We have for review Yates v. State, 751 So.2d 781 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
Yates challenges his sentence under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act (the “Act”) on several grounds, all of which have been addressed by this Court. See Grant v. State, 770 So.2d 655 (Fla.2000) (rejecting an ex post facto challenge to the Act and holding that the Act violates neither the single subject rule for legislation nor principles of equal protection); McKnight v. State, 769 So.2d 1039 (Fla.2000) (holding that a defendant has the right both to present evidence to prove that the defendant does not qualify for sentencing under the Act and to challenge the State’s evidence regarding the defendant’s eligibility for sentencing as a prison releasee reoffender); State v. Cotton, 769 So.2d 345 (Fla.2000) (holding that the Act does not permit a “victim veto” which would violate a defendant’s due process rights by precluding application of the Act in some instances but not others, as well as holding that the Act is not void for vagueness and does not constitute a form of cruel or unusual punishment); Ellis v. State, 762 So.2d 912, 912 (Fla.2000) (recognizing that, “[a]s to notice, publication in the Laws of Florida or the Florida Statutes gives all citizens constructive notice of the consequences of their actions”) (quot*833ing State v. Beasley, 580 So.2d 139, 142 (Fla.1991)). Accordingly, we approve the decision of the district court to the extent it is consistent with Grant, McKnight, Cotton,1 and Ellis.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, and PARIENTE, JJ., concur. QUINCE, J., dissents.. In its decision in Yates, the Fifth District cited to its decision in Speed v. State, 732 So.2d 17 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), approved, 779 So.2d 265 (Fla.2001). In our decision in Cotton, we disapproved the opinion in Speed to the extent that it implied, in dicta, that a subsection of the Act gives to each victim a veto over the imposition of the mandatory sentences that are prescribed in other parts of the Act.