NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 26 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 22-10011
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 1:99-cr-00465-JAO-1
v.
DOUGLAS AKIRA HIRANO, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
Jill A. Otake, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 17, 2022**
Before: S.R. THOMAS, PAEZ, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
Douglas Akira Hirano appeals from the district court’s judgment and
challenges the 8-month sentence and a special condition of supervised release
imposed upon his second revocation of supervised release. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
As a preliminary matter, the government is incorrect that Hirano’s appeal is
moot. See United States v. Verdin, 243 F.3d 1174, 1178 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding
that an appeal is not moot if success on appeal could result in a reduction in the
period of supervised release).
Hirano contends that the district court used the incorrect criminal history
category to determine his guidelines range. However, the court properly used the
criminal history category calculated at his original sentencing. See U.S.S.G.
§ 7B1.4 n.1 (“The criminal history category to be used in determining the
applicable range of imprisonment [at a revocation hearing] is the category
determined at the time the defendant originally was sentenced to the term of
supervision.”). Hirano’s challenges to his career offender designation are beyond
the scope of these proceedings. See United States v. Castro-Verdugo, 750 F.3d
1065, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that the validity of the original sentence
may not be attacked in a revocation proceeding).
Hirano also challenges a special condition of supervised release requiring
him to disclose financial information to probation. He contends that the district
court did not provide an adequate explanation for imposing the condition and that
the condition is overbroad and substantively unreasonable. The district court did
not plainly err. See United States v. Garcia, 522 F.3d 855, 860 (9th Cir. 2008).
The court was not required to explain its reasons for imposing this particular
2 22-10011
condition, see United States v. Daniels, 541 F.3d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 2008), which is
substantively reasonable and sweeps no more broadly than necessary to achieve the
goals of sentencing in this case, see Garcia, 522 F.3d at 861-62.
AFFIRMED.
3 22-10011