(after stating the facts). The court did
not err in overruling the appellant’s motion to set aside his plea of guilty entered at a former term of the court, and in sentencing appellant upon such plea. The appellant was twenty-four years of age. He was advised by the court of the legal consequences of such plea.
(1) The statute provides for the appointment of counsel upon the request of one who has been indicted for a felony where he is unable to employ any. Kirby’s Digest, § 2273. Appellant made no request for the court to appoint counsel to defend him. On his motion to set aside the plea of guilty, he did not offer to introduce any testimony that tended to prove that he was not guilty of the crime charged, and his testimony was not sufficient to show that he was induced to enter a plea of guilty under a misapprehension of-the facts. His plea of guilty was entered voluntarily, and there is nothing in the record to show that the plea was improperly entered. It was within the discretion of the court, under the evidence adduced, to allow appellant to withdraw his plea of guilty entered at a former term, or to refuse to allow him to do so. There was no abuse of the court’s discretion. Joiner v. State, 94 Ark. 198.
(2) This court has held that sentence may be pronounced on a plea of guilty at a term subsequent to that at which the plea was entered. Thurman v. State, 54 Ark. 120; Greene v. State, 88 Ark. 290; Joiner v. State, 94 Ark. 198; State v. Wright, 96 Ark. 203; Barwick v. State, 107 Ark. 115.
The judgment is affirmed.