IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-10432
(Summary Calendar)
MICHAEL JAY WOODS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JAMES A. COLLINS, DIRECTOR,
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION,
ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(1:95-CV-1-C)
(September 21, 1995)
Before GARWOOD, WIENER and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Michael Jay Woods, in appealing the
dismissal as frivolous of his civil rights suits against a plethora
*
Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that
have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on
the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless
expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."
Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion
should not be published.
of state officials, complains of the district court's adverse
rulings on his motion to vacate the order dismissing his complaint
as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), and his motion for leave to
amend his complaint. In this court Woods has filed a motion to
supplement the record. We separately grant the motion to
supplement the record and consider it in connection with this
appeal. After doing so, however, we find no abuse of discretion,
and thus no reversible error, in the rulings complained of, so we
affirm the judgment and related rulings of the district court.
I
Following the filing of Woods' civil right complaint pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and without conducting a Spears'1 hearing or
providing a questionnaire to Woods for the further development of
his allegations, the district court dismissed Woods' complaint as
frivolous. As the court's order does not specify that dismissal
was with prejudice, it is presumed to be without prejudice.2
On the same day that the district court dismissed Woods'
action, it received his amended complaint naming additional
defendants and adding new claims that challenged aspects of his
confinement in two county jails. Shortly thereafter, the district
court ordered Woods' amended complaint stricken, which action was
followed by Woods' filing of a second motion to vacate. Both such
motions were denied by the district court and this appeal followed.
1
Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179, 182 (5th Cir. 1985).
2
Graves v. Hampton, 1 F.3d 315, 318-19 (5th Cir. 1993).
2
II
Among seven "counts" that Woods attempted to raise in his
amended complaint, only the second and seventh are relevant to
claims raised in Woods' original complaint that implicated aspects
of his confinement in the John Middleton Transfer Facility; the
rest relate to confinement in two county jailsSQmatters not raised
in the original complaint and thus not to be considered in this
appeal. As Woods' original complaint was dismissed without
prejudice, however, he may raise new claims in a new § 1983 action.
Liberally construed, Woods purports to advance a liberty
interest claim under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
Constitution. The Supreme Court recently adopted a new method for
determining whether a state has created a protected liberty
interest to benefit prison inmates.3
States may in certain circumstances create
liberty interests which are protected by the
Due Process Clause. But these interests will
generally be limited to freedom from restraint
which, while not exceeding the sentence in
such an unexpected manner as to give rise to
protection by the Due Process Clause of its
own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and
significant hardship on the inmate in relation
to the ordinary incidents of prison life.4
The Supreme Court has determined that, rather than focusing on
the presence or absence of mandatory statutory or regulatory
language,5 the reviewing court should consider the nature of the
3
Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2297-2300 (1995).
4
Id. at 2300.
5
See, e.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983).
3
challenged state action and whether it involved such a significant
departure from normal prison conditions that the state might have
conceivably created a liberty interest.
Viewed in light of the teachings of Sandin, the fact that
Woods was confined in a transfer facility and not entitled to the
privileges available at other TDCJ-ID facilities did not impose
"atypical and significant hardship[s]" when compared to "the
ordinary incidents of prison life."6 Clearly, then, Woods' liberty
interest claims lack an arguable basis in fact or in law.
The other claim asserted by Woods that is cognizable on this
appeal implicates equal protection: He asserts that prisoners
housed in TDCJ-ID facilities have more privileges than do
prisoners, like Woods, who are housed in the John Middleton
Transfer Facility.7 To establish an equal protection violation,
Woods must, among other things, demonstrate that similarly situated
individuals were treated differently.8
In this case, the appropriate set of inmates to be examined as
"similarly situated" are those state prisoners housed in transfer
6
Sandin v. Conner, 115 S.Ct. at 2300.
7
Woods complained in the district court that, as he was
subjected to the intermediate step of being housed at a transfer
facility, he was treated differently than other state prisoners who
were transferred directly from county jails to TDCJ-ID facilities.
As he does not raise this argument on appeal, it is deemed
abandoned. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir.
1993).
8
Muhammad v. Lynaugh, 966 F.2d 901, 903 (5th Cir. 1992).
4
facilities,9 not all state prisoners regardless of where or how
they are housed. As nothing indicates that state prisoners at
transfer facilities are, for purposes of an equal protection
analysis, similarly situated to those located at other types of
TDCJ facilities, Woods has not and cannot establish an equal
protection violation.
III
As for all of the particularized claims and allegations
advanced by Woods that are cognizable on this appeal, we have
carefully examined them in light of (1) the record as supplemented,
(2) Woods' briefs and all arguments made therein, and
(3) applicable legal theories advanced. In each instance, we reach
the firm conclusion that no reversible error was made by the
district court, and that no purpose would be served by remanding
this case for further proceedings.10 The district court did not
abuse its discretion by dismissing Woods' complaint without further
factual development and without addressing his amended complaint.
As to all matters properly before this court on this appeal, Woods'
supplemental allegations do not cure the deficiencies in his
original complaint to the extent required to present arguable bases
in either fact or law.
9
See Muhammad, 966 F.2d at 903 (a prisoner in one prison
unit was not "similarly situated" to a prisoner housed in another
unit).
10
See Whitaker v. City of Houston, Tex., 963 F.2d 831, 835
(5th Cir. 1992).
5
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment and related rulings of
the district court are, in all respects,
AFFIRMED.
6