IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 95-30333
Summary Calendar
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MARY G. SMITH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
LUCAS TIRE COMPANY, INC.,
Defendant,
BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE COMPANY, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
(94 CV 2215)
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September 19, 1995
Before KING, SMITH, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Defendant Bridgestone/Firestone Company, Inc.
("Bridgestone"), appeals an order granting plaintiff Mary Smith's
motion to amend the complaint and remanding to state court.
*
Local Rule 47.5.1 provides: "The publication of opinions that have no
precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-
settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens
on the legal profession." Pursuant to that rule, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published.
Concluding that we lack appellate jurisdiction, we dismiss the
appeal.
I.
Smith, a resident of Louisiana, filed a "Claim for Damages"
in Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans against Lucas
Tire Company, Inc. ("Lucas"), and Bridgestone, the manufacturer
of Regency Road King tires. Smith, who had purchased tires from
Lucas in New Orleans, alleges that she was injured in an
automobile accident that was caused by a defective tire.
Bridgestone filed notice of removal, asserting diversity
jurisdiction. Bridgestone is an Ohio corporation with its
principal place of business in Ohio, and Lucas was a Mississippi
corporation. The store at which Smith purchased her tires was no
longer in business. Lucas filed a counterclaim against
Bridgestone "for full contribution, defense and/or indemnity on
any judgment" against Lucas.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), Smith filed a motion to
remand, asserting that complete diversity was lacking because
Lucas was a Louisiana corporation at the time the case was filed.
Bridgestone filed an opposition, stating that Lucas, a
Mississippi corporation that operated the New Orleans retail
store, was dissolved on April 29, 1994. Lucas's Louisiana assets
were sold to Calvin J. Lucas, III, and Lucas Tire, Inc. ("Lucas
Louisiana"), was incorporated in Louisiana on January 1, 1994,
with its principal place of business in Kenner, Louisiana. Lucas
Louisiana did not purchase or assume any of the liabilities of
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Lucas other than those set out in the purchase agreement.
The district court denied remand, reasoning that Lucas
Louisiana was not a defendant, so there was diversity of
citizenship. Smith filed a motion for leave to amend her
complaint to correct the identification of a party defendant and
add defendants, alleging that Lucas Louisiana and Lucas "were a
continuation of the now dissolved LUCAS TIRE COMPANY." Further,
Smith wished to add as defendants known shareholders of Lucas,
Calvin Lucas, III, Richard t. Butler, and Anne Lucas Butler,1 and
unknown shareholders of Lucas at the time of dissolution.
Bridgestone opposed the motion to amend, asserting that the
proposed joinder "would have the effect of destroying diversity
jurisdiction thereby necessitating remand back to state court."
According to Bridgestone, the additional parties were not
indispensable, and the denial of joinder of the non-diverse
parties would not cause prejudice. Based upon the factors
enunciated in Hensgens v. Deere & Co., 833 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir.
1987), the district court granted leave to amend and found that
joinder and remand pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) were
appropriate.
II.
Bridgestone contends that the order granting leave to amend
is separable from the order of remand. Thus, Bridgestone argues,
1
It appears that Calvin Lucas, III, was a Louisiana resident and that
Richard T. Butler and Ann Butler were Mississippi residents.
3
28 U.S. C. § 1447(d) does not bar us from reviewing the order
granting leave to amend.
Bridgestone is correct that the orders granting leave to
amend and remanding the case are separable, even though they were
issued in a single decree. See Tillman v. CSX Transp., Inc., 929
F.2d 1023, 1026 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 859 (1991).
The order granting leave to amend preceded that of remand "in
logic and in fact." Id. The determination of separability does
not help Bridgestone, however. "[J]urisdictional remands
premised on post-removal events are not reviewable." Linton v.
Airbus Industrie, 30 F.3d 592, 599 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 639 (1994). Even if a remand for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction is erroneous, the order may not be reviewable on
appeal. Id. at 600. "Efforts to dissect the reasoning of that
conclusion so as to find appellate jurisdiction are little more
than veiled attempts to investigate indirectly the correctness of
the district court's conclusion." Id.
Section 1447(d) is inapplicable in this case because it
provides for review of remand orders only in civil rights cases.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1443, 1447(d). The district court allowed the
joinder of non-diverse parties and remanded under § 1447(e).
Although it is not stated explicitly, the remand plainly was for
lack of jurisdiction. Any review of the district court's grant
of the motion to amend the complaint is "a postmortem exercise."
Tillman, 929 F.2d at 1028; Linton, 30 F.3d at 600.
The appeal is DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction.
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