(after stating the facts). It is earnestly insisted by counsel for the defendant that the evidence is not sufficient to warrant the verdict.
According to the testimony of the plaintiff, May-field, he took out the policies sued on in November and December, 1915, and since that time has kept the premiums paid. He admitted that his eyesight had been weak for fifteen or twenty years, but stated that he told this fact to the agent when he made his application for insurance. The trial was had in July, 1919, and May-field said that his eyes continued to be about the same until about a year ago, at which time sharp pains began to shoot through his left eye and that he soon afterwards lost the sight of it.
It is contended by counsel for the defendant that this testimony is not sufficient to support the verdict for the reason that the policy did not insure the plaintiff against any disease of the eye which existed at any time prior to the date of the application, but only from such diseases as might occur after the execution of the policy. Counsel insists that under the testimony the jury could not tell whether or not the disease which caused the -loss of plaintiff’s left eye existed at the date the policy was written or whether it occurred after the policy was executed.
We do not agree to the construction placed upon the policy by counsel for the defendant. So much of the clause in question as is applicable to the present case may be stated as follows: “It is specially provided that in case of disease resulting hereafter by or because of which the applicant shall suffer the total loss of one or both eyes,” etc. It is true that it is well settled in this State that policies of insurance should be interpreted by the rules governing other written contracts where the meaning of the language used is clear and explicit. It is equally well settled that in cases where there is doubt as to the meaning of the language used the policy should be construed strictly against the insurer and favorably to the insured. The reason is that policies of insurance are made on printed forms carefully prepared by experts employed by the insurer. The insured has no option as to the form of the contract and no voice in its preparation. The object óf the contract is to afford indemnity against loss, and the policy should be so construed as to effectuate this purpose rather than in a way which would defeat it. One of the dictionary meanings of the word “result” is to terminate, or to end. When given this meaning, the clause would read: It is expressly provided that in case of disease terminating or ending hereafter by or because of which the applicant shall suffer the total loss of one or both eyes, etc. In other words, the policy was intended to insure the applicant against the loss of his eyes from disease, regardless of the fact of whether the disease existed at the date of the policy or first began afterwards. The intention was that the loss of the eye, or the result from the disease should happen after the policy was executed. This is borne out by the application. By the terms of the policy the application was expressly made a part of the contract of insurance. The applicant was asked if he had a certain specified disease, and was then asked if both of his eyes were good and healthy. He answered, yes. Then follows a clause that these statements are true and correct, and that they are made to enable the applicant to obtain a membership certificate in the defendant association. The object of the question was to ascertain if the applicant’s eyes were in such a healthy condition as to warrant the association in insuring him against the loss of them from disease. Of course the loss of the eye must result after the execution of the policy. The company would be equally liable whether the disease originated before or after the execution of the policy, provided the loss of the eye was the result of the disease and happened after the execution of the policy, and there was no fraud perpetrated by the applicant in obtaining the insurance. The association was interested in knowing the condition of the applicant’s eyes in order to determine whether he was a fit subject for insurance against the loss of his eyes. If the applicant perpetrated a fraud in this respect, it would avoid the insurance..
In Mutual Aid Union v. Blacknall, 129 Ark. 450, the court held that a life insurance company will be bound under a policy of. life insurance, where the applicant and insured made false statements concerning his physical condition, where the agent soliciting the insurance was also charged with the duty of writing the data concerning the applicant’s physical condition, and where the agent, in course of the examination, learned the applicant’s true condition. The court further held that if an agent, in collusion with the applicant, even though acting within the apparent scope of his authority, perpetrates a fraud upon the insurance company by making false and fraudulent representations upon which the insurance is obtained, such fraud will vitiate the policy. See also Walker v. Illinois Bankers’ Life Ass’n, 140 Ark. 192.
The court instructed the jury on the question of fraud in procuring the policy in accordance with the principles of law just announced. The finding of the jury on this question was in favor of the applicant, and it can not be said that there is no evidence to support it. The insured testified that he made a full and fair disclosure of the condition of his eyes to the agent, and his testimony was corroborated by other witnesses who were present when the application for insurance was made.
Counsel for the defendant also assigns as error the action of the court in refusing to give an instruction asked by the defendant. We need not set out this instruction, for the object of it was to tell the jury that if it should find that the disease which resulted in the loss of plaintiff’s eye was in existence at the time the policy was executed, the company would not be liable. We have already discussed the meaning of that clause of the policy upon which the instruction in question was predicated, and for the reason there given we think that the policy was not susceptible of the meaning placed upon it by the association and that the court did not err in refusing the instruction.
It follows that the judgment must be affirmed.