[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
_____________________________U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
AUGUST 23, 2007
No. 06-13204
_____________________________ THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 05-00649-CV-J-HES-HTS
ATLANTIC SOUNDING CO., INC.,
WEEKS MARINE, INC.,
Plaintiffs-Counter-
Defendants-Appellants,
versus
EDGAR L. TOWNSEND,
Defendant-Counter-
Claimant-Appellee,
THOMAS KIMBROUGH,
Defendant.
_________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________________________
(August 23 ,2007)
Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, CARNES and FAY, Circuit Judges.
EDMONDSON, Chief Judge:
In this interlocutory appeal, Plaintiffs-Appellants Atlantic Sounding Co.,
Inc., and Weeks Marine, Inc. (“Plaintiffs”) appeal the district court’s denial of
Plaintiffs’ motion to strike Defendant-Appellee Edgar L. Townsend’s
(“Defendant”) request for punitive damages. The district court concluded that it
was bound by our prior panel decision in Hines v. J.A. LaPorte, Inc., 820 F.2d
1187 (11th Cir. 1987), which permits a seaman to recover punitive damages when
an employer arbitrarily and willfully refuses to pay maintenance and cure.
Plaintiffs contend that Hines was abrogated by Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 111
S. Ct. 317 (1990), in which the Supreme Court concluded that recovery for non-
pecuniary loss in the wrongful death of a seaman was not available under general
maritime law. We conclude that our prior decision in Hines remains binding law
in this Circuit; therefore, we affirm.
On 5 July 2005, Defendant, a seaman and crew member of the Motor Tug
Thomas, allegedly slipped and landed shoulder first on the steel deck of the vessel,
injuring his shoulder and clavicle. According to Defendant, Plaintiffs advised him
that they would not provide him with maintenance and cure, which covers medical
care, a living allowance, and wages for seamen who become ill or are injured
2
while serving aboard a vessel.1 Plaintiffs then filed this suit for declaratory relief
on the question of their obligations in this matter.
Two days later, Defendant filed suit against Plaintiffs pursuant to the Jones
Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, and general maritime law, alleging negligence,
unseaworthiness, arbitrary and willful failure to pay maintenance and cure, and
wrongful termination. He then filed the same claims as counterclaims to the
declaratory judgment action and sought punitive damages on his maintenance and
cure claim.
The district court later consolidated the two actions.
Plaintiffs moved to strike or to dismiss Defendant’s request for punitive
damages. Plaintiffs contended that, under Miles, neither the Jones Act nor general
maritime law provides a cause of action against an employer for non-pecuniary
damages. The district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion, concluding that it was
bound by our rule in Hines. The district court later denied Plaintiffs’ motion for
1
In Flores v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 47 F.3d 1120, 1127 (11th Cir. 1995), we described this kind
of cause of action:
The seaman's action for maintenance and cure may be seen as one designed
to put the sailor in the same position he would have been had he continued to work:
the seaman receives a maintenance remedy, because working seamen normally are
housed and fed aboard ship; he recovers payment for medical expenses in the amount
necessary to bring him to the maximum cure; and he receives an amount representing
his unearned wages for the duration of his voyage or contract period.
3
reconsideration of the issue, but certified the question for review on interlocutory
appeal.
Whether punitive damages may be recovered in maintenance and cure
actions is a question of law that we review de novo. See Tucker v. Fearn, 333
F.3d 1216, 1218 n.2 (11th Cir. 2003). The central question here is whether we
may depart from our prior ruling in Hines, based on the Supreme Court’s
intervening decision in Miles; we conclude that we may not.
Under our prior panel precedent rule, a later panel may depart from an
earlier panel’s decision only when the intervening Supreme Court decision is
“clearly on point.” Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. at Birmingham Bd. of Trustees, 344
F.3d 1288, 1290-92 (11th Cir. 2003) (concluding that an intervening Supreme
Court decision did not “implicitly overrule” a prior circuit decision because the
cases dealt with different issues and were not “clearly inconsistent”). The
Supreme Court reminds us that “[t]here is, of course, an important difference
between the holding in a case and the reasoning that supports that holding.”
Crawford-El v. Britton, 118 S. Ct. 1584, 1590 (1998). So, that the reasoning of an
intervening high court decision is at odds with that of our prior decision is no basis
for a panel to depart from our prior decision. As we have stated, “[o]bedience to a
Supreme Court decision is one thing, extrapolating from its implications a holding
4
on an issue that was not before that Court in order to upend settled circuit law is
another thing.” Main Drug, Inc. v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 475 F.3d 1228,
1230 (11th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the Supreme Court’s determination that the
time requirement in Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 was not jurisdictional did not “relieve[] us
from the obligation to follow our prior panel decisions holding that the
requirements of Appellate Rule 5 are jurisdictional”); see also Smith v. GTE
Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001)(“[W]e categorically reject any
exception to the prior panel precedent rule based upon a perceived defect in the
prior panel's reasoning or analysis as it relates to the law in existence at that
time.”); Fla. League of Prof’l Lobbyists, Inc. v. Meggs, 87 F.3d 457, 462 (11th
Cir. 1996) (“[W]e are not at liberty to disregard binding case law that is so closely
on point and has been only weakened, rather than directly overruled, by the
Supreme Court.”).
In Hines, a panel of this Court determined that, in an action for maintenance
and cure, “both reasonable attorney’s fees and punitive damages may be legally
awarded in a proper case” – that is, upon a showing of a shipowner’s willful and
arbitrary refusal to pay maintenance and cure. Hines, 820 F.2d at 1189. In
reaching this conclusion, we relied mainly on four cases: Vaughan v. Atkinson, 82
S. Ct. 997 (1962); Complaint of Merry Shipping, Inc., 650 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. Unit
5
B 1981): Holmes v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 734 F.2d 1110 (5th Cir. 1984); and
Robinson v. Pocahontas, Inc., 477 F.2d 1048 (1st Cir. 1973). We started with the
proposition that Vaughan “permitted a seaman to recover reasonable counsel fees
when the shipowner’s default in the duty to provide maintenance and cure was
willful and persistent.” Hines, 820 F.2d at 1189.2 We then noted that we had
previously concluded in Merry Shipping that “punitive damages [were]
recoverable under general maritime law upon a showing of a shipowner’s willful
and wanton misconduct in a death action.” Id. And we noted that the Fifth Circuit
had extended the Merry Shipping rule to maintenance and cure actions in Holmes
and that the First Circuit also allowed punitive damages in similar circumstances.
Id. While stating that Vaughan was not dispositive because it considered only
attorney’s fees, we decided to follow the Fifth Circuit in adopting the reasoning of
Merry Shipping and extending Vaughan’s rule to punitive damages in
maintenance and cure actions. Id.
Three years later in Miles, the Supreme Court “conclude[d] that there is no
recovery for loss of society in a general maritime action for the wrongful death of
2
We did, however, acknowledge that it was unclear whether the Vaughan majority regarded
attorney’s fees as an item of compensatory damages or as a punitive measure. See Hines, 820 F.2d
1189.
6
a Jones Act seaman.” Miles, 111 S. Ct. at 326. In reaching this conclusion, the
Court made this observation:
We no longer live in an era when seamen and their loved ones must look
primarily to the courts as a source of substantive legal protection from
injury and death; Congress and the States have legislated extensively in
these areas. In this era, an admiralty court should look primarily to these
legislative enactments for policy guidance. We may supplement these
statutory remedies where doing so would achieve the uniform
vindication of such policies consistent with our constitutional mandate,
but we must also keep strictly within the limits imposed by Congress.
Id. at 323. Then, taking note that neither the Jones Act nor the Death on the High
Seas Act (“DOHSA”), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761, 762--both of which provide causes of
action for the wrongful death of a seaman--permits the recovery of non-pecuniary
losses, such as loss of society, the Court stated that “[i]t would be inconsistent
with our place in the constitutional scheme were we to sanction more expansive
remedies in a judicially created cause of action in which liability is without fault
than Congress has allowed in cases of death resulting from negligence.” Id. at
326. Therefore, the Court denied the recovery sought and “restore[d] a uniform
rule applicable to all actions for the wrongful death of a seaman, whether under
DOHSA, the Jones Act, or general maritime law.” Id.
Plaintiffs argue that “[t]he Miles uniformity principle dictates that all
subsequent courts determining the availability of damages in a maritime case must
7
provide for uniform results in similar factual settings, regardless of whether the
action is brought pursuant to the Jones Act, DOSHA, or general maritime law.”
Under this principle, Plaintiffs reason, Defendant cannot recover punitive damages
for a general maritime maintenance and cure cause of action because he would not
be able to recover punitive damages--which are non-pecuniary in nature--under the
Jones Act. But this argument can only be based on the reasoning of the Miles
opinion, not on the Miles decision: its holding. Miles says and--more important--
decides nothing about maintenance and cure actions or punitive damages. See
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821) (Marshall,
C.J.) (“[G]eneral expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with
the case in which those expressions are used.”) For this reason, the Miles decision
provides no basis for this panel to depart from Hines under our prior panel
precedent rule. See Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 34 F.3d 1279, 1283 (5th
Cir. 1994), rev’d in part on reh’g, 59 F.3d 1496 (1995) (“Maritime’s argument that
Miles abrogates this Circuit’s rule [announced in Holmes] permitting the recovery
of punitive damages in maintenance and cure cases obviously cannot rest upon the
specific holding in Miles . . . . Miles did not involve maintenance and cure or
punitive damages.”); Glynn v. Roy Al Boat Mgmt. Corp., 57 F.3d 1495, 1503 (9th
Cir. 1995) (“Because Miles did not consider the availability of punitive damages,
8
and was not faced with a claim for maintenance and cure that has no statutory
analog, it does not directly control the question of whether punitive damages are
available for the willful failure to pay maintenance.”).3 Therefore, the district
court did not err in following Hines--the law of this Circuit--and in denying
Plaintiffs’ motion to strike Defendant’s request for punitive damages.
AFFIRMED.
3
Even those courts that have extended Miles to factual situations that are more similar to that
presented in Miles have recognized that they do so under the reasoning, rather than the holding, of
the Supreme Court’s opinion. See, e.g., Horsley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 15 F.3d 200, 202-03 (1st Cir.
1994) (relying on the “rationale” and “analysis” of Miles to conclude that seaman who had suffered
nonfatal injuries could not recover punitive damages in an unseaworthiness action under general
maritime law); Miller v. Am. President Lines, Ltd., 989 F.2d 1450, 1455, 1459 (6th Cir. 1993)
(concluding that punitive damages are not available in general maritime law unseaworthiness action
for wrongful death of a seaman, after stating that Miles’s “reasoning, if not its holding, seems to
cover the type of damages before us”).
9
CARNES, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I join Chief Judge Edmondson’s opinion in its entirety. For the reasons it
explains and on the basis of the decisions it cites, we are obligated to follow our
prior precedent in Hines v. J.A. LaPorte, Inc., 820 F.2d 1187 (11th Cir. 1987).
We must follow Hines’ specific holding that punitive damages are available where
there is a willful and persistent failure to pay maintenance and cure, 820 F.2d at
1189–90, even though this Court might have decided that issue differently if Miles
v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 111 S. Ct. 317 (1990), had been available at
the time it first arose.
The prior panel precedent rule is a fundamental ground rule that embodies
the principle of adherence to precedent. It promotes predictability of decisions
and stability of the law, it helps keep the precedential peace among the judges of
this Court, and it allows us to move on once an issue has been decided. Without
the rule every sitting of this court would be a series of do-overs, the judicial
equivalent of the movie “Groundhog Day.” While endlessly recurring fresh starts
is an entertaining premise for a romantic comedy, it would not be a good way to
run a multi-member court that sits in panels. As a panel, we must follow our
holding in Hines instead of any inferences we may draw from the Supreme Court’s
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reasoning in deciding a different issue in Miles because the prior precedent rule
requires that we do so, and we take that rule seriously.
At the same time, of course, we are obligated to take Supreme Court
decisions seriously, very seriously. Our obligation to do so flows from the
constitutional plan of “one supreme Court, and . . . such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain.” U.S. Const. Art. III, § 1; see Schwab v.
Crosby, 451 F.3d 1308, 1325 (11th Cir. 2006) (“We have always believed that
when the Founders penned Article III’s reference to the judicial power being
vested ‘in one supreme Court and in such inferior Courts’ as Congress may
establish, they used ‘supreme’ and ‘inferior’ as contrasting adjectives, with us
being on the short end of the contrast.” (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct.
1126 (2007).
The duty of a later panel of this Court to follow an earlier one’s decision
ends when that decision conflicts with the holding of a later Supreme Court
decision. If Miles had held that punitive damages were not available for the
willful failure to pay maintenance and cure, we certainly would follow that
holding instead of our contrary one in Hines, even if the Miles opinion did not
mention the Hines decision. See In re Provenzano, 215 F.3d 1233, 1235 (11th Cir.
2000); Davis v. Singletary, 119 F.3d 1471, 1482 (11th Cir. 1997); United States
11
v. Hogan, 986 F.2d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1993). But Miles held nothing about
maintenance and cure or punitive damages. It addressed the different issue of
whether damages for loss of society are recoverable in a general maritime cause of
action for the wrongful death of a seaman, deciding that they were not. 498 U.S.
at 37, 111 S. Ct. at 328.
The contention of the appellants in this case is not that the Miles holding is
contrary to the Hines holding, but that the reasoning the Supreme Court used to
reach its holding in Miles, 498 U.S. at 30–33, 111 S. Ct. at 324–26, is inconsistent
with the holding in Hines, 820 F.2d at 1189–90. The argument does not pit
holding against holding, but reasoning against holding. The broader question this
argument presents is whether, and if so when, a panel of this Court may vary from
a specific holding of an earlier one based on the reasoning the Supreme Court used
to reach a later decision on a different issue.
That question is not particularly difficult in this case because even if there is
some tension between the two, it is far from clear that Miles’ reasoning conflicts
with Hines’ holding. At least a half dozen courts have held that Miles does not
compel the conclusion that punitive damages are unavailable in maintenance and
cure cases. See Glynn v. Roy Al Boat Mgmt. Corp., 57 F.3d 1495, 1503 (9th Cir.
1995) (concluding that Miles “does not directly control the question of whether
12
punitive damages are available for the willful failure to pay maintenance” but
deciding that punitive damages are unavailable for another reason); Smith v.
MAR, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 62, 67 (D.R.I. 1995) (noting that “Miles has not stated
that punitive damages are unavailable in a claim for maintenance and cure,” and
concluding that “plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages for the agent’s arbitrary
and willful conduct in failing to pay maintenance and cure is a viable claim post
Miles”); White v. Am. River Transp. Co., 853 F. Supp. 300, 301 (S.D. Ill. 1993)
(“As a purely judicial remedy, maintenance and cure has no statutory counterpart.
Consequently, it does not defeat Miles’ goal of uniformity to permit nonpecuniary
damages in conjunction with a claim for maintenance and cure.”); Ortega v.
Oceantrawl, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 621, 624 (D. Alaska 1992) (“Miles does not extend
to preclude a claim for exemplary damages in regard to a claim for maintenance
and cure.”); Ridenour v. Holland Am. Line Westours, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 910, 911,
913 (W.D. Wash. 1992) (concluding that “Miles is not dispositive as to the
availability of punitive damages for willful withholding of maintenance and cure”
and holding that “punitive damages are available in an action for maintenance and
cure”); Anderson v. Texaco, Inc., 797 F. Supp. 531, 536 (E.D. La. 1992)
(concluding that the availability “punitive damages for willful failure to pay
maintenance and cure, a firmly rooted general maritime law claim, is unaffected by
13
Miles because failure to pay is a contractual claim not reached by any maritime
statute”).
Other courts have decided differently. See Guevara v. Mar. Overseas Corp.,
59 F.3d 1496, 1512 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (relying on Miles to overrule a prior
panel decision and hold that “punitive damages [are] not . . . available in any
action for maintenance and cure” (emphasis omitted)); In re J.A.R. Barge Lines,
L.P., 307 F. Supp. 2d 668, 673 (W.D. Pa. 2004) (“Under the Miles uniformity
principle, then, punitive damages are unavailable in maintenance and cure actions
under general maritime law.”); Blige v. M/V GEECHEE GIRL, 180 F. Supp. 2d
1349, 1355 (S.D. Ga. 2001) (same); Watters v. Harrah’s Ill. Corp., 993 F. Supp.
667, 676–77 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (citing cases coming down on different sides of the
issue, but deciding that “[p]ursuant to the Miles uniformity principle, punitive
damages are not recoverable in the tort-like maintenance and cure action” and that
“punitive damages should not be recoverable in a contract-like maintenance and
cure action if they are not recoverable in a tort-like maintenance and cure action”);
Boyd v. Cinmar of Gloucester, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 208, 209–10 (E.D. Va. 1996)
(“extending” the Supreme Court’s ruling in Miles to bar recovery of punitive
damages in maintenance and cure actions).
14
The bottom line is that courts are divided over whether the reasoning of
Miles conflicts with a holding that punitive damages are available in maintenance
and cure actions. At least where reasonable jurists may disagree about whether a
later Supreme Court decision compels a different answer to an issue decided by an
earlier panel, later panels should follow the existing circuit precedent. That is the
case here.
Of course, even if an intervening Supreme Court decision does not conflict
with a prior panel precedent to the extent of overruling it, en banc rehearing may
be granted for the purpose of addressing the issue afresh in light of the reasoning
or implications of the Supreme Court decision. Whether to do that, however, is a
different question.
15