(after stating the facts). (1-2) The court was correct in vesting the title in the appellee, but was in error in grounding its decree on the theory that the appel-lee had acquired title by adverse possession for more than seven years. There had been no visible change in the possession of appellee since the death of her husband. Her possession was amicable in its origin insofar as the appellant, Jas. J. Miller, was concerned. In order to have set the statute of limitation in motion it was necessary for the appellee to have held the title adversely and to have exercised such acts of ownership as to indicate an intention on her part to hold the land adversely to appellant, who was the remainderman. Appellee’s possession was permissible so far as the appellant was concerned and it remained so until the appellee indicated a purpose to sell the land and nothing was done by the appellee herself until that time that was calculated to bring home to the appellant any knowledge of the fact that it was her purpose to hold the land adversely to him. Such we think is the correct conclusion.
The testimony of appellee is clear and convincing to the effect that after the death of her husband, she and her step-son, the appellant, entered into a contract by which the appellant was to deed her his interest in the old home place in consideration of her in turn deeding to him her dower in certain other tracts of land. As she understood it, it was the land on which she had resided with her husband since their marriage, in 1898. She said she had no experience in land descriptions and never measured the land as described in the deed, but she thought that it was all hers under the contract. Appellant admits there was a contract to convey the old homestead, but says there was no mutual mistake in making the deed but he does not enter into detail in explaining the terms of the contract. He simply states that it was agreed that Mary J. Miller was to have one acre and that he was to have the other property, but he states also that the west fence, a part of the fence enclosing the homestead was continued where it was when the deeds were exchanged. He visited his step-mother at least twice a year and observed that she was using the property that enclosed the homestead.
This testimony convinces ns that the terms of the contract between Mrs. Miller and her step-son, Jas. J. Miller, the appellant, was as she states it. The testimony is clear, unequivocal and convincing that the contract contemplated that appellant was to convey his interest in the homestead, and that the old homestead ás' the parties then understood, consisted of the land that was' enclosed and occupied as a homestead, which embraced the parcel now in controversy. The testimony of Mrs. Jas. J. Miller is of no probative effect and does not contradict or lessen the weight to be allowed to the testimony of the appellee. For although ishe says she was present at the time the deeds were made, she does not say that the contract between her husband and the appel-lee contemplated that her husband should deed to the appellee, only one acre. She says that it was her understanding but does not say that it was the understanding between the parties to the contract. The testimony upon the whole meets every requirement of the law to entitle the appellee to a reformation of her deed in accordance with the contract as she stated it to be.
(3) In the recent case of Dawkins v. Petteys, 121 Ark. 498, we said, “The ultimate fact to be determined on appeal in chancery cases is not whether the chancellor pursued correct and logical mental processes in reaching his conclusion, but whether the conclusion itself is correct. Harriage v. Daly, 121 Ark. 23; Dicken v. Simpson et al., 117 Ark. 304, 174 S. W. 1154.”
Although the chancellor did not base his conclusion upon sound reasons, the decree was nevertheless correct and is therefore in all things affirmed.