Appellant, the Florida Police Benevolent Association, Inc. (P.B.A.), seeks reversal of an order of the trial court dismissing its complaint for declaratory relief. We affirm.
P.B.A. is the certified bargaining agent for the security services bargaining unit which encompasses the state’s correctional and correctional probation officers. In January, 2000, P.B.A. entered negotiations with Governor Bush. In April, 2000, P.B.A. and Governor Bush reached a negotiated wage agreement which provided for a wage increase totaling five percent during fiscal year 2000-2001 for employees in the security services unit. Consistent with the negotiated wage agreement, Governor Bush submitted a budget request to the Florida Legislature in an amount sufficient to fund the negotiated wage agreement. The legislature, however, provided for a two and one-half percent wage increase in the 2000-2001 General Appropriation Act.
P.B.A. filed a declaratory action in circuit court based upon the legislature’s action. P.B.A. argued in the complaint that Section 8.1.A(1) of the 2000-2001 General
The trial judge dismissed the complaint for declaratory relief with prejudice. The judge concluded that: “Plaintiff would have this Court declare, in effect, that the Governor’s negotiations bind the legislature .... Plaintiff cannot state a cause of action requiring legislative funding of an executive negotiation without offending the separation of powers doctrine.”
The supreme court has previously recognized that public bargaining and private bargaining are inherently different because, under the Florida Constitution, exclusive control over public funds rests solely with the legislature. “The fact that public employee bargaining is protected under Florida’s Constitution does not require us to ignore universally recognized distinctions between public and private employees. The constitutional right to bargain must be construed in accordance with all provisions of the constitution. Surely it was not intended to alter fundamental constitutional principles, such as the separation of powers doctrine.” State v. Florida Police Benevolent Association, Inc., 613 So.2d 415, 418 (Fla.1992). A wage agreement with a public employer is subject to the necessary public funding which involves the powers, duties, and discretion of the legislature. The legislature is not required to fund a collective bargaining agreement of public employees. “Any other rule would permit the executive branch of government, by entering into collective bargaining agreements calling for additional appropriations, to invade the legislative branch’s exclusive right to appropriate funds.” Id. at 418-419.3 Accordingly, the trial judge correctly dismissed the complaint.
It is not entirely clear to us what is meant by the language quoted above. The majority apparently determined that where the legislature funds a collective bargaining agreement, but tries to change the terms, the agreement will be enforced; when the legislature “underfunds” a collective bargaining agreement, the legislature can say how the funds will be distributed. Whether or not we are correct in our understanding, the pleadings in the pres
Accordingly, the order on appeal is AFFIRMED.
1.
Section 8.1 .A(l) of the Conference Report on House Bill 2145, General Appropriations Act FY 2000-2001 provides: “Funds are provided in Specific Appropriation 1866 for pay increases for all eligible employees represented by the Florida Police Benevolent Association. ... Funds are to be distributed as follows: 1) Based on the funds provided in Specific Appropriation 1866 which are different from the funds recommended for the negotiated collective bargaining agreement, it is the intent of the Legislature for all eligible unit and non-unit employees assigned to the Security Services pay plan to receive a competitive pay adjustment of 2.5% on each employee's September 30, 2000, base rate of pay, effective October 1, 2000.”
2.
Section 447.309(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2000) provides: "If the state is a party to a collective bargaining agreement in which less than the requested amount is appropriated by the Legislature, the collective bargaining agreement shall be administered on the basis of the amounts appropriated by the Legislature. The failure of the Legislature to appropriate funds sufficient to fund the collective bargaining agreement shall not constitute, or be evidence of, any unfair labor practice. All collective bargaining agreements entered into by the state are subject to the appropriations powers of the Legislature, and the provisions of this section shall not conflict with the exclusive authority of the Legislature to appropriate funds.”
3.
Similar to the situation in State v. Florida Police Benevolent Assoc., Inc., 613 So.2d 415 (Fla.1992), the negotiated agreement at issue recognized this limitation. The agreement provided that the Governor "agrees to recommend to the 2000 Legislature sufficient funds to implement the following pay increases for fiscal Year 2000-2001.”
4.
The majority relied on the decision in New Jersey v. State Troopers Fraternal Association, 91 N.J. 464, 453 A.2d 176 (1982). There, a collective bargaining agreement gave troopers participation in the state's prescription drug program, which at the time provided that the state would pay for drugs but the employee would pay a deductible of $1.25 per prescription. In its next appropriations act, the New Jersey Legislature allocated funds for the program based upon a co-payment by employees of $2.50 per prescription. The New Jersey court addressed whether the legislature’s exclusive power over appropriations entitled it to make unilateral program changes. The court first noted that the legislature was not bound to fund the program simply because it was included in the collective bargaining agreement. However, because the legislature did choose to fund the program, and because there was no suggestion that the money appropriated was insufficient to cover the program at the $1.25 level, the court held that enforcing the program at this level would not infringe on the appropriations power. The Florida Supreme Court majority found "this test to be a reasonable accommodation of both the right to collectively bargain and the legislature’s exclusive control over the public purse.” 613 So.2d at 421.