[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
October 28, 2003
No. 03-12685 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket Nos. 02-00167-CV-2-CDL-4
02-41915 BKC-JT
IN RE: DERRYL FRANKLIN ROZIER,
Debtor.
MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
DERRYL FRANKLIN ROZIER,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
_________________________
(October 28, 2003)
Before TJOFLAT, BIRCH and RONEY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
CERTIFICATION FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF GEORGIA, PURSUANT TO O.C.G.A. § 15-2-9.
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA AND ITS HONORABLE
JUSTICES:
Motors Acceptance Corporation (“Motors Acceptance”) appeals the district
court’s affirmance of the bankruptcy court’s grant of Derryl Franklin Rozier’s
(“Rozier”) motion for contempt in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding. In affirming
the bankruptcy court’s order holding Motors Acceptance in contempt for failure to
return to the debtor an automobile repossessed prior to the filing of the Chapter 13
petition, the district court construed Georgia law as providing that both legal title and
right of redemption of a vehicle remain with a debtor, after a creditor’s repossession
of that vehicle.
There appears to be no issues of fact. The parties agree that the case turns on
state law. Having found no case law addressing this exact issue of Georgia law, we
certify the following question of law to the Supreme Court of Georgia and postpone
any further consideration of this appeal until we receive an answer from that court.
Rozier purchased an automobile in the State of Georgia, with financing which
was assigned to Motors Acceptance. On August 8, 2002, Motors Acceptance
repossessed the vehicle due to Rozier’s failure to make installment payments as set
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forth in the sales contract. A few days later, on August 12, Rozier filed a petition
under Chapter 13 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Georgia. Soon after filing his petition,
Rozier requested that Motors Acceptance return possession of the vehicle back to
him, which Motors Acceptance declined to do. He then filed a motion for contempt
against Motors Acceptance for its refusal to return the vehicle. Although possession
was relinquished under a Temporary Turnover Order, the parties reserved their right
to pursue the issue. The bankruptcy court ultimately granted Rozier’s motion for
contempt, holding Motors Acceptance in willful contempt of the automatic stay under
11 U.S.C. § 362 by refusing to return the automobile. The district court affirmed the
bankruptcy court’s contempt order, holding that because, under its interpretation of
Georgia law, both the right of redemption and legal title of a vehicle remain with a
debtor even after a creditor’s repossession of that vehicle, Rozier’s automobile should
have been relinquished by Motors Acceptance to him as part of his Chapter 13
bankruptcy estate during the pendency of his bankruptcy petition. See Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Rozier, 290 B.R. 910, 913 (M.D. Ga. 2003).
Under the Bankruptcy Code, a court may order a third party to turn over to the
debtor’s bankruptcy estate property in its possession if, among other things, such
property is considered “property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. §§ 541, 542. “Property of
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the estate” includes “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case.” Id. § 541(a)(1); see also Bel-Tel Fed. Credit Union v.
Kalter, 292 F.3d 1350, 1351 (11th Cir. 2002).
The dispositive question on this appeal is whether a vehicle repossessed prior
to the filing of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition is in fact the property of the debtor’s
bankruptcy estate. The answer to this question turns on whether, under Georgia law,
legal ownership passes to a creditor at the time of repossession. See Bel-Tel Fed.
Credit Union, 292 F.3d at 1353 (noting that “the nature and existence of the
[debtor’s] right to property is determined by looking at state law”) (internal quotation
and citation omitted).
This Court has held that under Florida and Alabama law a defaulted vehicle
debtor has no ownership rights, other than a right of redemption, which is an
insufficient ownership interest for that vehicle to be considered part of the debtor’s
bankruptcy estate. See Bel-Tel Fed. Credit Union, 292 F.3d at 1360 (interpreting
Florida law); Lewis v. Charles R. Hall Motors, Inc., 137 F.3d 1280, 1285 (11th Cir.
1998) (interpreting Alabama law). The district court held, and appellee Rozier
argues, that Georgia law is different from Florida and Alabama law, and that in
addition to a right of redemption, the debtor had ownership rights entitling him to
possession of the automobile.
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If, as the district court held, both legal title and the right of redemption of a
vehicle remain with a defaulted debtor even after his creditor’s repossession of the
vehicle, then the vehicle remains part of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate under §
541(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, and the district court properly affirmed the
bankruptcy court’s order holding Motors Acceptance in contempt for failure to
relinquish the vehicle back to Rozier after he had filed his bankruptcy petition. If, as
Motors Acceptance contends on appeal, Georgia law affords a debtor no right in a
repossessed vehicle other than a right of redemption, then the district court erred by
concluding that the repossessed vehicle was part of the bankruptcy estate and thus
abused its discretion by finding Motors Acceptance in contempt for failure to
relinquish the same.
To answer these questions, this Court now certifies the following question of
Georgia law to the Supreme Court of Georgia:
DOES LEGAL TITLE, OR ANY OTHER OWNERSHIP INTEREST
THAT WOULD GIVE A RIGHT OF POSSESSION, PASS TO THAT
CREDITOR UNDER GEORGIA LAW UPON REPOSSESSION OF
AN AUTOMOBILE SUBSEQUENT TO A DEBTOR’S DEFAULT
ON AN AUTOMOBILE INSTALLMENT LOAN CONTRACT, OR
DOES SUCH LEGAL TITLE OR OTHER OWNERSHIP INTEREST
REMAIN IN THE DEBTOR?
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We certify the above-styled question to the Supreme Court of Georgia. The
phrasing used in this certified question should not restrict that court’s consideration
of the problems of state law posed by this case.
QUESTION CERTIFIED.
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