NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 3 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SPOKANE INDIAN TRIBE; UNITED No. 21-35502
STATES OF AMERICA,
D.C. No. 2:72-cv-03643-SAB
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v. MEMORANDUM*
DAN SULGROVE; LESLIE SULGROVE;
CHAMOKANE LANDOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Objectors-Appellants,
v.
DAWN MINING CORP; STATE OF
WASHINGTON; CHRISTOPHER M.
NEWHOUSE,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington
Stanley A. Bastian, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted July 5, 2022
Portland, Oregon
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as
provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Before: WATFORD, R. NELSON, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
Objectors are Chamokane Creek Basin (“Basin”) landowners who challenge
the modification of a judgment that affects water rights in the Basin. We dismiss the
appeal because Objectors lack standing.
1. The United States established a reservation for the Spokane Indian
Tribe (“Tribe”), which included a right to Basin water to fulfill the purpose of this
reservation. The United States filed the original lawsuit seeking judicial
confirmation of the Tribe’s water rights in the Basin. This lawsuit did not include
permit-exempt users in the Basin.
After a trial, the district court found that the Tribe held a water right senior to
most other Basin water users. The court also determined the water rights for the
named Defendants. The court did not adjudicate the water rights of certain de
minimis users, finding that these uses of water should always be available.
About 25 years later, a report showed that the Basin’s water flow was not
meeting the Tribe’s water right. The suspected cause was either that de minimis
water users were using more water than allowed under Wash. Rev. Code
§ 90.44.050, or that the number of de minimis users had increased. The Tribe, the
United States, and Washington (“Government Parties”) proposed a settlement to fix
the issue, but avoid adjudicating these users. This settlement included a provision
that the United States and Tribe would not sue non-parties for drawing less than one
2
acre-foot per year (about 900 gallons per day), and any enforcement under state law
would require State approval.
The Government Parties presented the settlement to the district court and
requested that the judgment be modified. The district court entered an order to show
cause as to why the court should not approve the settlement and modify the
judgment. The court received five objections, including a joint objection by
Appellant-Objectors.
After a hearing, the district court approved the settlement and modified the
judgment. Importantly, the court made the following change: “The undisputed
evidence is that normal stock water use . . . and domestic water use is de minimus
and does not include impoundments. The [Judgment] is therefore adjusted to reflect
that these uses are not included in the judgment and should always be available,” to
“Water for domestic use and normal stock water use at the carrying capacity of the
land without the use of impoundments is included in this Judgment, but it is neither
adjudicated nor quantified at this time.” Objectors appealed this decision.
2. “The standing Article III requires must be met by persons seeking
appellate review.” Arizonans for Off. Eng. v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997). This
requirement is jurisdictional and cannot be waived, see Va. House of Delegates v.
Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945, 1951 (2019), and must be considered “whether or not
the issue was raised in the district court,” Maricopa-Stanfield Irrigation & Drainage
3
Dist. v. United States, 158 F.3d 428, 433 (9th Cir. 1998). At a minimum, standing
requires that Objectors show “(1) a concrete and particularized injury, that (2) is
fairly traceable to the challenged conduct, and (3) is likely to be redressed by a
favorable decision.” Va. House of Delegates, 139 S. Ct. at 1950.
3. Objectors argue that the original language protected de minimus water
users like them from future curtailment and regulation. They maintain that the
district court performed a general stream adjudication, and that the judgment
affected all water users in the Basin, not just the water users brought into court.
These arguments are flawed because the original judgment provided no
protection for Objectors. First, “[a] general adjudication . . . is a process whereby
all those claiming the right to use waters of a river or stream are joined in a single
action to determine water rights and priorities between claimants.” State Dep’t of
Ecology v. Acquavella, 674 P.2d 160, 161 (Wash. 1983). Even though the district
court made some stray comments suggesting that the adjudication may be a general
stream adjudication,1 it did not do so because not all water users in the Basin were
joined. Only permitted water users were joined; de minimis water users, like
Objectors, were not.
1
For example, the original judgment defined the Basin “to include the entire
Chamokane Creek System,” and that the district court had “jurisdiction to adjudicate
the surface and ground waters of the” Basin.
4
Second, Washington law directly contradicts the theory that exempt uses are
protected from adjudication. “[A]n appropriator’s right to use water . . . is subject
to senior water rights.” Whatcom County v. Hirst, 381 P.3d 1, 9 (Wash. 2016). This
applies to permit-exempt and de minimis uses because “any withdrawal of water
impacts the total availability of water,” and thus “an appropriator’s right to use water
from a permit-exempt withdrawal is subject to senior water rights.” Id. Even with
the language in the original judgment, Objectors could have been sued at any time
by senior water holders such as the Tribe.
Further, the modified judgment and settlement agreement protects Objectors
more than before. The agreement states that the Government Parties will not
adjudicate permit-exempt users that draw less than one acre-foot per year. This gives
Objectors some legal protection where originally there was none.
4. Because Objectors cannot claim a redressable injury caused by the
modification of the judgment, the appeal is DISMISSED.
5
Spokane Indian Tribe v. Dawn Mining Corp
Combined Opinion