[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUNE 20, 2005
No. 04-15126 THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 02-60988-CV-UUB
OFFSHORE MARINE TOWING, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MR23,
her engines, boiler, machinery, tackle, equipment,
freights, furnishings, and appurtenances, etc., in rem,
CHERIF AYOUTY,
WINGHAM, LTD.,
in personam, as owner of MR23,
Defendants-Appellees,
GIBRALTAR BANK,
Garnishee-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(June 20, 2005)
Before DUBINA, PRYOR and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PRYOR, Circuit Judge:
This admiralty appeal presents two related issues: (1) whether attorney’s
fees may be awarded to a salvor in an in rem action against the vessel; and (2)
whether the district court acted within its authority under the Federal Arbitration
Act, 9 U.S.C. section 11, when it modified the arbitration award in favor of the
salvor to exclude attorney’s fees and expenses. We affirm the decision of the
district court, because attorney’s fees are not part of a salvage lien that may be
awarded in an in rem action and the awarding of attorney’s fees was not submitted
to the arbitrator.
I. BACKGROUND
On July 6, 2002, the M/V MR23, a sixty-one foot luxury motor yacht, was
grounded on the shore of Gun Cay in the Bahamas. The owner of the MR23,
Cherif Ayouty, was on board and requested assistance. Offshore Marine Towing,
Inc. (OMT) responded to the call for assistance.
On arrival at the stranded vessel, OMT presented Ayouty with a Standard
Form Marine Salvage Contract, which Ayouty executed. The contract provided
that the services of OMT were rendered on a no-cure/no-pay basis and provided for
arbitration of all disputes regarding the reasonableness of any fees or charges due
under the contract. The contract did not contain any provision regarding the in
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personam jurisdiction of the vessel owner. After execution of the contract, OMT
successfully freed the MR23 and towed her to Fort Lauderdale, Florida, where a
dispute arose over the salvage award due OMT.
On July 19, 2002, OMT filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida to arrest the MR23 as security for its salvage lien.
OMT invoked the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the court under 28 U.S.C.
section 1333, and stated that the case was an action to foreclose a maritime lien.
The district court issued a warrant in rem for the MR23. Ayouty, who is not
subject to personal jurisdiction in Florida, entered a limited appearance, under Rule
E(8) of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, to
defend the vessel without subjecting himself to in personam jurisdiction.
OMT moved the district court to compel arbitration. The district court
ordered the parties to submit to arbitration. The arbitrator issued an award in favor
of OMT for salvage in the amount of $15,852.50 and interest. The arbitrator
overruled Ayouty’s objections to an award of attorney’s fees and stated that “the
award of attorney’s fees is specifically permitted in salvage cases.” The arbitrator
granted OMT legal fees and expenses in the amount of $29,314.82. The arbitrator
noted that it was not clear that the issue of attorney’s fees had been submitted to
arbitration, but stated “[i]f it was not the intention of the [c]ourt for the issue of
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fees and costs to be a subject of this award, it can certainly so state and handle
those issues as it sees fit.”
OMT moved the district court to confirm the arbitration award. Ayouty
moved the district court to modify or vacate the award solely with regard to the
attorney’s fees and expenses. On review, the district court ruled that attorney’s
fees could not be awarded in an in rem action and that the issue of attorney’s fees
had not been submitted to the arbitrator. The district court granted Ayouty’s
motion to modify the arbitration award. OMT appeals.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews an order that vacates or modifies an arbitration award
“for clear error with respect to factual findings and de novo with respect to the
district court’s legal conclusions.” Gianelli Money Purchase Plan & Trust v. ADM
Investor Servs., Inc., 146 F.3d 1309, 1311 (11th Cir. 1998).
III. DISCUSSION
Arbitration awards may be modified in a limited number of circumstances.
We first address whether the district court properly modified the arbitration award.
We then address whether attorney’s fees may be awarded to a salvor in an in rem
action for salvage, which is a question of first impression in this circuit.
A. Because the Issue of Attorney’s Fees Was Not a Matter Submitted to the
Arbitrator, the District Court Properly Modified the Arbitration Award.
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Under the Federal Arbitration Act, a district court may modify the decision
of an arbitrator in a limited number of circumstances:
(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or
an evident material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or
property referred to in the award.
(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to
them, unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon
the matter submitted.
(c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the
merits of the controversy.
9 U.S.C. § 11. The district court ruled that the issue of attorney’s fees was not
submitted to the arbitrator and modified the arbitration award.
“Under the FAA, upon motion of a party, district courts must compel
arbitration of all claims subject to arbitration.” Am. Exp. Fin. Advisors, Inc. v.
Makarewicz, 122 F.3d 936, 940 (11th Cir. 1997). OMT argues that the order of the
district court that compelled arbitration included attorney’s fees, because the
contract between OMT and Ayouty required arbitration and, as stated in the district
court order, “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be
resolved in favor of arbitration.”
This argument fails. The district court cannot compel arbitration on an issue
not before it. The only question before the district court was the value of the
salvage lien. As we explain below, because attorney’s fees are not part of the
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salvage lien, the district court did not submit the issue of attorney’s fees to the
arbitrator. The district court correctly found that the award of attorney’s fees was
not a matter submitted to the arbitrator.
B. Attorney’s Fees Are Not Part of a Salvage Lien and May
Not Be Awarded in an In Rem Action for Salvage.
It is the general rule that attorney’s fees are not awarded in admiralty cases,
Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. M/V Ocean Lynx, 901 F.2d 934, 941 (11th Cir. 1990), but
there are a few exceptions to this rule. Attorney’s fees have been awarded when
the losing party has acted in bad faith or vexatiously. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co.
v. Wilderness Soc., 421 U.S. 240, 258-59, 95 S. Ct. 1612, 1622 (1975); Vaughan v.
Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530-31, 82 S. Ct. 997, 999-1000 (1962). Attorney’s fees
have also been awarded to an indemnitee in a suit against the indemnitor, Platoro,
Ltd., Inc. v. Unidentified Remains of a Vessel, 695 F.2d 893, 906 n.19 (5th Cir.
1983), and in cases involving breach of the warranty of workmanlike performance.
Delta S.S. Lines, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 747 F.2d 995, 1011 (5th Cir.
1984).
This case does not involve any recognized exception to the general rule, and
the district court correctly held that Bradford Marine Inc. v. M/V Sea Falcon, 64
F.3d 585 (11th Cir. 1995), controls this case. In Bradford, we held that attorney’s
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fees could not be collected in an in rem action to enforce a maritime lien for
necessaries: “A suit in rem to enforce a maritime lien is limited to the value of the
lien itself. ‘The only object of the proceeding in rem, is to make [the right to the
maritime lien] available–to carry it into effect. It subserves no other purpose.’” Id.
at 589 (quoting The Rock Island Bridge, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 213, 215 (1867)). We
further held that “the attorney’s fees in this case are properly charged against the
Sea Falcon in rem . . . only if the fees, which Bradford incurred as a result of
retaining legal counsel to pursue a claim against the Sea Falcon and its owners,”
were necessaries and provided to the Sea Falcon. Id. Because the attorney’s fees
were not necessaries provided to the Sea Falcon, we held that the attorney’s fees
could not be assessed in the in rem action. Id.
Although OMT attempts to distinguish Bradford on the ground that it
involved a lien for necessaries, this arguments is unpersuasive. There is no basis to
limit the reasoning of Bradford to in rem actions for a maritime lien for
necessaries. A maritime action in rem for salvage, including contract salvage, is
also a suit to enforce a lien. 46 U.S.C. § 31301 (5)(F). Because the attorney’s fees
incurred in the litigation and arbitration were not part of the value of the salvage
lien against the vessel, they could not properly be recovered in an action in rem.
“Awards for performance of salvage services are not limited to a strict
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quantum meruit measure of the value of the services performed. Rather, the award
is calculated to include a bounty or premium based upon the risk involved in the
operation and the skill with which it was performed.” Treasure Salvors, Inc. v.
Unidentified Wreck & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 640 F.2d 560, 567 (5th Cir.
1981). The calculation of the award is specific to the facts of each case, and
compensation is given as a reward “for perilous services, voluntarily rendered, and
as an inducement to seamen and others to embark in such undertakings to save life
and property.” The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1, 14 (1869).
In The Blackwall, the Supreme Court enumerated six factors related to the
salvor’s skill and risk in the calculation of a salvage award:
(1.) The labor expended by the salvors in rendering the salvage
service. (2.) The promptitude, skill, and energy displayed in rendering
the service and saving the property. (3.) The value of the property
employed by the salvors in rendering the service, and the danger to
which such property was exposed. (4.) The risk incurred by the
salvors in securing the property from the impending peril. (5.) The
value of the property saved. (6.) The degree of danger from which the
property was rescued.
Id. at 13-14. These factors are a guide to measure both the cost to the salvors of
performing the service and the benefit to the salvee. Margate Shipping Co. v. M/V
JA Orgeron, 143 F.3d 976, 986-87 (5th Cir. 1998).
Attorney’s fees do not fit within any of the Blackwall factors. Attorney’s
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fees are not a measure of the labor expended by the salvors, the skill of the salvors,
the value of salving property, or the risk to the salvors or the property. Neither do
the attorney’s fees correspond to the value of the salved property or the risk to that
property. Rather, attorney’s fees arise in the enforcement of a salvage lien;
attorney’s fees are not part of the lien itself.
The cases cited by OMT to establish the propriety of an award of attorney’s
fees in an in rem action are distinguishable; in no case on which OMT relies were
attorney’s fees awarded against a vessel. In Southernmost Marine Services v. M/V
Potential, 250 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1380-81 (S.D. Fla. 2003), attorney’s fees were
awarded against an insurance company for its frivolous failure to pay a salvage
award after contracting with the salvors. In Cobb Coin v. Unidentified, Wrecked
Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 549 F. Supp. 540, 562-63 (S.D. Fla. 1982), attorney’s
fees were awarded against the State of Florida for its bad faith interference with the
salvor’s federal rights. In Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked &
Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 556 F. Supp. 1319, 1341 (S.D. Fla. 1983), attorney’s
fees were awarded against the intervening salvor. In Compania Galena, S.A. v.
M/V Caribbean, 565 F.2d 358 (5th Cir. 1978), no attorney’s fees were awarded,
and in Faneuil Advisors, Inc. v. O/S Sea Hawk, 50 F.3d 88 (1st Cir. 1995), which
OMT erroneously cited for tacit support of its position, the First Circuit reversed
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the district court on the ground that the vessel at issue had not been salvaged. The
court expressed no opinion on the remaining issues, including attorney’s fees,
because its holding that the vessel was not salvaged “obviate[d] the need for any
discussion on these other issues.” Id. at 90 n.6.
We conclude that attorney’s fees may not be recovered in an in rem action to
enforce a salvage lien. The district court did not have in personam jurisdiction
over the vessel owner to enforce a contractual obligation to pay attorney’s fees, and
OMT did not pursue any remedies quasi in rem. The district court, therefore, did
not err in modifying the arbitration award.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because attorney’s fees may not be awarded in an in rem action for a salvage
lien and the issue of attorney’s fees was not submitted to the arbitrator, the district
court correctly modified the arbitration award in favor of OMT to exclude
attorney’s fees and costs.
AFFIRMED.
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