I agree that the judgment in this case, insofar as it awards grandparent visitation, must be reversed. I continue to maintain my view that Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3-4.1, is unconstitutional per se. See Richburg v. Richburg, 895 So.2d 311, 319 (Ala.Civ.App. 2004) (Crawley, J., concurring in the result); L.B.S. v.L.M.S., 826 So.2d 178, 199 (Ala.Civ.App. 2002) (Crawley, J., dissenting); and R.S.C. v. J.B.C., 812 So.2d 361, 371 (Ala.Civ.App. 2001) (Crawley, J., concurring in the result). I would, therefore, base my decision on the mother's argument that, because she has not been shown to be other than a fit parent, the parental presumption in her favor (which presumes that the mother would act in the best interest of her child, see Troxel v.Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000)) insulates her decision to deny grandparent visitation from interference by the state. Otherwise, as the decision of the Washington Supreme Court invalidating its third-party-visitation statute stated:
In re Smith, 137 Wash.2d 1, 20, 969 P.2d 21, 30-31 (1998),aff'd sub nom., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000).2"State intervention to better a child's quality of life through third party visitation is not justified where the child's circumstances are otherwise satisfactory. To suggest otherwise would be the logical equivalent to asserting that the state has the authority to break up stable families and redistribute its infant *Page 846 population to provide each child with the `best family.' It is not within the province of the state to make significant decisions concerning the custody of children merely because it could make a `better' decision."
I continue to find the statute repugnant to the United States Constitution for these reasons.