[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JULY 8, 2003
No. 02-12797 THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 01-10024-CR-SH
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RODCLIFFE HUGH MCPHEE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(July 8, 2003)
Before CARNES, MARCUS and SUHRHEINRICH*, Circuit Judges.
MARCUS, Circuit Judge:
Rodcliffe Hugh McPhee (“McPhee”) appeals his 57-month sentence
imposed upon his conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
*
Honorable Richard F. Suhrheinrich, United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit,
sitting by designation.
100 kilograms or more of marijuana, while on board a vessel subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of the Maritime Drug Law
Enforcement Act (“MDLEA”), 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(j). McPhee entered a
conditional plea of guilty to Count One of a two-count indictment, expressly
reserving the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the
indictment under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2).1 On appeal, McPhee raises only the
issue of whether the district court erred in finding that the vessel Notty was subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States under § 1903. After thoroughly reviewing
the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the district court did not err in
finding that the Notty was a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,
and accordingly affirm.
1
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2) provides:
With the consent of the court and the government, a defendant may
enter a conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere, reserving in
writing the right to have an appellate court review an adverse
determination of a specified pretrial motion. A defendant who
prevails on appeal may then withdraw the plea.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2).
McPhee’s plea agreement states in pertinent part: “The defendant is entering a conditional
guilty plea pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2), whereby he expressly reserves
the right to appeal the district court’s adverse ruling on the defendant’s motion to dismiss the
indictment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”
2
Generally, the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment is
reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d
1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 1997). However, we review de novo the district court’s
interpretation and application of the statutory provisions concerning the court’s
subject matter jurisdiction, and review for clear error the district court’s factual
findings with respect to jurisdiction. See United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088,
1114 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denied sub nom., Hernandez v. United States, _ U.S.
_, 123 S. Ct. 1484, 155 L. Ed. 2d 231 (2003).
The relevant facts are straightforward. On May 1, 2001, the United States
Coast Guard Cutters Bear and Tampa, which had been conducting law
enforcement surveillance in an area of the Caribbean Sea between eastern Cuba
and the Bahamas, maneuvered into position to intercept a go-fast vessel named
the Notty. When the Bear directed the Notty to heave to, the Notty increased
speed and attempted to evade the Coast Guard Cutters and air surveillance.
During the high-speed chase that followed, Coast Guard personnel observed the
crew of the Notty throwing packages overboard as the Notty maneuvered in a zig-
zag pattern. The Tampa moved into position and fired warning shots in front of
the Notty, but the Notty proceeded to use evasive maneuvers for approximately
3
twenty more minutes. Eventually, the Notty stopped and a Coast Guard party from
the Bear boarded the vessel.
McPhee and two other co-defendants, Darron Lloyd Rolle and Dave Mario
Williams, were found aboard the Notty. Although all three claimed Bahamian
nationality and the master of the Notty claimed that the vessel was registered in
the Bahamas, no registration was found on board the vessel. When inquiry
directed at Bahamian authorities did not result in an affirmative and unequivocal
assertion that the vessel was registered in the Bahamas, the Coast Guard deemed
the vessel stateless, arrested the defendants, and brought them to Key West,
Florida. The Coast Guard recovered a total of ninety-four bales of marijuana
(weighing 2,092 pounds) which had been thrown overboard during the hot pursuit.
McPhee was indicted, along with the other two crew members, for
conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute (Count One) and
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute (Count Two) while on board a
vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of 46 U.S.C.
app. §§ 1903(j) and 1903(a).2 On October 30, 2001, McPhee and the co-
2
These sections provide:
(a) Vessels of United States or vessels subject to jurisdiction of
United States
It is unlawful for any person on board a vessel . . . subject to
4
defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss the indictment, challenging the
government’s assertion that the vessel upon which they had been apprehended was
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. They claimed, in essence, that the
Notty had never left the territorial waters of the Bahamas and, therefore, that the
United States did not have authority to arrest them. (McPhee and his co-
defendants did not dispute that the Bahamian government could not verify that
their vessel was registered in the Bahamas.) The government responded, however,
that the Notty was subject to American jurisdiction because it was “without
nationality,” that is, it was a “stateless vessel” that had been intercepted in
international waters, and, that even if the vessel had been intercepted in Bahamian
waters, the Bahamas and the United States had entered into an agreement that
allowed the United States to exercise jurisdiction over stateless vessels located
more than three miles from Bahamian land.
the jurisdiction of the United States . . . to knowingly or intentionally
manufacture or distribute, or to possess with intent to manufacture or
distribute, a controlled substance.
...
(j) Attempt or conspiracy
Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense
defined in this chapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those
prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of
the attempt or conspiracy.
46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(a), (j).
5
Soon thereafter, on November 30, 2001, the district court conducted an
evidentiary hearing on the motion to dismiss and, at the conclusion of the hearing,
invited the parties to supplement their pleadings in support of their positions. On
December 26, 2001, the district court denied the defendants’ motion, finding that
the Notty was indeed subject to the jurisdiction of the United States because it was
a vessel without nationality seized in international waters, and that, in any event,
the Bahamian Government consented to enforcement of American law by the
United States in Bahamian territorial waters. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(f) (“All
jurisdictional issues arising under this chapter are preliminary questions of law to
be determined solely by the trial judge.”); see also Tinoco, 304 F.3d at 1111-12
(holding that 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903, which allows the court to decide whether the
MDLEA’s jurisdiction and venue requirements are met as a matter of law, does
not violate defendant’s due process or jury trial rights). After the denial of this
motion, as noted, McPhee entered a conditional plea of guilty to Count One. This
appeal ensued.
McPhee urges that the statutory requirements for subject matter jurisdiction
imposed by 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(c)(1)(E)3 were not met because, at the time of
3
Section 1903(c)(1)(E) provides: “[A] ‘vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States’ includes-- . . . (E) a vessel located in the territorial waters of another nation, where the
nation consents to the enforcement of United States law by the United States.” 46 U.S.C. app. §
6
the seizure, the Notty was located within the territorial of waters of the Bahamas,
and, the Bahamian Government had not consented to the enforcement of American
law by the United States in its territorial waters. We need only decide one issue
today -- whether, at the time of seizure, the Notty was a stateless vessel located
within international waters. Because we are satisfied that it was, the Notty was a
vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and accordingly, we need
not answer the more difficult questions of whether the Bahamian Government
consented to the enforcement of American law by the United States in the
territorial waters of the Bahamas, or whether the United States had jurisdiction to
seize a stateless vessel without consent, within Bahamian territorial waters.4
1903(c)(1)(E).
4
Section 1903(c) also provides in relevant part:
(1) . . . [A] “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States”
includes--
(A) a vessel without nationality;
...
(2) For purposes of this section, a “vessel without nationality”
includes--
...
(C) a vessel aboard which the master or person in charge
makes a claim of registry and the claimed nation of registry does not
affirmatively and unequivocally assert that the vessel is of its
nationality. . . .
46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(c)(1)(A), (2)(C).
7
In United States v. Marino-Garcia, we concluded that “international law
permits any nation to subject stateless vessels on the high seas to its jurisdiction,”
and, consequently, that “all persons aboard vessels engaged in drug trafficking that
[fail] to unmistakably accede to the authority of a single sovereign while
traversing the high seas [are] subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the United
States.”5 679 F.2d 1373, 1383-84 (11th Cir. 1982); see also 33 C.F.R. § 2.05-1
(defining “high seas” (with exceptions not relevant here) as “all waters which are
neither territorial seas nor internal waters of the United States or of any foreign
country”); 33 C.F.R. § 2.05-5(b) (defining “territorial seas” of foreign countries as
“waters within the belt that is adjacent to its coast and whose breadth and baseline
are recognized by the United States”). The United States generally recognizes the
territorial seas of foreign nations up to twelve nautical miles adjacent to
recognized foreign coasts. See United States: Proclamation on an Exclusive
Economic Zone, 22 I.L.M. 461, 462 (March 10, 1983) (“The United States will
respect only those territorial sea claims of others in excess of 3 nautical miles, to a
maximum of 12 nautical miles, which accord to the U.S. its full rights under
5
Lieutenant Walsh testified that a vessel must generally be “12 miles” from a foreign
nation to be in international waters, although “[t]here are some countries that claim less than 12
miles.” Testimony of Lieutenant Walsh before the district court (November 30, 2001), at 19. He
explained that the Bahamas claims a twelve-mile territorial water boundary. See id.
8
international law in the territorial sea.”); United States Ocean Policy, Statement by
President Reagan, 22 I.L.M. 464, 464 (March 10, 1983) (“[T]he United States will
recognize the rights of other states in the waters off their coasts, as reflected in the
[United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea], so long as the rights and
freedoms of the United States and others under international law are recognized by
such coastal states.”); see also United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1245, 1272, Part II § 2, Art. 3 (“Every State has the right
to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical
miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this
Convention.”).6
McPhee offers two arguments in support of his claim that the Notty was in
Bahamian territorial waters at the time of its seizure and his arrest. First, he says
that the district court clearly erred in finding the coordinates plotted by Lieutenant
Thomas F. Walsh on the Tampa’s navigation chart, Government Exhibit 1, to be
the most accurate source of information regarding the position of the Tampa at the
6
As explained by the Government, although the United States is not a party to the
Convention, the Government “generally recognizes [the Convention] as customary international law
apart from the deep sea-bed mining provisions.” See Government’s Suppl. Response in Opposition
to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, submitted to the district court on December 10, 2001, at 6; see
also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 107-777, at § 104 (2002) (“The United States, although not a party to the
[Convention], has consistently maintained that specific provisions . . . represent customary
international law.”).
9
time the Notty was boarded. He suggests that the district court wrongly accepted
the chart, which placed the Notty approximately 17 miles east of Cay Santo
Domingo and in international waters at the time it was boarded, over two other
sources of information about the Notty’s location: the Law Enforcement Checklist,
which placed the Tampa at a position three miles north of Cuba at that time;7 and
the Miami Command Center Chronological Phone Log, which placed the Tampa
approximately ten miles north of the nautical chart position and within twelve
miles of Cay Verde and Cay Santo Domingo, i.e., well within Bahamian territorial
waters. Second, he argues that even if the Notty was not intercepted within twelve
miles of a known Bahamian landmark, it was still in Bahamian territorial waters
because it was within twelve miles of Saint Vincent Rock, which, he contends, is a
Bahamian island from which Bahamian territorial waters radiate.
After thorough review of the record, we can find no clear error in the district
court’s determination that the navigation chart was the “most accurate source of
information” as to the Notty’s location at the time of its interception. At the
evidentiary hearing, the Government offered the testimony of Lieutenant Walsh,
Operations Officer and Navigator on the Tampa at the time of the interception.
Lieutenant Walsh testified that Government Exhibit 1 was the chart that was on
7
At oral argument, McPhee conceded that this location was not accurate.
10
board the Tampa at the time of the pursuit of the Notty, and that the chart indicated
that the Tampa was located “[j]ust over 17 miles east of Cay Santo Domingo,”
unambiguously in international waters at the time of its interception. He explained
that it was his job to ensure that he was cognizant of the Tampa’s position
wherever it was on the high seas, and that late in the evening of April 30, 2001 and
early morning of May 1, 2002, he plotted the Tampa’s pursuit of the Notty
according to coordinates provided by a “Global Positioning System” (“GPS”) on
the navigation chart. Walsh explained that a GPS “receives information from
satellites . . . [which] is processed and that information is displayed . . . as
numbers [that can be] transferr[ed] to [a] chart or [] map.” He added that the
boarding vessel and the Notty were “no more than 1,000 yards or half mile from
[the] plotted position” of the Tampa at that time. When questioned about the
different coordinates provided on the Command Center Phone Log, he explained
that the information found in the Log is not accurate, as demonstrated by the fact
that it indicates a position close to or in violation of standing orders “not [to] take
the ship into water less than six meters.” He also observed that the navigation
chart indicates the accurate position because it was recorded on board the Tampa
contemporaneously with the interception, while the Phone Log was prepared by
11
individuals in Miami based on coordinates transmitted to them via satellite from
the Tampa.
McPhee argues, nevertheless, that the district court committed clear error in
crediting the testimony of Lieutenant Walsh and the navigation chart. We
disagree. “Under the clearly erroneous standard, we must affirm the district court
unless review of the entire record leaves us ‘with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.’” United States v. Engelhard Corp., 126 F.3d
1302, 1305 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564,
573, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L. Ed. 2d 518 (1985)). Furthermore, “we allot
substantial deference to the factfinder, in this case, the district court, in reaching
credibility determinations with respect to witness testimony.” EEOC v. Joe’s
Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1285-86 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Stano v.
Butterworth, 51 F.3d 942, 944 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that we defer even
beyond clear error review to trial court findings relating to witness credibility
determinations)). “As long as the district court’s findings are plausible, we may
not reverse the district court even if we would have decided the case differently.”
Englehard, 126 F.3d at 1305 (citing Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574, 105 S. Ct. at
1511). As the Supreme Court explained, deference to the district court is
important to the proper functioning of the judiciary:
12
The trial judge’s major role is the determination of fact, and with
experience in fulfilling that role comes expertise. Duplication of the
trial judge’s efforts in the court of appeals would very likely
contribute only negligibly to the accuracy of fact determination at a
huge cost in diversion of judicial resources. In addition, the parties to
a case on appeal have already been forced to concentrate their
energies and resources on persuading the trial judge that their account
of the facts is the correct one; requiring them to persuade three more
judges at the appellate level is requiring too much.
Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574-75, 105 S. Ct. at 1512.
McPhee has not pointed us to anything in the record demonstrating that the
district court’s findings were erroneous, let alone clearly erroneous. “‘Where there
are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them
cannot be clearly erroneous.’” Solomon v. Liberty County Comm’rs, 221 F.3d
1218, 1227 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574, 105 S. Ct. at
1511). Here, the district court was presented with a substantial body of evidence
to support its finding that the navigation chart was the more reliable source for
discerning the location of the Notty. As discussed, supra, Lieutenant Walsh
testified that the most accurate way to determine the location of the Notty when it
was apprehended was by using the Tampa’s navigation chart from the time of the
event, and that the Phone Log location could not be expected to be as accurate.
McPhee offered precious little to contradict Lieutenant Walsh’s testimony as to
the precise geographic location of the Notty at the time of seizure.
13
McPhee also suggests, however, that he can prevail even if the navigation
chart position is considered accurate, because the position it provides still places
the Notty within Bahamian territorial waters and the Bahamian government did
not consent to the enforcement of American law within its territorial waters.8 This
turns entirely on whether Saint Vincent Rock, which, according to the navigation
chart, was located within twelve miles of the Notty at the time of the interception,
is a “rock” or an “island” for the purposes of determining Bahamian territorial
waters. If Saint Vincent Rock is a Bahamian “island” from which the twelve-mile
Bahamian territorial boundary could radiate, then the Notty was within Bahamian
territorial waters at the time of the interception; however, if it is a “rock,” then the
Notty was in international waters or at “high seas” at that time. Both sides agree
that this determination must be made in accordance with the definition of “island”
provided in The 1993 Archipelagic Waters and Maritime Jurisdiction Act of the
Bahamas (the “Act” or the “Archipelagic Act”).9
8
McPhee does not dispute that if we find that the Notty was not within Bahamian
territorial waters at the time of the interception, we need not reach whether the Bahamian
Government had consented to the enforcement of American law by the United States as required by
§ 1903(c)(1)(E).
9
The Government argued that the Notty was in international waters or on the “high seas”
because “Saint Vincent Rock is a rock. If it was an island, it would be called Saint Vincent Island,
not Saint Vincent Rock.” Ultimately, we must determine whether it is a rock or an island according
to the statutory definitions provided by the Archipelagic Act. We note in passing that for some
purposes, the label is not altogether satisfying. Thus, for example, in the metaphysical sense, we can
discern no reason why something could not be both a rock and an island at the same time. See Paul
14
The district court began its analysis by taking judicial notice of the fact that
the Bahamas claims a twelve-mile territorial limit, and found that at the time of the
interception the Notty was over twelve miles from Cay Santo Domingo, the closest
Bahamian island. See Archipelagic Act, at § 4(1), (3) (“The territorial sea of The
Bahamas comprises those areas of the sea having as their inner limits the baselines
described in this section and as their outer limits a line established seaward from
those baselines every point of which is at a distance of twelve miles from the
nearest point of the appropriate baseline . . . [in part defined as] baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial sea of The Bahamas . . . measured [from] the
low water line along the coast of each island.”). Applying the definitions provided
in the Archipelagic Act, the district court determined that, “[h]aving heard the
testimony of Lieutenant Joseph Kramek, having examined the chart marking
depicting St. Vincent Rock, and having reviewed the Bahamian Archipelagic
[Act], the Court concludes that St. Vincent Rock does not constitute an island for
Simon and Art Garfunkel, I am a Rock, on Sounds of Silence (Columbia 1966) (“A winter’s day,
in a deep and dark December. I am alone, gazing from my window, to the streets below, on a freshly
fallen silent shroud of snow. I am a rock, I am an island. I’ve built walls, a fortress deep and mighty,
that none may penetrate. I have no need of friendship, friendship causes pain. It’s laughter and it’s
loving I disdain. I am a rock, I am an island. Don’t talk of love. Well I’ve heard the word before.
It’s sleeping in my memory. I won’t disturb the slumber of feelings that have died. If I never loved,
I never would have cried. I am a rock, I am an island. I have my books and my poetry to protect me.
I am shielded in my armor. Hiding in my room, safe within my womb, I touch no one and no one
touches me. I am a rock, I am an island. And a rock feels no pain. And an island never cries.”).
Of course, neither Simon nor Garfunkel has been identified as a nautical expert.
15
purposes of measuring the Bahamas’ twelve-mile territorial limit.” The district
court’s finding that Saint Vincent Rock is not an island is a finding of fact that we
review for clear error. See Tinoco, 304 F.3d at 1114.
Contrary to McPhee’s claim, the record is replete with evidence that Saint
Vincent Rock is not a Bahamian island for the purposes of determining Bahamian
territorial waters. In the first place, Lieutenant Walsh testified that Saint Vincent
Rock is “not Bahamian territory” because the markings on the navigation chart,
which identify Saint Vincent Rock, indicate “very shallow waters [and that there
could be] rocks in the vicinity of the surface of the water.”10 This testimony was
bolstered by the testimony of Lieutenant Joseph Kramek, an attorney with the
United States Coast Guard, who explained that Saint Vincent Rock “is normally a
10
Lieutenant Walsh testified in relevant part as follows:
Q. [Government counsel] Now, somewhat to the northeast . . .
there is an indication of Saint Vincent Rock, do you see that?
A. [Lieutenant Walsh] Yes, sir, I do.
Q. Are you familiar with whether or not that is a Bahamian
territory or not?
A. My understanding is that is not Bahamian territory.
Q. What is the basis for that understanding?
A. Based upon the symbol that is drawn on the chart.
Q. And what is that symbol?
A. It resembles a plus.
Q. Okay. And what does that plus mean on nautical charts?
A. There could be a possible -- very shallow waters. It could at
times have rocks in the vicinity of the surface of the water.
Testimony of Lieutenant Walsh before the district court (November 30, 2001), at 44-45.
16
submerged rock [and therefore] would not qualify as land.” He further explained
that it does not satisfy the definition of “island” -- a naturally formed area of land
which is surrounded by and above water at mean high-water -- in the Archipelagic
Act § 2. He also explained that Saint Vincent Rock does not fit the definition of
low-tide elevation under the Act § 4(5) (“a low-tide elevation is a naturally formed
area of land which is surrounded by and is above water at mean low-water but is
submerged at mean high-water”) because “it is not a naturally formed barrier of
land which is surrounded by above water, mean low water.” 11 Furthermore,
11
Lieutenant Kramek testified in relevant part in these terms:
Q. [Government counsel] On Government’s Exhibit 1A [an
enlargement of Exhibit 1], there is an indication Saint Vincent
Rock. Do you see that?
A. [Lieutenant Kramek] Yes, I do.
Q. And are you familiar with the markings that indicate where
Saint Vincent Rock is?
A. Yes, I am.
Q. And what do those markings mean?
A. That plus sign indicates that certain times that there may be
rocks awash there. However, it is normally a submerged rock.
Q. And is that Saint Vincent Rock a territory claimed by the
Bahamas?
A. No, it is not, sir. Since it is normally a submerged rock, it
would not qualify as land and therefore you would not extend
a territorial sea claim from that position[.]
Q. And are you familiar with the Bahamian law on how the
Bahama claims -- or how the Bahamas defines territory -- its
own territory?
A. Yes, sir, I am.
...
A. . . . I am reading from the Bahamian Archipelagic Waters and
Maritime and Jurisdiction Act of 1993, which is essentially
17
McPhee submitted nothing to support a finding that Saint Vincent Rock lies within
the breadth of the Bahamian territorial sea and, therefore, no support for his
position that it fits the definition of the Act § 4(4) (“Where a low-tide elevation
lies wholly or partly within the breadth of sea which would be the territorial sea of
The Bahamas if all low-tide elevations were disregarded for the purpose of
measurement of the breadth thereof, the low-tide elevation shall be treated as an
island.”).
Other record evidence also supports the district court’s finding. When the
navigation chart and Chart No.1, United States of America Nautical Chart --
Symbols Abbreviations and Terms (10th ed. 1997) (“Chart No. 1”) are read
together, they indicate that Saint Vincent Rock is a rock and not an island.
the Bahamian statute on how they define their territorial sea
claims.
And in the definition[] section, which is on page 2, paragraph
2, the word “island” means a naturally formed area of land
which is surrounded by and above water at mean high water.
Q. And based on that definition, does Saint Vincent Rock qualify
as a Bahamian territory?
A. No, it does not, sir.
...
Q. You testified that at times Saint Vincent Rock is awash. Why
is it that it does not fit the definition of low tide elevation?
A. It doesn’t fit the definition of low tide elevation because it is
not a naturally formed barrier of land which is surrounded by
above water, mean low water.
Testimony of Lieutenant Kramek before the district court (November 30, 2001), at 46-48, 52.
18
Specifically, the navigation chart indicates the presence of Saint Vincent Rock
with a plus sign encircled by dashes, which, according to Chart No. 1, represents a
“[d]angerous underwater rock of uncertain depth.” See Chart No. 1, at 43.
On this unambiguous record, we conclude that the district court did not
clearly err in finding that the Notty was a stateless vessel found in international
waters at the time of its interception by the United States Coast Guard.
Accordingly, the Notty was a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
and we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
19