NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 8 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DIANA ASTRID VASQUEZ-CASTILLO; No. 20-72565
MARIO CRISTOPHER GARCIA
VASQUEZ, Agency Nos. A208-175-115
A208-175-116
Petitioners,
v. MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted August 4, 2022**
Pasadena, California
Before: CALLAHAN and H. THOMAS, Circuit Judges, and HUMETEWA,***
District Judge.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Diane J. Humetewa, United States District Judge for
the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
Petitioner Diana Vasquez-Castillo1, a native and citizen of El Salvador,
petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) decision
dismissing an appeal from an immigration judge order denying her applications for
asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”), and protection under Article III of the United Nations Convention Against
Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the
petition.
We review the Board’s factual findings under the deferential “substantial
evidence” standard. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1015–16 (9th Cir. 2010)
(reviewing nexus determination under substantial evidence standard); INS v. Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992), superseded by statute on other grounds, 8
U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Under this standard, the petition for review must be denied
if the Board’s determination was “supported by reasonable, substantial, and
probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Elias–Zacarias, 502 U.S.
at 481 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4)). Petitioner bears the burden of proving she
is eligible for asylum or withholding of removal. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13, 1208.16.
1
Ms. Vasquez-Castillo’s minor son was also listed as a derivative on her asylum
application. We refer to Ms. Vasquez-Castillo as Petitioner.
2
Substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that Petitioner’s
subjective fear of gang retaliation upon her return to El Salvador is not objectively
reasonable because her family continues to live safely and unharmed there. See
Hakeem v. INS, 273 F.3d 812, 816 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding “[a]n applicant’s claim
of persecution upon return is weakened, even undercut, when similarly-situated
family members continue to live in the country without incident”), superseded by
statute on other grounds as stated in Ramadan v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646, 650 (9th
Cir. 2007).
Substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that Petitioner’s fear of
gang violence is unrelated to any protected ground and instead based on harm from
criminals who are generally motivated by gang violence.2 See Elias-Zacarias, 502
U.S. at 482 (affirming that persecution must be “on account of” a protected ground
to warrant relief under the INA); Zetino, 622 F.3d at 1016 (a petitioner’s “desire to
be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang
members bears no nexus to a protected ground”). Substantial evidence also supports
the Board’s conclusion that Petitioner failed to meet her burden to show the
2
We need not consider whether Petitioner’s particular social group, “member of her
father’s family,” is cognizable because the nexus to a statutorily protected ground is
independently dispositive of her claim. See Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 538
(9th Cir. 2004) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make
findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”)
(quoting INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976)).
3
government is unable or unwilling to protect her from any purported harm. Other
than speculative fear, Petitioner offered no objective evidence to support her
allegation on that issue. See Castro-Perez v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th
Cir. 2005) (finding petitioner’s failure to report non-governmental persecution
because of a belief that police would take no action did not establish that government
was unwilling or unable to control the persecution).
Substantial evidence also supports the Board’s conclusion that because
Petitioner failed to meet her burden to establish eligibility for asylum, it necessarily
follows that she cannot meet the higher burden that is required to establish eligibility
for withholding of removal. Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir.
2006) (“Since Zehatye could not establish her eligibility for asylum, the
[Immigration Judge] properly concluded that she was not eligible for withholding of
removal, which imposes a heavier burden of proof.”).
Finally, substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that Petitioner
failed to establish her CAT claim because she did not provide sufficient evidence to
prove she is more likely than not to be tortured in El Salvador by or with the
acquiescence of public officials. Petitioner provided a general report indicating that
“[w]omen’s rights NGOs claimed that many violent crimes against women occurred
within the context of gang structures[.]” General reports like this one, without more,
are insufficient to compel the conclusion that Petitioner is more likely than not to be
4
tortured. See Almaghzar v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 915, 923 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding
that general reports indicating torture occurred in a petitioner’s country, without
more, did not “compel the conclusion that Almaghzar would be tortured if
returned”).
PETITION DENIED.
5