UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 95-10106
(Summary Calendar)
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JULIAN ARTHUR RANDALL, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
RANDY McLEOD, Warden, Clements Unit,
TDCJ, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees,
_______________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Northern District of Texas
2:92 CV 259
_______________________________________________
September 15, 1995
Before SMITH, EMILIO M. GARZA, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Julian Randall, Jr., an inmate of the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice's Institutional Division ("TDCJ-ID"), appeals the
district court's dismissal, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988), of
his pro se, in forma pauperis civil rights suit. We affirm the
district court's dismissal.
I
*
Local Rule 47.5.1 provides: "The publication of opinions that have
no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-
settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens on
the legal profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published.
Randall filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1988), alleging that various prison officials had violated his
constitutional rights. In his complaint, Randall alleged that
after several inmates fought with prison guards in the mess hall,
the prison officials placed the population of his building in
lockdown. Randall claimed that the lockdown was punitive and,
therefore, that he should have received notice and a hearing before
being placed in lockdown. Randall also alleged in his complaint
that prison officials delivered sack lunches to the prisoners
during the lockdown, and that on two occasions the officials
refused to provide Randall with a "pork-free" meal.1 Randall
contends that the officials' failure to provide him with pork-free
meals constituted cruel and unusual punishment and violated his
First Amendment right to exercise his religious beliefs. A
magistrate judge dismissed both claims as frivolous under
§ 1915(d), and Randall appeals from the dismissal.
II
A district court may dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint
under § 1915(d) if it determines that the complaint is frivolous.
Thompson v. Patteson, 985 F.2d 202, 205 (5th Cir. 1993). "[A]
complaint is not frivolous for the purposes of § 1915(d) merely
because it fails to state a claim according to the standards of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)." Thompson, 985 F.2d at 205. A complaint
is frivolous if "it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in
1
Randall claims that his religious beliefs prohibit him from contact
with pork.
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fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S. Ct. 1827,
1831-32, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989). "A complaint is legally
frivolous if it is premised on an `indisputably meritless legal
theory,'" Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 281-82 (5th Cir. 1994)
(quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S. Ct. at 1833), and
factually frivolous "if the facts alleged are `clearly baseless,'
a category encompassing allegations that are `fanciful,'
`fantastic,' and `delusional.'" Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25,
32, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 1733, 118 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1992) (quoting
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325-28, 109 S. Ct. at 1831-33). We review a
district court's § 1915(d) dismissal of an in forma pauperis
complaint for abuse of discretion. See Denton, 504 U.S. at 34, 112
S. Ct. at 1734; Boyd, 31 F.3d at 282.
A
Randall contends on appeal that the magistrate judge
erroneously dismissed as frivolous his claim that prison officials
should have given him notice and a hearing before placing him in
lockdown. The magistrate judge held that Randall's claim is
legally frivolous because Randall was placed in lockdown for
administrative rather than punitive reasons.
"In the context of prisoners placed in more restrictive
confinement, a protected liberty interest can arise in one of two
ways: when the restriction is imposed for punitive (as opposed to
an administrative) purpose, and when a state regulation creates a
liberty interest." Giovanni v. Lynn, 48 F.3d 908, 911 (5th Cir.
1995), petition for cert. filed, ___ U.S.L.W. ___ (U.S. June 13,
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1995) (No. 94-9846).2 "[T]he Supreme Court has long recognized
that prison officials have the authority to transfer an inmate to
more restrictive quarters for non-punitive reasons." Mitchell v.
Sheriff Dep't, Lubbock County, Tex., 995 F.2d 60, 63 (5th Cir.
1993); see also Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468, 103 S. Ct. 864,
869, 74 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1983) (holding that Due Process Clause
subjects an inmate's treatment by prison authorities to judicial
oversight only if such treatment falls outside the terms of the
inmate's sentence, and holding that "[i]t is plain that the
transfer of an inmate to less amenable and more restrictive
quarters for nonpunitive reasons is well within the terms of
confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence").
However, "[t]he use of punitive isolation without affording due
process is unacceptable and violates the 14th Amendment." Pembroke
v. Wood County, Tex., 981 F.2d 225, 229 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
___ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 2965, 125 L. Ed. 2d 665 (1993).
In his complaint, Randall alleged that his entire building was
placed under lockdown because of the misconduct of three of the
2
Randall argues in his brief on appeal that the administrative
directive pursuant to which the prison officials placed his building in lockdown
creates a liberty interest in "not [being] placed on lockdown unless there is
a major or mess [sic] disruption," and that "[t]hree inmates in a isolated
incident clearly does not justify major or mess, as the [directive] specifies
that particular sanction as involved in this case not be imposed." However, in
his complaint, as the magistrate judge noted, Randall "pointed to no statutes or
regulations which create a liberty interest in plaintiff's retaining the same
level of restrictions while the rest of the general population in his building
was placed in administrative lockdown," nor did he allege "any violation of the
institutional regulations which govern this kind of administrative lockdown."
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building's inmates, and that he was not one of the three.3 We
addressed claims similar to Randall's in two recent cases, and in
both we held that the district court abused its discretion in
dismissing as frivolous a due process claim from an inmate who had
been placed in lockdown because of an incident in which the inmate
was not involved. In Eason v. Thaler, 14 F.3d 8 (5th Cir. 1994),
we held that "[e]ven though a lockdown rarely will require more
than informal review, some process arguably was due [the inmate.]"
Id. at 9. However, we based our holding on the fact that we had
"limited information" as to the reasons for the lockdown. Id. We
cited as support our decision in Mitchell, which also involved a
due process claim that was factually very similar to Randall's. We
held in Mitchell that because the inmate had alleged that the
lockdown was punitive in nature, and because the record was not
sufficiently developed as to the reasons for the lockdown, the
district court had abused its discretion in dismissing the inmate's
claim as frivolous. Mitchell, 995 F.2d at 63 ("Mitchell raises the
non-frivolous contention))and from the record before us we cannot
tell whether there is a basis for the contention))that the prison
officials placed Mitchell in isolation for punitive reasons and not
that he was segregated for administrative reasons.").
The present case differs from Eason and Mitchell in one
important respect. In his complaint, Randall alleged that he was
3
In his complaint, Randall stated that he "was in the dining hall on
July 10, 1992, when three prisoners and two or more officers got into a fight in
eight building where [Randall] is housed as close custody status and was punished
for infraction committed by them."
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placed in lockdown "pursuant to" TDCJ-ID's Administrative Directive
3.31 (March 7, 1991), which gives prison officials the power to
order lockdowns "where necessary to suppress a major threat to the
institution's safety or security." Jones v. Cockrell, No. 94-40188
(5th Cir. Feb. 6, 1995) (unpublished opinion). Thus, unlike the
inmate in Mitchell, Randall has not alleged that he was placed in
lockdown for punitive rather than administrative reasons. Instead,
Randall contends that he was placed in lockdown for administrative
reasons, but that the result was that he was punished for a fight
that other inmates had with the prison guards. Thus, the
confinement that Randall suffered, albeit more restrictive than
confinement in the general prison population, does not implicate
the Due Process Clause. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 468, 103 S. Ct. at
869 ("It is plain that the transfer of an inmate to less amenable
and more restrictive quarters for nonpunitive reasons is well
within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison
sentence."). We therefore hold that the magistrate judge did not
abuse its discretion in dismissing Randall's due process claim as
frivolous under § 1915(d).
B
Randall also contends on appeal that prison officials violated
his first and eighth amendment rights by refusing him a "pork-free"
meal on two occasions during the lockdown. The magistrate judge
held that Randall's claim was frivolous, reasoning that: (1)
"[Randall's] claim concerning a failure to provide pork-free meals
alleges two isolated incidents not sufficient to . . . constitute
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a constitutional violation;" (2) "[Randall] has not alleged facts
to show that any substantial burden was placed on his exercise of
religion;" (3) "[Randall] has also alleged he had no reason to
think that the guard served him the two meals with the pork in them
on purpose;" and (4) "At no point has plaintiff alleged any harm to
indicate that the meals were not sufficient to preserve health."
In his complaint, Randall claimed that he twice refused sack
lunches brought to him during the lockdown because he believed the
lunches were not pork-free. According to Randall, he informed each
official that he needed a pork-free meal, but neither provided him
with one. Randall contended that the officials knew or should have
known that eating pork is against Randall's religious beliefs.
Randall alleges in his complaint that he did not eat the meals
offered him on the two occasions and, as a result, suffered hunger
pains and weight loss.
Randall contends on appeal that the officials' failure to
provide him with adequate food constituted cruel and unusual
punishment. See Cooper v. Sheriff, Lubbock County, Tex., 929 F.2d
1078, 1083 (5th Cir. 1991) ("Because depriving a prisoner of
adequate food is a form of corporal punishment, the eighth
amendment imposes limits on prison officials' power to so deprive
a prisoner.").
"Certainly, the Constitution does not tolerate the
administrative transformance of a sentence of several years'
imprisonment to one of a gulag-type death by incremental
starvation." George v. King, 837 F.2d 705, 707 (5th Cir. 1988).
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However, Randall was not starved. Even if we assume that Randall
was deprived of one of his three meals on two separate days,
Randall's Eighth Amendment claim is frivolous because we have held
that providing inmates with only two meals a day is not necessarily
unconstitutional. See Green v. Ferrell, 801 F.2d 765, 770-771 (5th
Cir. 1986) (holding that jail could constitutionally continue
serving inmates only two meals a day, given jail physician's
testimony that inmates had no medical problems caused by inadequate
diet, because Eighth Amendment only requires that inmates receive
"`well-balanced meal[s], containing sufficient nutritional value to
preserve health'" (quoting Smith v. Sullivan, 553 F.2d 373, 380
(5th Cir. 1977)).
Randall contended in his complaint that he suffered hunger
pains and weight loss as a result of missing lunch on two days of
the lockdown, not that the nutritional value from the meals he did
receive was insufficient to preserve his health. See Woods v.
Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 581 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that prison
officials violate inmates' Eighth Amendment rights only when
officials deny inmates the minimal civilized measure of life's
necessities). Thus, we hold that the magistrate judge did not
abuse his discretion in dismissing Randall's Eighth Amendment claim
as frivolous under § 1915(d).
C
Randall also contends on appeal that the prison officials'
failure to provide him with a pork-free meal on two separate
occasions violated his First Amendment right to freely exercise his
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religious beliefs. The district court dismissed Randall's first
amendment claim as frivolous on the grounds that (1) "[Randall] has
not alleged facts to show that any substantial burden was placed on
his exercise of religion," and (2) "[Randall] has also alleged he
has no reason to think that the guard served him the two meals with
pork in them on purpose."4
Restrictions on inmates' right to exercise their religious
beliefs must be reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests. Muhammad v. Lynaugh, 966 F.2d 901, 902 (5th Cir. 1992).
Thus, because "[p]rison officials have a constitutional obligation
to provide reasonably adequate food and, absent some legitimate
penological interest preventing the accommodation of a prisoner's
religious restrictions, food which is anathema to an inmate because
of his religion is at least arguably inadequate." Eason, 14 F.3d at
10 (footnotes omitted).
We addressed a claim similar to Randall's in Eason, in which
an inmate complained that he received only three non-pork meals
during a twenty-five-day lockdown. We held in Eason that the
district court abused its discretion in dismissing the inmate's
claim as frivolous. The present case is distinguishable from
Eason, however, because Randall was refused a pork-free meal on
only two occasions during the lockdown, and not during the same
4
In fact, Randall contended in his complaint that the prison official
who refused to give him a pork-free meal on the first occasion was not the same
official who refused on the second occasion. While Randall did state in his
complaint that one of the officials told him that the meal Randall refused did
not have pork in it, Randall did allege that the other official told him that
there were no pork-free meals left.
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day. While Randall may have received only two "adequate" meals on
two days of the lockdown, he contended in his complaint that he
suffered hunger pains and weight loss as a result, not that the
nutritional value from the meals he did receive was insufficient to
preserve his health. See Green, 801 F.2d 765, 770-71 (holding that
jail could constitutionally continue serving inmates only two meals
a day, given jail physician's testimony that inmates had no medical
problems caused by inadequate diet, because Eighth Amendment
requires only that inmates receive "`well-balanced meal[s],
containing sufficient nutritional value to preserve health.'"
(quoting Smith v. Sullivan, 553 F.2d 373, 380 (5th Cir. 1977)).
Thus, Randall cannot show that the prison officials' failure to
provide him with a pork-free meal on two separate occasions
burdened his right to freely exercise his religious beliefs. The
district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Randall's
Eighth Amendment claim as frivolous.5
III
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's
dismissal of Randall's complaint.
5
Our reasoning parallels that of the Sixth Circuit in Barnes v. Mann,
12 F.3d 211, 211 (6th Cir. 1993), in which an inmate claimed "that his First
Amendment right to worship the Muslim religion was violated because the defendant
failed to adequately provide food substitutes for pork when pork, pork-items, or
pork derivatives were served." The Sixth Circuit held that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the claim as frivolous, stating:
[The inmate] asserts a legal interest which does not exist. He is
not constitutionally entitled to a pork-free diet. Defendant is
only required to prepare a diet sufficient to keep prisoners in good
health, or in the case of Muslims, a diet which provides them with
adequate nourishment without the consumption of pork. To the extent
plaintiff may be asserting he is malnourished, he has failed to
properly plead such a claim.
Id.
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