[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 03-12572 August 24, 2004
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 02-21125-CV-FAM
SME RACKS, INC., a Florida corporation,
VALTEC INFORMATION SYSTEMS, INC.,
a Florida corporation,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
RAFAEL A. CASTRO, MR.,
individually,
Plaintiff,
versus
SISTEMAS MECANICOS PARA ELECTRONICA, S.A.,
a Spanish company, CARMELO GARCIA APARICIO.,
S.A., et al.
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(August 24, 2004)
Before BLACK, BARKETT and STAHL *, Circuit Judges.
*
Honorable Norman H. Stahl, United States Circuit Judge for the First Circuit, sitting by
designation.
BARKETT, Circuit Judge:
SME Racks, Inc. (“SME Racks”) and Valtec Information Systems, Inc.
(“Valtec”), two Florida corporations, and Rafael A. Castro (“Castro”), a Florida
citizen,1 appeal the dismissal of their suit against a Spanish corporation, Sistemas
Mecanicos Para Electronica, S.A. (“Sistemas Mecanicos”), arising out of their
purchase of allegedly defective goods. The question on appeal is whether the
district court abused its discretion in dismissing this case on grounds of forum non
conveniens.2 We find that the district court abused its discretion by failing to apply
the strong presumption that a United States citizen will not be ousted from the
courts of this country and reverse.
BACKGROUND
Acting in his capacity as owner of Valtec, Castro attended an industry
exhibition in Las Vegas, Nevada, where Sistemas Mecanicos was promoting its
products. Negotiations between Castro and Sistemas Mecanicos began in Las
Vegas, and Sistemas Mecanicos followed up by twice sending agents to Castro’s
Miami office to negotiate a business plan. Castro then went to Spain twice to
further negotiate and finalize their international agreement. The contract was
1
Appellants will be referred to collectively as “SME Racks.”
2
The district court adopted in whole the Report and Recommendation of the magistrate
judge. For convenience, we refer to the Report as if it were the district court’s opinion.
2
executed in Spain and provided that “[b]oth parties submit and refer themselves to
Spanish law and to settle any disputes that may arise between them as a result of
this contract.”
The products were manufactured in Spain and shipped to Florida, and
payment was sent. When the goods were found to be defective, Sistemas
Mecanicos sent a replacement shipment. Castro claimed that this shipment also
contained defective products. Castro consequently filed a diversity action in
federal court alleging numerous contract and tort claims.3
Sistemas Mecanicos moved for dismissal on grounds of forum non
conveniens. After determining that Spanish courts could provide an adequate and
available alternative forum,4 the district court concluded that the private
convenience factors were at or near equipoise because witnesses and evidence were
located in both Florida and Spain. The district court then found that the public
convenience factors, “particularly the fact that the Court will have to apply Spanish
law–weigh strongly in favor of dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds.”
3
In its Second Amended Complaint, SME Racks has asserted claims for: fraud in the
inducement; rescission of purchase agreement; promissory estoppel; quasi-contract/quantum
meruit; unjust enrichment; negligent misrepresentation; negligent design, manufacture, and
inspection; negligent assembly, inspection, packing, and storage; breach of oral agreement;
breach of express warranty; breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing.
4
That Spanish courts provide an independent and adequate alternative forum is not at
issue in this appeal.
3
Report at 8. The district court granted Sistemas Mecanicos’s motion and SME
Racks filed this appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district court’s forum non conveniens determination “may be reversed
only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion; where the court has
considered all relevant public and private interest factors, and where its balancing
of these factors is reasonable, its decision deserves substantial deference.” Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981). “[T]he court abuses its discretion
when it fails to balance the relevant factors.” La Seguridad v. Transytur Line, 707
F.2d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 1983). Furthermore, “where the court does not weigh
the relative advantages of the respective forums but considers only the
disadvantages of one, it has abused its discretion.” Id. at 1307.
DISCUSSION
In considering a motion for dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens,
the trial judge must consider all relevant factors of private interest,
weighing in the balance a strong presumption against disturbing
plaintiffs’ initial forum choice. If the trial judge finds this balance of
private interests to be in equipoise or near equipoise, he must then
determine whether or not factors of public interest tip the balance in
favor of a trial in a foreign forum.5
5
We have clarified that although “private factors are generally considered more
important” than public ones, courts should consider both public and private factors “in all cases.”
Leon v. Millon Air, Inc., 251 F.3d 1305, 1311 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted).
4
Id. at 1307.
The Supreme Court set out in detail in Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert, 330
U.S. 501 (1947), factors to be considered in balancing the private and public
interests. The Court explained:
An interest to be considered, and the one likely to be most pressed, is
the private interest of the litigant. Important considerations are the
relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory
process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining
attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of the premises,
if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical
problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.
There may also be questions as to the enforceability of a judgment if
one is obtained. The court will weigh relative advantages and
obstacles to fair trial. It is often said that the plaintiff may not, by
choice of an inconvenient forum, “vex,” “harass,” or “oppress” the
defendant by inflicting upon him expense or trouble not necessary to
his own right to pursue his remedy. But unless the balance is strongly
in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely
be disturbed.
Factors of public interest also have a place in applying the
doctrine. Administrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation
is piled up in congested centers instead of being handled at its origin.
Jury duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon the people of
a community which has no relation to the litigation. In cases which
touch the affairs of many persons, there is reason for holding the trial
in their view and reach rather than in remote parts of the country
where they can learn of it by report only. There is a local interest in
having localized controversies decided at home. There is an
appropriateness, too, in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum
that is at home with the state law that must govern the case, rather
than having a court in some other forum untangle problems in conflict
of laws, and in law foreign to itself.
5
330 U.S. at 508-09 (emphasis added).
A. Private Interest Factors
As the Gilbert Court made clear, with regard to the weighing of the private
interests, the plaintiffs’ choice of forum should rarely be disturbed “unless the
balance is strongly in favor of the defendant.” Id. at 508. This presumption in
favor of the plaintiffs’ initial forum choice in balancing the private interests is at its
strongest when the plaintiffs are citizens, residents, or corporations of this country.
Leon v. Millon Air, Inc., 251 F.3d 1305, 1311 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[B]alancing
private interests requires determining the convenience of the parties, affording
domestic plaintiffs ‘a strong presumption’ that their forum choice is sufficiently
convenient, and a weaker presumption applying in cases brought by foreign
plaintiffs.”).
While the Supreme Court has been clear that “dismissal should not be
automatically barred when a [domestic] plaintiff has filed suit in his home forum,”
Piper Aircraft Co. 454 U.S. at 255 n.23 (emphasis added),6 in this Circuit we have
6
In full, the Supreme Court stated that:
In Koster, we stated that “[i]n any balancing of conveniences, a real showing of
convenience by a plaintiff who has sued in his home forum will normally
outweigh the inconvenience the defendant may have shown.” As the District
Court correctly noted in its opinion, the lower federal courts have routinely given
less weight to a foreign plaintiff’s choice of forum. A citizen’s forum choice
should not be given dispositive weight, however. Citizens or residents deserve
somewhat more deference than foreign plaintiffs, but dismissal should not be
6
long mandated that district courts “‘require positive evidence of unusually extreme
circumstances, and should be thoroughly convinced that material injustice is
manifest before exercising any such discretion as may exist to deny a United States
citizen access to the courts of this country.’” La Seguridad, 707 F.2d at 1308 n.7
(quoting Burt v. Isthmus Dev. Co., 218 F.2d 353, 357 (5th Cir. 1953)7); see also
Lehman v. Humphrey Cayman, Ltd., 713 F.2d 339, 342 (8th Cir. 1983) (requiring
same standard); Founding Church of Scientology v. Verlag, 536 F.2d 429, 435
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (same).
While the district court referenced the presumption in favor of plaintiffs’
choice of forum in the introductory portion of its discussion, the district court
failed to articulate the relevant standards and failed to apply any presumption in its
analysis. First, the district court failed to recognize our rule that “positive evidence
of unusually extreme circumstances” must be present and that the court must be
“thoroughly convinced that material injustice is manifest” before ousting a
automatically barred when a plaintiff has filed suit in his home forum. As
always, if the balance of conveniences suggests that trial in the chosen forum
would be unnecessarily burdensome for the defendant or the court, dismissal is
proper.
Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 255 n.23 (internal citations omitted).
7
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the
Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions handed down prior to
the close of business on September 30, 1981.
7
domestic plaintiff from this country’s courts. La Seguridad, 707 F.2d at 1308 n.7.
The district court’s reference to the presumption in favor of the plaintiffs’ choice of
forum also fails to make clear that this presumption is to be applied specifically
when weighing the private interests. Id. at 1307.
Second, even if we were to assume that the district court correctly
understood the proper legal standard, the district court never mentions the
presumption in favor of the plaintiffs or incorporates the presumption into its
calculus once it actually engages in weighing the private interests. Indeed, the
Report makes clear that the district court entirely failed to consider the
presumption in favor of the plaintiffs’ choice of forum in its analysis at all.
After establishing that an adequate and available forum existed in Spanish
courts, the district court opinion turned to balancing the private interest factors. In
determining that the private convenience factors were at or near equipoise, the
district court focused only on factors related to the practical problems that make
“trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive,” such as where the evidence and
witnesses are located. Applying these factors, both fora were found to be equally
inconvenient. In full, this portion of the Report reads as follows (for ease of
reference, we have numbered the paragraphs):
[1] Relevant private factors include the relative ease of access to
sources of proof, ability to obtain witnesses, and all other practical
8
problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive.
[2] Witnesses who examined the merchandise when it was unloaded
in Florida are located in Florida. Additionally, the allegedly defective
products were shipped to Florida and are currently located in Florida,
some of the negotiations took place in Florida, and Defendants’
representatives traveled to Florida on at least one occasion to
negotiate.
[3]However, weighing in favor of transfer to Spain is the fact that
witnesses who shipped and manufactured the merchandise, as well as
Defendants, are located in Spain. Additionally, in light of the fact that
Plaintiffs alleged, in part, that the merchandise was defectively
manufactured, it may be necessary to examine Defendants’
manufacturing facilities, which are located in Spain. Finally, the
documentary evidence is located in both Florida and Spain, and some
of it is in Spanish.
[4] The Court concludes that the private convenience factors are at or
near equipoise. If the Court only considered only [sic] those factors,
without looking at the public interest factors, then the Court would
conclude that trial in either forum - this Court or Spain - would be
equally inconvenient. However, because the private interest factors
are at or near equipoise, the Court must consider the public interest
factors.
Report at 3-4 (internal citation and punctuation omitted).
This section of the Report follows the standard format of stating a test,
applying the test to the circumstances of the case, and thereby reaching a
conclusion. In ¶1, the district court set out the test that guided its analysis, namely
that “[r]elevant private factors include the relative ease of access to sources of
proof, ability to obtain witnesses, and all other practical problems that make trial of
a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive.” Nothing in this statement of the rule
indicates that the plaintiffs’ choice is given substantial deference in weighing the
9
private interest factors. In ¶¶2-3 the district court applied the test as it was framed,
focusing only on factors related to the practical problems that make “trial of a case
easy, expeditious, and inexpensive.” The Report offers no suggestion that the
court accorded the plaintiffs’ choice any deference in the analysis. Finally, in ¶4,
the district court concluded that the private interest factors were at or near
equipoise because “trial in either forum - this Court or Spain - would be equally
inconvenient.” In sum, there is simply no hint from the opinion, that in weighing
the private interest factors, the district court considered the strong presumption in
favor of the domestic plaintiffs’ choice of forum.
Nor is there any basis to speculate that the district court simply failed to
mention the presumption in its application section, but nevertheless considered the
presumption and determined that the presumption was defeated.8 If any
presumption exists in favor of the plaintiffs’ choice (never mind a presumption
requiring “positive evidence of unusually extreme circumstances” before upsetting
the plaintiffs’ choice), then by definition the plaintiffs’ choice must win if all other
factors are equal. See Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 508 (“[U]nless the balance is
strongly in favor of the defendant[s], the plaintiff[s’] choice of forum should rarely
8
See Dissent at 20-21 (“[T]he only sensible way to understand the district court’s
conclusion that the private interests were at or near equipoise is that the strong presumption in
favor of domestic plaintiffs was partly defeated, not that it was ignored.”).
10
be disturbed.”). Thus, for the district court to have applied the presumption in
determining that the private interest factors were at or near equipoise, the district
court would have had to silently determine that a trial in Florida was sufficiently
more inconvenient than a trial in Spain in order to counterbalance the presumption
in favor of the plaintiffs’ choice of forum.
This theory simply cannot be reconciled with the district court’s explication
of its own logic – the reason the private interest factors were, in its view, at or near
equipoise was because “either forum - this Court or Spain - would be equally
inconvenient.” In light of this language, the only way the presumption could have
been applied is to read the district court’s pronouncement that both forums are
“equally inconvenient” as short hand for: “the Spanish forum is more convenient
than this forum, but when weighed against the presumption in favor of the
plaintiffs’ choice of forum, the two can be understood as equally inconvenient.”
While there is a deferential standard of review, we need not engage in such
conjecture. The district court simply found that the convenience factors were
about equal and failed to weigh the presumption in favor of the plaintiffs into the
balance. This failure is a clear abuse of discretion. See La Seguridad, 707 F.2d at
1307 (“[T]he court abuses its discretion when it fails to balance the relevant
11
factors.”).9
B. Public Interest Factors
Because reversal and remand are appropriate solely based upon the district
court’s failure to balance all the relevant private interest factors, we need not
determine whether the district court again abused its discretion in weighing the
public interest factors. Nevertheless, we feel it useful to express some concern that
in weighing the public interest factors the district court failed to consider the
United States’ strong interests in providing a forum for this litigation.
“Relevant public interest factors include the sovereigns’ interests in deciding
the dispute.” Republic of Panama, v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A., 119
F.3d 935, 953 (11th Cir. 1997). While the district court recognized that Florida
9
Judge Black’s dissent that suggests our interpretation
opens a Pandora’s Box of problems regarding the review of a district court’s
forum non conveniens decision. Suppose 51 percent of the evidence were in
Spain, and 49 percent were in Florida—would the strong presumption in favor of
domestic plaintiffs tilt the balance in favor of retaining jurisdiction? What about
52 percent? 55 percent? 60 percent? In the forum non conveniens scale,
precisely how heavily does the strong presumption in favor of domestic plaintiffs’
forum choices weigh?
Dissent at 21. In this case, the district court made clear that it found both fora “equally
inconvenient.” Thus, if any presumption applies at all, it must apply in this situation. Whether a
district court would abuse its discretion in determining that 51 percent, 52 percent, or 55 percent
of the evidence is sufficient to constitute “positive evidence of unusually extreme
circumstances” warranting dismissal is simply not before us. La Seguridad, 707 F.2d at 1308
n.7. What is before us is a case where the district court unequivocally found that both fora were
equally inconvenient and yet determined that the private interest factors were at or near
equipoise. The presumption in favor of the plaintiff simply was not applied.
12
had an interest in this litigation, it failed to recognize any federal interest.
Yet, we have been clear that “[t]here is a strong federal interest in making sure that
plaintiffs who are United States citizens generally get to choose an American
forum for bringing suit, rather than having their case relegated to a foreign
jurisdiction.” Esfeld v. Costa Crociere, S.P.A., 289 F.3d 1300, 1311 (11th Cir.
2002); see also Burt, 218 F.2d at 356 (“This nation has historically been most
solicitous of its citizens’ welfare and its courts exist as much for the adjudication
of its citizens' controversies as for the enforcement of its laws.” ). Furthermore, it
is clear that a sovereign has a very strong interest when its citizens are allegedly
victims and the injury occurs on home soil. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. 235
(1981) (finding that Scotland had a stronger interest than the United States in
hearing the case in part because “[t]he accident occurred in its airspace” and “[a]ll
of the decedents were Scottish”); Satz v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 244 F.3d
1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that Argentina’s interest in deciding the
dispute was stronger than the United States where all the victims of a plane crash
were Argentinean and the plane crashed in Argentina). Thus, in this case, the
United States has a strong interest in providing a forum for its citizens’ grievances
against an allegedly predatory foreign business that actively solicited business and
caused harm within the home forum.
13
These factors distinguish this case from other cases where we found that the
public interest factors weighed in favor of dismissal because of the application of
foreign law.10 Moreover, while the application of foreign law is an important
factor to be considered in weighing the public interests, this factor cannot be
accorded dispositive weight.11
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the district court clearly abused its discretion in dismissing
this case and therefore REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
10
All but one of our cases that the district court relies upon in supporting its assertion that
the application of foreign law weighs heavily in favor of dismissal involve only foreign
plaintiffs. See Ford v. Brown, 319 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2003) (English citizen); Leon, 251 F.3d
1305 (Ecuadorian citizens); Republic of Panama, 119 F.3d 935 (the Republic of Panama);
Magnin v. Teledyne Cont’l Motors, 91 F.3d 1424 (11th Cir. 1996) (French citizens); Sibaja v.
Dow Chem. Co., 757 F.2d 1215 (11th Cir. 1985) (Costa Rican citizens); Sigalas v. Lido
Maritime, Inc., 776 F.2d 1512 (11th Cir. 1985) (Greek nationals).
The only case relied upon by the district court in which plaintiffs were not all foreign was
Satz, 244 F.3d at 1279. That case involved a products liability suit brought by the estates of
victims of an airplane crash in Argentina. All of the victims were Argentinean nationals, and of
the five plaintiff representatives of the estates, four were Argentinean (although one resided in
Florida), and one was a United States citizen living in Argentina. Id. at 1281 n.1. The court
noted that the private factors weighed heavily in favor of dismissal because most of the
evidence, including the crash wreckage, witnesses, and important documents were in Argentina.
Id. at 1283-84. Also, besides the application of foreign law, the court noted that the public
factors weighed in favor of Argentina because all of the victims were Argentinean. Id. at 1284.
Thus, in Satz, although one of the plaintiffs was a United States citizen, he was a resident abroad
and all other factors pointed overwhelmingly in favor of forum non conveniens dismissal.
11
See Burt, 218 F.2d at 357 (“There are, no doubt, difficulties in attempting to determine
and apply foreign law; but the necessity to do so often occurs. . . . In such cases, the rules of the
foreign law and their interpretation are simply questions of fact, and the conclusion is as
reviewable as any other fact issue . . . A different situation might be presented if the federal
court were being asked to enforce some equitable or otherwise unusual relief peculiar to the
foreign law . . . [however] [t]he fact that success or failure depends upon the law of Mexico does
not, of itself, justify dismissal.”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
14
BLACK, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from today’s decision for two overarching reasons.
First, the majority’s private interest analysis does not accord sufficient deference to
the district court’s decision.1 Second, the majority’s public interest
pronouncements are improvident dicta.
I. FORUM NON CONVENIENS IN GENERAL
Generally speaking, three Supreme Court cases provide the foundation for
analyzing forum non conveniens issues. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501,
67 S. Ct. 839 (1947); Koster v. (Am.) Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U.S.
518, 67 S. Ct. 828 (1947); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 102 S. Ct.
252 (1981). Gilbert established the familiar private/public interests framework.
330 U.S. at 508–09, 67 S. Ct. at 843. Relevant private interests include access to
sources of proof, the availability and cost of attendance of witnesses, the
possibility of view of the premises, “and all other practical problems that make trial
of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” Id. at 508, 67 S. Ct. at 843. Relevant
public interests, on the other hand, include administrative difficulties with deciding
litigation in congested centers rather than at their origin, the imposition of jury
duty on a community unrelated to the litigation, the relative interests of the
possible fora, and the interest in a court avoiding the necessity of “untangl[ing]
1
Like the majority, for convenience I treat the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation as if it were the district court’s opinion.
15
problems in conflict of laws, and [applying] law foreign to itself.” Id. at 508–09,
67 S. Ct. at 843. Gilbert’s companion case, Koster, stated the strong presumption
in favor of a home plaintiff’s choice of forum. 330 U.S. at 524, 67 S. Ct. at
831–32. Finally, Piper Aircraft clarified that this presumption is “somewhat”
weaker when the plaintiff is a foreigner. 454 U.S. at 255 n.23, 102 S. Ct. at 266
n.23. Nevertheless, even though the deference due a domestic plaintiff’s forum
choice is greater, Piper Aircraft explained:
A citizen’s forum choice should not be given dispositive weight,
however. Citizens or residents deserve somewhat more deference
than foreign plaintiffs, but dismissal should not be automatically
barred when a plaintiff has filed suit in his home forum. As always, if
the balance of conveniences suggests that trial in the chosen forum
would be unnecessarily burdensome for the defendant or the court,
dismissal is proper.
Id. (emphasis added and citations omitted).
With this foundation in mind, we have previously clarified that a district
court must merely do three things before concluding a case should be dismissed
under forum non conveniens. C.A. La Seguridad v. Transytur Line, 707 F.2d 1304,
1307 (11th Cir. 1983). First, it must identify an adequate alternative forum. Id.
(citing Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 506–07, 67 S. Ct. at 842). Second, according the
plaintiff’s forum choice the appropriate deference under Koster and Piper Aircraft,
it must weigh the private interests. Id. (citation omitted). Third, if the private
interests are at or near equipoise, it must consider whether factors of public interest
16
“tip the balance in favor of a trial in a foreign forum.”2 Id. (citation omitted). In
short, I respectfully disagree with today’s decision because I believe the district
court adequately undertook all three steps.
II. THE MAJORITY’S PRIVATE INTEREST ANALYSIS
Despite the limited nature of our review, the majority finds the district
court’s analysis of the litigants’ private interests constituted a clear abuse of
discretion. Respectfully, I disagree.
A. Abuse of Discretion Review
The Supreme Court has strenuously admonished appellate courts that they
may reverse a district court’s forum non conveniens decision only when there has
been a “clear abuse of discretion.” Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 257, 102 S. Ct. at
266 (emphasis added). To that end, “where the [district] court has considered all
relevant public and private interest factors, and where its balancing of these factors
is reasonable, its decision deserves substantial deference.” Id. Specifically, when
applying abuse of discretion review, the Supreme Court has instructed appellate
courts not to fall into the trap of “los[ing] sight of this rule, and substitut[ing their]
own judgment for that of the District Court.” Id., 102 S. Ct. at 266–67.
The majority has fallen into this trap. The crux of today’s holding is that the
district court failed to apply the presumption in favor of domestic plaintiffs’ forum
2
To aid appellate review, we previously clarified that district courts should consider both
public and private factors “in all cases.” Leon v. Millon Air, Inc., 251 F.3d 1305, 1311 (11th Cir.
2001).
17
choice. Unfortunately, the majority is able to justify this conclusion only because
it does not limit its review for error to a clear abuse of discretion. Typically, when
we ask whether a district court abused its discretion, we ask whether the district
court applied the relevant law to the relevant facts. For example, even though we
might disagree with the district court’s decision, we generally find a district court
abused its discretion only when it applied the wrong rule, failed to balance the
relevant factors, or only considered the disadvantages of one of the fora. See
Transytur Line, 707 F.2d at 1308. In contrast, when we review a question de novo,
we do not accord the district court’s reasoning any deference. Today’s opinion,
however, does not question whether the district court applied the wrong rule,3
failed to balance the relevant factors, or only considered the disadvantages of one
of the fora—instead, the district court is reversed because it did not apply the rule
stringently or meaningfully enough. This holding therefore blurs the important
distinction between review for a clear abuse of discretion and de novo review.
B. The District Court’s Recognition and Application of the Strong Presumption
There can be no question the district court was aware of and applied the
strong presumption in favor of a plaintiff’s initial forum choice. The district court
3
The majority suggests the district court “failed to articulate the relevant standards,”
(Opinion at 7), but I do not understand why the majority attaches talismanic significance to the
fact the district court did not (1) quote “our rule that ‘positive evidence of unusually extreme
circumstances’ must be present and that the court must be ‘thoroughly convinced that material
injustice is manifest,’” or (2) explain the presumption only applies “when weighing the private
interests,” (Opinion at 7). Given the district court’s explicit and repeated recognition of the
strong presumption in favor of a plaintiff’s forum choice, see infra Part II.B, I do not think it was
necessary for the district court also to regurgitate the majority’s particular magic words.
18
referenced the strong presumption three times. First, the district court explicitly
referenced the “strong presumption against disturbing plaintiffs’ initial forum
choice.” (Report at 3 (emphasis added; citation and internal punctuation omitted).)
Second, the district court explained that “courts should apply the doctrine of forum
non conveniens only in rare cases.” (Id. (emphasis added and internal punctuation
omitted) (citing Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 510, 67 S. Ct. at 843).) Third, when balancing
the private and public factors, the district court clarified that “unless the balance is
strongly in favor of the defendants, the plaintiffs’ choice of forum should rarely be
disturbed.” (Id. (emphasis added and internal punctuation omitted) (citing Gilbert,
330 U.S. at 508, 67 S. Ct. at 843).) I do not see how the district court could have
demonstrated fuller awareness of the strong presumption in favor of a plaintiff’s
initial forum choice short of stating it a fourth time with the proviso “I really mean
it this time.”4
C. The District Court’s Analysis of the Private Interests in Light of the Strong
Presumption
I believe the district court’s decision is entitled to “substantial deference”
because it “considered all relevant public and private interest factors, and . . . its
balancing of [those] factors [was] reasonable.” Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 257,
102 S. Ct. at 266.
4
The majority suggests the district court “never mentions the presumption in favor of the
plaintiffs or incorporates the presumption into its calculus once it actually engages in weighing
the private interests.” (Opinion at 8.) I do not understand how the addition of the words “the
presumption was defeated” would be any different from adding the proviso “I really mean it this
time.”
19
Considering the private interest factors explicitly set out in Gilbert, in light
of its previous acknowledgment of the strong presumption in favor of a domestic
plaintiff’s forum choice, the district court ultimately concluded “the private
convenience factors are at or near equipoise.” (Report at 4.) To contextualize the
district court’s reasoning, it is necessary to set it out at length:
Witnesses who examined the merchandise when it was
unloaded in Florida are located in Florida. Additionally, the allegedly
defective products were shipped to Florida and are currently located in
Florida, some of the negotiations took place in Florida, and
Defendants’ representatives traveled to Florida on at least one
occasion to negotiate.
However, weighing in favor of transfer to Spain is the fact that
witnesses who shipped and manufactured the merchandise, as well as
Defendants, are located in Spain. Additionally, in light of the fact that
Plaintiffs alleged, in part, that the merchandise was defectively
manufactured, it may be necessary to examine Defendants’
manufacturing facilities, which are located in Spain. Finally, the
documentary evidence is located in both Florida and Spain, and some
of it is in Spanish.
(Report at 4 (citation omitted).)
Essentially, the majority holds that when these substantive facts are
combined with the strong presumption in favor of a domestic plaintiff’s forum
choice, a district court clearly abuses its discretion by dismissing the case on forum
non conveniens grounds. This conclusion, however, cannot be reached under
review for abuse of discretion without substituting the majority’s discretion for that
of the district court. Instead, the only sensible way to understand the district
court’s conclusion that the private interests were at or near equipoise is that the
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strong presumption in favor of domestic plaintiffs was partly defeated, not that it
was ignored.5
The latter interpretation, unfortunately, opens a Pandora’s Box of problems
regarding the review of a district court’s forum non conveniens decision. Suppose
51 percent of the evidence were in Spain, and 49 percent were in Florida—would
the strong presumption in favor of domestic plaintiffs tilt the balance in favor of
retaining jurisdiction? What about 52 percent? 55 percent? 60 percent? In the
forum non conveniens scale, precisely how heavily does the strong presumption in
favor of domestic plaintiffs’ forum choices weigh? Abuse of discretion review is
supposed to obviate the need of appellate courts to draw such arbitrary lines in the
sand because it commits such decisions to the district court’s sound discretion.6
Unfortunately, today’s opinion simultaneously deprives district courts of their
5
The majority declines to “speculate that the district court simply failed to mention the
presumption in its application section, but nevertheless considered the presumption and
determined that the presumption was defeated.” (Opinion at 10.) In contrast, because we may
only review the district court’s decision for a clear abuse of discretion, I would decline to
speculate that despite repeatedly stating the presumption in its rule section, the district court
nevertheless “entirely failed to consider the presumption in its analysis at all.” (Opinion at 8.)
6
The majority reasons that because “the district court made clear that it found both fora
‘equally inconvenient[,]’ if any presumption applies at all, it must apply in this situation.”
(Opinion at 12 n.9.) Thus, the majority interprets the district court to have determined that
precisely 50 percent of the evidence was in Spain, and precisely 50 percent of the evidence was
in the United States. This interpretation, however, ignores the district court’s actual conclusion
that the private interests were “at or near equipoise.” (Order at 4 (emphasis added).) Given the
scope of this conclusion, and the limited scope of our review, I believe the district court
calculated the presumption in favor of a plaintiff’s forum choice did not outweigh its
determination that somewhat more evidence was in Spain than the United States. As such, the
majority commits the exact same error as countless advocates at oral argument by protesting that
the Pandora’s Box problem does not apply in this case. (See Opinion at 12 n. 9.) Not only does
the Pandora’s Box problem apply to the instant case, but it will certainly apply with full force to
the next.
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discretion to determine these thorny forum non conveniens issues while failing to
provide them a clear cut rule for future application.
D. Summary
For these reasons, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that
the district court committed a clear abuse of discretion when it weighed the
litigants’ private interests. Instead, I believe the district court adequately
acknowledged the presumption, and still concluded, as was within its discretion,
that the private interests were at or near equipoise.
III. THE MAJORITY’S PUBLIC INTEREST ANALYSIS
The district court found two public interests militated toward dismissal: the
application of Spanish law and administrative burdens. The majority concludes the
district court’s reasoning was in error. I disagree with the majority’s public
interest analysis for two reasons.
First, as the majority expressly concedes, (Opinion at 12), its
pronouncements regarding public interests are dicta. See Denno v. Sch. Bd. of
Volusia County, Fla., 218 F.3d 1267, 1283 (11th Cir. 2000) (defining dicta as court
statements that are “not necessary” to decide a case).
Second, the dicta regarding the application of foreign law as a relevant
public interest consideration are inconsistent with no fewer than eight Eleventh
Circuit cases and two Supreme Court cases. The Supreme Court and Eleventh
Circuit have repeatedly held that avoiding the application of foreign law is a
22
relevant public interest consideration. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 251, 102 S. Ct. at
263; Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 509, 67 S. Ct. at 843; Ford v. Brown, 319 F.3d 1302,
1307 (11th Cir. 2003); Leon v. Millon Air, Inc., 251 F.3d 1305, 1315 (11th Cir.
2001); Satz, 244 F.3d at 1284; Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings
(Luxembourg) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 953 (11th Cir. 1997); Magnin v. Teledyne Cont’l
Motors, 91 F.3d 1424, 1430 (11th Cir. 1996); Sigalas v. Lido Maritime, Inc., 776
F.2d 1512, 1520 (11th Cir. 1985); Sibaja v. Dow Chemical Co., 757 F.2d 1215,
1217 n.4 (11th Cir. 1985); Transytur Line, 707 F.2d at 1307.
The majority tries to distinguish these cases by noting that none of them
involved exclusively domestic plaintiffs. (Opinion at 14 & n.10.) When analyzing
the public interests, however, this is a distinction without difference. The
presumption in favor of a domestic plaintiff’s forum does not apply when weighing
the public interests. See Transytur Line, 707 F.2d at 1307 (“[T]he trial judge must
consider all relevant factors of private interest, weighing in the balance a strong
presumption against disturbing plaintiffs’ initial forum choice. If the trial judge
finds this balance of private interests to be in equipoise or near equipoise, he must
then determine whether or not factors of public interest tip the balance in favor of
trial in a foreign forum.” (second emphasis added)). Instead, the presumption
applies only to the weighing of the litigants’ private interests. See id. Indeed, it
makes no sense to weigh the presumption in favor of domestic plaintiffs’ forum
choices a second time when considering the public interests. Public factors only
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concern the interests of the local court and local community, see Gilbert, 330 U.S.
at 508–09, 67 S. Ct. at 843, whereas the presumption in favor of a plaintiff’s forum
choice addresses the private interests of the plaintiff. Additionally, I do not
understand how the recognition of a federal interest in this litigation would add
anything to the public interest scales when the district court already recognized
Florida’s interest in this litigation. For these reasons, the weight of the public
interest in avoiding the application of foreign law does not turn on whether the
plaintiff is domestic or foreign.7
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from today’s decision, and would
instead affirm the district court.
7
Alternatively, to the extent the majority merely intends to pronounce the district court
could not accord dispositive weight to the potential application of foreign law, the majority
knocks down a straw man argument never adopted by the district court. The district court never
accorded dispositive weight to the potential application of foreign law because it already had
balanced the private interests and concluded they were at or near equipoise. As such, the
application of foreign law was nothing more than one of two public interests that tipped the
forum non conveniens scale toward dismissal. Accordingly, the majority’s contrary citation to
Burt v. Isthmus Development Co., 218 F.2d 353, 357 (5th Cir. 1955), is inapposite. (Opinion at
14 n.11.)
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