[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 01-15211 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APRIL 21, 2003
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 98-10102-CV-NCR
MOSQUITO CONTROL DISTRICT OF FLORIDA,
Special Taxing District,
a.k.a. The Florida Keyes Mosquito
Control District,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
COREGIS INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(April 21, 2003)
Before TJOFLAT, BIRCH and GODBOLD, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This court certified to the Supreme Court of Florida two questions of
Florida law that we held determinative of a case pending in this court and for
which there appeared to be no controlling precedent:
1. Whether a petition before the Florida Monroe
County Career Service Counsel [sic] was a
proceeding in a “court of law.”
2. If so, whether the petition was seeking “money
damages.”
Mosquito Control Dist. of Fla. v. Coregis Ins. Co., 281 F.3d 1207, 1208 (11th Cir.
2002).
The Florida Supreme Court responded. No. SC02-311, Feb. 27, 2003. It set
out the facts as follows: The appellee, Mosquito Control Special Taxing District,
a/k/a The Florida Keys Mosquito Control District (“District”), purchased a public
officials and employees liability insurance policy from the appellant, Coregis
Insurance Company. The policy stated: “[a]s respects Claims for Loss which is
covered by this Policy . . . [Coregis] shall have the right and duty to select counsel
and to defend any Suit.” The policy further defined “claim” as “a demand for
Money Damages as of right,” while “money damages” was further defined as
“monetary compensation for past harms or injuries.” The term “suit” was also
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defined in the policy as “a proceeding in a court of law where Money Damages
may be awarded.”
An employee of the District filed a petition before the Monroe County
Career Service Council (“MCCSC”), alleging that the District improperly
discriminated against him in employment decisions on the basis of political
affiliation. That petition requested declaratory judgments regarding the propriety
of the contested employment decisions and sought an award of attorney fees as
well as costs incurred in bringing the petition. A related suit was filed in Florida
state circuit court at the same time. The District notified Coregis of both the
circuit court action and the petition before the MCCSC. Coregis undertook to
defend the circuit court action, but it declined to provide a defense before the
MCCSC on the ground that the petition was not covered by the policy.
The District then filed the present action against Coregis in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida seeking declaration that
the policy required Coregis to provide a legal defense for the claims asserted in the
petition before the MCCSC and seeking the recovery of attorney fees incurred by
the District in defending itself before the MCCSC. The United States District
Court granted summary judgment in favor of the District, holding that the MCCSC
qualified as a court of law under the policy and that the petition was a suit seeking
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money damages in the form of attorney fees. Coregis appealed, and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit certified to the Florida Supreme
Court the above questions regarding contract interpretation under Florida law.
The Florida Supreme Court responded. No. SC02-311, Feb. 27, 2003. It
answered the first certified question in the negative and declined to reach the
second certified question. The Court concluded that “court of law” was a term of
definite legal meaning expressly limited by Article V section 1 of the Florida
Constitution, which vests judicial power in designated courts and forbids the
establishment of other courts by any political subdivision of municipality.
Therefore, it found that the petition before MCCSC was not a proceeding before a
“court of law” but rather an administrative agency possessing only quasi-judicial
powers. It found that the negative answer to the first question rendered moot the
question regarding money damages.
The determination of Florida law by the Supreme Court of Florida is
determinative of this appeal. Coregis was entitled to a summary judgment. The
decision of the United States District Court is therefore REVERSED and the case
is REMANDED to the District Court with direction to enter summary judgment
for Coregis.
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