[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APRIL 14, 2003
No. 01-15180 THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 00-01159-CV-CAP-1
ALTON V. HALLUM, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
PROVIDENT LIFE AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
(April 14, 2003)
Before BLACK and HULL, Circuit Judges, and LAZZARA*, District Judge.
PER CURIAM:
*
Honorable Richard A. Lazzara, United. States District Judge for the Middle District of
Florida, sitting by designation.
In Hallum v. Provident Life and Accident Insurance Co., 289 F. 3d 1350
(11th Cir. 2002), we certified the following question to the Georgia Supreme
Court:
WHETHER, UNDER GEORGIA LAW, CARPAL TUNNEL
SYNDROME, WHICH IS CAUSED BY REPETITIVE HAND
MOTION, IS MORE PROPERLY CLASSIFIED AS AN “INJURY”
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF A DISABILITY INCOME
INSURANCE POLICY WHICH DEFINE AN “INJURY” TO MEAN
“ACCIDENTAL BODILY INJURIES OCCURRING WHILE YOUR
POLICY IS IN FORCE,” OR WHETHER CARPAL TUNNEL
SYNDROME IS MORE PROPERLY CLASSIFIED AS A
“SICKNESS” UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE SAME POLICY
WHICH DEFINE “SICKNESS” TO MEAN “SICKNESS OR
DISEASE WHICH IS FIRST MANIFESTED WHILE YOUR
POLICY IS IN EFFECT?”
Id. at 1354.
The Georgia Supreme Court, after a thorough review of our certified
question, provided the following answer: “Under Georgia law, a person who
unexpectedly suffers from carpal tunnel syndrome brought on by years of
intentional repetitive hand motions that renders him disabled has suffered an
“injury,” as that term is defined in this Provident Life insurance policy.”
Provident Life and Insurance Co. v. Hallum, ___ S. E. 2d ___ (Ga. 2003). The
Georgia Supreme Court noted, however, that “[w]hether that legal standard is met
2
as a matter of law in this case requires application of the federal rules governing
summary judgment, which is a determination best made by the federal court.” Id.
Given our prior review of the record, we conclude that the district court
acted in accord with this legal standard in granting summary judgment in favor of
Hallum under the “Injuries” provision of the policy. 1 As we observed in our
earlier opinion, one of Hallum’s treating physicians “definitively state[d] that
Hallum’s CTS was aggravated by his job[,]” and another treating physician
testified that this condition “was due to a repetitive motion disorder caused by
[Hallum’s] occupation . . . and that the condition developed over an extended
period of time.” Hallum, 289 F. 3d at 1353. A third treating physician provided
additional testimony that “given a patient with Hallum’s medical and occupational
history, he believed that CTS would be due to significant hand activity, such as
surgery, over an extended period of time.” Id. We also observed that “Provident
did not offer any medical testimony or other evidence to contradict the testimony
of Hallum’s treating physicians.” Id. We finally note that on appeal Provident has
never questioned whether Hallum’s CTS rendered him disabled within the
1
We, of course, review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same familiar standards as the district court. See, e.g., Walker v. Prudential Prop. &
Cas. Ins. Co., 286 F. 3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2002).
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meaning of the policy, but only whether Hallum’s CTS was caused by a sickness
or an injury as defined by the policy.
Accordingly, because we conclude that the record conclusively establishes
no genuine issue as to the material fact that Hallum’s unexpected disabling carpal
tunnel syndrome was caused by years of intentional repetitive hand motions in
connection with his surgical profession, the district court was correct in
determining that Hallum suffered an “injury” under the terms of Provident’s
insurance policy. We, therefore, affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Hallum. 2
AFFIRMED.
2
Given our affirmance, we, like the district court, need not address the issue of whether
Hallum also was entitled to benefits under the presumptive total disability provision of the
policy.
4