[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-15724 August 11, 2006
________________________ THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 03-20387-CV-UNGARO-BENAGES
MANUEL VALLE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Florida Department of Corrections,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(August 11, 2006)
Before CARNES, HULL and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
WILSON, Circuit Judge:
Manuel Valle appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254
petition for writ of habeas corpus. We address the following issues: (1) whether
Valle was denied the effective assistance of counsel at resentencing due to
counsels’ presentation of model prisoner evidence; (2) whether Valle’s rights
under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986),
were violated; (3) whether Valle’s rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments were violated when the trial court denied his motions to suppress
incriminating statements; and (4) whether Valle was denied Due Process and Equal
Protection based on the manner in which the jury was selected. After argument
and consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
The facts of this case, as summarized by the Florida Supreme Court, are as
follows:
On April 2, 1978, Officer Louis Pena of the Coral Gables Police
Department was on patrol when he stopped appellant and a
companion for a traffic violation. The events that followed were
witnessed by Officer Gary Spell, also of the Coral Gables Police
Department. Officer Spell testified that when he arrived at the scene,
appellant was sitting in the patrol car with Officer Pena. Shortly
thereafter, Spell heard Pena use his radio to run a license check on the
car appellant was driving. According to Spell, appellant then walked
back to his car and reached into it, approached Officer Pena and fired
a single shot at him, which resulted in his death. Appellant also fired
two shots at Spell and then fled. He was picked up two days later in
Deerfield Beach.
2
Valle v. State, 474 So. 2d 796, 798 (Fla. 1985) (Valle II).
On April 13, 1978, Valle was indicted for the first degree murder of Pena,
the attempted first degree murder of Spell, and the possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon. Valle v. State, 394 So. 2d 1004, 1005 (Fla. 1981) (per curiam)
(Valle I). At trial, which began on May 8, 1978, the jury found Valle guilty of all
crimes charged. Id. at 1006. The jury recommended a sentence of death, which
the trial court followed. Id. Valle then appealed his convictions and death
sentence, and the Florida Supreme Court reversed his convictions in 1981 after
finding that Valle was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel when he
was required to go to trial within 24 days after his arraignment. Id. at 1005.
After remand, Valle was again convicted of first degree murder, received a
death sentence, and appealed. Valle II, 474 So. 2d at 798. The Florida Supreme
Court affirmed his convictions and sentence, id., but the United States Supreme
Court subsequently vacated judgment and remanded the case to the Florida
Supreme Court in light of Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 106 S. Ct. 1669,
90 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1986).1 Valle v. Florida, 476 U.S. 1102, 106 S. Ct. 1943, 90 L. Ed.
2d 353 (1986) (Valle III).
1
In Skipper, the Supreme Court held that the exclusion from the sentencing hearing of
testimony regarding petitioner’s good behavior during the seven months he spent in jail awaiting
trial deprived petitioner of his right to present relevant mitigation evidence. 476 U.S. at 4, 106
S. Ct. at 1671.
3
On remand, the Florida Supreme Court determined that Valle was entitled to
resentencing because he was previously precluded from putting on the expert
testimony of a clinical psychologist and two corrections consultants to show that
Valle would be a model prisoner in the future, in violation of Skipper. Valle v.
State, 502 So. 2d 1225, 1225-26 (Fla. 1987) (per curiam) (Valle IV). At this
resentencing, the jury recommended a sentence of death by eight to four, and the
court imposed the death penalty, finding that: “(1) Valle had been previously
convicted of another violent felony; (2) the murder was of a law enforcement
officer; (3) the murder was for the purpose of preventing lawful arrest; (4) the
murder hindered the enforcement of laws; and (5) the murder was cold, calculated
and premeditated.” Valle v. State, 581 So. 2d 40, 43 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam)
(Valle V). The judge merged factors two, three, and four, and treated them as one
aggravating factor. Id. The court did not find any mitigation. Id.
After this sentencing, Valle again appealed to the Florida Supreme Court,
raising a number of claims, including his claim that during jury selection, the judge
failed to hold an adequate inquiry into the state’s peremptory challenges of black
venire members. Id. The Florida Supreme Court rejected his claims, and Valle
again appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which denied certiorari. Valle
v. Florida, 502 U.S. 986, 112 S. Ct. 597, 116 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1991) (Valle VI).
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He then filed a motion for post-conviction relief under Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.850. Valle v. State, 705 So. 2d 1331, 1332 (Fla. 1997) (per
curiam) (Valle VII). The Florida Supreme Court remanded for an evidentiary
hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on his assertion that
his defense team unreasonably introduced model prisoner evidence. Id. at 1334.
After remand, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that
his ineffective assistance claim based on Skipper was without merit. Valle v. State,
778 So. 2d 960, 966-67 (Fla. 1992) (per curiam) (Valle VIII).
Valle then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in state court, which was
denied. Valle v. Moore, 837 So. 2d 905, 906 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam) (Valle IX).
He subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal district court,
which was also denied. Valle v. Crosby, 18 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D. 1017 (2005)
(Valle X). The district court granted a certificate of appealability with respect to
the four issues outlined above, and this appeal followed.
III. Standard of Review
Valle filed his petition after the effective date of the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Therefore, this case is governed
by the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 as modified by the Act. Lindh v. Murphy,
521 U.S. 320, 326, 117 S. Ct. 2059, 2063, 138 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1997). With respect
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to claims adjudicated on the merits, § 2254(d)(1) restricts the issuance of habeas
relief to those cases resulting in a decision that was contrary to, or involving an
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the
United States Supreme Court. Section 2254(d)(2) provides for habeas relief where
the state court determination “resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.”
The AEDPA also mandates deference to state court factual determinations.
Under § 2254(e)(1), a state court’s determination of a factual issue is presumed
correct. One seeking habeas relief must rebut this presumption by clear and
convincing evidence. § 2254(e)(1).
IV. Discussion
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Valle argues that his 1988 resentencing counsel’s performance was deficient
because their decision to present model prisoner evidence was based on the
mistaken belief that they were required to do so or the previous death sentence
would be reinstated. Valle argues that as a result of the introduction of this
evidence, the door was opened to the State’s presentation of evidence that Valle
had twice attempted to escape from prison and an instruction to the jury that Valle
6
had been on death row for ten years. Moreover, Valle argues that he can show
prejudice because considering the totality of the evidence, confidence is
undermined in the jury’s eight to four death recommendation. See Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1503, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000)
(“[E]rrors that undermine confidence in the fundamental fairness of the state
adjudication certainly justify the issuance of” the writ of habeas corpus.).
The State responds that the state courts found that counsel made a strategic
decision to present prison behavior evidence because other mitigation evidence had
previously failed to persuade the jury or trial court not to recommend death.
According to the State, Valle has failed to rebut these factual findings by clear and
convincing evidence. See § 2254(e)(1). Here, the State argues, there is ample
support for the finding that the attorneys were not credible. Therefore, the state
courts’ application of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80
L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), was not unreasonable or contrary to clearly established
federal law. See § 2254(d)(1).
To show that counsel was so ineffective as to require reversal of the
conviction, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and
that prejudice resulted therefrom. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.
To do so, a defendant must show that counsel committed errors that were so
7
serious as to deprive the defendant of the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment as well as a fair trial whose result is reliable. Id.
Here, the trial court found that “despite their claim to the contrary, [counsel]
did not believe that they were required . . . to introduce evidence that the defendant
was, and in the future, would be a model prisoner,” but rather they believed that
“without additional mitigating evidence, . . . the result of the sentencing proceeding
would be the same” as it was in 1981. Valle VIII, 778 So. 2d at 966. Counsel’s
performance, therefore, was reasonable and not deficient under Strickland.
The Florida Supreme Court agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that
counsel’s performance did not constitute deficient performance and that Valle was
unable to show prejudice in light of the fact that the trial court found no statutory
mitigating circumstances, gave little weight to nonstatutory mitigators, and found
three “very powerful” aggravating circumstances. Id. at 967.
In this case, as the State correctly points out, Valle has failed to show that
the state court’s factual findings were incorrect or that its legal determinations were
unreasonable or contrary to federal law. See § 2254(d)(1). Valle merely reiterates
the testimony produced at the evidentiary hearing that the state courts already
rejected. Further, the state courts’ conclusions regarding prejudice were not
contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland, particularly in light of the
8
absence of mitigating factors and the presence of three strong aggravating
circumstances. Therefore, Valle’s ineffective assistance claim is without merit.
B. Batson Claim
Valle claims that his rights under Batson were violated when six of the
State’s nine peremptory challenges at his resentencing proceeding were used to
strike black prospective jurors. He says the trial court refused to conduct an
inquiry into his Batson claim, requiring reversal of his death sentence.
Furthermore, he contends that the state trial court never made findings with regard
to Valle’s claim of discrimination following the state’s race neutral explanation,
and therefore, the claim should be reviewed de novo. Because the trial court failed
to apply Batson reasonably, Valle argues that habeas relief is warranted.
The State first claims that Valle’s Batson claim was properly denied because
it is procedurally barred. See Valle V, 581 So. 2d at 43-44. Even if the claim was
not barred, the State argues that the district court still properly denied the claim on
the merits. The Florida Supreme Court rejected Valle’s Batson claim because, in
addition to being procedurally barred, the claim was factually without basis. Id. at
44 n.4. The State contends that the AEDPA standard of review is correct, and the
district court properly determined that the rejection of Valle’s claim was not
contrary to, or an unreasonable application of Batson.
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The Florida Supreme Court summarized what occurred at the 1988
resentencing jury selection:
After the jury had been selected but before it had been sworn, one of
Valle’s attorneys claimed “an impropriety in the record” as to the
state’s use of peremptory challenges against certain jurors. The
defense attorney noted that six blacks and two Hispanics were
peremptorily excused by the state. The judge then observed that if
there was a problem with any particular juror he wanted “the state to
be able to respond in whichever manner they wish.” One of the
prosecutors then asked the judge if he was making a finding that the
state had somehow improperly excused jurors. The judge responded,
“I’ve been asked to make no findings and I am making no findings but
for record-keeping purposes she has some objection to the state’s
action and, of course, I’m giving the state an opportunity to respond in
time.” The state then voluntarily gave its reasons for peremptorily
excusing the eight jurors. After the prosecutor finished giving his
reasons for exercising the peremptory challenges, the defense attorney
stated, “I object on the basis of [Valle’s] Sixth, Eighth and 14th
amendment rights, to the combination of the challenges for cause,
either peremptory challenges leading to a jury that is in favor of the
death penalty.”
Valle V, 581 So.2d at 43-44.
Batson prescribes a three-part test to evaluate equal protection challenges to
a prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges. 476 U.S. at 96-98, 106 S. Ct. at
1722-24. First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing of discrimination.
Id. at 96, 106 S. Ct. at 1723. Next, the State must give a race neutral explanation
for challenging black jurors. Id. at 97, 106 S. Ct. at 1723. Finally, the trial court
has the duty to determine whether the defendant has established purposeful
10
discrimination. Id. at 98, 106 S. Ct. at 1724.
Here, it is unnecessary to address the issue of the procedural bar, because
even assuming the claim is preserved, Valle is not entitled to habeas relief based on
Batson. The Florida Supreme Court did address the merits of the Batson claim,
concluding that Valle failed to show that “it is likely the challenges were used in a
racially discriminatory manner.” Valle V, 581 So. 2d at 44 n.4. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court reasoned that “[t]wo blacks served as jurors and a third
served as an alternate,” the prosecutor’s reasons for the challenges “appear[ed] to
be racially neutral,” and “Valle, himself, is not black.” Id. (citing Kibler v. State,
546 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1989)). At the time Valle’s conviction became final, these
reasons were not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly
established federal law. See § 2254(d)(1). Therefore, Valle’s Batson claim is
unavailing.
C. Confession Claim
Valle argues that because he individually and through his attorney invoked
his rights to silence and to have counsel present during interrogation, the trial court
erred in admitting the subsequently obtained confessions into evidence, and the
state courts’ adjudication was contrary to or an unreasonable application of
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). Here,
11
Valle claims that he invoked his right to silence and his right to counsel when he
told Detective Wolf, an interviewing officer, that he had consulted with a public
defender and that “she had advised him not to speak to anybody or to sign
anything.” Further, the lieutenant with custody of Valle was instructed through
counsel, and the lieutenant agreed, not to permit police officers to question Valle.
Valle contends that under Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S. Ct. 495, 30
L. Ed. 2d 427 (1971), this was sufficient to invoke the Edwards v. Arizona rule
forbidding further questioning. See 451 U.S. 477, 482, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 1883, 68
L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981) (holding that when a suspect invokes the right to consult with
an attorney, the suspect is not subject to further interrogation until counsel is made
available). Valle cites Romine v. Head, 253 F.3d 1349, 1365 (11th Cir. 2001), in
support of his contention that we must review his claim involving his right to
silence de novo because the Florida Supreme Court did not address Valle’s
argument on this point.
The State responds that the confession claim was properly denied. After
conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found Valle never asserted his
right to remain silent or to have counsel present, either himself or through the
public defender. The Florida Supreme Court reached the same conclusions.
According to the State, the district court properly applied the AEDPA standard of
12
review and determined that Valle had not rebutted the presumption of correctness
afforded state court factual findings and that the state court’s conclusions were not
contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law.
In this case, there was an evidentiary hearing where the trial court heard the
testimony of the public defender, Wolf, and other participants in the arrest and
interrogation of Valle. The trial court found that Valle never told the public
defender that he intended to invoke his rights to silence and counsel, that Wolf was
unaware that Valle had spoken to an attorney until after Valle himself advised him
of this fact during the interrogation, and that Valle’s statement to Wolf was that he
had spoken with the public defender who had told him not to say anything or sign
anything. The trial court further found, as a matter of law, that “at no time did
[Valle] ever assert his constitutional rights to remain silent or to have counsel
present or in any way invoke any of his constitutional rights under . . . Miranda . .
.,” that “the defendant never intended to and did not invoke his rights to remain
silent and to counsel through [the public defender],” and that Valle’s “subsequent
written waiver of his constitutional rights was freely, knowingly and voluntarily
executed by . . . Valle, and that he freely and voluntarily first spoke with Detective
Wolf and then freely and voluntarily made a formal written confession.”
13
The Florida Supreme Court found that Valle waived his Miranda rights and
did not subsequently invoke them. Valle II, 474 So.2d at 798-99. Valle’s
statement that his lawyer had advised him not to sign anything or answer any
questions was, the Florida Supreme Court said, at best equivocal, and as such,
interrogating officers were permitted to clarify Valle’s wishes. Id. at 799. Valle’s
statement that he had several experiences with police officers in the past and that
he had cooperated in the past and was willing to do so on that occasion showed that
Valle voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Id. Further, only the defendant may
invoke the right to counsel. Id. The Florida Supreme Court concluded that Valle’s
“statement, combined with the previous oral waiver, a later express written waiver,
and the fact that at not [sic] time before, during, or after questioning did [Valle]
request an attorney, convinces us that he made a voluntary, knowing and intelligent
waiver of his Miranda rights.” Id.
In Miranda, the Supreme Court recognized that an accused has a
constitutional right not to be compelled to make incriminating statements during
the process of interrogation. 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S. Ct. at 1624. Because “[t]he
circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to
overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege” against compulsory
self-incrimination, a suspect in custody also has the right to consult with counsel
14
prior to and during questioning. Id. at 469, 86 S. Ct. at 1625. The defendant may
waive the privilege against self-incrimination, but the prosecutor must show that
the waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Id. at 475, 86 S. Ct. at 1628.
Here, while it is not disputed that Valle informed Wolf that he had spoken to
an attorney and that “she had advised him not to speak to anybody or to sign
anything,” it was not unreasonable nor contrary to precedent for the state courts to
conclude that this was not an invocation of Valle’s Miranda rights. See, e.g.,
Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768, 771 (5th Cir. 1979) (requiring officers to
seek clarification of the suspect’s wishes when the suspect’s statements are
ambiguous), abrogated by Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S. Ct.
2350, 2355, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1994) (clarifying that a suspect must
unambiguously assert the right to counsel in order to stop interrogation until
counsel is available). This is further buttressed by Valle’s statement that he had
always cooperated with police and his execution of a written waiver of his
Miranda rights. The state courts also reasonably rejected Valle’s claims that his
attorney invoked his rights to silence and to counsel for him. See Moran v.
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 433 n.4, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1147 n.4, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1986)
(explaining that the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination can only be
15
invoked by the defendant). Therefore, Valle’s claims based upon the denial of his
motion to suppress do not warrant habeas relief.
D. Composition of Grand and Petit Juries
Valle next claims that the grand jury that indicted him, as well as all other
grand juries dating back to 1971, were selected from venires chosen in a way that
resulted in a gross underrepresentation of Latins in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 493, 97 S. Ct. 1272, 1279,
51 L. Ed. 2d 498 (1977). He also claims that the process for selecting petit juries
systematically excluded distinctive groups in the community and thereby violated
the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538, 95 S.
Ct. 692, 702, 42 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1975); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 630-
31, 92 S. Ct. 1221, 1225, 31 L. Ed. 2d 536 (1972). Here, the state courts and the
district court concluded that Valle failed to prove that “Latins” were an identifiable
minority and denied his requests for an evidentiary hearing. Because his
contention that Latins are a cognizable minority has not been subjected to
evidentiary development, Valle argues that the district court should have granted
an evidentiary hearing.
The State contends that the state courts properly denied these claims without
granting an evidentiary hearing. Castaneda requires a defendant to show that a
16
group is a cognizable class by demonstrating that the group is “singled out for
different treatment under the laws, as written or as applied.” 430 U.S. at 494, 97 S.
Ct. at 1280. Based on the conclusory allegations that Valle proffered, the State
argues that the state courts did not act unreasonably or in a way contrary to federal
law in finding that Valle failed to show that Latins are a cognizable class or in
denying Valle’s requests for an evidentiary hearing. See Rojas v. State, 288 So. 2d
234, 237 (Fla. 1973). Further, the State says that the district court properly denied
the evidentiary hearing because Valle failed to develop the record as required by §
2254(e).
To show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause in the context of grand
jury selection, a defendant must demonstrate that “the procedure employed resulted
in substantial underrepresentation of his race or of the identifiable group to which
he belongs.” Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494, 97 S. Ct. at 1280. To make such a
showing, a defendant must first show that the group is a “recognizable, distinct
class, singled out for different treatment under the laws, as written or applied.” Id.
Next, the defendant must show the degree of underrepresentation by comparing the
proportion of the group in the total population to the proportion of the group
chosen to serve as grand jurors over a significant period of time. Id. Finally, a
17
selection process that is prone to abuse or one that is not racially neutral supports a
presumption of discrimination. Id.
The Due Process Clause is violated when petit juries are not drawn from a
source fairly representative of the community. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538, 95 S. Ct. at
702. To prove a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, a
defendant is required to demonstrate that: (1) the allegedly excluded group is
“distinctive” in the community; (2) the representation of the excluded group in
venires is not “fair and reasonable” relative to the number of such persons in the
community; and (3) this underrepresentation is caused by the “systematic
exclusion” of the group in the process of jury selection. Duren v. Missouri, 439
U.S. 357, 364, 99 S.Ct. 664, 668, 58 L. Ed. 2d 579 (1979).
Here, the trial court summarily denied Valle’s motions to dismiss the
indictment and to strike the petit venire. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the
denial of these motions, concluding that in light of Castaneda and Duren, Valle
failed to establish that “Latins” were an single, cognizable group. Valle, 474 So.
2d at 800. Both courts denied Valle’s requests for evidentiary hearings.
Because Valle attempted to secure an evidentiary hearing in the state courts,
Valle’s failure to develop a factual basis for his claim in state court does not
preclude this Court from granting an evidentiary hearing. § 2254(e)(2); see also
18
Breedlove v. Moore, 279 F.3d 952, 960 (11th Cir. 2002). Even so, “no evidentiary
hearing is necessary where the proffered evidence would not affect the resolution
of the claim.” Bolender v. Singletary, 16 F.3d 1547, 1555 n.9 (11th Cir. 1994).
Therefore, in order to obtain an evidentiary hearing, Valle must demonstrate that
his factual allegations, if proven, would indicate that the state courts acted contrary
to, or unreasonably applied, clearly established federal law when they rejected his
Equal Protection and Due Process claims. See § 2254(d).
Valle’s factual proffer in state court included the following: (1) the Dade
County Commission’s creation of the Department of Latin Affairs in 1973 based
on a recognition of difficulties encountered by people from Cuba, Mexico, Spain,
and other Latin American countries who do not speak English; (2) expert
testimony that Latins differ from other residents of Dade County because of
language and culture; (3) an expert’s conclusion that grand jury venires had not
been randomly selected with regard to Latins; (4) and evidence that showed that no
Latin forepersons had been selected to preside over grand juries between 1967 and
1977, and the foreperson on the grand jury indicting him was a non-Latin male.
Because Valle does not offer any evidence in support of his claim that was not
already considered by the state courts, we consider whether the state courts acted
19
contrary to, or unreasonably applied, clearly established federal law when they
rejected his claims. See Bolender, 16 F.3d at 1555 n.9; see also § 2254(d).
Here, the Florida Supreme Court’s conclusion that “[t]he term ‘Latin
American’ encompasses people from too many different countries and different
cultural backgrounds and attitudes to constitute a single cognizable class for equal
protection analysis” is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Castaneda
or Duren. See Valle II, 474 So. 2d at 800; see also United States v. Rodriguez, 588
F.2d 1003, 1007 (11th Cir. 1979) (stating that appellant’s mere assertion that his
statistics indicated that the number of Latin registered voters had more than
doubled since the master jury wheel was last filled indicated purposeful
discrimination was insufficient to show that “persons of such diverse national
origins as Cubans, Mexicans, and Puerto Ricans possess such similar interests that
they constitute a cognizable group . . . .” (quotation omitted)). Therefore, Valle is
not entitled to habeas relief on this ground.
V. Conclusion
Based upon consideration of the parties’ arguments, briefs, and the record,
we affirm the district court’s denial of Valle’s petition for habeas relief.
AFFIRMED.
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