NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 9 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 21-50103
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 2:21-cr-00016-FLA-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
KAMRAN REZAPOUR,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Fernando L. Aenlle-Rocha, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted July 14, 2022
Pasadena, California
Before: BENNETT and KOH, Circuit Judges, and KATZMANN,** Judge.
In 2014, Kamran Rezapour pleaded guilty to charges of wire fraud and
adulteration or misbranding of food or drugs in the Western District of North
Carolina. The court sentenced him to 108 months in custody followed by three
years of supervised release and imposed both a criminal fine and mandatory
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Gary S. Katzmann, Judge for the United States Court
of International Trade, sitting by designation.
restitution. On January 22, 2021, jurisdiction over Rezapour’s supervised release
was transferred to the Central District of California. Subsequently, the United
States Probation Office (“Probation”) petitioned the court for revocation of that
supervised release, alleging that Rezapour had violated the conditions of his
release by failing to submit monthly payments toward his criminal fine, failing to
notify Probation of changes to his economic circumstances, and failing to submit
truthful monthly supervision reports. At a hearing on April 9, 2021, Rezapour
admitted these violations, and the district court revoked and reimposed his
supervised release with a number of additional special conditions. Among these
additional conditions was the requirement that Rezapour be limited to one virtual
currency wallet to be used for all personal transactions. Rezapour timely appealed
this condition, alleging that the district court abused its discretion by limiting him
to a single cryptocurrency wallet. We find that it did not.
We have jurisdiction of this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the
imposition of a special condition of supervised release for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Gnirke, 775 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing United States
v. Wolf Child, 699 F.3d 1082, 1089 (9th Cir. 2012)) (“Where the defendant
properly objected to a special condition of supervised release, we review the
district court’s imposition of the condition for an abuse of discretion.”). Such
review requires “considerable deference” to the conclusions of the district court
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and “is limited to whether the condition was procedurally and substantively
reasonable.” Id. (quoting Wolf Child, 699 F.3d at 1089). A condition is
substantively reasonable where it (1) is “reasonably related” to the nature and
circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, and
the purposes of the sentence as a whole, including deterrence, protection of the
public, and rehabilitation of the offender; (2) “involves no greater deprivation of
liberty than is reasonably necessary” for those purposes; and (3) “is consistent with
any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(d)(1)–(3) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)–(D)). Where “a district
judge has considered the [18 U.S.C. ]§ 3553(a) factors and the totality of the
circumstances supports the sentence, we have held that the sentence is
substantively reasonable.” United States v. Blinkinsop, 606 F.3d 1110, 1116 (9th
Cir. 2010).
Rezapour contests the relatedness and reasonable necessity of the single-
wallet condition. He first argues that the condition is not reasonably related to the
crime, his history, or the purposes of his sentence because it does not materially
diminish the supervisory burden on Probation, has no relationship to his predicate
conviction, and fails to take into account his timely payment of restitution (if not of
his criminal fine). While he acknowledges that it may be more convenient for
Probation to supervise a single virtual wallet, he likewise contends that the special
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condition involves a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary
because it negatively affects the security of his virtual assets and because
Probation’s supervisory interest is adequately accommodated by the various
reporting requirements already imposed by the district court.
With respect to relatedness, we have previously held that a special condition
limiting the defendant to a single bank account after he failed to make restitution
payments is “reasonably related to supervising [the defendant’s] ability” to pay.
United States v. Jeremiah, 493 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2007). Here, although
Rezapour had fulfilled his obligation to pay the court-ordered restitution by the
time the contested condition was imposed, he still owed $12,500 on his $15,000
criminal fine and had likewise failed to consistently make payments toward that
debt. Indeed, the district court tailored the single-wallet condition expressly to
address Rezapour’s “lack of cooperation” with the terms of his sentence. Although
a digital wallet does not serve exactly the same function as a bank account, the
overarching purpose (storage and transfer of funds) is analogous. We therefore
conclude that the single-wallet condition is reasonably related to the purposes of
the sentence.
With respect to reasonable necessity, it is a “well-established principle that
parolees and other conditional releasees are not entitled to the full panoply of rights
and protections possessed by the general public”—indeed, they are “properly
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subject to a ‘broad range of [restrictions] that might infringe constitutional rights in
free society.’” United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 833 (9th Cir. 2004)
(plurality opinion) (alteration in original) (quoting McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 36
(2002)). Permissible restrictions have included the single bank account limitation
noted above, the requirement that a defendant seek prior approval for all credit
charges, broad financial disclosure requirements, and the requirement that a
defendant apply all unexpected financial gains toward court-ordered restitution
amount. See, e.g., Jeremiah, 493 F.3d at 1046; United States v. Garcia, 522 F.3d
855, 862 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Moschella, 727 F.3d 888, 893–894 (9th
Cir. 2013). As Rezapour had previously failed to make the required payments
toward his criminal fine, failed to notify Probation of relevant changes to his
financial circumstances, and failed to submit truthful monthly supervision reports,
we conclude that limiting him to a single virtual currency wallet during the period
of his supervised release was reasonably necessary to ensuring his compliance with
his sentence. Any concomitant restriction on his liberty with regard to his virtual
currency investments is not excessive in light of the totality of the circumstances
and the district court’s thorough consideration of the sentencing factors.
For the reasons set out above, reviewing the record as presented to the
district court, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
imposing the contested single-wallet condition.
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AFFIRMED.
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