Haliburton v. Secretary for the Department of Corrections

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ August 21, 2003
THOMAS K. KAHN
No. 01-15865 CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 98-08225-CV-FAM

JERRY LEON HALIBURTON,
Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

SECRETARY FOR THE DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS, James Crosby,
Secretary,
Respondent-Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(August 21, 2003)

Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

WILSON, Circuit Judge:
 Jerry Leon Haliburton was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced

to death.1 After the completion of his direct appeal and state habeas court

proceedings, Haliburton filed, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a petition for habeas

corpus relief in the district court challenging the first degree murder conviction

and death sentence. The district court denied the petition, but granted a certificate

of appealability (COA) as to all issues. Haliburton contends that 1) the State

withheld evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); 2) he

did not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing on his Brady claim regarding

Freddie Haliburton’s March 15, 1982 statement; and 3) he received ineffective

assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of his trial.2 For the reasons set forth

1
Haliburton also was convicted of burglary of the victim’s residence.
2
Haliburton also raises other claims in his petition for habeas relief. After thoroughly
reviewing his petition and after the benefit of oral argument, however, we find that the following
eleven claims are without merit and do not warrant further discussion: 1) he received ineffective
assistance of counsel at the guilt phase; 2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel, because
trial counsel waived his speedy trial rights; 3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the
penalty phase, because counsel did not object to the jury instructions; 4) he received ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel; 5) the trial court erred by preventing him from presenting
evidence of mitigating factors; 6) the trial court erred by refusing to allow defense counsel to
comment about an uncalled witness; 7) the trial court erred by failing to declare a mistrial based
upon statements about his first trial; 8) the trial court erred in allowing the State to use gory
photographs; 9) the trial court erred in refusing to include certain testimony when it reread
testimony requested by the jury during its deliberations; 10) the trial court erred in refusing to use
a special verdict form; and 11) the cumulative effect of prosecutorial misconduct rendered his
trial fundamentally unfair. The following six claims that were raised and rejected in the district
court on the merits or as having been procedurally barred have been abandoned on appeal as
independent bases for habeas relief: 1) Florida’s capital punishment law is unconstitutional; 2)
judicial electrocution constitutes cruel and unusual punishment; 3) the burden at the sentencing
phase was impermissibly shifted to the defendant; 4) the trial court erred in allowing the jury to

2
below, we find that Haliburton is not entitled to relief from his conviction or his

sentence, and, therefore, we affirm the district court’s denial of his petition.

BACKGROUND

In the early morning of August 9, 1981, Donald Bohannon’s home was

burglarized, and he was attacked with a knife as he slept. “Bohannon died as a

result of thirty-one stab wounds over his neck, chest, arms, and scrotum.”

Haliburton v. State, 561 So. 2d 248, 249 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam). His body was

found in his bed later that afternoon by his estranged girlfriend, Teresa Kast. “The

perpetrator had gained entry to [Bohannon’s] apartment by removing glass panes

from a jalousie door. Fingerprint evidence led the police to” Haliburton.

Haliburton v. State, 476 So. 2d 192, 193 (Fla. 1985), vacated, 475 U.S. 1078

(1986).

On August 13, 1981, the police took Haliburton to the station house,

advised him of his rights, and questioned him for several hours. During the

interrogation, Haliburton gave a recorded statement wherein he “admit[ted]

consider whether the homicide was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; 5) the death sentence
was unconstitutional, because the jury heard improper aggravating factors; and 6) the jury
instructions during the penalty phase of the trial were unconstitutionally vague with respect to the
aggravating factors. Although Haliburton no longer raises claims three through six as
independent bases for relief, he continues to argue that his counsel’s failure to raise them on
direct appeal constituted ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. We, however, already
rejected that claim.

3
breaking in and seeing the body,” but “did not admit to committing the murder.”

Id. Nevertheless, he was arrested and charged with first degree murder and

burglary. The grand jury, however, returned an indictment only for burglary.3

Thereafter, on December 17, 1981, Haliburton’s counsel waived his right to a

speedy trial to secure more time to prepare for the burglary trial.

On March 12th or 15th of 1982, Haliburton’s brother, Freddie, and Sharon

Williams, Freddie’s girlfriend, recorded statements at the police station and at the

State Attorney’s Office4 indicating that on separate occasions Haliburton admitted

to each of them that he committed the murder.5 Armed with this additional

evidence, the state attorney secured a grand jury indictment on the murder charge

on March 24, 1982. Subsequently, in September of 1983, Haliburton was

convicted of burglary and first degree murder and sentenced to death. Nelson E.

3
In September and November of 1981 the State twice failed to indict Haliburton for
Bohannon’s murder.
4
For ease of reference, we will refer to Freddie’s statement at the State Attorney’s Office
as his March 15, 1982 statement. Freddie gave that statement in the presence of Assistant State
Attorney Paul O. Moyle, Sergeant David Houser, and a court reporter. The parties, however,
have been unable to locate a transcript of the March 15, 1982 statement.
5
In early March of 1982 Williams filed a charge of sexual battery against Haliburton after
he allegedly held a knife to her throat and attempted to rape her. Apparently, after Freddie
learned about the charge, he and Williams told police about Haliburton’s alleged confessions to
each of them. Later that year, Williams dropped the charge against Haliburton.

4
Bailey represented Haliburton at trial.6 On direct appeal, the Florida Supreme

Court reversed his convictions and remanded the case for a new trial, because it

found that Haliburton’s statement to the police without his attorney present, but

after his attorney arrived at the police station and requested to see him, should

have been suppressed.7

The State sought certiorari review from the United States Supreme Court,

and, on March 24, 1986, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded

the case to the Florida Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Moran v.

Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986). See Florida v. Haliburton, 475 U.S. 1078 (1986)

(per curiam). In Moran, the Supreme Court declined to find a violation of the

United States Constitution where the police failed to inform the defendant that his

attorney was attempting to contact him before he waived his Fifth Amendment

rights. 475 U.S. at 423–24. The Supreme Court noted in Moran, however, that its

decision did not “disable[] the States from adopting different requirements for the

conduct of its employees and officials as a matter of state law.” Id. at 428. Thus,

6
Although the record is unclear as to who represented Haliburton throughout the original
prosecution, it appears that he originally was represented by Mitchell Beers. Bailey assumed the
role of Haliburton’s counsel, however, before the first trial. Then, Charles Musgrove handled the
successful appeal, and Bailey and Musgrove handled the second trial, with Bailey functioning as
lead counsel. Bailey is now a judge on the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida.
7
The Florida Supreme Court also rejected Haliburton’s claim that his waiver of a speedy
trial applied only to the burglary charge. See Haliburton, 476 So. 2d at 193.

5
on remand, the Florida Supreme Court maintained its position that the failure to

suppress Haliburton’s statement violated the due process provision of the Florida

Constitution, and, once again, reversed Haliburton’s convictions and remanded the

case for a new trial. See Haliburton v. State, 514 So. 2d 1088, 1090 (Fla. 1987)

(per curiam).

Haliburton’s second trial began on January 25, 1988, and Bailey was

appointed as defense counsel again. The jury convicted Haliburton of burglary

and first degree murder and voted nine to three in favor of the death penalty. See

Haliburton, 561 So. 2d at 249. After considering the evidence, the trial judge

found four aggravating factors,8 no statutory mitigating factors, and insufficient

nonstatutory mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating factors.

Therefore, the court imposed the death sentence.

The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence on direct

appeal. Id. at 252. Thereafter, Haliburton’s execution was scheduled for March of

8
The aggravating factors were as follows:

[t]he capital felony was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment;
the defendant was twice previously convicted of violent felonies; the capital
felony was committed while engaged in a burglary; and the capital felony was a
homicide and was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner,
without any pretense of moral or legal justification.

Haliburton, 561 So. 2d at 249 n.1.

6
1992, but in February of 1992 he filed a motion to vacate his conviction and

sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and a motion for a

stay of execution. See Haliburton v. Singletary, 691 So. 2d 466, 468 (Fla. 1997)

(per curiam). A stay was granted on March 12, 1992 to allow the trial court to

consider his postconviction motion to vacate. Subsequently, the trial court denied

some of the claims in his Rule 3.850 motion and scheduled an evidentiary hearing

for the others. After conducting the hearing, the trial court denied the remaining

claims,9 and, thereafter, Haliburton appealed the denial of his Rule 3.850 motion10

9
The trial court also denied Haliburton’s motion for a rehearing.
10
In the appeal of the denial of his Rule 3.850 motion, Haliburton raised the following
nine claims:

(1) whether the successor judge properly ruled on [his] motion for rehearing; (2)
whether the state withheld exculpatory evidence and whether counsel’s
performance was deficient during the guilt phase; (3) whether counsel’s
performance was deficient at the penalty phase; (4) whether the jury instructions
and aggravating circumstances were unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; (5)
whether the state complied with [his] chapter 119 requests; (6) whether counsel
was ineffective in advising [him] to waive speedy trial rights on the burglary
charge; (7) whether counsel was ineffective regarding prosecutorial misconduct;
(8) whether the jury instructions improperly shifted the burden to [him]; and (9)
whether [he] was denied due process when the governor signed his death warrant
before the two-year time limit for filing a motion for post-conviction relief
expired.

Haliburton, 691 So. 2d at 468–69. Claims four and eight were procedurally barred, and, as
Haliburton’s stay was granted in March of 1992, he conceded that claim nine was moot.

7
and filed a petition for state habeas corpus relief.11 On January 9, 1997, the

Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order denying his Rule 3.850

motion and denied his petition for state habeas corpus relief.

Subsequently, Haliburton filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas

corpus in the Southern District of Florida. In its preliminary order,12 the district

court denied eighteen of the twenty claims raised in Haliburton’s petition and

ordered an evidentiary hearing to decide whether (1) Freddie’s March 15, 1982

statement constituted a basis for a Brady violation and for a finding that trial

counsel’s performance was ineffective at the guilt phase; and (2) trial counsel’s

decision not to present a mental health expert as mitigating evidence constituted

11
In his petition for state habeas corpus relief, Haliburton asserted the following five
claims:

(1) whether appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness precluded reliable adversarial
testing; (2) whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a claim
that the sentencing court precluded him from presenting mitigating witnesses; (3)
whether appellate counsel failed to argue that the evidence was insufficient to
prove guilt; (4) whether counsel was ineffective for not raising on appeal the
court’s refusal to permit counsel to argue that the grand jury would not indict
[him] solely on physical evidence; and (5) whether inadequate limiting
instructions on aggravating factors violated [his] right to a reliable capital
sentence.

Haliburton, 691 So. 2d at 472.
12
The case originally was assigned to Judge Daniel T.K. Hurley, and, thus, he issued the
preliminary order on August 27, 1999. Subsequently, Judge Hurley recused himself, and the case
was assigned to Judge Federico A. Moreno.

8
ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase. Haliburton v. Sec’y for the

Dep’t of Corr., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1382, 1384, 1387, 1390 (S.D. Fla. 2001). On

September 10, 2001, after conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court

denied Haliburton’s petition for habeas corpus relief in its entirety, id. at 1392, and

granted a COA as to all issues, see Haliburton v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., S.D.

Fla. 2001, __ F. Supp. 2d __ (No. 98-08225-CV-FAM, Oct. 23, 2001).13 This

appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“When reviewing the district court’s denial of a habeas petition, we review

questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact de novo, and findings of fact

for clear error.” Nyland v. Moore, 216 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2000) (per

curiam). Moreover, as we are reviewing a final state habeas judgment, “our

review is greatly circumscribed and is highly deferential to the state courts”

pursuant to § 2254 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(AEDPA). Crawford v. Head, 311 F.3d 1288, 1295 (11th Cir. 2002).14

13
Initially, the court granted a COA as to the two issues addressed in the federal
evidentiary hearing. Haliburton, however, filed a motion for clarification as to whether the COA
addressed the other issues previously decided by Judge Hurley. The court granted the motion and
issued a COA “on all issues including those previously decided by Judge Hurley.” Haliburton,
__ F. Supp. 2d at __.
14
Haliburton filed his petition for habeas corpus relief on April 10, 1998, well after the
enactment of the AEDPA. Thus, our review is governed by the AEDPA. See Lindh v. Murphy,

9
 The standards applicable to our review under the AEDPA are well settled.

First, § 2254(e)(1) provides for a highly deferential standard of
review for factual determinations made by a state court: [A]
determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be
presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of
rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing
evidence.
Second, § 2254(d) allows federal habeas relief for a claim
adjudicated on the merits in state court only where that adjudication
in state court (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2)
resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.

Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Furthermore, we previously have stated that

[a] state court decision is ‘contrary to’ clearly established federal law
if either (1) the state court applied a rule that contradicts the
governing law set forth by Supreme Court case law, or (2) when faced
with materially indistinguishable facts, the state court arrived at a
result different from that reached in a Supreme Court case.

Putman v. Head, 268 F.3d 1223, 1241 (11th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, __ U.S. __,

123 S. Ct. 278 (2002). Additionally, “[a] state court’s decision [is] an

‘unreasonable application’ of federal law if it identifies the correct legal rule from

Supreme Court case law, but applies that rule in an unreasonable manner to the

521 U.S. 320, 322, 326–27 (1997) (providing that the AEDPA applies to federal habeas petitions
filed after April 24, 1996).

10
facts of petitioner’s case.” Breedlove v. Moore, 279 F.3d 952, 961 (11th Cir.

2002), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 123 S. Ct. 1278 (2003). Furthermore, a state court

decision that “unreasonably extends, or declines to extend, a governing legal

principle (as established by Supreme Court case law) to a new context” also

constitutes an unreasonable application of federal law. Id.

DISCUSSION

I. Brady Claims

Haliburton contends that he is entitled to relief from his conviction, because

the state withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady.

In Brady, the Supreme Court placed an affirmative duty on the prosecution

to reveal any “evidence [that] is material either to guilt or to punishment,

irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. at 87.

This duty covers “[i]mpeachment evidence . . . as well as exculpatory evidence.”

United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). Brady does not, however,

require that the prosecution “deliver [its] entire file to defense counsel, but only

[that it] disclose” material evidence. Id. at 675 (footnote omitted). Evidence is

material under Brady “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence

been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Id. at 682.

11
 A. Fingerprint Test Results

In early March of 1982 Williams filed a charge of sexual battery against

Haliburton. She alleged that Haliburton held a knife to her throat and attempted to

rape her, but, later that same year, she dropped the charge. At Haliburton’s second

trial in 1988, however, Williams testified that Haliburton held a knife to her throat

during the attack in 1982 and said, “You don’t think I’d do nothing to you, huh?”

and “I do you just like I did that man, I kill you . . . .” She also testified that

during the same conversation, he told her that a “knife was the best thing next to a

gun,” because it would be difficult to prove that he was responsible if he hurt

someone with a knife.15 As testing at the time of the charge did not reveal

Haliburton’s fingerprints on the knife allegedly used in the attack, he contends that

he could have used the fingerprint test results to impeach Williams’s testimony

that he held a knife to her throat. He, however, contends he was not able to do so,

because the State withheld the fingerprint test results in violation of Brady.

The state court rejected Haliburton’s Brady claim as to this issue.

Haliburton, 691 So. 2d at 470. The court found that the fingerprint test results

were for a separate charge that was nolle prossed six years before Haliburton’s

15
The trial court found that this testimony was relevant to determine whether Haliburton
was confessing to the instant murder.

12
second trial. Id. Moreover, the State Attorney’s Office where the charge was filed

had an open files policy. Id. Thus, the state court concluded that Haliburton could

have requested the file on the attack under that policy and presumably discovered

the fingerprint test results. Id. As the state court’s reasonable determination of the

facts, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), leads us to the conclusion that Haliburton could

have discovered the fingerprint test results with due diligence, the state court’s

determination that the State did not violate Brady was an objectively reasonable

adjudication of federal law, see id. § 2254(d)(1). Accordingly, Haliburton is not

entitled to relief based upon this claim.

B. Freddie Haliburton’s Gain Time

In June of 1982 Freddie was convicted of burglary and sentenced to twelve

years in state prison. During his sentence, he was transferred to the Palm Beach

County Jail to testify in both of Haliburton’s trials and to be deposed regarding

Haliburton’s case. While Freddie was in the county jail, however, he could not

accrue gain time for his burglary conviction.16 Thus, Virginia Gay Broome,17 who

was the prosecutor at the time, agreed to write a letter to the Department of

16
“Under Florida law, a prisoner who behaves well and diligently performs assigned work
can reduce his term of incarceration by earning gain time.” Raske v. Martinez, 876 F.2d 1496,
1496 (11th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).
17
Broome is now a judge on the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida.

13
Corrections (DOC) requesting that Freddie not be penalized by losing his gain

time while he was in the county jail. Haliburton, 691 So. 2d at 470. Haliburton,

however, characterizes Broome’s letter to the DOC as a deal to induce Freddie’s

testimony and thus contends that the State failed to disclose the deal fully in

violation of Brady.

Both Freddie and Broome denied that there was a deal to induce Freddie’s

testimony, but they both acknowledged that Broome wrote to the DOC about

Freddie’s lost gain time. Id. For example, at Freddie’s deposition on January 15,

1988, Broome stated in the presence of Bailey that she told Freddie she “would

write and try to keep [him] from losing gain time while” he was in the county jail.

Thus, Bailey knew that Broome wrote the letter to the DOC before Haliburton’s

second trial began. See United States v. Meros, 866 F.2d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir.

1989) (per curiam) (declining to find a Brady violation where defense counsel

knew that a witness might have been involved in plea negotiations before the

witness took the stand). Furthermore, on cross-examination at the second trial,

Freddie testified that the prosecutor agreed to contact the DOC on his behalf, but

not in exchange for his testimony. 18

18
On cross-examination of Freddie, Bailey inquired about the prosecution contacting the
DOC on Freddie’s behalf as follows:

14
 As the State notified the defense about the letter to the DOC and Freddie

testified about the letter at trial, the state court found “no failure on the state’s part

to disclose relevant evidence.” Haliburton, 691 So. 2d at 470. We conclude that

the Florida Supreme Court’s decision that the State disclosed all relevant evidence

concerning the deal involving Freddie’s gain time was a reasonable application of

clearly established federal law, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), and was based upon a

reasonable determination of the facts, see id. § 2254(d)(2).

II. Federal Evidentiary Hearing

Haliburton contends that although he received an evidentiary hearing on his

Brady claim regarding Freddie’s March 15, 1982 statement, it was not a full and

fair hearing because he was not permitted to call Bailey, his trial counsel, to

testify.19 Thus, he contends that he is entitled to a remand for further evidentiary

proceedings on this issue. Despite Haliburton’s efforts to frame our review in

[Bailey:] Has anybody in the Prosecutor’s Office while you’ve been here to
testify at this trial – answer this question yes or no – has anybody
agreed to make any kind of request, recommendation, anything else
to the Department of Corrections where you’re being held in
custody?
[Freddie:] Yes.
[Bailey:] As a result of you being here testifying today; yes or no?
[Freddie:] No.
[Bailey:] Okay.
19
To the extent that Haliburton challenges the merits of the Brady claim regarding
Freddie’s March 15, 1982 statement in addition to the procedural aspects of the evidentiary
hearing, we affirm the district court’s denial of the Brady claim.

15
terms of whether the federal evidentiary hearing was full and fair, there is no such

recognized claim for relief, and we instead are treating his claim as one that the

district court abused its discretion by conducting the hearing in the way that it did.

The district court ordered an evidentiary hearing to determine whether a

transcript of Freddie’s March 15, 1982 statement existed, and, if so, whether the

State committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose the transcript. Contrary to

the State’s position before the state courts, however, it conceded at the federal

hearing that Freddie made a statement at the State Attorney’s Office in the

presence of Sergeant David Houser, Assistant State Attorney Paul O. Moyle,20 and

a court reporter. The State also conceded that there was a transcript of the

statement, which it turned over to the defense, that could not be located at present.

As a result, the court received testimony at the hearing from Houser, Moyle,

Richard Barkin, and Freddie to determine the content of the statement. Houser

and Moyle, who were both present for Freddie’s March 15, 1982 statement,

testified that they recalled Freddie giving a formal statement that was transcribed

and that the statement identified Haliburton as Bohannon’s murderer.21 Moyle

20
Moyle was the chief homicide prosecutor in Palm Beach County at that time. Moyle is
now a judge on the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida.
21
Sergeant Houser testified that Freddie’s March 15, 1982 statement indicated that
Haliburton confessed “that he had gone into the Bohanan [sic] apartment and stabbed Donald
Bohanan [sic].” Similarly, Moyle testified that Freddie’s March 15, 1982 statement “indicat[ed]

16
also testified that after the grand jury returned an indictment, he turned the file

over to Barkin, the prosecutor. Barkin testified that he generally recalled that

Freddie’s March 15, 1982 statement indicated that Haliburton confessed that he

committed the murder. Additionally, although Freddie testified that he made the

statement, he invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when

asked about the contents of his statement.

When Haliburton rested his case, he reserved the right to call Bailey to

testify as to the contents of Freddie’s March 15, 1982 statement22 even though

both parties agreed that he would not be able to recall the specifics of the

statement. As Bailey could not recall the specifics of the statement, the court was

uncertain as to what his testimony would add to the disposition of the Brady claim.

Therefore, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2246,23 the court ordered Bailey to testify

through interrogatories and affidavits. Specifically, the court allowed each party

to submit fifteen interrogatories to Bailey regarding his knowledge of Freddie’s

that [Haliburton], his brother, had confessed to this murder.”
22
Haliburton wanted to present Bailey’s testimony as to the Brady claim and the
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. As Bailey testified at the state evidentiary hearing on the
ineffective assistance of counsel claim and no new information was presented in the federal
evidentiary hearing, the court declined to hear his testimony on that issue again.
23
Section 2246 provides that in habeas corpus actions, “evidence may be taken orally or
by deposition, or, in the discretion of the judge, by affidavit.” 28 U.S.C. § 2246.

17
March 15, 1982 statement and ordered that Bailey answer the interrogatories under

oath in an affidavit. Thereafter, the court permitted each party to submit five reply

interrogatories and scheduled oral argument to determine whether Bailey’s live

testimony would be needed after reviewing the answers to the interrogatories.

After both parties agreed to the procedure,24 Haliburton submitted three

questions, the State submitted eleven questions, and neither party submitted reply

questions. As anticipated, Bailey’s answers to the interrogatories indicated that he

did not recall the specifics of Freddie’s March 15, 1982 statement, but that he was

aware of the statement before the first trial and had a general recollection that the

contents of the statement were inculpatory, as were all of Freddie’s statements in

the case.25

24
When the court proposed this procedure, defense counsel did not object.
25
Bailey answered the interrogatories as follows:

Q4. At the time of Jerry Haliburton’s first trial were you aware of Freddie’s
March 12th statement?
A. When you say “March 12th statement” I assume you are referring to the
statement given by Freddie Haliburton to Assistant State Attorney Paul
Moyle inside the prosecutor’s office with a court reporter present. Yes, I
was aware of that statement prior to the first trial.
Q5. What was your understanding/knowledge regarding the contents of that
statement?
A. My understanding/knowledge of it was that he repeated what he had told
the police earlier, concerning his brother Jerry’s confession to him. My
understanding was that he repeated the same details of when and where the
confession occurred and of the contents of the confession. It was my
understanding that his statement to Paul Moyle was fully consistent with

18
 Nevertheless, Haliburton maintained at oral argument that he needed to

present Bailey’s live testimony to test the discrepancy in his answers to the

interrogatories – that is, the fact that Bailey could not recall the specifics of

Freddie’s March 15, 1982 statement, but he generally could recall that it was

inculpatory. Based upon Bailey’s answers, which were provided under oath, and

the testimony of the other witnesses, however, the court found a sufficient

evidentiary basis to rule upon Haliburton’s Brady claim without Bailey’s live

testimony. Haliburton, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 1388.

As Bailey did not testify live, Haliburton contends that he did not receive a

full and fair evidentiary hearing. The court, however, received Bailey’s testimony

in the form of interrogatories pursuant to § 2246. Section 2246 provides, “On

application for a writ of habeas corpus, evidence may be taken orally or by

deposition, or, in the discretion of the judge, by affidavit. If affidavits are

admitted any party shall have the right to propound written interrogatories to the

affiants, or to file answering affidavits.” 28 U.S.C. § 2246. Additionally, Rule 7

of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts

his later testimony to the grand jury. I also understood it was consistent
with what he later testified to at both the first and second trials.
Q6. Did you understand the statement to have been either inculpatory or
exculpatory of your client Jerry Haliburton?
A. Extremely and emphatically inculpatory.

19
gives judges the discretion to expand the record to “include, without limitation, . . .

answers under oath, if so directed, to written interrogatories propounded by the

judge. Affidavits may be submitted and considered as a part of the record.”

In light of the fact that Bailey could not recall the specifics of Freddie’s

March 15, 1982 statement, we find that the district court was well within its

discretion in taking his testimony through interrogatories and considering his

answers to the interrogatories as a part of the record. See 28 U.S.C. § 2246.

Furthermore, the court provided Haliburton an ample opportunity to demonstrate

why Bailey’s live testimony would be needed through reply interrogatories, which

Haliburton did not make use of, and oral argument. Therefore, as the court

received testimony from the witnesses who had knowledge of Freddie’s March 15,

1982 statement, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by

conducting the evidentiary hearing in the way that it did or by relying upon

Bailey’s interrogatories in lieu of hearing his live testimony. As a result,

Haliburton is not entitled to relief on this claim.

III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at the Penalty Phase

Haliburton contends that he is entitled to relief from his sentence, because

he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase. The Florida

Supreme Court, however, rejected that claim. Haliburton, 691 So. 2d at 471.

20
Thus, we must determine whether the Florida Supreme Court’s legal conclusions

were contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

It was well settled when the Florida Supreme Court adjudicated

Haliburton’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim that Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668 (1984), is the controlling legal standard for ineffective assistance of

counsel claims. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000). To prove that

counsel rendered ineffective assistance under Strickland, a defendant must

demonstrate that “counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the

adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just

result.” 466 U.S. at 686. Thus, Strickland established a two-pronged standard to

determine whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance.26 Id. at 687.

First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This
requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a
defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction
or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process
that renders the result unreliable.

26
The Strickland analysis is applicable at both the guilt and penalty phases in a capital
case. 466 U.S. at 686–87.

21
Id.27

When conducting an ineffectiveness review, the court’s role “is not to grade

counsel’s performance.” Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th

Cir. 2000) (en banc).28 On the contrary, the court’s role in this context is to

conduct an objective inquiry and determine whether “counsel’s performance is

reasonable[] under prevailing professional norms.” Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted). Therefore, “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly

deferential.” Id. at 1314 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Courts must indulge

[the] strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable and that

counsel made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional

judgment.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). This

presumption is even stronger when the court is examining the performance of

experienced counsel. Id. at 1316. To overcome this presumption in favor of

competence, the petitioner bears the heavy – but not insurmountable – burden of

27
As the Florida Supreme Court cited and applied Strickland and we have not found a
Supreme Court case that is based upon facts that are materially indistinguishable from the facts
of this case, we conclude that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision was not contrary to clearly
established federal law. See Putman, 268 F.3d at 1242 (concluding that the state habeas court
decision was not contrary to clearly established federal law because it cited and applied
Strickland to an ineffectiveness claim).
28
Chandler summarizes the clearly established federal law governing ineffective
assistance of counsel cases at the time of the Florida Supreme Court’s decision. 218 F.3d at
1313–19. Therefore, we cite Chandler for the principles to be used in ineffective assistance of
counsel cases.

22
persuading the court “that no competent counsel would have taken the action that

his counsel did take.” Id. at 1314–15.

We note, however, that “[n]o absolute rules dictate what is reasonable

performance for lawyers,” because absolute rules would impede “the

constitutionally protected independence of counsel and restrict the wide latitude

counsel must have in making tactical decisions.” Id. at 1317 (internal quotation

marks omitted). For example, “counsel need not always investigate before

pursuing or not pursuing a line of defense,” because following a particular line of

defense “is a matter of strategy and is not ineffective unless the petitioner can

prove the chosen course, in itself, was unreasonable.” Id. at 1318; see also

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (“[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation

of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.”).

Additionally, counsel is not “required to present all mitigation evidence, even if

the additional mitigation evidence would not have been incompatible with

counsel’s strategy.” Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1319. Counsel must be permitted to

weed out some arguments to stress others and advocate effectively. Id.

Haliburton contends that Bailey was ineffective, because he did not begin

preparation for the penalty phase until after the guilty verdict, which resulted in

his failure to present mitigating evidence about Haliburton’s disadvantaged

23
childhood, alcohol and substance abuse, sex abuse, and brain damage. He

contends that Bailey should have introduced this mitigating evidence through the

testimony of Susan La Fehr Hession, a mental health expert.

We reject Haliburton’s assertion that Bailey did not begin preparing for the

penalty phase until after the guilty verdict in the second trial. As Bailey

represented Haliburton in the first trial, he had most of the background and

preparation work for the penalty phase completed before the second trial began.

Haliburton, 691 So. 2d at 471. Yet, Bailey testified at the state court evidentiary

hearing that during the guilt phase of the second trial, he simultaneously

conducted additional follow-up preparation for the penalty phase. Indeed, at the

second penalty phase, he presented six additional witnesses.29 Thus, we find that

the Florida Supreme Court’s conclusion that the record does not support

Haliburton’s contention that Bailey failed to begin preparation for the penalty

phase until after the guilty verdict was returned is not an unreasonable

determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

Furthermore, Bailey was not deficient for declining to present evidence

about Haliburton’s disadvantaged childhood, alcohol and substance abuse, sex

29
We present this evidence only as support for the fact that Bailey conducted additional
preparation for the second penalty phase hearing, not as conclusive proof that his performance
was effective.

24
abuse, and brain damage. As Bailey represented Haliburton in the first and second

trials, he was aware of Haliburton’s abusive background through frequent contact

with his family members, including phone calls, visits to the family members’

homes, and conferences at Bailey’s office. See Haliburton, 691 So. 2d at 471.

Additionally, Bailey knew that La Fehr Hession would have testified that there

was an indication of brain damage. Id. Yet, Bailey decided not to present

evidence about Haliburton’s abusive background and the indication of brain

damage, because such evidence can often hurt the defense as much or more than it

can help.30 See Crawford, 311 F.3d at 1321 (“[E]vidence of alcohol or drug abuse

. . . often has little mitigating value and can do as much or more harm than good in

the eyes of the jury.”). Instead, Bailey’s strategy in the penalty phase was to paint

a picture of a man worth saving by emphasizing Haliburton’s close family ties and

the positive influence he had on members of his family and fellow inmates. See

Haliburton, 691 So. 2d at 471.

As Bailey thoroughly investigated Haliburton’s background and mental

health, we conclude that he knew enough to make an informed, strategic decision

30
At the state evidentiary hearing, Bailey testified that he chose not to present evidence
about Haliburton’s abusive background in part because such evidence “can paint an appealing
picture of how your client was abused and all those factors lead up to him doing what [he] did
and you may convince the jury of that absolutely; but you may also convince them that, paint a
picture of Frankenstein.”

25
not to present such mitigating evidence and that his strategic decision was

reasonable. See Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1319 (providing that “counsel [is not]

required to present all mitigation evidence, even if the additional mitigation

evidence would not have been incompatible with counsel’s strategy”). Thus, we

conclude that the Florida Supreme Court’s holding that Bailey’s performance at

the penalty phase was not ineffective is a reasonable application of clearly

established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).31

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Haliburton has not shown that

he is entitled to relief from either his conviction or his death sentence. Thus, the

district court properly denied his habeas petition.

AFFIRMED.

31
The Florida Supreme Court concluded in the alternative that “[i]n light of the
substantial, compelling aggravation found by the trial court, there is no reasonable probability
that had the mental health expert testified, the outcome would have been different.” Haliburton,
691 So. 2d at 471. Thus, even if we were to assume that counsel’s performance was deficient,
we find that the Florida Supreme Court’s alternative conclusion is a reasonable application of
clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

26