United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
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No. 11-1549
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United States of America, *
*
Appellant, * Appeal from the United
* States District Court for
v. * the District of Nebraska.
*
Carlos Lomeli; Manuel Hernandez, *
*
Appellees. *
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Submitted: November 16, 2011
Filed: April 18, 2012
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Before RILEY, Chief Judge, BEAM and BYE, Circuit Judges.
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BEAM, Circuit Judge.
Appellant, the United States Government, appeals from the district court's1
order adopting the findings and supplemental findings and recommendations of the
magistrate judge2 granting Carlos Lomeli's and Manuel Hernandez's motions to
suppress evidence obtained as a result of a wiretap. The government claims that the
1
The Honorable Lyle E. Strom, United States District Court for the District of
Nebraska.
2
The Honorable F.A. Gossett, III, United States Magistrate Judge for the
District of Nebraska.
district court erred in holding that the government's objections to the magistrate
judge's initial findings and recommendation were moot, and by refusing to consider
the merits of its arguments against suppression of the authorized wiretap. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In October 2009, in furtherance of an ongoing narcotics investigation, an
Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) for the District of Nebraska submitted an
application for interception of wire communications to a federal judge who approved
the requested wiretap. Applications for an order authorizing or approving the
interception of wire or oral communications ("wiretap applications") are governed by
federal law. Under the law, wiretap applications may only be authorized by a discrete
number of people specially designated by the Attorney General, who are enumerated
in the federal statute. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1). Additionally, all wiretap applications
must identify the investigative or law enforcement officers making the application,
and indicate the Department of Justice (DOJ) officer authorizing the application. 18
U.S.C. § 2518(1)(a).
The application at issue here generally complied with all requirements, except
that even though the application indicated that "[a]ttached to this Application are
copies of the Attorney General's order of Special Designation and the Memorandum
of Authorization approving this Application," none were attached. The entire
paragraph in the application that is at issue today reads:
Pursuant to Section 2516 of Title 18, United States Code, the Attorney
General of the United States has specially designated the appropriate
officials of the Criminal Division to exercise the power conferred on the
Attorney General by Section 2516 of Title 18, United States Code, to
authorize this Application, under the power designated to him by special
designation of the Attorney General pursuant to Order number 3055-
2009 of February 26, 2009, and an appropriate official of the Criminal
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Division, has authorized this Application. Attached to this Application
are copies of the Attorney General's order of Special Designation and
the Memorandum of Authorization approving this Application.
Defendants Carlos Lomeli and Manuel Hernandez filed motions to suppress
following their arrests founded upon evidence obtained during the authorized
wiretaps. The motions, in part, claimed that the wiretap application failed to comply
with federal law. On December 9, 2010, the magistrate judge filed a report and
recommendation. As relevant here, the magistrate judge recommended that the
motions to suppress be granted as to all evidence obtained as a result of the wiretap.
The magistrate judge concluded that the government's failure to include the
authorizing forms was not a mere technical defect and thus the wiretap application
was insufficient on its face.
Over Lomeli's and Hernandez's objection, the magistrate judge reopened this
matter and conducted a supplemental hearing on January 5, 2011. During the
hearing, the government entered into evidence the two missing documents from the
wiretap application, showing that the people signing off on the wiretap had the
authority to do so. On January 17, 2011, following the supplemental hearing, the
magistrate judge filed its supplemental findings and recommendation. In it, the
magistrate judge acknowledged that both parties' objections to the initial report and
recommendation were pending before the district judge and no final judgment had
been entered. The magistrate judge also highlighted the fact that to-date the
government had never made any attempt to produce the authorization documents that
were to be attached to the wiretap application, did not provide the missing
attachments to Lomeli and Hernandez during discovery, and "apparently made no
effort to locate the missing documents prior to the suppression hearing." Rather than
denying the rehearing on this basis outright, the magistrate judge reopened the matter
"only to the extent necessary to provide Judge Strom with a complete record."
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The magistrate judge then, however, discussed the substantive issue as to
whether the omission of the attached documents was merely a technical defect. The
magistrate judge held a second time that the government's failure to attach the
referenced authorization documents was not merely a technical defect and was fatal
to its claim. The magistrate judge pointed out the paucity3 of record evidence that the
identity of the officer who authorized the application was somehow actually or timely
disclosed to the issuing judge despite the omission of that information from the
application. Thus, the magistrate judge held that contrary to Sixth Circuit precedent
relied upon by the government in support of its argument that not every
noncompliance with the relevant wiretap application statutes mandates suppression,
see United States v. Gray, 521 F.3d 514, 524 (6th Cir. 2008), the nature of the defect
here was not technical nor surmountable for similar reasons. Accordingly, the
magistrate judge once again granted defendants' motions to suppress.
The district court issued its order on February 8, 2011. As relevant here, the
court acknowledged that the government filed objections to the magistrate judge's
initial findings and recommendation but overruled the objections "as moot inasmuch
as the magistrate judge reopened the record." The court noted that no objections were
filed to the supplemental findings and recommendation and they were thus "approved
and adopted." It then ruled that "[d]efendant Lomeli's motion to suppress is granted
in part; the motion to [suppress] evidence obtained as the result of the October 22,
2009, Nebraska Wiretap is suppressed," and likewise that "Hernandez' motion to
suppress is granted; the motion to suppress evidence obtained as the result of the
October 22, 2009, Nebraska Wiretap is suppressed." The government appeals.
3
"Paucity" may be a misnomer here, as the record is wholly devoid of any such
evidence.
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II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
This court reviews suppression issues under a two-pronged standard of review,
reviewing the district court's factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions
de novo. United States v. Sheikh, 367 F.3d 756, 762 (8th Cir. 2004).
B. Procedural Issue
On appeal, the government argues that the district court failed to conduct a de
novo review when it adopted the magistrate judge's supplemental findings and
recommendation. It claims the court thus failed to address the government's pending
objections regarding the magistrate judge's recommendation suppressing the wiretap
evidence.
In the end, no matter what this court determines regarding whether the
government was required to renew its initial objection or file objections anew
following the issuance of a magistrate judge's supplemental findings and
recommendation, or what standard of review the district court employed, any ruling
on this discrete procedural matter does not effect our de novo review of the legal
conclusions that are central to the instant analysis. See United States v. Barragan,
379 F.3d 524, 528 (8th Cir. 2004) ("We review de novo the district court's legal
conclusions.").
The rule in this circuit is that a failure to object to a magistrate judge's
report and recommendation will not result in a [wholesale] waiver of the
right to appeal "when the questions involved are questions of law or
mixed questions of law and fact, or when neither the local court rule nor
the magistrate's notice has clearly informed the [parties] that failure to
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object to the magistrate's report will result in a waiver of the right to
appeal."
United States v. Benshop, 138 F.3d 1229, 1234 (8th Cir. 1998) (first and third
alteration in original) (quoting Francis v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 103, 104 (8th Cir. 1986)
(per curiam) (internal quotation omitted)).
C. Substantive Issue Regarding Wiretap Application Evidence
"The federal wiretap statute was first enacted as Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub.L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212-223, codified at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520." United States v. Moore, 41 F.3d 370, 374 (8th Cir. 1994).
"The law has dual purposes, '(1) protecting the privacy of wire and oral
communications, and (2) delineating on a uniform basis the circumstances and
conditions under which the interception of wire and oral communications may be
authorized.'" Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968-2
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2153). The statute broadly prohibits wiretaps "[e]xcept as
otherwise specifically provided in this chapter." 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1).
The federal statutes governing wiretap applications clearly require that such
applications must be authorized by the Attorney General or other such designated
authority specifically enumerated in the statute. Id. at § 2516(1). All wiretap
applications must identify the investigative or law enforcement officer making the
application, and the designated Attorney General representative authorizing the
application. Id. at § 2518(1)(a). According to the statutory scheme, the court may
suppress evidence acquired through wiretapping, upon motion of "[a]ny aggrieved
person" if "(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted; (ii) the order of
authorization or approval under which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face;
or (iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the order of authorization
or approval." Id. at § 2518(10)(a). Noncompliance with the statutory provisions
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governing the application procedure are contemplated by the relief available for
aggrieved persons under the statute. United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 528
(1974) (explaining that § 2518(10)(a)(i) provides for suppression of evidence directly
or indirectly obtained in violation of the pre-approval provisions of the chapter and
that these provisions were intended to play a central role in the statutory scheme and
thus violation thereof amounts to the unlawful interception of wire and oral
communications).
Determining whether suppression is warranted in a particular case requires an
examination as to whether the statutory requirement violated (here, the failure to
identify the applicant's authority to make the application) occupies a central, or even
functional, role in guarding against unwarranted use of wiretapping or electronic
surveillance. United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 578 (1974). Suppression is
required under § 2518(10)(a)(i) & (ii)4 only for "failure to satisfy any of those
statutory requirements that directly and substantially implement the congressional
intention to limit the use of intercept procedures to those situations clearly calling for
the employment of this extraordinary investigative device." Giordano, 416 U.S. at
527 (holding, in part, that suppression under § 2518(10)(a)(i) for "unlawfully
intercepted" communications includes constitutional violations as well as failure to
satisfy certain statutory requirements); see also Moore, 41 F.3d at 375 (analyzing
whether a facial insufficiency violated a core statutory requirement in a §
2518(10)(a)(ii) case). Suppression is not justified if the facial insufficiency of the
wiretap order is no more than a technical defect. Moore, 41 F.3d at 374. According
to Moore, our analysis is two-tiered, first identifying the omission or defect at issue
(i.e., whether the challenged document is insufficient on its face), and second,
4
It is unclear from the parties' initial motions and the district court's order
which of the grounds available under § 2518(10)(a) was relied upon to suppress the
wiretap evidence here.
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determining whether that defect violates a core statutory requirement or whether it is
a mere technical defect not warranting suppression. Id. at 375.
The government asserts that the boilerplate statement in the wiretap application
itself that "an appropriate official of the Criminal Division" had given authorization,
fulfilled the statutory purpose–that just by saying someone authorized by the Attorney
General had signed off on it, "the issuing judge was made aware that the central role
in guarding against the unwarranted use of wiretapping had been fulfilled." So,
argues the government, the failure to attach the actual authorizing documents was
merely a technical defect. The district court disagreed, holding that omitting these
documents could not be a mere technical defect because correct authorization and
proof thereof is the center of the whole statutory scheme limiting the use of intercept
procedures to those situations clearly calling for the employment of this extraordinary
investigative device.
In Giordano, the Supreme Court stated it was "confident that the provision for
pre-application approval was intended to play a central role in the statutory scheme
and that suppression must follow when it is shown that this statutory requirement has
been ignored." 416 U.S. at 528. In Giordano, the Court suppressed evidence when
it became apparent that at the time the wiretap applications were made, the
application erroneously purported to have been authorized by a specially designated
Assistant Attorney General. Id. at 509, 529. Later, however, it developed that the
first wiretap application had not in fact been authorized by a specially designated
individual, but rather the Attorney General's Executive Assistant, an individual not
statutorily authorized to do so. Id. at 510. Because the officer approving the
application had been misidentified, the motion to suppress was granted under §
2518(10)(a)(i) as to evidence obtained from the execution of the first wiretap and any
wiretap thereafter that relied upon the first faulty application. Id. at 533.
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Later, in Chavez, the Court again visited this issue. There, the Court held that
suppression was not necessary where the Attorney General had actually authorized
the challenged wiretap but the application incorrectly identified the Assistant
Attorney General (a potential, statutorily designated official that could have been
designated by the Attorney General) as the authorizing official. 416 U.S. at 568-69.
The Court acknowledged the "facial sufficiency" of the wiretap application because
it clearly identified on its face the name of the authorizing Assistant Attorney
General. Id. at 573-74. Stated differently, the application in Chavez stated that a
specifically named, statutorily designated official actually gave the authorization. In
light of Chavez, the government's argument that the statement on the application itself
that the appropriate approval had been received carries some weight. The critical
difference is, however, that in Chavez, the face of the application included the name
of the specific individual that had purportedly authorized the application whereas the
application in this case just states generically that "an appropriate official of the
Criminal Division" had authorized the application. Id. at 566. Unlike Chavez, one
cannot tell from the face of the application at issue here exactly who the authorizing
individual was, just generically that authorization was received, which does not allow
the authorizing judge to issue an interception order with the knowledge contemplated
by Congress. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(a) (requiring that each application include the
identity of the officer authorizing the application).
The Eighth Circuit has likewise weighed in on this matter. In Moore, the
defendant challenged a wiretap application that had been approved by the judge, and
although the judge thought he signed the application order, there was no signature by
the judge on the order. 41 F.3d at 373. There, we denied the motion to suppress,
determining that the absence of the judge's signature was only a technical defect. Id.
at 375-76. The court held that the requirement of judicial approval is obviously at the
core of the congressional purpose underlying the statute, but noted that written
approval was not actually required. Id. And, there was testimony from the
authorizing judge that he indeed approved the application and fully intended to sign
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it. Id. In fact, the judge testified that he found sufficient probable cause to issue the
order and believed he had signed the order along with all of the other original papers
presented to him for his signature at the time of the application. Id. at 372-73. On
those facts, the absence of the judge's signature did "not reflect a violation of any
underlying statutory requirement." Id. at 375. Moore is thus inapposite to the issue
uniquely presented here.
The application in the instant case is insufficient on its face, as it does not
comport with the § 2518(1)(a) requirement. And despite the government's arguments
to the contrary, the omission here is not "technical" as has been determined in other
cases. See United States v. Radcliff, 331 F.3d 1153, 1160-63 (10th Cir. 2003)
(denying suppression because even though the name of the authorizing official was
omitted from the wiretap order, there was no dispute that the applications identified
the appropriate DOJ individual); United States v. Fudge, 325 F.3d 910, 917-18 (7th
Cir. 2003) (denying suppression even though the order granting the wiretap
application did not specifically identify the authorizing DOJ official because attached
to the application were two letters specifying the approval and authorization, along
with an affidavit supporting the same).
By way of this statutory scheme, Congress intended:
not only to limit resort to wiretapping to certain crimes and situations
where probable cause is present but also to condition the use of intercept
procedures upon the judgment of a senior official in the Department of
Justice that the situation is one of those warranting their use. It is
reasonable to believe that such a precondition would inevitably
foreclose resort to wiretapping in various situations where investigative
personnel would otherwise seek intercept authority from the court and
the court would very likely authorize its use.
Giordano, 416 U.S. at 527-28.
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The authorizing judge in the instant case had no way of knowing the name of
the actual, statutorily designated official that had indeed authorized the application
even though the application states as much in general terms–one of the core
components of this legislation. And, the government offered no evidence (such as
was received in other cases) that the judge indeed knew the identity of the appropriate
authorizing official, or that the name of the statutorily designated official was
otherwise disclosed. Such evidence would have demonstrated compliance with all
the fundamental statutory safeguards that protect against unauthorized or unwarranted
wiretap surveillance.5 See Moore, 41 F.3d at 375 n.2 (justifying a determination that
an omission was a mere technicality by focusing on the relevant perspective of the
parties to the events, where all present, including the judge, proceeded as if the judge
had signed the order as he fully intended, thus Congress's purpose in requiring
judicial approval was substantially fulfilled).
Despite the fact that the government intended and may very well have thought
the appropriate authorizing documents were attached to the application, they were
not, and there is nothing in the record to give us reason to believe that the judge
authorizing the wiretap–the person for whose benefit the statutory requirement is
written–knew that the requisite authority was obtained. It was not until the magistrate
judge conducted the supplemental hearing in the instant case that the government
offered the supporting documents. Given the congressional intent to strictly limit the
use of this electronic interception, failing to include the name of the authorizing
official, and failing to include the documents that could have easily established
5
The cases relied upon by the government to support the proposition that minor
errors in a wiretap application or order do not warrant suppression are wholly
distinguishable. In each, either the issuing judge knew the identity of the authorizing
DOJ official, or the official was designated by name in the application but that
information was omitted from the authorizing order. See United States v. Callum,
410 F.3d 571, 574-77 (9th Cir. 2005), Fudge, 325 F.3d at 914-18; Radcliff, 331 F.3d
at 1160-62.
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confirmation or proof of such authorization, was not a "minor," or merely technical,
defect.6 We therefore affirm the district court's suppression order on this basis.
C. Good Faith Exception
The government alternatively argues that the Leon good faith exception should
apply in these circumstances because, again, the application's statement that "an
appropriate official of the Criminal Division" suffices. Yet, even though we have
applied the good faith doctrine adopted in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)
in the § 2518(10)(a) context, it does not apply on these facts. Moore, 41 F.3d at 376.
In Leon, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does
not require the suppression of evidence seized by the police pursuant to a search
warrant which was sought, obtained, and executed in objectively reasonable good
faith, but which was held, subsequently, to have been issued without probable cause.
468 U.S. at 918-21.
Moore and its application of the good faith doctrine is notably distinct. In
Moore it "'was the judge, not the police officers, who made the critical mistake.'" 41
F.3d at 376 (quoting Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 990 (1984)). There,
the law enforcement officials "complied with the core statutory requirements of
federal wiretap law in applying for and executing the wiretap orders." Id. at 376-77.
The officer in Moore left the judge's chambers believing, as did the judge, that the
6
In doing so, we part ways with our sister circuit, which held otherwise on
similar facts. See Gray, 521 F.3d at 523, 527 (denying suppression because even
though the specific name of the authorizing official was omitted from the application,
and it was unclear whether the applicant informed the judge of the specific name of
the authorizing official, the fact of proper authorization was made known to the
issuing judge at the time he signed the application–i.e., the applicant told the judge
he had obtained authorization from a DOJ official specially designated to approve
wiretap applications).
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judge had approved the wiretap application and that the order had been entered. Id.
at 376. Accordingly, we held the officer acted in good faith in presuming the validity
of the wiretap order he reasonably believed he watched the judge sign and enter.
Just the opposite occurred here. We have already determined that the
government failed to comply with the core statutory requirements of federal wiretap
law and that the omission here was not merely a technical defect. Stated in
juxtaposition with Leon jurisprudence, we hold that no wiretap applicant can, in good
faith, rely upon a court order authorizing the wiretap when the applicant failed to
comply with the edicts of the federal wiretap statute in procuring the order. The
failure here thwarts the core purpose of the statutory scheme in place to regulate such
extraordinary investigative techniques. To hold otherwise on these facts would
prompt bad practices and reward those who routinely include mere boilerplate
language in wiretap applications, which runs upstream from the carefully laid out
statutory scheme. Without including the name of the authorizing DOJ official on
wiretap applications, there can be no "good faith" reliance under the statutory scheme
carefully crafted by Congress to limit the use of these electronic interceptions. We
will take no part in detracting from Congress's intent "to make doubly sure that the
statutory authority be used with restraint and only where the circumstances warrant
the surreptitious interception of wire and oral communications." Giordano, 416 U.S.
at 515.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated we affirm the grant of the motions to suppress in this
case.
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