NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 9 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RUTH MERI ACOSTA, AKA Ruth Mery No. 20-72052
Acosta Mejia,
Agency No. A094-190-510
Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted July 14, 2022
Pasadena, California
Before: BENNETT and KOH, Circuit Judges, and KATZMANN,** Judge.
Ruth Meri Acosta Mejia, a citizen of Honduras, challenges the decision of
the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing her appeal of the
Immigration Judge (“IJ”)’s denial of her claims for withholding of removal and
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Gary S. Katzmann, Judge for the United States Court
of International Trade, sitting by designation.
protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Exercising our
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), we deny the petition.
“We review for substantial evidence the BIA’s decision that an applicant has
not established eligibility for . . . withholding of removal[] and CAT protection.”
Zhiqiang Hu v. Holder, 652 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2011), abrogated on other
grounds by Garland v. Ming Dai, 141 S. Ct. 1669 (2021). We will uphold the
agency’s findings of fact unless “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled
to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of withholding of
removal because Acosta failed to establish a clear probability of future persecution.
Because Acosta did not allege that she experienced past persecution in
Honduras, she must show a “clear probability of future persecution” to establish
eligibility for withholding of removal. Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1091
(9th Cir. 2010). The agency found that Acosta failed to do so because she did not
demonstrate: (1) a nexus between her proffered Particular Social Group (“PSG”)—
that being the “Acosta family,” the “Arguellas Mejia family,” and the “Acosta
Mejia family”—and the harm feared; or that (2) her claimed fear is objectively
reasonable. Acosta contests both findings, but her arguments are unavailing.
To the first point, although the agency accepted Acosta’s proposed family-
based PSG as cognizable, the agency found that any past harms endured by
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Acosta—in the form of murders and/or disappearances of eight family members—
did not come about because of membership in the family. On appeal, Acosta has
not identified a specific commonality among her family members to explain why
they as a family are targets. Acosta’s own explanations—that various family
members were murdered or disappeared for witnessing crimes, resisting extortion,
and/or serving as a judge—support the IJ’s assessment that her “family were
victims of criminal actors” who sought out various opportunistic moments to harm
and/or extort money from Acosta’s family members unconnected to a protected
ground.
To the second point, although the agency articulated multiples issues
undermining the objective reasonability of Acosta’s fear of future persecution, on
appeal, Acosta only responds to one of them. Namely, Acosta contends that the
continued presence and safety of various family members in Honduras does not
undercut her objective fear of future persecution on family-based grounds because
the agency failed to make a finding that the identified remaining family members
are “similarly situated” to her. However, the agency did make such a finding and
the record does not compel a contrary determination where several of Acosta’s
remaining family members share her last name and continue to reside in Honduras.
Indeed, as the IJ observed, Acosta herself resided in Honduras without incident for
four years after her brother disappeared after witnessing a bank robbery.
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Because Acosta has not raised any arguments sufficient to disturb the
agency’s determination that she failed to establish a clear probability of future
persecution, the BIA properly upheld the IJ’s order denying withholding of
removal.
2. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Acosta is
ineligible for CAT relief because she failed to show she is more likely than not to
be tortured in Honduras by or with the acquiescence of the government.
On appeal, Acosta’s argument seems to be that because the Honduran
government would not be able to protect her, the court should find acquiescence
rising to the level of torture. We have rejected such arguments. Andrade-Garcia v.
Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[A] general ineffectiveness on the
government’s part to investigate and prevent crime will not suffice to show
acquiescence.”). Moreover, record evidence—such as human rights reports by the
State Department—shows that the Honduran government is trying to combat the
kind of gang violence Acosta fears, and that the authorities were responsive to the
Acosta family following each gang-related fatality that befell her relatives.
Because Acosta has not shown that the record compels a finding of
government acquiescence in torture, the BIA properly upheld the IJ’s order
denying her claim for protection under the CAT.
PETITION DENIED.
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Ruth Acosta v. Merrick Garland
Combined Opinion