[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APR 11, 2007
No. 06-12647 THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 04-00515-CV-ORL-22KRS
DONTRAY CHANEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CITY OF ORLANDO, FLORIDA,
a municipal corporation, and
JONATHAN CUTE,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(April 11, 2007)
Before BIRCH and PRYOR, Circuit Judges, and NANGLE,* District Judge.
BIRCH, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff-Appellant Dontray Chaney brought an action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, against the City of Orlando, Florida, and Officer Jonathan Cute, an
Orlando police officer, alleging claims for wrongful arrest, excessive force, and
malicious prosecution. After the jury returned a special verdict in Chaney’s favor,
Officer Cute made a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, pursuant to
Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which the district court
granted. Because we conclude that the district court erred in granting Officer
Cute’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, we REVERSE the district
court’s judgment as to Officer Cute and REMAND this case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
The evidence adduced at trial, which we must view in a light most favorable
to Chaney as the party against whom judgment was entered as a matter of law, is as
follows. In the early evening of 5 June 2003, Chaney was en route to Mercy
Market, a convenience store located at 1430 Mercy Drive in Orlando, to pick up a
few items. Chaney was driving a 1996 Pontiac Grand Am that belonged to his
*
Honorable John F. Nangle, Senior U.S. District Judge for the Eastern District of
Missouri, sitting by designation.
2
cousin, Antawain Green. The Grand Am had a plastic cover over the vehicle’s rear
license tags. After Chaney made a right turn onto Mercy Drive from the Palms
Apartment complex, Officer Cute stopped him. Officer Cute illuminated his police
cruiser’s blue lights, and Chaney pulled the Grand Am into the parking lot of the
Mercy Market and placed it in park.
After stopping the vehicle, Chaney opened his car door and began to exit the
vehicle in an attempt to ascertain the reason for the traffic stop. At that time
Chaney was holding his license in his hand. As Chaney was stepping out of the
car, Officer Cute, who was approximately four to five feet away and was fast
approaching, told Chaney to “get back in the fucking car.” R14 at 8; R3-65, Exh. 1
at 13. Chaney then sat back down in the driver’s seat, placed his feet back inside
the vehicle with the driver side door still “cracked,” and placed his hands in his lap
with his driver’s license in his hand. Chaney asked Officer Cute the reason for the
stop, but instead of answering him, Officer Cute reached into the vehicle to pull the
keys out of the car’s ignition. Chaney attempted to stop Officer Cute by placing
his hand over the ignition, and asked the officer what he was doing. Officer Cute
then grabbed Chaney’s arm and twisted it behind his back, grabbed Chaney by the
neck in a “choke hold,” and pulled Chaney out of the car. R14 at 9; R3-65, Exh. 1
at 15.
3
After pulling Chaney out of the vehicle, Officer Cute dropped Chaney to the
ground and placed his knee between Chaney’s shoulder blades in an attempt to pin
Chaney on his stomach. Officer Cute placed one of Chaney’s hands in handcuffs.
Officer Cute then held a “Taser” 1 to Chaney’s head and asked Chaney: “do [you]
want some?” R14 at 10. Chaney testified that he did not attempt to resist arrest or
struggle with Officer Cute while he was pinned to the ground, but that he again
asked Officer Cute what he was doing. At this time, only one of Chaney’s hands
had been placed in handcuffs; Chaney’s other hand was still loose. Officer Cute
then stood up and, with Chaney still pinned on the ground, tased him. Chaney
testified that being tased caused him to lose control over his body, and that he “felt
like [he] was going to die.” R3-65, Exh.1 at 17-18.
After being tased, Chaney rolled over onto his back and attempted to sit up,
but Officer Cute tased Chaney a second time and rolled him back onto his stomach.
Officer Cute then placed his foot on Chaney’s head and “squish[ed]” it on the
1
The term “Taser” refers to an electronic device used to subdue persons without causing
fatal harm. A Taser is a battery-charged unit approximately the size and appearance of a
flashlight. It holds two replaceable cartridges, each containing a hooked barb, or dart, attached
to the cartridge by a long, electricity-conducting insulated wire. Each dart can be fired
independently by depressing the corresponding lever located on the frame of the Taser. When
the probes make contact with the target, the Taser transmits high voltage electrical current along
the wires and into the body of the target. In addition, after the Taser’s initial “shot” has been
fired and contact has been made, an electrical current may be transmitted through the wire to the
target by repeatedly pressing on the Taser’s lever. See Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1273
n.3 (11th Cir. 2004) (describing a Taser); Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036, 1040 n.1
(6th Cir. 1992) (same).
4
pavement “like he put out a cigarette,” R14 at 13, which caused an abrasion on
Chaney’s cheek. Officer Cute placed the other handcuff on Chaney’s loose hand.
Chaney remained on the ground while other officers arrived at the scene. Chaney
claims that he recalls an officer, apparently one of Officer Cute’s superiors,
arriving at the scene and telling Officer Cute that “[Chaney] didn’t need to be
[t]ased any more.” R3-65, Exh.1 at 19. Chaney was helped up from the ground
and was led to a police cruiser.
At this point a crowd of onlookers had gathered at the Mercy Market. As
the officers led Chaney to a police car, he asked a member of the crowd if she
would call his mother and tell her what had happened to him. The bystander asked
Chaney for his phone number. As Chaney began to answer, Officer Cute “grabbed
. . . a pressure point in [Chaney’s] throat by [his] Adam’s apple,” and told him
“don’t say a fucking word.” R14 at 14. Officer Cute then slammed Chaney’s
head onto the trunk of the police cruiser.
Chaney was subsequently taken to a location near the incident, for further
questioning. Chaney testified that, en route, an officer in the cruiser asked him:
“how did the fucking Taser feel?” R3-165, Exh. 1 at 23. After sitting in the
cruiser for a short time, Chaney was taken to a warehouse area, where he met with
a Sergeant in the Orlando Police Department and was asked a series of questions
5
about the tasing incident. The officers took pictures of Chaney’s wounds; they
removed the Taser hooks out of Chaney’s back (they had been lodged in his back
for approximately 15 minutes); and took detailed notes on Chaney’s version of
events. At that time, Chaney was informed that Officer Cute had stated that he had
stopped Chaney because the rear license tag cover on the Grand Am had been
obscured. Chaney disputed this allegation, telling the Sergeant that the license tag
was not obscured. When Chaney was told that he was going to be taken to jail, he
asked the Sergeant if he would personally transport him to the station, because he
was uncomfortable riding in the same car with Officer Cute. Chaney was
informed, however, that, as the arresting officer, Officer Cute was required to take
him to the station.
Officer Cute transported Chaney to the Orange County Correctional Facility
without incident. Chaney was given a traffic citation for operating a vehicle with
an obscured license plate, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 316.605.2 He was also
charged with the misdemeanor offense of resisting an officer without violence, in
2
That provision states, in pertinent part, that “all letters, numerals, printing, writing, and
other identification marks upon the [license] plates regarding the word ‘Florida,’ the registration
decal, and the alphanumeric designation shall be clear and distinct and free from defacement,
mutilation, grease, and other obscuring matter, so that they will be plainly visible and legible at
all times 100 feet from the rear or front. Nothing shall be placed upon the face of a Florida plate
except as permitted by law or by rule or regulation of a governmental agency. . . . A violation of
this subsection is a noncriminal traffic infraction, punishable as a nonmoving violation . . . .”
6
violation of Fla. Stat. § 843.02.3 A traffic court later found Chaney not guilty of
driving with an obscured license. The charge for resisting an officer without
violence was nolle prossed.
In March 2004 Chaney brought the present § 1983 action in the Ninth
Judicial Circuit of Orange County, Florida against Officer Cute and the City of
Orlando. Chaney’s amended complaint alleged claims against Officer Cute for
wrongful arrest, excessive force, and malicious prosecution in pursuing the traffic
violation, all in violation of Chaney’s Fourth Amendment rights. He also lodged
three counts against the City of Orlando, alleging that the excessive use of Tasers
by Orlando police officers was an official custom or policy of the Department; that
the Department failed to properly train its officers in the use of Tasers; and that the
Department failed to monitor officers who used Tasers in an excessive manner.
The defendants removed the action to the Middle District of Florida.
A four-day jury trial was held in March 2006. At the close of Chaney’s
case-in-chief, Officer Cute moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). The court denied that motion. Officer Cute
renewed this motion at the close of all of the evidence. The court reserved a ruling
3
That statute states that “[w]hoever shall resist, obstruct, or oppose any officer . . . in the
lawful execution of any legal duty, without offering or doing violence to the person of the
officer, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree.”
7
on that motion, and submitted the case to the jury.
After reading the jury its instructions, the court directed the jury to make
findings on a special verdict form. The special verdict form contained a number of
specific issues for the jury to decide. The jury made the following pertinent
findings. First, the jury found that Officer Cute “reasonably believed that the tag
of the vehicle driven by [Chaney] was obstructed in violation of Florida law when
he stopped [Chaney].” R9-152 at 1. Second, the jury found that Officer Cute
“reasonably believed that [Chaney] resisted his lawful directives or attempted
arrest.” Id. Third, the jury found that Officer Cute “intentionally committed acts
that violated [Chaney]’s federal constitutional right not to be subjected to excessive
force,” and that Officer Cute “used unreasonable force” both in effecting the arrest
of Chaney and in tasing him. Id. at 2. Fourth, the jury found that Officer Cute
“acted with malice in pursuing the traffic citation against [Chaney].” Id.
Separately, the jury found that the City of Orlando did not have any “custom or
policy that resulted in the constitutional violations” that Chaney suffered at the
hands of Officer Cute. Id.
The jury then imposed nominal damages ($972.15) to compensate for the
cost of Chaney’s post-incident medical treatment; for his bond; and for his having
to defend against the traffic citation. Id. at 3. The jury also imposed punitive
8
damages against Officer Cute in the amount of $100,000, based on its finding that
Officer Cute had acted with malice or reckless indifference to Chaney’s rights. Id.
After the verdict, Officer Cute made a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of
law pursuant to Rule 50(b), based on a theory of qualified immunity. Separately,
Officer Cute moved for a new trial, pursuant to Rule 59, on the basis of qualified
immunity, alleged inconsistencies in the jury verdict, and the contention that the
punitive damages award was excessive.
The district court addressed Officer Cute’s renewed motion for judgment as
a matter of law in a detailed order. With respect to Chaney’s wrongful arrest
count, the court observed that “[t]he jury found that Officer Cute reasonably
believed that [Chaney] resisted Officer Cute’s lawful directives or attempted
arrest.” R9-165 at 11. The court reasoned that because an arrest supported by
probable cause is, by law, not a “wrongful arrest” in violation of the Fourth
Amendment,4 and because, according to the court, the jury’s verdict had made
clear that Officer Cute had probable cause to arrest Chaney for resisting, the court
concluded that Chaney’s wrongful arrest claim failed. The court then granted
Officer Cute judgment as a matter of law on that count.
4
See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 1557
(2001) (“If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very
minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest
the offender.”).
9
With respect to Chaney’s excessive force count, the court noted that the jury
had concluded that Officer Cute had probable cause to arrest Chaney, but had
nevertheless found that the force used by Chaney was excessive. The court
observed, however, that it was obligated to determine whether Chaney was entitled
to qualified immunity as a matter of law on the excessive force count. The court
thus applied the two-part analysis set forth in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201,
121 S. Ct. 2151, 2156 (2001), assessing whether the facts alleged, taken in the light
most favorable to the party asserting the injury, showed that the officer’s conduct
violated a constitutional right, and, if so, whether that right was clearly established
under federal law.
Applying the Saucier analysis, the court first suggested that it was unclear
whether Officer Cute’s conduct was excessive as a matter of law, or whether it was
de minimis so as to fail to implicate Chaney’s Fourth Amendment rights.5 The
court then reverted to the fact that “the jury concluded that Officer Cute had
probable cause and the authority to make the arrest,” and stated that “[t]he
authority to make an arrest permits an officer to use reasonable force.” R9-165 at
18. In light of the jury finding that probable cause existed, the court concluded that
5
See Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he application of de
minimis force, without more, will not support a claim for excessive force in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.”) (alteration added).
10
the force used by Officer Cute in connection with a lawful arrest was reasonable
under the circumstances, and that therefore Chaney’s constitutional rights had not
been violated.
As to the second step of the Saucier framework–whether the right not to be
tasered was clearly established–the court found that there was no case law in this
circuit recognizing such a right. And with respect to a more general right to be free
from excessive force at the hands of police officers, the court reiterated that the
jury had found that Officer Cute had probable cause to make his arrest, and that,
“consequently,” the force used was reasonable under the circumstances. As a
result, the court concluded that Officer Cute was entitled to qualified immunity on
Chaney’s excessive force count, and granted Officer Cute’s renewed motion for
judgment as a matter of law.
Finally, with respect to the malicious prosecution count based on Chaney’s
alleged traffic violation, the court again concluded that the jury had found that
Officer Cute had probable cause to effectuate the traffic stop, and that, because a
malicious prosecution action under Florida law requires an absence of probable
cause,6 Chaney’s malicious prosecution count was not viable. Relying on the
6
See Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1234 (11th Cir. 2004) (applying
Florida law).
11
jury’s finding that Officer Cute had probable cause, the court granted Officer
Cute’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on the malicious
prosecution count.
After granting Officer Cute’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of
law on the three counts pending against him, the district court then entered final
judgment in favor of Officer Cute and the City of Orlando.7 The court never
addressed the alternative motion for a new trial. This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. District Court’s Order Granting Officer Cute Judgment as a Matter of Law
Chaney argues that the district court erred in granting Officer Cute’s
renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. We review a district court’s
ruling on a motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo. See Doe v. Celebrity
Cruises, Inc., 394 F.3d 891, 902 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Under Rule
50, “[a] party’s motion for judgment as a matter of law can be granted at the close
of evidence or, if timely renewed, after the jury has returned its verdict, as long as
7
Defendant-Appellee City of Orlando did not file a motion for judgment as a matter of
law in this case. The district court’s entry of final judgment in favor of the City of
Orlando–based on the jury’s express finding in Interrogatory #6 that there was no custom or
policy in place that condoned excessive force by Orlando police officers–has not been appealed,
nor is it implicated by our review of the court’s analysis as to Officer Cute’s Rule 50(b) motion.
Thus, our decision addresses the court’s decision to grant Officer Cute’s renewed motion for
judgment as a matter of law; we do not disturb the court’s separate entry of final judgment in
favor of the City of Orlando.
12
‘there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find’” for
the non-moving party. Lipphardt v. Durango Steakhouse of Brandon, Inc., 267
F.3d 1183, 1186 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 50).
Regardless of timing, however, in deciding on a Rule 50 motion a district
court’s proper analysis is squarely and narrowly focused on the sufficiency of
evidence. The question before the district court regarding a motion for judgment
as a matter of law remains whether the evidence is “legally sufficient to find for the
party on that issue,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1), regardless of whether the district
court’s analysis is undertaken before or after submitting the case to the jury. See
Cleveland v. Home Shopping Network, Inc., 369 F.3d 1189, 1192 (11th Cir. 2004)
(stating that judgment as a matter of law should only be granted “when there is no
legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for the party on that
issue”); Arthur Pew Constr. Co. v. Lipscomb, 965 F.2d 1559, 1563 (11th Cir.
1992) (stating that the “usual inquiry” under Rule 50 is “sufficiency, i.e. whether
the evidence was sufficient to submit [the issue] to the jury”); see also 9A Charles
Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2537 (2d ed.
1995) (stating that “[t]he standard for granting a renewed motion for judgment as a
matter of law under Rule 50(b) is precisely the same as the standard for granting
the pre-submission motion [under 50(a)]”). Accordingly, we have stated that in
13
ruling on a party’s renewed motion under Rule 50(b) after the jury has rendered a
verdict, a court’s sole consideration of the jury verdict is to assess whether that
verdict is supported by sufficient evidence. See Lipphardt, 267 F.3d at 1186
(citation omitted); Arthur Pew, 965 F.2d at 1563.
In this case, the jury rendered a verdict in Chaney’s favor, awarding
$100,000 in damages based on its finding that Officer Cute had acted with malice
or reckless indifference to Chaney’s rights. Subsequent to this verdict, Officer
Cute renewed his motion for judgment as a matter of law on the basis of qualified
immunity, having already made this argument at the close of Chaney’s case and
again at the close of all of the evidence.
In this case, the district court, in ruling on Officer Cute’s renewed motion for
judgment as a matter of law, effectively based its conclusions on the jury findings
contained in the special verdict form. In discussing Chaney’s count for wrongful
arrest, for example, the court observed that the jury had found that Officer Cute
had probable cause that Chaney was resisting arrest, and then stated, “[s]ince
Officer Cute had probable cause [Chaney]’s cause of action for false arrest fails.”
R9-165 at 11. Likewise, in discussing Chaney’s claim for excessive force, the
court again observed the jury had found that Officer Cute had probable cause to
arrest Chaney, and that therefore Officer Cute was entitled to use a reasonable
14
amount of force in connection with that arrest. Id. at 18, 23. In light of the jury’s
finding that probable cause existed–as well as the court’s separate conclusion that
the force used was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances–the court
granted qualified immunity to Officer Cute on the excessive force count. Finally,
in assessing Chaney’s malicious prosecution count, the court once again observed
that the jury had found that Officer Cute had probable cause to effectuate the traffic
stop. Relying on the jury finding that there was probable cause to initiate the
traffic stop, the court concluded that Chaney’s malicious prosecution claim also
failed as a matter of law. Id. at 12.
The court’s order granting Officer Cute’s renewed motion for judgment as a
matter of law was predicated almost entirely on the special findings that the jury
had made on the verdict form, and not on an assessment of whether there was
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could have rendered a verdict in
Chaney’s favor. The court based its conclusions–in whole or in part–on the jury’s
determination that Officer Cute had acted with probable cause. In doing so, the
court failed to comport with the proper legal standard for ruling on a motion
pursuant to Rule 50 and impermissibly credited the jury’s findings.
The fact that Rule 50(b) uses the word “renew[ed]” makes clear that a Rule
50(b) motion should be decided in the same way it would have been decided prior
15
to the jury’s verdict, and that the jury’s particular findings are not germane to the
legal analysis. See, e.g., Celebrity Cruises, 394 F.3d at 903 (“This Court
repeatedly has made clear that any renewal of a motion for judgment as a matter of
law under Rule 50(b) must be based upon the same grounds as the original request
for judgment as a matter of law made under Rule 50(a) at the close of the evidence
and prior to the case being submitted to the jury.”); Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea, 71
F.3d 837, 842 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that a Rule 50(b) motion “may be used to
renew consideration of issues initially raised in a pre-verdict motion [under Rule
50(a)],” but that the court cannot consider matters not raised in the initial motion).
The jury’s findings should be excluded from the decision-making calculus on a
Rule 50(b) motion, other than to ask whether there was sufficient evidence, as a
legal matter, from which a reasonable jury could find for the party who prevailed at
trial.
Here, in ruling on Officer Cute’s renewed motion under Rule 50(b), the
court should have limited its inquiry as to whether there was sufficient evidence in
the record to support a jury’s finding of excessive force and its imposition of
liability on Officer Cute. By placing an undue emphasis on the jury’s particular
findings as to probable cause–and by repeatedly making decisions on the Rule 50
motion through the lens of what the jury found–the court engaged in an erroneous
16
analysis in deciding Officer Cute’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of
law. As a result, we conclude that the analysis of district court’s judgment granting
Officer Cute judgment as a matter of law was flawed and that the judgment must
be reversed. We remand this case to permit the district court to address Officer
Cute’s renewed motion in a manner consistent with this opinion.
B. District Court’s Failure to Decide Officer Cute’s Motion For a New Trial
The district court also failed to rule on Officer Cute’s motion for a new trial
pursuant to Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Officer Cute’s motion
sought a new trial on the basis of qualified immunity, as well as on the grounds
that the verdict was inconsistent and the punitive damages award was excessive.
Rule 50, which permits a party to “alternatively request a new trial” in
connection with a motion for judgment as a matter of law, Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b),
makes clear that
[i]f the renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law is granted, the
court shall also rule on the motion for a new trial, if any, by
determining whether it should be granted if the judgment is thereafter
vacated or reversed, and shall specify the grounds for granting or
denying the motion for the new trial.
Fed. R. Civ. P 50(c)(1) (emphasis added). By its plain language, the Rule obligates
the court to rule on a motion for a new trial when issuing its ruling on a renewed
motion for judgment as a matter of law. Here, the district court failed to do so.
17
Thus we also remand this case to permit the district court to properly consider not
only Officer Cute’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law but also
Officer Cute’s separate motion for a new trial.
III. CONCLUSION
Chaney appealed the district court’s judgment as to Officer Cute, contending
that the district court erred in granting Officer Cute judgment as a matter of law
under Rule 50(b). Having reviewed the district court’s opinion, we conclude that
the district court used an improper legal analysis in deciding Officer Cute’s
renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. Specifically, we conclude that
the district court’s decision placed an undue weight on the findings of the jury as to
probable cause. Because a reliance on the findings of the jury was incompatible
with the proper standard for deciding a Rule 50 motion, we REVERSE the
judgment in favor of Officer Cute and REMAND this case for the district court to
consider the merits of Officer Cute’s renewed motion in a manner consistent with
this opinion. In addition, because the district court failed to rule on Officer Cute’s
motion for a new trial as mandated by Rule 50(c)(1), we REMAND this case for
the district court to address the merits of Officer Cute’s motion for a new trial.
18