additional claim that the district court erred in declining to
conduct an evidentiary hearing on his petition. On habeas review, “[a] petitioner is entitled to an

54
 III.

Although we agree with the district court’s determination that Brownlee’s

conviction should not be vacated, a thorough review of the record and governing

law compels a different conclusion with respect to the sentence of death imposed

by the state court. Because counsel’s failure to investigate, obtain, or present any

evidence of mitigating circumstances to the sentencing jury constituted ineffective

evidentiary hearing in federal court if he alleges facts which, if proven, would entitle him to
relief.” Cave v. Singletary, 971 F.2d 1513, 1516 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Townsend v. Sain, 372
U.S. 293, 83 S. Ct. 745, 9 L. Ed. 2d 770 (1963)). Because state court findings of fact are entitled
to a presumption of correctness, however, a federal court should conduct a hearing on factual
questions only if the state did not conduct “a full, fair, and adequate hearing.” Routly v.
Singletary, 33 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(6)). The
petitioner bears the burden of establishing the need for an evidentiary hearing in federal court.
See id.

Brownlee does not, and indeed cannot, deny that he received an evidentiary hearing on
his Rule 32 claims in the state court. Instead, he argues that the hearing resulted in inadequate
findings of fact because the state court merely adopted verbatim a proposed order submitted by
the State. Even though Brownlee is correct that we have criticized the verbatim adoption of
proposed orders, the Supreme Court and this Court have consistently upheld the use of such
orders as long as they were adopted after adequate evidentiary proceedings and are fully
supported by the evidence. See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105
S. Ct.1504, 1511, 84 L. Ed. 2d 518 (1985); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S.
651, 656, 84 S. Ct. 1044, 1047, 12 L. Ed. 2d 129 (1964); Ammons v. Dade City, 783 F.2d 982,
984 n.4 (11th Cir. 1986). As in Ammons, the extensive record from the Rule 32 proceedings in
this case “eliminates any doubt about the [trial] judge’s involvement in the matter and careful
analysis of . . . [the] evidence.” Ammons, 783 F.2d at 984 n.4.

Brownlee’s argument that he should have received an evidentiary hearing is further
undermined by his failure to identify any evidence that he would have presented that could have
supported his petition to vacate the conviction. As for his challenge to the conviction, Brownlee
has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing.
See Breedlove v. Moore, 279 F.3d 952, 959 (11th Cir. 2002) (“We review a district court’s
decision to deny an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion.”); see also Routly, 33 F.3d at
1284.

55
assistance of counsel, Brownlee is entitled to habeas corpus relief and a new

sentencing proceeding consistent with the Sixth Amendment’s command that a

defendant receive the effective assistance of counsel.

A.

The standard for ineffective assistance of counsel remains the same in the

sentencing portion of a capital case as it is at the guilt/innocence phase. Again, in

order to prove a Sixth Amendment violation, a petitioner must show first that

counsel performed deficiently, and second that the deficient performance

prejudiced the defense. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.

Brownlee’s primary claim of ineffective assistance at sentencing is that counsel

failed to investigate or present any evidence of mitigating circumstances to the

jury, especially in light of a lengthy and significant record of mitigating

circumstances. Brownlee argues that if counsel had presented in the jury phase

evidence of his personal history, specifically including his serious psychiatric

problems and substantial intellectual limitations as well as his long history of drug

and alcohol abuse, the jurors would have found mitigating circumstances and also

determined that the mitigators were not outweighed by the aggravating

circumstances. In that case, the jury would have recommended life imprisonment

instead of death.

56
 The State responds that any deficiency in counsel’s performance at

sentencing was not prejudicial for two reasons. First, it contends that the evidence

supporting mitigating circumstances, which was introduced by Brownlee in the

Rule 32 proceedings, would not have convinced the jury to recommend life

imprisonment instead of death. Second, the State argues that even if counsel’s

deficiency might have affected the sentencing jury’s advisory verdict, any error

was necessarily cured when the trial judge, who had ultimate sentencing authority

under Alabama law, considered Brownlee’s mitigating evidence and still chose to

impose a sentence of death. Brownlee counters that a failure to present evidence in

the jury phase of an Alabama capital sentencing cannot be cured by presenting

evidence to the judge, who, under the Alabama sentencing scheme, is required to

“consider” the jury’s recommendation.

On appeal, the State notably does not contest the district court’s

determination that counsel performed deficiently under the first prong of

Strickland by failing to investigate or present any evidence of mitigating

circumstances at the jury phase of the sentencing. Indeed, in response to questions

from the panel at oral argument, counsel for the respondent said that the State was

litigating the appeal solely on the prejudice prong and conceded that “[w]e’re not

contesting the district court’s finding of deficient performance.” In light of the

57
State’s concession, we do not have before us the question of whether counsel

performed deficiently, and we accept, for purposes of this appeal, the district

court’s determination that counsel’s performance was in fact “outside the wide

range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.

Ct. at 2066.

This concession is not surprising in view of the district court’s finding that

“[t]he evidence shows [Brownlee’s] attorneys failed to conduct any kind of

substantive investigation into his background or character for purposes of

presenting potentially mitigating evidence at sentencing until after the jury

returned its advisory verdict, and that such constituted deficient performance

within the meaning of Strickland.” The district court plainly disagreed with the

state court’s determinations that there was no mitigating evidence to present and

that the decision to present no mitigating evidence was strategic. With regard to

the existence of mitigating evidence, the district court explained that “Brownlee’s

counsel had not done any investigation into Brownlee’s background or character,

so they did not know what evidence there might have been to present” and that

“virtually any evidence shedding light on a defendant’s background, character, or

prospects for rehabilitation or adjustment to prison life is relevant to mitigation and

is to be considered by the sentencer when offered.” In addition, the district court

58
expressly rejected the argument that the decision to present no mitigating evidence

was strategic, noting that Dunn and Kendrick “did not . . . pursue a penalty phase

strategy emphasizing residual doubt,” and that counsel in fact based much of their

argument on the “emotional and personal” appeal that Brownlee was a “living,

breathing human being.” As the district court found, such a strategy would have

benefitted from evidence of Brownlee’s background and character.

Because of the unusual circumstances of this case, in which the State does

not contest that counsel performed deficiently, the sole question under Strickland is

whether Brownlee can prove prejudice as a result of his counsel’s deficient

performance. As discussed above, a court will find prejudice only if counsel’s

errors “undermine confidence in the outcome” of the proceeding. Strickland, 466

U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. Our confidence is undermined if the petitioner can

“show that there is a reasonable probability that . . . the result of the proceeding

would have been different” if counsel had not committed “unprofessional errors.”

Id. Significantly, although a petitioner must show that counsel’s errors had more

than “some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding,” Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 394, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1514, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000), the

Supreme Court has said that a petitioner is not required to show that “counsel’s

deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case,” Strickland,

59
466 U.S. at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2068; see also Mincey v. Head, 206 F.3d 1106, 1143

(11th Cir. 2000) (“The ‘more likely than not’ standard would be more demanding

than what is required under Strickland.”). Rather, as the Supreme Court has held,

“the ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the

proceeding whose result is being challenged.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696, 104 S.

Ct. at 2069.

As long as “the result of the particular proceeding is unreliable because of a

breakdown in the adversarial process that our system counts on to produce just

results,” our confidence is undermined. Id. Phrased another way, “[t]he result of a

proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even

if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to

have determined the outcome.” Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068; see also Brown v.

Jones, 255 F.3d 1273, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001) (“A petitioner satisfies the prejudice

prong when he shows that trial counsel’s deficient performance deprived him of ‘a

trial whose result is reasonable.’”) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct.

at 2064).

For a Strickland claim involving counsel’s failure to present any mitigating

evidence in the sentencing phase of a capital case, our confidence in a sentence of

death is undermined if the petitioner can show that “but for counsel’s

60
unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the sentencer would

have weighed the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors to find that the

circumstances did not warrant the death penalty.” Weeks v. Jones, 26 F.3d 1030,

1042 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting Bush v. Singletary, 988 F.2d 1082, 1090 (11th Cir.

1993)). We have explained that “[t]he appropriate analysis of the prejudice prong

of Strickland requires an evaluation of ‘the totality of the available mitigation

evidence -- both that adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in the habeas

proceedings -- in reweighing it against the evidence in aggravation.’” Bottoson v.

Moore, 234 F.3d 526, 534 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Taylor, 529 U.S. at 397-98,

120 S. Ct. at 1515). If, after conducting this analysis, we determine that the capital

sentencing was “fundamentally unfair” and that the death sentence was therefore

“unreliable,” our confidence has been undermined and the petitioner is entitled to

relief. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700, 104 S. Ct. at 2071.

Under the facts of this case, we are compelled to conclude that counsel’s

failure to investigate, obtain, or present any mitigating evidence to the jury, let

alone the powerful mitigating evidence of Brownlee’s borderline mental

retardation, psychiatric disorders, and history of drug and alcohol abuse,

undermines our confidence in Brownlee’s death sentence. As an initial matter, we

note that counsel faced no legal restrictions in presenting a wide range of

61
mitigating evidence. Alabama law defines mitigating evidence generously, giving

jurors and judges wide discretion to decide that a given fact constitutes a mitigating

factor. The capital sentencing statute lists seven specific mitigating circumstances,

see Ala. Code § 13A-5-51, including that the offense “was committed while the

defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,” id.

§ 13A-5-51(2), and that “[t]he capacity of the defendant to appreciate the

criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law

was substantially impaired,” id. at § 13A-5-51(6). The statute then establishes that,

in addition to those factors, “mitigating circumstances shall include any aspect of a

defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the

defendant offers as a basis for life imprisonment without parole instead of death,”

as well as “any other relevant mitigating circumstance.” Id. § 13A-5-52; see also,

e.g., Beck v. State, 396 So. 2d 645, 663 (Ala. 1980) (holding that “the court must

permit the defendant to introduce any matter relating to any mitigating

circumstances”); Haney v. State, 603 So. 2d 368, 389 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991)

(discussing defendant’s right to “a full and unrestricted opportunity to present

mitigating evidence regarding her character, background, motivations, and record

and the circumstances of the offense”).

Indeed, the broad inclusion of mitigating evidence is mandated not only by

62
the Alabama statute, but also by the Supreme Court and this Court, which have

repeatedly emphasized the constitutional right of a defendant facing the death

penalty to present any relevant evidence of mitigating circumstances. In Lockett v.

Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 57 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1978), the Supreme Court

explained that the “qualitative difference between death and other penalties calls

for a greater degree of reliability when the death sentence is imposed,” and thus

held that “the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all

but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a

mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the

circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence

less than death.” Id. at 604, 98 S. Ct. at 2964-65. As we said in Bolender v.

Singletary, 16 F.3d 1547, 1562 n. 18 (11th Cir. 1994), Lockett and its progeny

“stand for the proposition that a defendant in a capital case has the right to present

any relevant and competent mitigating evidence to the sentencer.” See generally

Dobbs v. Turpin, 142 F.3d 1383, 1386-87 (11th Cir. 1998) (“The purpose of a

sentencing hearing is to provide the jury with the information necessary for it to

render an individualized sentencing determination based upon the character and

record of the individualized offender and the circumstances of the particular

offense.”) (internal punctuation and citations omitted).

63
 If counsel had exercised Brownlee’s right to present all relevant and

competent mitigating evidence, the jury would have heard compelling evidence

addressing two statutory mitigating circumstances -- that the crime “was

committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or

emotional disturbance,” Ala. Code. § 13A-5-51(2), and that “[t]he capacity of the

defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to

the requirements of the law was substantially impaired,” id. § 13A-5-51(6) -- as

well as several significant non-statutory mitigating factors, see id. § 13A-5-52.

These factors are amply supported by evidence of Brownlee’s borderline

mental retardation, serious psychiatric illnesses, and extensive drug abuse,

particularly on the night in question. In testimony uncontradicted by the State, Dr.

Beidleman explained that Brownlee had an IQ score “in the range of 67, 68, 75.”

He characterized Brownlee as borderline mentally retarded and said that his

“limited intellectual resources” left him “right on the borderline between having

severe social and occupational impairment . . . and being able to cope in a sort of

mildly adaptive manner, right on the edge.” According to Dr. Beidleman,

Brownlee’s substantial intellectual limitations were compounded by a variety of

significant psychiatric disorders, including schizotypal personality disorder,

antisocial personality disorder, various drug dependencies, and seizure disorder or

64
epilepsy. As described by Dr. Beidleman, these disorders were real and

substantial. Schizotypal personality disorder, for example, is marked by thought

disturbance, paranoid ideation, and excessive social anxiety. Moreover,

Brownlee’s frequent seizures, as described by his sisters and neighbor, included

terrifying episodes in which he would lose consciousness, cause significant

damage to his surroundings and his own body, and fall to the floor convulsing,

with his mouth foaming, his eyes rolling back in his head, and his tongue in danger

of being swallowed. One episode even involved Brownlee’s effort to jump out the

window of a second-story apartment.

At the Rule 32 proceeding, Dr. Beidleman explained that the combination of

Brownlee’s limited intellectual functioning and psychiatric disorders left him with

“diminished capacity.” Particularly if Brownlee had been using drugs before going

to Jodie’s Lounge,20 Dr. Beidleman testified that Brownlee would have been

“significantly impaired” as a result of his various disorders at the time of the crime,

and “[h]e would have [had] difficulty guiding his actions and might have [had]

difficulty conforming his behavior.” Dr. Beidleman discussed Brownlee’s

impairments in these terms:

20
In addition to Goodgame’s testimony that Brownlee had been using drugs before going
to Jodie’s Lounge, Dr. Beidleman testified in the judicial sentencing hearing that Brownlee
reported using cocaine, talwin, and alcohol during the crime.

65
 Well, certainly I think you have to first examine his intellectual level,
he’s operating with very diminished intellectual capacity, if the prison
records and my evaluations are accurate, he certainly doesn’t function
with more than 75 IQ points. Based on that alone, you expect
diminished judgment, poor social intelligence. When you add the
factors of drug and alcohol abuse and perhaps extreme levels of both,
it is hard to tell for sure, but if he was abusing those substances, they
would have an accumulative effect on these other disorders.

Dr. Beidleman further explained that, because of his substantial intellectual

limitations and psychiatric illnesses, Brownlee differed markedly from other

individuals who drank alcohol or used drugs. Addressing counsel, he explained,

“if you drank sufficiently to be impaired, you still have the pluses . . . of being

highly intelligent, having some social control over your behavior and not having

the existence of any present psychiatric disorders, like his personality disorder.”

Brownlee, on the other hand, lacked any of these “pluses.”

Our confidence in the advisory sentencing verdict is undermined because the

jury did not hear any of this significant testimony. First, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors in failing to present Dr. Beidleman’s diagnoses and the

supporting evidence to the jury, there is a reasonable probability that the

combination of Brownlee’s serious psychiatric disorders and his drug use would

have supported a finding that the crime was committed “under the influence of

extreme mental or emotional disturbance.” Ala. Code § 13A-5-51(2). As Dr.

Beidleman explained, Brownlee suffered from various disturbances and psychiatric

66
disorders even when he was not abusing drugs, and his disorders included seizures

in which he would do harm to himself and engage in other uncontrollable behavior.

Once drugs were taken, Brownlee likely experienced an “extreme mental or

emotional disturbance” under § 13A-5-51(2). See McNabb v. State, -- So. 2d --,

2002 Westlaw 126987, at *2 (Ala. Crim. App. Feb. 1, 2002) (discussing court’s

finding of statutory mitigation based on defendant’s voluntary cocaine use and

resulting “cocaine paranoia”).

Also under the Alabama statute, there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the jury would have found that “[t]he capacity of

the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct

to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired.” Ala. Code § 13A-5-

51(6). According to Dr. Beidleman, Brownlee’s capacity was diminished by his

limited intellectual functioning and psychiatric disorders alone. Drug or alcohol

use on the day of the crime would have substantially aggravated these pre-existing

limitations. Although the drug use, standing alone, would not have qualified

Brownlee for the mitigating circumstance under § 13A-5-51(6), see Ferguson v.

State, 814 So. 2d 925, 964 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000), the jury could have found this

statutory mitigator if Brownlee’s “level of intoxication was so great that his ability

to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the law

67
was substantially impaired,” id.21 Further, while substantial evidence showed that

Brownlee had a limited ability to control his actions or judge right and wrong as a

result of his psychiatric disorders, intellectual impairments, and drug abuse, none

of this evidence was presented to the jury due to counsel’s deficient performance.

Our confidence is further undermined because, in addition to the statutory

mitigating circumstances, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have

found non-statutory mitigating circumstances to exist. Most importantly, we

believe that the jury could have found a mitigating circumstance based on

Brownlee’s borderline intellectual functioning and psychiatric disorders, which,

again, included schizotypal personality disorder, antisocial personality disorder,

multiple drug dependencies, and a violent seizure disorder or epilepsy. See, e.g.,

Smith v. State, -- So. 2d --, 2002 WL 126985, at *57 (Ala. Crim. App. Feb. 1,

2002) (listing defendant Willie Smith’s “verbal I.Q. of 75, classified as the

borderline range between mild retardation and low-average intelligence” as a

21
We recognize that emphasizing a defendant’s intoxication at the time of a murder could
weaken a case for a life sentence because “a showing of alcohol and drug abuse is a two-edged
sword.” Robinson v. Moore, -- F.3d --, 2002 Westlaw 1815705, at *24 (11th Cir. Aug. 8, 2002)
(quoting Tompkins v. Moore, 193 F.3d 1327, 1338 (11th Cir. 1999)). Nevertheless, we believe
in the instant case that Brownlee would have benefitted from the presentation of such evidence
because, as Dr. Beidleman testified, Brownlee’s drug use and intoxication at the time of the
crime exacerbated his pre-existing severe intellectual limitations and psychiatric disorders. On
the peculiar facts of this case, the jury would not have been asked to find that the Brownlee’s
drug use, standing alone, was a mitigating circumstance.

68
“properly found” mitigating factor); Smith v. State, -- So. 2d --, 2000 WL 1868419

(Ala. Crim. App. Aug. 31, 2001) (listing defendant Jerry Smith’s borderline mental

retardation as properly found mitigating factor); Clisby v. State, 456 So. 2d 99, 102

(Ala. Crim. App. 1983) (holding that evidence of psychiatric disorders such as

antisocial personality “must be considered as relevant mitigating evidence”)

(emphasis in original).

Evidence of Brownlee’s severe intellectual limitations is particularly

significant in light of the United States Supreme Court’s recent holding in Atkins

v. Virginia, -- U.S. --, 122 S. Ct. 2242, -- L. Ed. 2d -- (2002), that the Eighth

Amendment categorically prohibits the execution of mentally retarded individuals.

As the Supreme Court explained, mental retardation is generally defined as having

an IQ below 70, see id. at -- n.5, 122 S. Ct. at 2245, accompanied by “significant

limitations in adaptive skills such as communication, self-care, and self-direction

that become manifest before age 18,” id. at --, 122 S. Ct. at 2250. An individual

who is mentally retarded has a “diminished capacit[y] to understand and process

information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience,

to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions

of others.” Id. (footnote omitted). In Atkins, the Supreme Court said that even

though the deficiencies faced by mentally retarded individuals “do not warrant an

69
exemption from criminal sanctions, . . . they do diminish their personal

culpability.” Id. at --, 122 S. Ct. at 2250-51. As a result, the Court held that “the

mentally retarded should be categorically excluded from execution” because they

are less deserving of society’s ultimate retribution and less susceptible to the

deterrent effects of the death penalty. Id. at --, 122 S. Ct. at 2251. The Court also

noted that, for a variety of reasons, “[m]entally retarded defendants in the

aggregate face a special risk of wrongful execution.” Id. at --, 122 S. Ct. at 2252.

Thus, under Atkins, a mentally retarded individual cannot be executed even if a

jury has found multiple aggravating circumstances to exist.

In this case, Brownlee’s trial lawyers had their client examined by only one

clinical psychologist. This examination took place only after the trial judge

suggested that counsel contact Dr. Beidleman, and, notably, only after the jury

phase of the sentencing process was completed. Based on Dr. Beidleman’s

testimony alone, which included evidence that Brownlee’s IQ was “in the range of

67, 68, 75,” there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have found that

Brownlee suffered from mild or borderline mental retardation, or that a non-

statutory mitigating circumstance existed. Indeed, it is abundantly clear that an

individual “right on the edge” of mental retardation suffers some of the same

limitations of reasoning, understanding, and impulse control as those described by

70
the Supreme Court in Atkins. Counsel’s failure to investigate this issue at all or to

present any of this evidence seriously undermines our confidence in the application

of the death sentence.

We cannot say with certainty what the jury would have done if they had

heard the substantial mitigating evidence in this case. What we can say is that our

confidence in the jury’s balancing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances,

and its resulting recommendation of death, has been substantially undermined as a

result of counsel’s failure to present to the jury any of the powerful mitigating

evidence that was available. Our concerns are exacerbated in light of lingering

questions about the strength of the case against Brownlee, including whether or not

he fired the fatal shot killing Dodd, which hinged entirely on the testimony of

Goodgame. Unlike Goodgame, Brownlee was not identified by any of the

witnesses as being in the bar during the robbery, and no forensic evidence linked

him to the crime. Moreover, nobody, not even Goodgame, claimed to have seen

Brownlee shoot Dodd. In addition, much of Goodgame’s testimony was

contradicted by Warren and Jones, and all three witnesses who implicated

Brownlee in the crime admitted to using drugs, including cocaine and “T’s and

blues,” extensively on the night in question. Although there was sufficient

evidence to convict Brownlee beyond a reasonable doubt, in light of the many

71
evidential weaknesses linking Brownlee to the murder (including the absence of

any eyewitness identification or scientific evidence and the many material

inconsistencies in the accounts of Goodgame, Warren, and Jones), the substantial

mitigating evidence never presented to the jury looms still larger in the calculus.

As we have observed before, “[t]he primary purpose of the penalty phase is

to insure that the sentence is individualized by focusing [on] the particularized

characteristics of the defendant. By failing to provide such evidence to the jury,

though readily available, trial counsel’s deficient performance prejudice[s a

petitioner’s] ability to receive an individualized sentence.” Cunningham v. Zant,

928 F.2d 1006, 1019 (11th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). In this case, counsel’s

absolute failure to investigate, obtain, or present any evidence, let alone the

powerful, concrete, and specific mitigating evidence that was available, prevented

the jurors from hearing anything at all about the defendant before them. An

individualized sentence, as required by the law, was therefore impossible. Instead,

the jury was asked to decide Virgil Brownlee’s fate without hearing anything about

his borderline mental retardation, his schizotypal personality disorder, his

antisocial personality disorder, his many drug and alcohol dependencies, or his

history of seizures.

As in Collier v. Turpin, 177 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 1999), another case in

72
which counsel’s failure to present adequate mitigating evidence to the jury was

deemed prejudicial, we believe that counsel’s ineffectiveness in fact

precipitated a ‘breakdown in the adversarial process.’ The jury was
called upon to determine whether a man whom they did not know
would live or die; they were not presented with the particularized
circumstances of his past and of his actions on the day of the crime
that would have allowed them fairly to balance the seriousness of his
transgressions with the conditions of his life. Had they been able to
do so, we believe that it is at least reasonably probable that the jury
would have returned a sentence other than death.

Id. at 1204. Quite simply, our confidence is undermined because there is a

reasonable probability that the jury would have recommended a life sentence if it

had heard all of the powerful mitigating evidence that could have been presented.

The result of Brownlee’s sentencing proceeding is “unreliable,” and, on this

incomplete record, the imposition of a death sentence is “fundamentally unfair.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700, 104 S. Ct. at 2071. This finding of prejudice, coupled

with the uncontested finding of deficient performance, establishes Brownlee’s

Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing.

B.

The State also argues that any perceived prejudice in failing to present this

body of mitigating evidence to the jury was altogether cured because the trial judge

heard much of this evidence at the sentencing phase and still decided that there

were no mitigating circumstances. We disagree and hold that, in this case, the

73
constitutional flaw evident at the jury sentencing phase was not cured by the trial

judge.

Our precedent has long indicated that the role of the advisory jury is so

essential that a failure to present mitigating evidence to the jury cannot easily be

cured at the judicial sentencing stage. In Magill v. Dugger, 824 F.2d 879 (11th Cir.

1987), we considered an appeal from a Florida death sentence imposed after the

trial court instructed the sentencing jury that it could not consider evidence of the

defendant’s remorse as a nonstatutory mitigating factor. This instruction violated

the Supreme Court’s mandate in Lockett that a defendant must be allowed to

present any aspect of his character or record, or any circumstances of the crime,

that he deems appropriate as mitigating evidence. See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604, 98

S. Ct. at 1965. The jury then recommended a sentence of death based on the

evidence that it did consider, and the trial court imposed a death sentence. The

Florida Supreme Court vacated the death sentence on grounds unrelated to Lockett,

and on remand the trial judge, without a new advisory jury, again sentenced the

defendant to death.

On habeas corpus review, we held the death sentence unconstitutional

because, due to the Lockett error, the defendant never had the benefit of a

constitutionally proper jury sentencing. We explained that “to hold that

74
resentencing by the court cleanses the taint of the original proceeding would ignore

the importance of the advisory jury in the Florida sentencing scheme.” Magill, 824

F.2d at 894. Under the Florida sentencing scheme, the judge would have had to

follow the jury’s recommendation unless the facts underlying the death sentence

“were so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ as to

the appropriateness of the death penalty.” Id.

Based on the role of the jury in Florida capital sentencing, we explained in

Magill that “[w]e cannot hold that the subsequent resentencing by the court purged

the taint of the original proceedings without infusing an unacceptable level of

arbitrariness into the administration of the death penalty in Florida.” Id. Rather, we

held that “[t]he error can be cured only by a sentencing proceeding before a new

advisory jury.” Id. Although the law in place at the time of Magill allowed a state

to “allocate the sentencing power as it wishe[d] between the judge and jury,” id.

(citation omitted),22 we rejected the idea that “a state may arbitrarily alter this

allocation as it applies to particular defendants,” id. Because Florida law called for

advisory jury proceedings, we noted that “[a] capital defendant is no less entitled to

that advisory jury sentence merely because his original sentencing proceeding was

22
This principle has been altered by the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Ring v.
Arizona, -- U.S. --, 122 S. Ct. 2428, -- L. Ed. 2d -- (2002), that a defendant cannot be sentenced
to death on the basis of an aggravating circumstance found by a sentencing judge sitting without
a jury.

75
infected by constitutional error.” Id.

We reached a virtually identical conclusion in Jones v. Dugger, 867 F.2d

1277 (11th Cir. 1989), another Florida case. In Jones, we held that a judge’s

erroneous instruction to the sentencing jury that it could consider only statutory

mitigating factors was not rendered harmless even though the judge in fact later

considered evidence of the nonstatutory mitigating factors, which consisted of

testimony that the petitioner was loved by his family and behaved well in prison.

See id. at 1280. The decision in Jones rested on the conclusion that the judge’s

error-free consideration of the mitigating evidence did not constitute a “curative

action” in light of “the importance of the advisory jury in the Florida sentencing

scheme.” Id. Indeed, as a panel of this court explained, “because the jury

recommendation resulted from an unconstitutional procedure, the entire sentencing

process has necessarily been tainted. The trial judge’s consideration of

nonstatutory mitigating evidence, therefore, did not render harmless the Lockett

error.” Id. (footnote omitted).

As Alabama’s own law and cases from the United States Supreme Court

clearly show, the similarities between the Florida and Alabama capital sentencing

systems make the reasoning of Magill and Jones entirely applicable to this case.

The role of the sentencing jury is essential in Alabama as it is in Florida

76
even though the Florida capital sentencing statute requires the judge to afford

“great weight” to the jury’s recommendation and allows him to override a life

sentence only if “virtually no reasonable person” could disagree with a sentence of

death, Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975), while in Alabama the trial

court is required only to “consider” the jury recommendation. Alabama’s capital

sentencing statute establishes unambiguously that the judge “shall consider the

recommendation contained in the advisory verdict.” Ala. Code § 13A-5-47(e)

(emphasis added). While the statute does not specify the precise weight that a trial

judge must afford the jury’s recommendation, see, e.g., Ex parte Taylor, 808 So. 2d

1215, 1217-18 (Ala. 2001), the use of the term “shall consider” indicates that a

court is required to reflect actively and carefully on the jury’s recommendation, as

consideration clearly involves more than a passing thought, see, e.g., Nat’l

Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 608, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2189, 141

L. Ed. 2d 500 (1998) (Souter, J., dissenting) (describing “taking into

consideration” as a “conscious activity,” involving “continuous and careful

thought; examination; deliberation; attention”) (quotations and citations omitted);

see also Black’s Law Dictionary 277 (5th ed. 1979) (defining “consider” as “[t]o

fix the mind on, with a view to careful examination; to examine; to inspect. To

deliberate about and ponder over. To entertain or give heed to.”); Webster’s Third

77
New Int’l Dictionary, 483 (1986) (listing, as first definition, “to reflect on: think

about with a degree of care or caution”).

Indeed, like the Florida Supreme Court, whose descriptions of the

importance of the jury’s role played an important part in our decisions in Magill

and Jones, the Alabama Supreme Court has itself explained that a trial judge in

Alabama must take into account a recommendation from the sentencing jury under

the state’s capital sentencing scheme. In Ex parte Williams, 556 So. 2d 744 (Ala.

1987), the court held that a sentencing jury’s consideration of an improper

aggravating factor was not cured by the trial judge’s removal of that improper

factor from his equation when he decided whether to accept the jury’s

recommendation of death.23 As the court explained in Williams, Alabama’s capital

sentencing statute gives the jury an essential role in the sentencing process that is,

in fact, as important as the role of the judge:

The legislatively mandated role of the jury in returning an advisory
verdict, based upon its consideration of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, can not be abrogated by the trial court’s errorless
exercise of its equally mandated role as the ultimate sentencing
authority. Each part of the sentencing process is equally mandated by
the statute; and the errorless application by the court of its part does
not cure the erroneous application by the jury of its part. . . . To hold

23
The jury in Williams was instructed that it could consider, as an aggravating
circumstance, the fact that the defendant was under a sentence of imprisonment when he
committed the capital offense. Before the judicial sentencing hearing, however, it was
established that the defendant had in fact not been under such a sentence.

78
 otherwise is to hold that the sentencing role of the jury, as required by
statute, counts for nothing so long as the court’s exercise of its role is
without error.

Id. at 745 (citing Ala. Code §§ 13A-5-46, 47(e)). As the Alabama statute and the

discussion in Williams make clear, Alabama has developed a capital sentencing

scheme in which the role of the sentencing jury is no less important than in Florida.

The United States Supreme Court recognized this principal in Harris v.

Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 514-15, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1036-37, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1004

(1995), when it held that Alabama’s capital sentencing system is consonant with

the Eighth Amendment even though it does not specify the precise weight that a

judge must give to the jury’s verdict. Discussing the central role of the advisory

jury in Alabama, the Court explained that an Alabama death sentence must be

reversed if there has been a constitutional error in the jury phase: “If the judge

must consider the jury verdict in sentencing a capital defendant, as the statute

plainly requires, then it follows that a sentence is invalid if the recommendation

upon which it partially rests was rendered erroneously.” Harris, 513 U.S. at 512,

115 S. Ct. at 1036.

In explaining why the role of the jury is essential under Alabama’s capital

sentencing system, the Supreme Court discussed the principle announced earlier in

Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 112 S. Ct. 2926, 120 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1992), that

79
the presentation of an improper aggravating factor to the sentencing jury renders a

death sentence invalid even if the trial judge did not consider that improper

aggravating factor in reaching the final sentence.24 The Harris Court explained

that such an error before the sentencing jury would not be harmless in Alabama

just because a judge there, unlike a judge in Florida, is not required to give any

particular weight to the jury’s verdict. Instead, the Supreme Court observed that

“consequential error attaches whenever the jury recommendation is considered in

the process, not only when it is given great weight by the judge.” Harris, 513 U.S.

at 513, 115 S. Ct. at 1036. This is so because “the indirect weighing of an invalid

aggravating factor creates the same potential for arbitrariness as the direct

weighing of an invalid aggravating factor.” (citing Espinosa, 505 U.S. at 1082, 112

24
In Espinosa, the jury was given an unconstitutionally vague instruction describing the
aggravating circumstance for an “especially wicked, evil, atrocious or cruel” murder. The State
argued that even though the instruction allowed the jury to consider an improper aggravating
factor, any error was cured because the trial judge, acted independently, weighed the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances properly. The United States Supreme Court rejected this
argument, holding that “if a weighing State decides to place capital sentencing authority in two
actors rather than one, neither actor must be permitted to weigh invalid aggravating
circumstances.” 505 U.S. at 1082, 112 S. Ct. at 2929.

In Fortenberry v. Haley, -- F.3d --, 2002 Westlaw 1574989, at *10 n.7 (11th Cir. July 17,
2002), we recently held that the petitioner’s Espinosa claim provided no basis for habeas corpus
relief because his conviction became final before the Supreme Court issued Espinosa, a decision
the Supreme Court has deemed not retroactive. See id. at --. Because our decision does not rely
on Espinosa, Brownlee does not face a similar retroactivity problem. Our decision rests on the
reasoning of Strickland, Magill and Jones, all of which were issued before Brownlee’s
conviction became final.

80
S. Ct. at 2928.

As Harris makes clear, the rationale behind Magill and Jones applies with

equal force in Alabama as in Florida. It is evident that, as discussed above, a

prejudicial error in the jury phase of a bifurcated sentencing proceeding, such as

the Sixth Amendment violation in this case, prevents the jury from issuing a valid

advisory verdict. Without such a verdict, the trial judge is unable to perform his

statutorily-mandated task of considering the jury’s opinion and building upon that

opinion to fashion an appropriate sentence for the defendant. As a result, a

prejudicial error in the jury phase, such as a violation of the Sixth Amendment’s

right to counsel, taints the entire sentencing proceeding. Allowing a judge to cure

this taint in the case of an individual defendant could limit the significance of the

jury participation required by statute and would risk, as we explained in Magill,

“infus[ing] an unacceptable level of arbitrariness into the administration of the

death penalty.” 824 F.2d at 894. This is equally true in Alabama as it is in Florida.

Because the Alabama legislature has given the jury an essential role in the

sentencing process, that role cannot readily be abrogated.

The particular importance of the jury’s role in the application of the death

sentence has been re-emphasized by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ring,

which held the Sixth Amendment does not allow “a sentencing judge, sitting

81
without a jury, to find . . . aggravating circumstance[s] necessary for imposition of

the death penalty,” and instead “requires that they be found by a jury.” -- U.S. at --,

122 S. Ct. at 2443. As the Court explained, the constitutional right to a jury trial

guarantees that if a defendant facing the death penalty “prefer[s] the common-sense

judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the

single judge, he [is] to have it.” Id. (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,

156, 88 S. Ct. 1444, 1451, 20 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1968)). Based on this principle, Ring

expressly invalidated the capital sentencing laws of Arizona and four other states

that “commit both capital sentencing factfinding and the ultimate sentencing

decision entirely to judges,” id. at -- n.6, 122 S. Ct. at 2442, but the Supreme Court

did not address the constitutionality of the Alabama and Florida systems, “in which

the jury renders an advisory verdict but the judge makes the ultimate sentencing

determinations.” Id. In this appeal, we have no need to address the many

complicated issues raised by Ring because Brownlee’s sentence was improperly

rendered under longstanding principles articulated in Strickland and in Magill and

Jones.25 Plainly, however, Ring reinforces our earlier holdings regarding the

25
It is apparent that the jury in this case did find at least one aggravating circumstance to
exist beyond a reasonable doubt. In finding Brownlee guilty of murdering Dodd during the
robbery of Jodie’s Lounge, the jury necessarily found that “[t]he capital offense was committed
while the defendant was engaged or was an accomplice in the commission of . . . robbery,”an
aggravator under Ala. Code § 13A-5-49(4).

82
central role of the jury in the capital sentencing process.

Quite simply, precedent from the Supreme Court and this Circuit makes

clear that, in light of the central role that Alabama has assigned to the capital

sentencing jury, a judge must be able to consider a constitutionally valid jury

recommendation of life or death when sentencing a capital defendant. In this case,

no such recommendation was available to the judge because the jury did not hear

any of the powerful mitigating evidence that should have been presented.26 The

role of the jury is too important, and the right to introduce all mitigating evidence

is too essential, to permit a judge to correct so egregious a failure by counsel to

investigate, obtain, or present powerful mitigating evidence to the sentencing jury.

Additionally, just as we find no basis to distinguish Magill and Jones based

on the fact that this case involves the law of Alabama, rather than Florida, we also

can find no basis to distinguish them because the constitutional violation in the jury

26
We also note that, even in the judicial sentencing proceeding, the trial court did not hear
all of the mitigating evidence that counsel could have presented. Indeed, significant portions of
Brownlee’s mitigating evidence were not presented until the Rule 32 proceedings. For example,
based on his three meetings with Brownlee and his review of records that had not been made
available before the judicial sentencing, Dr. Beidleman testified in detail at the Rule 32 hearing
about Brownlee’s intellectual limitations and the effects that those limitations had on the day of
the crime. In fact, it was not until the Rule 32 proceeding that the trial court heard that
Brownlee’s IQ was “in the range of 67, 68, 75 IQ points.” It was also adduced from Dr.
Beidleman that Brownlee’s IQ was tested while he was in prison and that it had tested at 69. The
Rule 32 proceedings also included far more information about Brownlee’s seizure disorder based
on Dr. Beidleman’s review of previously-unpresented records as well as the detailed testimony
of Brownlee’s sisters and neighbor, Maxine Driver.

83
sentencing phase of Brownlee’s case involved the Sixth Amendment, not the

Eighth Amendment. Although we have never had occasion to apply Magill and

Jones to a case in which the jury’s failure to consider mitigating evidence resulted

from ineffective assistance of counsel as opposed to an erroneous jury instruction,

it is clear that the principle announced in those cases should apply here. We can

find no logical, legal, or historical reason to hold otherwise. Indeed, the Sixth

Amendment’s right to counsel is a “fundamental” right that is, at the very least,

every bit as critical as the Eighth Amendment’s right to present mitigating

evidence to the jury. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684-85, 104 S. Ct. at 2063 (“[T]he

Sixth Amendment right to counsel . . . is needed[] in order to protect the

fundamental right to a fair trial. . . . The right to counsel plays a crucial role in the

adversarial system embodied in the Sixth Amendment, since access to counsel’s

skill and knowledge is necessary to accord defendants the ample opportunity to

meet the case of the prosecution.”) (quotations omitted). As a result of the

constitutional error, Brownlee’s jury -- like the juries in Magill and Jones -- did not

have any opportunity to hear or evaluate powerful mitigating evidence.27 The

27
The evidence in mitigation in this case is far more powerful than the evidence that was
not considered by the jury in Magill or Jones. The unconsidered mitigating evidence in Magill
consisted solely of the defendant’s expressions of remorse, while the evidence not considered in
Jones consisted of character testimony from the defendant’s sister and a prison guard.

84
advisory verdict was therefore unconstitutionally flawed and there was no

constitutionally reliable jury recommendation for the sentencing court to consider.

In short, because Brownlee plainly received ineffective assistance of counsel

that prevented the sentencing jury from considering powerful mitigating evidence

and necessarily prevented the trial judge from “considering” any constitutionally

valid jury recommendation, the death sentence cannot stand. The constitutional

error in this case can be cured only by a sentencing proceeding before a new jury.

See Magill, 824 F.2d at 894.28

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of

Brownlee’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to his conviction,

REVERSE the ruling of the district court denying Brownlee’s petition as to his

sentence of death, and REMAND this case with the instruction that the district

court grant the writ of habeas corpus vacating Brownlee’s sentence of death.

AFFIRMED, in part, REVERSED, in part, and REMANDED with

instructions.

28
In light of our holding that Brownlee is entitled to a new sentencing proceeding, we
need not address his other allegations of sentencing error.

85
EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, concurring in the judgment:

I concur in the judgment. I stress that the State, in the appeal, did not contest

the district court’s determination that trial counsel performed deficiently at

sentencing. So, the first element (the performance element) of Strickland was

never put into controversy in this appeal. I also stress that I doubt -- and do not

understand today’s opinion to say -- that the failure to introduce evidence of mild

or borderline mental retardation in a capital sentencing proceeding will be, or

almost always will be, or even usually will be enough to satisfy the prejudice

element of Strickland. We need to be cautious about applying what is said in the

context of Eighth Amendment opinions in the materially different context of

deciding ineffective-assistance-of-counsel cases.

86