[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
April 28, 2004
No. 02-14145 THOMAS K. KAHN
_______________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket Nos. 00-3646 CV-N-W
& 00-03647-CV-N-W
PAMELA SUE JONES,
Plaintiff,
versus
DILLARD’S, INC.,
Defendant.
SARAH CROCKER, LANA
HOUSE, JAMES THOMPSON,
DEBORAH T. GIBBONS,
Plaintiffs,
GERDA BYRD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
DILLARD’S, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_________________________
(April 28, 2004)
Before DUBINA and FAY, Circuit Judges, and DOWD*, District Judge.
PER CURIAM:
This appeal from the Northern District of Alabama involved claims by the
plaintiff-appellant, Gerda Byrd, grounded in the federal Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), the Alabama Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(AADEA), and Alabama common law fraud. The district court had granted
defendant-appellee’s motion for summary judgment as to all defendants on all
claims and Byrd appealed.
On May 30, 2003, this Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the
fraud claim, but reversed the district court on the ADEA claim. Jones v. Dillard’s,
Inc., 331 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2003). We held that equitable tolling applied, with
the result being that the 180-day limitations period for filing a charge of
discrimination did not begin to run until Byrd learned that she had been replaced
*
Honorable David D. Dowd, Jr., United States District Judge for the Northern District of
Ohio, sitting by designation.
2
by a younger employee, notwithstanding her earlier suspicion of age
discrimination. Id. at 1266. We, therefore, concluded that Byrd’s EEOC charge
was timely filed. We also certified a question to the Alabama Supreme Court, id.
at 1269, and expressly delayed remand until that court had a chance “to define the
applicable limitations period to Byrd’s claim under the AADEA.” Id. at 1270.
On April 2, 2004, the Alabama Supreme Court answered the following
question: “ ‘What is the applicable limitations period for a claim brought under the
[Alabama Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Ala. Code 1975, § 25-1-20
through § 25-1-29]?’ ” Byrd v. Dillard’s, Inc., No. 1021439, slip op. at 1 (Ala.
Apr. 2, 2004) (per curiam) (quoting Jones v. Dillard’s, Inc., 331 F.3d at 1269).
That court stated:
[W]e hold that the § 25-1-29 incorporates the statutes of limitations
of the ADEA as follows:
(1) If a plaintiff files an AADEA claim in a state
court within 180 days from the occurrence of the alleged
unlawful practice, the applicable limitations period for
filing a charge with the EEOC, then that plaintiff’s claim
is timely.
(2) If a plaintiff files a charge with the EEOC
within 180 days from the occurrence of the alleged
unlawful practice and thereafter receives notice that the
EEOC has dismissed the charge, then that plaintiff’s
AADEA claim filed in the state court within 90 days
3
after the EEOC’s notice of dismissal of the charge is
timely.
Byrd v. Dillard’s, Inc., slip op. at 8.1
Accordingly, we vacate the entry of summary judgment to Dillard’s on the
ADEA claim and the AADEA claim and we affirm the judgment with respect to
the fraud claim. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion
and the opinion of May 30, 2003.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED AND VACATED IN PART.
1
The opinion of the Alabama Supreme Court is attached hereto as Appendix A.
4