UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 95-30238
(Summary Calendar)
_______________
JERRY HANDY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE CO. OF AMERICA
and THIOKOL CORP.,
Defendants-Appellees.
_______________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Louisiana
(94 335)
_______________________________________________
August 29, 1995
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DUHÉ, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Jerry Handy appeals the district court's affirmance of the
decision of the administrator of his employer's ERISA plan,
Prudential Insurance Co. ("Prudential"), to terminate and to
decline to reinstate Handy's long-term disability benefits. We
affirm.
I
*
Local Rule 47.5.1 provides: "The publication of opinions that have
no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-
settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens on
the legal profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published.
When Handy was injured in an automobile accident, he was a
participant in a benefit plan established by his employer, Thiokol
Corp. ("Thiokol"), and administered by Prudential. Under the
benefit plan's long-term disability provisions, Handy received
long-term disability benefits through January 3, 1993, the date his
attending physicians released him to return to work. Handy did not
return to work and requested continuation of his long-term
disability benefits.
The stipulated record includes several memoranda from
Prudential's claim file concerning Handy. These memoranda describe
the actions taken by Prudential to administer Handy's claim for
long-term disability benefits. The record also includes several
reports from various physicians concerning Handy's condition.
After his physicians released him to return to work, Handy
consulted Dr. Thomas Johnson, who diagnosed "a general weakening of
the supportive soft tissue structures" in Handy's lower back
requiring additional treatment "to normalize the connective
tissues, osseous structures of the spinal column, and remove the
spinal nerve interference." Dr. Johnson's report, however, did not
indicate whether Handy could perform his job or any other type of
work and did not state specifically the nature of the "abnormal
deviations" exhibited by an x-ray. Accordingly, a Prudential
memorandum noted that it was "unclear as to what was exactly found
on [the] x-ray" and concluded that it did "not appear th[at
Handy's] condition [was] severe enough to keep [him] from
performing his job as an Inspector."
-2-
Prudential then contacted Handy and verified that Thiokol had
informed him that it had a position available for him that would
accommodate his medical restrictions. The memorandum indicates
that Handy told Prudential that he was "not interested" in the
position Thiokol had made available. A few days later, Prudential
contacted Thiokol to determine the specific nature of the available
position. A Thiokol representative informed Prudential that
Thiokol had a position available as of January 4, 1993, that "was
similar to what [Handy] had done before but less physically
demanding," and that "this would have been the job [Handy] would
have returned to" because Handy was "still considered an
Inspector."
The same day, Prudential contacted Handy's treating physicians
for additional information.1 The memorandum indicates that Dr.
Prakasam placed a 50-pound lifting restriction on Handy, but that
Handy "could perform the Thiokol position that [he] would be
returning to." The memorandum also indicates that Dr. Taylor "was
very enthusiastic about [the] new position," which "should be
within Mr. Handy's limitations," and that Handy "could have
returned to this position on 1/4/93."
A few days later, Prudential "obtained some additional
information from Dr. Prakasam and Dr. Taylor which substantiates a
disability for [Handy] through 1/3/93. At this time, these
physicians agree that Mr. Handy could have returned to his
occupation as an Inspector on 1/4/93 based on the position
1
These were the physicians who had released Handy to return to work.
-3-
available to him." This memorandum also indicated that Dr. Guice,
a chiropractor whom Handy had consulted, wanted an additional week
or more of treatment before releasing Handy, but that "Dr. Guice
[had] no information regarding Handy's past medical history and
could not provide any objective findings to warrant a continued
disability."2
Based on this information, Prudential concluded that because
Drs. Prakasam and Taylor had released Handy to return to work to a
"job available to him which apparently now has less physical
demands than before," Handy no longer qualified for long-term
disability benefits. Consequently, Prudential notified Handy that:
"On January 4, 1993, you were released to return to an Inspector
position at Thiokol Corporation. Since this job accommodated your
functional capabilities, LTD benefits are not payable beyond
January 3, 1993."
After Prudential decided to terminate Handy's disability
benefits, Handy sought additional medical advice from Dr. Cotter,
who started treating Handy one month after Drs. Prakasam and Taylor
had released Handy to return to work. Dr. Cotter's report
indicates that Handy could return to work without heavy lifting and
could resume heavy duty in four to six weeks. The report also
indicates that Handy allegedly had returned to work but was
"unsteady handling `shells' (explosives)." Dr. Cotter recommended
an orthopaedic evaluation and light-duty work.
2
Dr. Guise did not know that other physicians had been treating Handy
for several months.
-4-
Prudential responded to Dr. Cotter's report by contacting
Thiokol. Thiokol informed Prudential that Handy had not returned
nor had he attempted to return to work, and that Handy did not work
with explosives. Prudential then contacted Dr. Cotter, who stated
that Handy had informed him that he had tried to return to work but
that he could not "handle it." After Prudential informed Dr.
Cotter that Handy had not returned to work and that a lighter
status position was available, Dr. Cotter stated that he still
recommended another orthopaedic evaluation and that "as long as
heavy lifting [was] required [Handy] could not do his job." Dr.
Cotter's report, however, contained no objective findings
supporting his conclusion that Handy could not return to work for
four to six weeks. After Prudential reviewed Dr. Cotter's advice,
it declined to reinstate Handy's long-term disability benefits.3
Handy filed suit in state court to recover the long-term
disability benefits that Prudential had denied. Pleading federal
jurisdiction based on ERISA, Prudential and Thiokol removed the
case to federal court. The parties consented to a bench trial upon
a stipulated record, and they filed briefs on the merits. The
district court made the factual findings reviewed above and
3
Prudential notified Handy of its decision and stated that it
reexamined "the medical and vocational information in file, including the
Attending Physician's statement completed by Dr. Cotter dated February 24, 1993,"
but that "[a]lthough you may still have some subjective complaints of pain, there
are no clinical findings to support that your condition has imposed restrictions
or limitations that would have prolonged your recovery beyond January 3, 1993."
Prudential also stated that: "In addition, the physicians that were treating you
as of January 1993 both confirmed that you were physically capable of performing
the duties of your job as of January 3, 1993. Based on this information we are
reaffirming our decision to terminate your LTD benefits effective January 3,
1993."
-5-
concluded that Prudential had not abused its discretion in
terminating Handy's long-term disability benefits or in declining
to reinstate those benefits. Based on these conclusions, the
district court dismissed Handy's suit with prejudice. Handy now
appeals.
II
Handy contends that the district court erred in concluding
that Prudential had not abused its discretion in terminating his
long-term disability benefits and in declining to reinstate those
benefits. In reviewing a district court's decision concerning a
plan administrator's determination of eligibility for benefits, we
review questions of law de novo and we set aside factual
determinations only if clearly erroneous. Chevron Chem. Co. v.
Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Local Union, 47 F.3d 139, 142 (5th Cir.
1995). If, as is the case here, the plan gives the administrator
discretion to determine eligibility or to interpret the terms of
the plan, the district court should review the administrator's
factual findings only for an abuse of discretion. Sweatman v.
Commercial Union Ins. Co., 39 F.3d 594, 598 (5th Cir. 1994); accord
Chevron, 47 F.3d at 142. We review de novo the district court's
conclusion as to whether the administrator abused its discretion,
and we review the district court's underlying factual findings for
clear error. Sweatman, 39 F.3d at 601.4 A plan administrator
4
Because this case proceeded in the court below as a bench trial on
a stipulated record without live testimony:
[T]he existence of factual questions will not undermine the result.
Moreover, we will resolve all inferences from the record in favor of
the district court's decision and will affirm unless the district
-6-
abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily or capriciously. Id.
Handy first argues that Prudential acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in deciding to terminate his benefits, contending that
Prudential "acted on . . . non-medical conclusions" and failed to
rely on all medical evidence, and that "specific information
regarding [a] new, lighter duty position" was not available. The
record indicates that Prudential evaluated all the medical records
relevant to Handy's condition prior to determining that he was no
longer eligible for long-term disability benefits as of January 3,
1993. The record also indicates that Prudential had reached this
conclusion in reliance on information provided by Handy's treating
physicians, Drs. Taylor and Prakasam, who had advised that Handy
could return to work after January 3, 1993, if Thiokol gave him a
"lighter duty job." Further, the record confirms that Thiokol had
a position available for Handy that accommodated his medical
restrictions,5 but that Handy was not interested. We hold that the
record supports the district court's decision that Prudential did
not act arbitrarily or capriciously in terminating Handy's long-
court resolved fact questions in a clearly erroneous manner or
misconstrued the law.
John v. State of La., 757 F.2d 698, 703 (5th Cir. 1985). However, "the
appellant's burden of showing clear error in the district court's fact findings
may be lightened somewhat where a record consists entirely of documentary or
written evidence and the trial court could not have based findings on the
credibility of witnesses giving oral testimony." Vetter v. Frosch, 599 F.2d 630,
632 (5th Cir. 1979).
5
Handy argues that Prudential memoranda indicate that Thiokol did not
have a lighter-duty position available. The memoranda on which Handy relies,
however, date from late 1992. Memoranda of January 1993 clearly indicate that
after it had previously notified Prudential of the lack of a suitable position,
Thiokol found a position that would accommodate Handy's condition and informed
Prudential of this change. Accordingly, the record does not support Handy's
contention.
-7-
term disability benefits. Accordingly, the district court did not
err in concluding that Prudential had not abused its discretion.
Sweatman, 39 F.3d at 601.
Handy also contends that the district court erred in holding
that Prudential had not abused its discretion in declining to
reinstate his benefits, arguing that Prudential acted arbitrarily
and capriciously when it failed to obtain the orthopaedic
evaluation recommended by Dr. Cotter. Handy relies on Salley v.
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 966 F.2d 1011, 1015 (5th Cir. 1992)
to argue that this evaluation was required to obtain all necessary
information to make a fully reasoned decision regarding the
reinstatement of Handy's benefits.
Salley does not support Handy's position. In that case, the
administrator failed to review records that were available.
Because those records contained information necessary to a proper
decision, this Court concluded that the administrator had abused
its discretion in failing to review the records. Salley, 966 F.2d
at 1015. Here, Prudential reviewed all the available records, and
because it already had three orthopaedic evaluations, it concluded
that a fourth would merely be cumulative. The district court held
that Prudential had not abused its discretion in refusing to obtain
the fourth evaluation. We agree. See Sweatman, 39 F.3d at 602-03
(distinguishing Salley because administrator had reviewed all
available records and declined to rely on certain physicians'
diagnosis because it relied on other physicians' conflicting
opinions, and concluding that district court had not erred in
-8-
concluding that administrator had not abused its discretion).
Accordingly, the district court did not err in holding that
Prudential had not abused its discretion when it refused to
reinstate Handy's long-term disability benefits.
III
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
district court.
-9-