[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
NOVEMBER 21, 2007
No. 05-14600
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 02-22677-CV-DLG
MIGUEL V. RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
James McDonough,
EVERGLADES CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION,
R. PENDLETON,
Assistant Warden,
NADRIAN BRINSON,
Correction Officer a.k.a. Brinston,
EDNA FIGUEROA,
a.k.a. Figueroa, Correction Officer, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
No. 05-14842
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 02-22677-CV-DLG
MIGUEL V. RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et
al.,
Defendants,
R. KUGLER,
Assistant Warden,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(November 21, 2007)
Before ANDERSON, MARCUS and COX, Circuit Judges.
ANDERSON, Circuit Judge:
2
Appellant Miguel V. Rodriguez, a Florida prisoner, filed this §1983 suit
against two prison officials, Appellees Raymond Kugler and Charles Johnson,
alleging that they violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment.1 Specifically, Rodriguez says that while he was being held in
administrative segregation he informed Kugler and Johnson that members of his
former gang had threatened to kill him upon his release into the general prison
population. He therefore asked Kugler and Johnson to place him in protective
custody or, alternatively, to transfer him from the prison. Rodriguez says that
despite being confronted with the information of the death threats and his requests
for protection, Kugler and Johnson recommended that he be released into the
general population. Mere hours after reentering the general population, Rodriguez
was violently assaulted — stabbed in the back and chest with a shank — by
Arnold Cleveland, a member of the Latin Kings. Rodriguez says that Kugler’s and
Johnson’s failure to take reasonable steps aimed at preventing the attack, the threat
of which each was subjectively aware, violated the Eighth Amendment under
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994).
1
Rodriguez originally sued a total of five prison officials, but only Kugler and Johnson
are before us in this appeal. In his complaint, Rodriguez also pursued tort claims against Kugler
and Johnson under Florida law. The district court rejected the Florida-law claims, and Rodriguez
does not challenge that ruling on appeal.
3
Following discovery, the district court granted summary judgment to
Kugler, holding that Rodriguez’s complaints about the threats to his life did not
contain “specific facts” sufficient to show that Kugler had subjective knowledge
of the risk. In reaching this determination, the district court relied exclusively on
our decision in Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2003).
Rodriguez’s claim against Johnson went to trial. After Rodriguez presented
his case in chief, Johnson moved for judgment as a matter of law. The district
court granted Johnson’s motion, holding that he did not cause the Eighth
Amendment violation because he did not have the final authority to order
Rodriguez’s release into the general prison population.
Rodriguez appeals both rulings. After oral argument and a thorough review
of the record, we vacate the judgment of the district court with respect to both
Kugler and Johnson and remand both claims for further proceedings.
With respect to Kugler, we conclude that: (1) there are genuine issues of
material fact regarding whether he was subjectively aware that Rodriguez faced a
substantial risk of serious harm; (2) this appeal does not require us to address the
reasonableness of Kugler’s response to the risk of harm facing Rodriguez; and
(3) there is evidence in the summary-judgment record from which a reasonable
juror could find a causal connection between Kugler’s actions and the Eighth
4
Amendment violation.
With respect to Johnson, we conclude that: (1) a reasonable juror could find,
based on the evidence presented at trial, that Johnson was subjectively aware that
Rodriguez faced a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) this appeal does not require
us to address the reasonableness of Johnson’s response to the risk of harm facing
Rodriguez; and (3) a reasonable juror could find, based on the evidence presented
at trial, a causal connection between Johnson’s actions and the Eighth Amendment
violation.
I. FACTS
These are the facts taken in the light most favorable to Rodriguez,
construing all reasonable inferences in his favor.2 In 2002, Rodriguez was an
inmate at the Everglades Correctional Institution (ECI) in Miami, Florida.
Raymond Kugler was the Assistant Warden for Operations at ECI and, in that
capacity, shared responsibility for prison security. Charles Johnson was the
Colonel of ECI and was, in that capacity, the chief of prison security.
During the winter of 2002, Rodriguez was under “close management,”
which in ECI parlance means that he was segregated from the general prison
2
Because Rodriguez may not be able to prove such reasonable inferences to the
satisfaction of the jury, the facts we recite may ultimately turn out not to reflect the true facts of
the case.
5
population3 for security purposes. Rodriguez had been in close management since
January 2001 because of an ongoing investigation of gang activity at ECI and
because he had assaulted a fellow inmate while in the compound. On at least one
previous occasion, Rodriguez had been placed in close management in response to
his request that the prison provide him protection.
While under close management in early 2002, Rodriguez “learned that gang
members at ECI wanted to kill [him].” Pl.’s Decl. ¶4. Those who wanted to kill
him were members of his former gang, the Latin Kings, which had a particularly
strong presence at ECI. They wanted to kill Rodriguez as retribution for his
having renounced his membership. On at least two occasions while under close
management, Rodriguez verbally told Kugler “of the threat made against my life”
by members of his former gang and “asked [Kugler] that I be transferred to
another correctional institution for my protection.” Id. ¶5. Rodriguez’s transfer
request was “in addition to requesting that [I] be placed in protective custody.”4
Id. Kugler took no action with respect Rodriguez’s allegations or his requests for
protection.
Rodriguez also spoke to Johnson on a number of occasions regarding the
3
The general prison population at ECI is known as “the compound.”
4
Kugler says he does not recall having any conversations with Rodriguez.
6
threats on his life. According to his trial testimony, Rodriguez, beginning in
March 2002, told Johnson “[t]hat I was afraid for my life and that I didn’t want to
go out to the compound and that he should give me protection and give me a
transfer” from ECI. Trial Tr. I at 104-05. Rodriguez specifically informed
Johnson that his life had been threatened by members of the Latin Kings.
Rodriguez explained to Johnson why he was scared of the Latin King members at
ECI, stating that “they would shout at me, telling me that they were going to kill
me.” Id. at 139. One of Rodriguez’s fellow inmates, Antania Tyrone Flowers,
testified at trial to a conversation that he overheard between Rodriguez and
Johnson. In that conversation, Rodriguez asked Johnson for protection from the
gang members in the compound and, specifically, that he be transferred to another
prison. According to Flowers, Johnson responded that “he was going to look into
it and . . . get with the classification officer . . . , and he’d let [Rodriguez] know
what they [were] going to do about that.” Trial Tr. II at 201. Johnson, however,
did not “look into” anything, did not “get with” anyone, and did not otherwise tell
anyone about Rodriguez’s safety concerns. Nor did he act on those concerns
himself, something he was authorized to do.
In addition to verbally expressing his security concerns to Kugler and
Johnson, Rodriguez also filed with ECI a written form, known as an Inmate
7
Request form, dated February 18, 2002, in which he stated: “I have a problem with
another inmate in this compound. I want you to tell me my status here where I am.
I submitted a request for protection. I want to know . . . whether you are going to
give me a transfer.” The February 18 Inmate Request form, submitted while
Rodriguez was still under close management, was addressed to both the “Warden”
and the “Asst. Warden.”5 Id. Rodriguez received a response from someone at
ECI, communicated on the bottom of the Inmate Request form itself, before the
attack occurred. ECI’s response acknowledged an ongoing investigation into gang
activity among the prison population.
Submitting an Inmate Request form is not the only way a prisoner at ECI
may bring a security concern to the attention of the appropriate officials. Johnson,
who (like Kugler) had frequent face-to-face contact with inmates at ECI, testified
in his deposition that inmates may also bring their security concerns directly to
ECI officials through informal conversation. ECI officials knew what to do when
faced with such concerns because ECI had in place an established protocol for
5
As the Assistant Warden for Operations, including security, Kugler concedes that
he would ordinarily have received a security-related Inmate Request form like Rodriguez’s.
Kugler Dep. at 30-31. He denies, however, having seen the Inmate Request form submitted by
Rodriguez any time prior to this lawsuit. Id. at 29. As the Colonel of ECI, and thus the chief of
security, Johnson likewise concedes that “if it [an Inmate Request form] addressed a security
concern, [the prison employee who translated it] would have forwarded it to me.” Johnson Dep.
at 66. Like Kugler, Johnson denies that he ever saw Rodriguez’s Inmate Request form prior to
this lawsuit. Id. at 66-67.
8
dealing with situations in which a prisoner reports that he fears his life is in
jeopardy. According to Johnson, the protocol is triggered as follows:
[If an inmate] comes to me and state[s] that he is in fear for his life, I
am going to make him stand right there and I’m going to call the shift
supervisor and explain to the shift supervisor, “This inmate stated
he’s in fear for his life, please place him in administrative
confinement until we do a protective management review.”
Johnson Dep. at 24.
Johnson explained that a “protective management review” entails having a
sergeant “go and investigate” the inmate’s claims. Such a review requires that the
sergeant “get all the statements from everybody” that the inmate says he is having
trouble with. Id. Once that process is complete, according to Johnson, if the
prisoner’s safety concerns are substantiated, the appropriate prison officials
“get[] together and we normally recommend he [the complaining inmate] be
transferred from the institution.” Id. at 25.6 No protective management review
was ever initiated in response to the safety concerns expressed by Rodriguez.
On April 3, 2002, a Classification Review meeting was held to determine
whether Rodriguez was ready to be released from close management back into the
6
Johnson’s deposition, as well as Kugler’s, was before the court for purposes of the
Kugler summary judgment. Although Johnson’s deposition was not introduced into evidence at
the trial of Rodriguez’ claim against Johnson, the same evidence with respect to the protective
management protocol was introduced at the trial, primarily in the form of the portions of
Kugler’s deposition which were read to the jury.
9
general population. Such meetings are convened periodically for inmates under
close management, and there is nothing in the record to indicate that the April 3
meeting was scheduled in response to Rodriguez’s complaints. Present at this
meeting were Rodriguez, Kugler, Johnson, and a classification officer. Kugler and
Johnson, along with the classification officer, formed a three-person team tasked
with the responsibility of making a recommendation to another group of
individuals — a “classification team” — regarding an inmate’s suitability for
release from close management. The classification team was the body empowered
to make final decisions about whether to release an inmate from close
management. Neither Kugler nor Johnson had final authority (either individually
or jointly) to order Rodriguez’s release from close management. They do not,
however, dispute that either one of them could have recommended to the
classification team that Rodriguez be held in protective custody while the threats
on his life were investigated — e.g., by a “protective management review” — or
that he be transferred to another institution. Nor do they dispute the fact that each
of them had independent authority to initiate a protective management review.
Instead of pursuing any of these alternatives, Kugler and Johnson ignored
Rodriguez’s repeated requests for protection and recommended to the
classification team that he be released into the compound.
10
During the April 3 meeting, Rodriguez again told Kugler that he believed
his life was in danger and requested that he be transferred to another institution for
protection.7 Pl.’s Decl. ¶9. Kugler ignored Rodriguez’s request and told him that
he was being recommended for release to the compound and that “he had to make
any request for transfer from the compound.”8 Id. During the meeting, Kugler
told Rodriguez that if he did not comply with the order to return to the compound,
Kugler would “give [him] a disciplinary report and continue him on CM status.”9
Id. ¶10. At the conclusion of the April 3 meeting, Rodriguez was recommended
for release from close management and was released six days later on April 9 at
6:00 p.m.
On the morning of April 10, 2002, only hours after having been transferred
to the compound, Rodriguez was stabbed in the back and chest with a shank by
Arnold Cleveland, an “enforcer”10 of the Latin Kings.
7
Kugler denies that Rodriguez raised any security-related concerns at the April 3
meeting.
8
Kugler denies this.
9
Kugler denies this.
10
The role of an “enforcer” is to exact physical retribution on those who repudiate
their gang membership.
11
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, applying
the same standard that bound the district court and viewing the evidence and all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Rodriguez. See Drago v.
Jenne, 453 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2006). “Summary judgment is appropriate
when ‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)).
We review de novo a district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a), applying the same standard that bound the district court.
Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe County, Fla., 402 F.3d 1092,
1114 (11th Cir. 2005). That standard requires that we examine the evidence
presented at trial in the light most favorable to Rodriguez. Id. The district court’s
entry of judgment as a matter of law in favor of Johnson was proper only if
“‘there [was] no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable juror to find
for [Rodriguez]’” on his Eighth Amendment claim. Id. (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P.
50(a)).11
11
Neither Kugler nor Johnson argues on appeal that he is shielded from suit by
qualified immunity. We therefore express no view on the application of qualified-immunity
principles to these facts.
12
III. DISCUSSION
The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials “to protect
prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at
833, 114 S. Ct. at 1976 (citing various courts of appeals); see Zatler v.
Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 400 (11th Cir. 1986) (“[I]t is well settled that a prison
inmate has a constitutional right to be protected . . . from physical assault by other
inmates.”). “[H]aving stripped [prisoners] of virtually every means of self-
protection and foreclosed their access to outside aid, the government and its
officials are not free to let the state of nature take its course.” Farmer, 511 U.S at
833, 114 S. Ct. at 1977.
A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when he actually
(subjectively) knows that an inmate is facing a substantial12 risk of serious harm,
yet disregards that known risk by failing to respond to it in an (objectively)
12
Because the Court’s task in Farmer was only “to define the term ‘deliberate
indifference,’” the Court expressly declined to address “at what point a risk of inmate assault
becomes sufficiently substantial for Eighth Amendment purposes.” 511 U.S. at 829, 834 n.3, 114
S. Ct. at 1974, 1977 n.3 (emphasis added). Neither Kugler nor Johnson argues that the risk of
harm facing Rodriguez was insufficiently substantial for Eighth Amendment purposes. In the
context of this case, we conclude that the gang-related threats made on Rodriguez’s life, which
were explicitly reported to prison officials, present a substantial enough risk of harm to trigger a
prison official’s Eighth Amendment duty to act; that is, to take some steps to investigate the
likelihood that the reported threat will materialize and to take some steps aimed at reducing the
likelihood of the risk. See e.g., Odom v. South Carolina Dep’t of Corr., 349 F.3d 765, 770 (4th
Cir. 2003) (concluding that an inmate-on-inmate assault resulting in “significant physical injury,”
preceded by reported death threats, was sufficiently substantial for Eighth Amendment purposes).
13
reasonable manner. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 829, 837, 844, 114 S. Ct. at 1974,
1979, 1982-83; see also Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1358 (11th Cir. 2003);
Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1582-83 (11th Cir. 1995). As with any
other claim brought under § 1983, to succeed, the inmate must demonstrate a
causal connection between the prison official’s conduct and the Eighth
Amendment violation. See Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1380 (11th Cir.
1982); see also LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1993).
With regard to the subjective component of the Eighth Amendment claim,
the Court in Farmer held that the prison “official must both be aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,
and he must also draw the inference.” 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S. Ct. at 1979.
The Court also held: “Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a
substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways,
including inference from circumstantial evidence.” Id. at 842, 114 S. Ct. at 1981
(emphasis added). A prison official cannot avoid liability under the Eighth
Amendment “by showing that . . . he did not know the complainant was especially
likely to be assaulted by the specific prisoner who eventually committed the
assault.” Id. at 843, 114 S. Ct. at 1982 (emphasis added). This is because “[t]he
question under the Eighth Amendment is whether prison officials, acting with
14
deliberate indifference, exposed a prisoner to a sufficiently substantial ‘risk of
serious damage to his future health.’” Id. (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S.
25, 35, 113 S. Ct. 2475, 2481 (1993)).
The Court in Farmer identified three ways that prison officials might avoid
Eighth Amendment liability. Officials might show: (1) “that they did not know of
the underlying facts indicating a sufficiently substantial danger and that they were
therefore unaware of a danger”; (2) “that they knew the underlying facts but
believed (albeit unsoundly) that the risk to which the facts gave rise was
insubstantial or nonexistent”; or (3) that “they responded reasonably to the risk,
even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” 511 U.S. at 844, 114 S. Ct. at 1982-
83.
Kugler and Johnson make two arguments on appeal. First, they maintain
that they did not know any “facts indicating a sufficiently substantial danger” and
thus did not actually know that Rodriguez faced a substantial risk of serious harm.
Their argument in this regard, stated differently, is that the concerns expressed by
Rodriguez were not specific enough to put them on actual notice of a risk of harm.
Second, they maintain that Rodriguez cannot demonstrate the requisite causal
connection because they did not, in their capacity at the April 3 meeting, have
final authority to order Rodriguez’s release from close management. All they
15
could do at that meeting was recommend Rodriguez’s release to the compound,
and this, they say, is not sufficient to support a finding that their actions caused his
subsequent injury.13
A. Summary Judgment to Kugler
1. Did Kugler Actually Know Rodriguez Faced a Substantial Risk
of Serious Harm?
The district court determined that Rodriguez could not satisfy the subjective
component of his Eighth Amendment claim and granted summary judgment to
Kugler solely on this basis.14 Rodriguez argues that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment to Kugler because there is evidence in the record from
which a reasonable juror could find that Kugler actually knew that Rodriguez
faced a substantial risk of serious harm from his former gang members.
Specifically, Rodriguez says, the summary-judgment record viewed in the light
most favorable to him demonstrates that: (1) he verbally informed Kugler on at
least two occasions that his life had been threatened by members of his former
gang and that, to avoid injury, he needed either to be transferred to another prison
13
Kugler and Johnson do not argue that they “knew the underlying facts but
believed (albeit unsoundly) that the risk . . . was insubstantial or nonexistent.” Nor do they argue
that they “responded reasonably to the risk.” And, as noted above, they do not argue qualified
immunity, i.e., that they have not violated clearly established law.
14
The district court did not address the objective component of Rodriguez’s claim
— i.e., whether Kugler responded to the risk of harm in an objectively reasonable manner.
16
or to be placed in protective custody at ECI; and that (2) he, by means of the
written Inmate Request form, informed Kugler that he feared for his safety in the
compound and requested a transfer from ECI. This, Rodriguez says, is enough
evidence of subjective knowledge to get his claim to a jury. We agree.
Rodriguez submitted a declaration in opposition to Kugler’s summary-
judgment motion in which he stated that “While in Close Management (“CM”) at
ECI prior to the April 10, 2002 stabbing incident, I learned that gang members at
ECI wanted to kill me.” Pl.’s Decl. ¶4. Viewed in the light most favorable to
Rodriguez, this evidence gives rise to an inference that he received threats on his
life, from members of his former gang, prior to the stabbing. Rodriguez stated in
his declaration that “verbally on at least two separate occasions [prior to the April
10 stabbing]” “I informed [Kugler] . . . of the threat made against my life and
asked that I be transferred to another correctional institution for my protection.”
Id. ¶5 (emphasis added). Again, viewed in the light most favorable to Rodriguez,
the reasonable inference created by this evidence is that the threat of which
Rodriguez twice informed Kugler was the gang-related threat referenced in the
preceding paragraph of his declaration, the threat we can infer from Rodriguez’s
knowledge that “gang members at ECI wanted to kill [him].” We think that this
evidence is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether
17
Rodriguez, on at least two occasions, told Kugler that he feared a gang member
might kill him and thus requested either a transfer from ECI or placement in
protective custody.
With regard to Rodriguez’s verbal complaints, Kugler said in his deposition
that he did not remember having any conversation with Rodriguez in which
Rodriguez mentioned the threats to his life or his need for a transfer or protective
custody. Kugler’s denial flatly contradicts Rodriguez’s allegations. Besides
denying that such conversations ever took place, Kugler also challenges the
sufficiency of Rodriguez’s declaration on the ground that it does not “furnish any
specifics as to who was posing the alleged threats.” Appellees’ Br. at 6 (emphasis
added). Kugler’s challenge to the declaration in this respect is without merit,
however, as confirmed by the Supreme Court in Farmer: “Nor may a prison
official escape liability for deliberate indifference by showing that . . . he did not
know that the complainant was especially likely to be assaulted by the specific
prisoner who eventually committed the assault.” 511 U.S. at 843, 114 S. Ct. at
1982 (emphasis added). We conclude that Rodriguez’s declaration testimony,
coupled with Kugler’s inability to recall any security-related conversations with
Rodriguez, is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact about whether
Kugler had subjective knowledge that Rodriguez faced a substantial risk of serious
18
harm.
With regard to the submission of Rodriguez’s February 18, 2002, Inmate
Request Form – in which he stated that he had “a problem with another inmate in
this compound,” that he had “submitted a request for protection,” and that he
“want[ed] to know . . . whether you are going to give me a transfer” – Kugler
testified in his deposition that, although he would ordinarily have received a
security-related Inmate Request form like Rodriguez’s, he never saw the one
submitted by Rodriguez. Kugler’s testimony that he would ordinarily have
received such a form, coupled with his express denial that he received the one
submitted on February 18, leads us to conclude that there is a genuine issue of
material fact about whether Kugler was aware of the Inmate Request form prior to
the attack. This dispute of fact, in turn, is relevant to the question whether Kugler
had subjective knowledge that Rodriguez faced a substantial risk of serious
harm.15
15
Standing alone, the dispute over whether Kugler received the Inmate Request
form probably would not suffice to create a genuine issue of fact about Kugler’s subjective
knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm and thus would not have precluded summary
judgment in Kugler’s favor. That is because, even if Kugler did receive it, the form does not
contain much about the nature of the anticipated risk. Rather, it vaguely states that “I have a
problem with another inmate in this compound” and “[have made a] request for protection.” But
when the information contained in the form is considered in conjunction with Rodriguez’s
declaration testimony that he verbally informed Kugler at least twice of the gang-related threats
to his life, then Kugler’s denial about receiving the Inmate Request form becomes more
important to the inquiry of Kugler’s subjective knowledge.
19
2. Did Kugler Respond Reasonably to the Known Risk?
“[P]rison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health
or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk,
even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844, 114 S. Ct.
at 1982-83. More succinctly, “prison officials who act reasonably cannot be found
liable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.” Id. at 845, 114 S. Ct. at
1983. We have said that a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment if he
responds to a known risk “in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Cottone, 326
F.3d at 1358. An official responds to a known risk in an objectively unreasonable
manner if “he knew of ways to reduce the harm but knowingly declined to act”
or if “he knew of ways to reduce the harm but recklessly declined to act.” Hale,
50 F.3d at 1583.
Rodriguez argues on appeal that Kugler responded to the threatened risk of
harm in an objectively unreasonable manner. But the district court, given that it
granted summary judgment to Kugler solely on the basis that Kugler lacked
subjective knowledge of the risk, stopped short of addressing this question.
Moreover, Kugler does not argue on appeal that his response was reasonable;
rather, Kugler argues only that he had no subjective knowledge of a substantial
risk of harm, and/or that he was not the cause. Because it is not necessary for us to
20
do so, we decline to address the objective component of Rodriguez’s Eighth
Amendment claim. We accordingly leave to the district court on remand the task
of considering this issue in the first instance.
3. Did Kugler Cause Rodriguez’s Injury?
In granting summary judgment to Kugler, the district court did not consider
whether Kugler caused the Eighth Amendment violation. The court did not need
to consider that question because it determined that there was not enough evidence
to show that Kugler actually knew about the substantial risk of serious harm facing
Rodriguez. On appeal, however, Kugler asks us to affirm the district court’s
judgment on the ground that he did not cause the violation. For the reasons stated
below with respect to Johnson, we reject Kugler’s argument because the record
contains evidence from which a reasonable juror could find a causal connection
between Kugler’s actions and the Eighth Amendment violation.
B. Judgment as a Matter of Law to Johnson
1. Did Johnson Actually Know Rodriguez Faced a Substantial
Risk of Harm?
Johnson argues that he did not actually know that Rodriguez faced a
substantial risk of serious harm. Johnson says that Rodriguez’s complaints were
too vague to trigger his Eighth Amendment duty to act. The evidence Rodriguez
21
presented at trial, however, tells a different story. That evidence is sufficient to
permit a reasonable juror to find that Johnson actually knew that Rodriguez faced
a substantial risk of serious harm. We thus reject Johnson’s argument to the
contrary.16
Rodriguez testified at trial that he first spoke with Johnson about his fear of
being released into the compound on March 28. On that date, Rodriguez told
Johnson “[t]hat I was afraid for my life and that I didn’t want to go out to the
compound and that he should give me protection and give me a transfer” to
another institution. Trial Tr. I at 104-105. Rodriguez spoke to Johnson again at
the April 3 Classification Review meeting. At that meeting Rodriguez “told the
colonel that I didn’t want to be released to the compound because . . . I was afraid
that other inmates would attack me, that I wanted for him to give me a protection
and a transfer.” Id. at 105. On at least one occasion, Rodriguez specifically told
Johnson that some member or members of the Latin Kings had issued a death
threat against him. Id. at 123. Rodriguez “told him [Johnson] that I was a . . .
retired gang member and that the Latin Kings wanted to attack me because I didn’t
16
The district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law to Johnson was not based
on a conclusion that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to demonstrate subjective
knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm. But Johnson does make this argument on appeal
as an alternative basis for affirming the judgment as a matter of law entered in his favor.
22
want to continue being a Latin King, and that that was one of the reasons why I
wanted protection at Everglades, because there were an excess amount of members
of that gang in there.” Id. Rodriguez told Johnson that “all the members were
sending me messages . . . [and] [w]hen I went past, they would shout at me, telling
me they were going to kill me.” Id. at 139.
Johnson argues that no reasonable juror could conclude from this evidence
that Rodriguez communicated to Johnson “specific facts from which an inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists.” Appellees’ Br. at
17. We disagree.
Johnson relies exclusively on our decision in Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d
1346 (11th Cir. 2003), to support his argument that Rodriguez’s complaints were
too vague to put Johnson on actual notice of a substantial risk of harm. Carter
does not help Johnson. In Carter an inmate was stabbed with a shank by a fellow
inmate with whom he had been placed. The inmate then sued various prison
officials under the Eighth Amendment for failing to prevent the stabbing, arguing
that he had made the officials sufficiently aware of the risk of harm, yet they failed
to act. We rejected the inmate’s claims on the ground that the comments he made
to the officials were too vague to show that the officials had “actual knowledge”
of a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. at 1350. Specifically, we noted that the
23
only complaints the inmate made to prison officials were that the attacker-inmate
(1) paced his cell like a wild animal, (2) wanted to fake a hanging in order to
secure a transfer, and (3) told the plaintiff-inmate that he would help the attacker-
inmate carry out the fake hanging “one way or another.” Id. at 1349. In rejecting
his Eighth Amendment claims, we expressly relied upon the fact that the inmate
never told prison officials that he “feared” his attacker, never told them that he had
been “clearly threatened,” and never asked to be placed in “protective custody.”
Id. at 1349, 1350. In short, we concluded: “Plaintiff has failed to establish that
either Defendant had a subjective awareness of a substantial risk of serious
physical threat to Plaintiff.” Id. at 1350. Carter is thus easily distinguishable on
its facts.
Here, unlike in Carter, Rodriguez told Johnson the following specific
information: (1) that he was a former Latin King who decided to renounce his
membership; (2) that members of the Latin Kings had threatened to kill him when
he returned to the compound in retaliation for his renunciation; (3) that the
compound at ECI was heavily populated with Latin Kings; and (4) that, in order to
prevent an attempt on his life, he needed either to be transferred to another
institution or to be placed in protective custody. These are the things that the
24
inmate in Carter did not do.17 A reasonable juror could find from this evidence
that Johnson actually knew that Rodriguez faced a substantial risk of serious harm.
Accordingly, we conclude that there was a “legally sufficient evidentiary
basis for a reasonable juror to find for [Rodriguez]” on the subjective component
of his Eighth Amendment claim. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a).
2. Did Johnson Respond Reasonably to the Known Risk?
As he did with respect to Kugler, Rodriguez argues on appeal that Johnson
responded to the threatened risk of harm in an objectively unreasonable manner.
But (as in the case of Kugler) the district court did not address this question, given
that it granted judgment as a matter of law to Johnson solely on the basis that
Johnson did not cause the Eighth Amendment violation. Moreover, Johnson does
not argue on appeal that his response was reasonable. Because it is not necessary
for us to do so, we decline to address the objective component of Rodriguez’s
Eighth Amendment claim. We accordingly leave to the district court on remand
the task of considering this issue in the first instance.
17
Kugler’s (and the district court’s) reliance on Carter is similarly misplaced.
Rodriguez on at least two separate occasions told Kugler that gang members had made threats on
his life and requested that Kugler place him in protective custody or recommend that he be
transferred from ECI.
25
3. Did Johnson Cause Rodriguez’s Injury?
The district court granted Johnson judgment as a matter of law solely on the
basis of its determination that Johnson did not cause the Eighth Amendment
violation. Johnson could not have caused the violation, the district court reasoned,
because he did not have final authority at the April 3 meeting to order Rodriguez’s
release from close management. That lack of authority was dispositive of the
issue, the district court concluded, because it was Rodriguez’s release from close
management that “caused” him to be in the general population where he could be
attacked by Arnold Cleveland. In other words, in the district court’s view, because
Johnson did not have the authority to order Rodriguez’s release, it necessarily
followed that Johnson’s actions could not have caused the subsequent injury. We
disagree with the district court’s narrow view of causation because it is
inconsistent with our precedents in this context. We therefore vacate the judgment
as a matter of law entered in favor of Johnson.
For purposes of determining whether Johnson caused the Eighth
Amendment violation and Rodriguez’s subsequent injury, the “critical” question is
whether Johnson was “in a position to take steps that could have averted the
stabbing incident . . . but, through [deliberate] indifference, failed to do so.”
Williams, 689 F.2d at 1384. To determine whether Johnson caused Rodriguez’s
26
injury, we look at his “duties, discretion and means.” Id.
Applying the concept of causation spelled out in Williams, we held in
LaMarca v. Turner that a plaintiff demonstrates the “necessary causal link” in
this context where he is able to show that the prison official (1) “had the means
substantially to improve” the inmate’s safety, (2) “knew that the actions he
undertook would be insufficient to provide [the inmate] with reasonable protection
from violence,” and (3) had “other means [] available to him which he
nevertheless disregarded.” 995 F.2d at 1539. Here, the record evidence is
sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to find that the “necessary causal link” has
been established.18
18
Our conclusion in this case is consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in
Farmer. There, the Court held that the “question under the Eighth Amendment is whether the
prison officials, acting with deliberate indifference, exposed a prisoner to a sufficiently
substantial ‘risk of serious damage to his future health.’” 511 U.S. at 843, 114 S. Ct. at 1982
(quoting Helling, 509 U.S. at 35, 113 S. Ct. at 2481). Addressing a causation-related argument,
the Court in Farmer rejected the position taken by certain prison officials who insisted that they
could not have caused the Eighth Amendment violation because they “had no power to control
prisoner placement” at the prison where the inmate was incarcerated. 511 U.S. at 850, 114 S. Ct.
at 1985. In rejecting the officials’ argument, the Court cited record evidence tending to show that
the inmate “was placed in administrative segregation pursuant to . . . a request . . . by staff at [the
prison where the officials worked].” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added).
Here, Kugler and Johnson offer a similar argument: that they “had no power to control
[Rodriguez’s] placement” and thus could not have caused the Eighth Amendment violation and
Rodriguez’s resultant injury. But both Kugler and Johnson said in their depositions that
Rodriguez would have been immediately placed in administrative confinement had they
“request[ed]” that a protective management review be initiated — in much the same way that the
“request” made by the officials in Farmer could determine the inmate’s placement within the
prison. Thus, as in Farmer, the evidence in this case suggests that Kugler’s and Johnson’s power
to request a protective management review gave them “power to control prisoner placement” at
ECI.
27
First, there is no doubt that Johnson, the chief of security at ECI, had the
means substantially to improve Rodriguez’s safety. Kugler testified (in his
deposition that was introduced at the trial) that if an inmate voiced a life-
threatening security concern to him, he was fully authorized to set in motion
procedures to place the inmate in immediate administrative confinement and
initiate a protective management review aimed at eliminating the risk of harm.
That course of action “could have averted,” Williams, 689 F.2d at 1384, the life-
threatening risk of harm facing Rodriguez because it could have resulted in
Rodriguez’s transfer from ECI. Indeed, as Kugler testified, if as a result of
protective management review “he was deemed to need protection, he would have
been put in for a protection transfer.” Trial Tr.I at 223.
Second, a reasonable juror could conclude from the evidence that Johnson
“knew that the actions he undertook would be insufficient to provide [the inmate]
with reasonable protection from violence.” LaMarca, 995 F.3d at 1539.
The evidence in this case supports such an inference because the only action
Johnson took in response to Rodriguez’s requests for protection was to
recommend that Rodriguez be returned to the compound — where he would have
no protection at all from the Latin Kings who had threatened his life.
Third, the fact that ECI had an established protocol for handling an inmate’s
28
life-threatening security concerns — immediate administrative segregation,
combined with a thorough protective management review — demonstrates that
Johnson had “other means [] available to him which he nevertheless disregarded,”
LaMarca, 995 F.3d at 1539, and that those means were means that “could have
averted,” Williams, 689 F.2d at 1384, the substantial risk of serious harm facing
Rodriguez.
We are satisfied that the evidence in this case is sufficient to permit a
reasonable juror to find the “necessary causal link” between Johnson’s actions and
Rodriguez’s injury.19 Because we are unable to say that “there [was] no legally
sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable juror to find for [Rodriguez]” on the
issue of causation, Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a), we must vacate the judgment as a matter of
law entered in favor of Johnson.20
19
Our causation analysis, and the conclusion we reach, is fully applicable to Kugler.
20
The dissent points out that Johnson and Kugler had the authority to make only
recommendations with respect to placement and classification decisions, which decisions rest
with the state classification team. However, we respectfully submit that proof of causation in
this case does not turn on the ultimate placement or classification decision with respect to
Rodriguez. There was evidence in this case that both Johnson and Kugler, acting alone and
independently, had the authority to trigger the “protective management review protocol,” which
would result in immediate administrative confinement, pending the appropriate investigation and
ultimate decision by the state classification team. There was also evidence that Rodriguez was
stabbed only hours after being transferred to the general population. Thus, we conclude that a
reasonable jury could find that the stabbing at issue in this case would not have occurred if either
Johnson or Kugler had acted on the alleged warnings, and caused Rodriguez to be placed in
immediate protective confinement pending investigation. Whether Rodriguez would have faced
a similar danger upon his ultimate release into the general population, if that were the ultimate
29
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we vacate both the summary judgment entered
in favor of Kugler and the judgment as a matter of law entered in favor of Johnson
and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
decision of the state classification team, is a matter for another day and another case. Unlike the
dissent, we do not consider the causal nexus in this case to be a mere possibility; we believe that
a reasonable jury could conclude that it is more likely than not that Rodriguez’ injury would have
been avoided had either Johnson or Kugler followed the protocol.
30
COX, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the court’s opinion because Miguel Rodriguez
failed to present any evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that
the conduct of Colonel Johnson or Assistant Warden Kugler caused his injury. I
would therefore affirm the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment in
favor of Kugler1 and judgment as a matter of law in favor of Johnson.
I discern two holdings in the court’s opinion. First, the court disagrees with
what it characterizes as the district court’s “narrow view of causation” and holds
that “the ‘critical’ question is whether Johnson was ‘in a position to take steps that
could have averted the stabbing incident . . . but, through [deliberate] indifference,
failed to do so.’” (Maj. Op. at 26) (emphasis added) (quoting Williams v. Bennett,
689 F.2d 1370, 1384 (11th Cir. 1982)). I will refer to this holding as the “primary
holding.”
Second, the court holds that the Defendants’ power to place Rodriguez in
temporary administrative confinement, pending a management review protocol,
establishes the necessary causation. I will refer to this holding as “the alternative
holding.” Both holdings lack precedential support in this circuit, and I will discuss
1
The district court did not consider the causation element of Rodriguez’s claim against
Kugler because it granted summary judgment on other grounds.
31
each in turn.
1. The Primary Holding
Section 1983 provides: “Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (emphasis added). This court “requires proof of an affirmative causal
connection between the official’s acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional
deprivation” in § 1983 cases. Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir.
1986). “[I]t is clear that the inquiry into causation must be a directed one,
focusing on the duties and responsibilities of each of the individual defendants
whose acts or omissions are alleged to have resulted in a constitutional
deprivation.” Williams, 689 F.2d at 1381.
“Evidence that an individual defendant had neither the authority nor the
resources to prevent the deprivation is material to [the causation analysis].” Id. at
1375. The court acknowledges that “[n]either Kugler nor Johnson had final
authority (either individually or jointly) to order Rodriguez’s release from close
management.” (Maj. Op. at 10.) That authority rested with the state classification
32
team.
The court relies upon Williams, 689 F.2d 1370, and LaMarca v. Turner, 995
F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1993), in holding that a “plaintiff demonstrates the ‘necessary
causal link’ in this context where he is able to show that the prison official (1)
‘had the means substantially to improve’ the inmate’s safety, (2) ‘knew that the
actions he undertook would be insufficient to provide [the inmate] with reasonable
protection from violence,’ and (3) had ‘other means [] available to him which he
nevertheless disregarded.’” (Maj. Op. at 27) (quoting LaMarca, 995 F.2d at 1539).
Both Williams and LaMarca involved systematic deficiencies in a prison’s
protection of inmates. Neither case supports this court’s holding on causation. The
Williams court emphasized the importance of the causation element:
By contrast, the critical causation issue here must be whether each
individual defendant was in a position to take steps that could have
averted the stabbing incident at Holman but, through callous
indifference, failed to do so. Resolution of this issue necessarily
entails a very individualized approach, taking into account the duties,
discretion and means of each defendant.
There can be no duty, the breach of which is actionable, to do that
which is beyond the power, authority, or means of the charged party.
One may be callously indifferent to the fate of prisoners and yet not be
liable for their injuries. Those whose callous indifference results in
liability are those under a duty—possessed of authority and means—to
prevent the injury.
Williams, 689 F.2d at 1384 (footnote omitted). In LaMarca, the defendant Turner
33
was a former prison superintendent. That court said the following about causation:
“Section 1983 thus focuses our inquiry on whether an official’s acts or omissions
were the cause—not merely a contributing factor—of the constitutionally infirm
condition.” LaMarca, 995 F.2d at 1538. The LaMarca court held that “the
evidence strongly supports a finding that, even within the constraints he faced,
Turner had the means substantially to improve prisoner safety at GCI.” Id. at 1539.
Indeed, it is unsurprising that a prison superintendent would have the means to
improve systematic deficiencies in protecting the safety of prisoners. Here, there is
no evidence that either Johnson or Kugler had the means to change Rodriguez’s
classification. Thus, they had no affirmative duty—which this court requires to
impute § 1983 liability to an individual defendant—to protect Rodriguez from the
injury he alleges. See Williams, 689 F.2d at 1384.
In short, instead of requiring some proof of an affirmative causal
connection, as our precedent requires, the court holds that Rodriguez need only
demonstrate that Johnson or Kugler failed to take steps to could have averted the
stabbing.2 The court fails to consider whether the classification team gave any
weight to Johnson’s or Kugler’s recommendation that Rodriguez be released to the
2
The court says, “we do not consider the causal nexus in this case to be a mere
possibility,” but no rationale supports this assertion. (Maj. Op. at 30 n.20.)
34
general prison population, a point on which Rodriguez has offered no evidence.3
Thus, the inquiry should end here. “The causal relation does not exist when the
continuum between Defendant’s action and the ultimate harm is occupied by the
conduct of deliberative and autonomous decision-makers.” Dixon v. Burke County,
303 F.3d 1271, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002). The state classification team’s decision—as
deliberate and autonomous decision-makers—to release Rodriguez to the general
prison population broke the continuum of causation between Johnson’s and
Kugler’s recommendation and Rodriguez’s injury.
2. The Alternative Holding
The court also holds that Johnson’s and Kugler’s failure to order temporary
administrative confinement, pending a protective management review, caused
Rodriguez’s injury: “[W]e respectfully submit that proof of causation in this case
does not turn on the ultimate placement or classification decision with respect to
Rodriguez. . . . Whether Rodriguez would have faced a similar danger upon his
ultimate release into the general population, if that were the ultimate decision of
the state classification team, is a matter for another day and another case.” (Maj.
Op. at 29-30 n.20.) The court seems to be saying that this particular injury at this
3
Rodriguez’s burden in proving causation would not necessarily have been onerous;
testimony that this recommendation would likely have been followed would have sufficed for the
jury to consider whether he proved causation by a preponderance of the evidence.
35
particular time would not have happened if only Johnson or Kugler had initiated
protective management review. This is an erroneous view of causation.
“For damages to be proximately caused by a constitutional tort, a plaintiff
must show that, except for that constitutional tort, such injuries and damages
would not have occurred and further that such injuries and damages were the
reasonably foreseeable consequences of the tortious acts or omissions in issue.”
Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1168 (11th Cir. 2000). “Under traditional tort
principles, causation has two required elements: cause-in-fact and legal or
proximate cause. . . . To establish cause-in-fact, the plaintiff must show that except
for the constitutional tort, such injuries and damages would not have occurred.” Id.
at 1168 n.16 (citation omitted).
Ignoring these basic principles of causation, the court holds that a
reasonable jury could find that Johnson or Kugler caused Rodriguez’s injury, since
either or both of them could have placed Rodriguez in administrative confinement
while the state classification team conducted a protective management review to
determine if his classification should change. This analysis fails the cause-in-fact
test. Nothing in the record indicates how long this administrative confinement
might have lasted (though it would clearly be only a temporary confinement) or
what the result of the protective management review might have been. Rodriguez
36
simply has made no showing that a recommendation for a protective management
review would have prevented his ultimate release into the general prison
population and his subsequent injury. Thus, there is nothing in the record that
demonstrates that Rodriguez’s injuries would not have occurred except for
Johnson’s and Kugler’s failure to place him in temporary administrative
confinement, pending protective management review. What the court terms “a
matter for another day and another case” (Maj. Op. at 30 n.20) is actually the
precise question before us today: has Rodriguez demonstrated that Johnson’s or
Kugler’s failure to order temporary administrative confinement was the legal cause
of his injury? The answer is no.
To buttress its holding that Johnson and Kugler had “power to control
prisoner placement,” the court relies on the Supreme Court case of Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994). In Farmer, the defendants argued
that they had no power to control placement of the plaintiff, an inmate who had
recently been transferred to an out-of-state prison. However, an affidavit from one
defendant admitted that the plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation at
the out-of-state prison pursuant to a “request” from their office. On this evidence,
the Supreme Court concluded that “the record gives at least a suggestion” that the
37
defendants could control prison placement at the out-of-state facility.4 Id at 850,
114 S. Ct. at 1985. The court analogizes Farmer to this case, holding that the
causation element is satisfied since Johnson and Kugler could have “requested”
that a protective management review be conducted and thus had “power to control
prisoner placement.” We cannot speculate as to what would—or might—have
happened if Johnson or Kugler had requested a protective management review.
Further, nothing in Farmer indicates that the type of administrative segregation
involved in that case was in any way akin to the temporary administrative
segregation of the kind we have here.
I would affirm the district court.
4
The totality of the Farmer Court’s discussion of the causation issue is as follows:
“Finally, to the extent respondents seek affirmance here on the ground that officials at FCI-
Oxford and the Bureau of Prisons regional office had no power to control prisoner placement at
Terre Haute, the record gives at least a suggestion to the contrary; the affidavit of one respondent,
the warden of USP-Terre Haute, states that after having been at USP-Terre Haute for about a
month petitioner was placed in administrative segregation ‘pursuant to directive from the North
Central Regional Office’ and a ‘request . . . by staff at FCI-Oxford.’ Accordingly, though we do
not reject respondents’ arguments about petitioner’s claim for damages, the record does not
permit us to accept them as a basis for affirmance when they were not relied upon below.
Respondents are free to develop this line of argument on remand.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 850, 114
S. Ct. at 1985-86 (citation omitted).
38
Rodriguez v. SECRETARY FOR DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date filed: 2007-11-21
Citations: 508 F.3d 611
Copy Citations