(after stating the facts). The principal question presented for our consideration is whether the trial court erred in refusing to direct a verdict for the defendant. It is contended that plaintiff was at most a licensee to whom the defendant owed no duty except to refrain from wilfully or wantonly injuring him while on the premises. We cannot agree with this contention. We think the undisputed evidence shows that the plaintiff was on the premises for the mutual advantage of himself and of the defendant and for that reason was there under an implied invitation of the defendant.
L. L. Priest was a witness for the defendant. According to his testimony he had exclusive charge of selling its wood at the time the accident occurred and had been so'employed for several years past. His own testimony makes him an employee of the company and not an independent contractor. He sold the wood for the defendant and received a commission therefor. He did not buy the wood and sell it again on his own account. His testimony is corroborated by that of the other witnesses and made him an employee of the company.
Mr. Thompson in discussing the liability of the owner for injuries from dangerous places on his grounds to persons coming there for the common interest or mutual advantage of both parties, quoted with approval the following clear enunciation of the rule by Judge dray of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts: “The owner or occupant of land is liable in damages to those coming to it, using due care, at his invitation or inducement, express or implied, on any business to be transacted or permitted by him, for an injury occasioned by the unsafe condition of the land, or of the access to it, which is known to him and not to them, and which he has negligently suffered to exist, and has given them no notice of.” Thompson’s Commentaries on the Law of Negligence (2 ed.), vol. 1, sec. 985.
This court has approved the rule as above stated. Hobart-Lee Tie Co. v. Keck, 89 Ark. 128; St. L., I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Wirbel, 104 Ark. 243; St. L., I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Dooley, 77 Ark. 561, and St. L., I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Duckworth, 119 Ark. 246.
The testimony shows that the hole in the ground was caused by the pipe rusting and making a hole in it so that the steam escaped from the pipe and formed a hole of boiling water. This condition had existed for a week or ten days and its existence was known to the defendant. As we have just seen, the plaintiff went upon the premises for the purpose of loading some wood which the defendant had sold him and stepped in the hole while backing his wagon into position preparatory to loading it. He had been directed to go there by the servant of the company who had exclusive charge of selling the wood. It is true this servant testified that he did not have authority to direct the plaintiff to go there for wood after working hours, but he had been exercising such authority for years and the plaintiff did not know of any limitation upon his authority in this respect. Under these circumstances the negligence of the defendant was a question for the jury.
It is also insisted that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence "as a matter of law and for that reason was not entitled to recover. We do not agree with counsel in this contention. As we have seen, the plaintiff was on the premises at the implied invitation of the defendant and it was dark when he got to the place where the accident occurred. It is true, according to the testimony of a witness for the defendant, steam was escaping from the pipe in the ground which caused a vapor to arise from the ground. The plaintiff, however, testified that he could not see the vapor on account of the darkness and did not know that the hole was there. The hole had been there for a week or ten days and was in plain view from where the plaintiff worked in the turning room. According to witnesses for the defendant, the escaping steam or vapor could be easily discernible by any one working in the turning room. The plaintiff, however, said that his view in that direction was obscured by clippings which were thrown from the turning room through the opening and lay piled upon the ground. He stated positively that he had not noticed the escaping steam and did not know that the hole was there. He had no occasion to make an investigation of the matter and it is entirely within the range of probability that he was so engrossed in his work that he did not observe the steam escaping or the vapor rising from the ground at the place in question. Under the circumstances, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff was, also, a jury question.
It is next insisted that the court erred in refusing instruction No. 2. The instruction is as follows: “You are instructed that if the plaintiff was on the yard for his own convenience at the time he was injured, he was not an employee but was a licensee; and the company owed him no duty to exercise even ordinary care in maintaining safe premises for him to go upon.”
There was no testimony upon which to predicate the instruction and the court did not err in refusing it. As we have already seen, the undisputed evidence shows that at the time the accident occurred the plaintiff was there for the purpose of hauling away some wood which he had purchased from the defendant. He was given permission to go there at that hour, and,being upon the premises in the common interest of himself and of the defendant, he was there at the implied invitation of the defendant. There was no testimony upon which to predicate an instruction that he was on the premises as a mere licensee.
The case was submitted to the jury upon proper instructions, framed in accordance with the principles of law above announced, and, finding no prejudicial error in the record, the judgment will be affirmed.