(after stating the facts). The chancery court was right in holding that appellees, who were the plaintiffs below, were not barred by the seven-year statute of limitations. The land in question was the homestead of Thomas Reeves, and he lived on it with his wife and minor children until his death. The adult heirs had no right to the possession of the homestead until th¿ youngest child became twenty-one years of age and the statute of limitations did not begin to run against them until the termination of the homestead of the youngest child. Mrs. Mamie Harp was the youngest child and did not become twenty-one years old until July 31,1914. This suit was commenced on December 1, 1917. Hence the suit was not barred by the statute of limitations. Smith v. Scott, 92 Ark. 146.
This is conceded .by counsel for appellants. They invoke the doctrine of laches as a bar to appellees ’ right of action, but we can not agree with their contention under the facts as disclosed by the record. The doctrine of laches has no application where the plaintiffs are not seeking equitable relief, but to enforce a legal title and where their action is not barred by the statute of limitations in reference thereto. Davis v. Neil, 100 Ark. 399; Fourche River Lbr. Co. v. Walker, 96 Ark. 540; Ward v. Sturdivant, 96 Ark. 434, and Waits v. Moore, 89 Ark. 19. The facts of this case do not bring it within the principles announced in Ayers v. McRae, 71 Ark. 209, and Jackson v. Becktold Printing & Book Mfg. Co., 86 Ark. 591.
In the first mentioned case, there was a foreclosure sale under a mortgage, but the mortgagor knew of the sale, was present at it and purchased a portion of the property included in the mortgage. He was presented with an account of his indebtedness before the sale and made no objection to its correctness. After the sale he made propositions to buy the land back and knew that the mortgagee who purchased at the sale was cutting timber from the land and raised no objection to him doing so. The court held that under the circumstances he was guilty of laches, whether his defense to the irregularity of the foreclosure sale was substantial or merely technical.
In the last mentioned case there was a foreclosure in equity, and the heirs of the mortgagor were duly served with process. Their attorney and their agent agreed that the decree of foreclosure might be entered in vacation. The court held that the decree was invalid on that account, but that the plaintiffs were guilty of laches which proved fatal to the relief asked for by them. There the mortgagees became the purchasers of the land and were placed in possession of it after the sale had been confirmed. They sold large quantities of timber from the land, changed the fences and in every respect used it as their own. The plaintiffs had been advised that they could set the sale aside because the decree had been rendered in vacation, yet they made no objection to the confirmation of the sale or the entry into possession by the purchasers under the deeds executed to them pursuant to the decree of foreclosure. They knew that the land was being sold off by the purchasers at the foreclosure sale and they did not move to set aside the decree until nearly five years after it was rendered. They did not claim to have been misled by any act of the parties to the suit and no excuse was given for the delay which was attributable to their own negligence. Hence the court held they were guilty of laches in not sooner bringing their suit.
Without a breach of duty there can be no laches. In Tatum v. Arkansas Lumber Co., 103 Ark. 251, and in numerous other cases this court has said that there must be some supervening equity calling for the application of the doctrine of laches. In that case we recognized that laches is negligence by which another has been led into changing his condition with respect to the property in question, so that it would be inequitable to allow the negligent party to be preferred upon his legal rights to the one whom his negligence has misled.
Again in the case of Reaves v. Davidson, 129 Ark. 88, it was contended that the plaintiffs were barred by laches, and the court said there was nothing in the evidence in the case to show that the defendants had been led into changing their condition with respect to the land, so that it would be inequitable to allow the plaintiffs to be preferred upon their legal rights. Hence the relief was denied.
No misleading conduct can be attributed to appellees in the present case. It can not be said that there was inexcusable delay on their part in ascertaining or asserting their rights, or that their failure to bring the suit sooner was due to culpable negligence and inattention to their rights. The deed of trust in question contained a power of sale, and our statute imposes conditions upon the exercise of the power of sale contained in a mortgage. The statute requires that the property shall first be appraised and that at the sale it shall bring two-thirds of the appraised value. In Craig v. Meriwether, 84 Ark. 298, it was held that a sale under the power in a mortgage without complying with the statute is invalid, and that no title can be vested thereunder.
In the case at bar, while Lesser testified that there was a sale under the power contained in the mortgage, his testimony is very vague and uncertain. It is not shown that the property was advertised for sale or that it was appraised as required by the statute. The mortgagees became the purchasers at the sale, and no deed was executed to them. Lesser testified that he went into possession of the land after this pursuant to the sale. Mrs. Reeves testified tliat she made two crops on the land after her husband’s death and then left it because she thought she could not pay off the mortgage indebtedness. She lived in Lee County for two years and then moved with her minor children to Woodruff County, where they have since resided. She was not present at the sale under the mortgage and did not know that appellants claimed that a sale had been made thereunder until some time in 1916 when her children went back to Lee County on a visit to some relatives and ascei'tained that fact.
According to Lesser the sale was had in 1896. At that time the children were minors, the oldest being only about twelve years old. After they became of age they did nothing whatever to mislead appellants and moved with reasonable diligence in bringing the suit after they discovered that they had an interest in the land. They found this out in 1916 and brought this suit in the latter part of 1917. There was no change in the condition of the parties after they ascertained their rights. Appellants were not misled to their prejudice by any conduct of appellees and the appellees were not guilty of laches. The mortgage indebtedness was due at the time Mrs. Reeves left the land, and the mortgagees had the right to take possession of the land and rent it out for the purpose of paying that indebtedness or to foreclose the mortgage.
As we have already seen, the foreclosure was invalid, and under the circumstances their possession of the land will be attributable to their rights under the mortgage, and they were properly treated by the chancellor as mortgagees in possession. It is true that the mortgagees executed a. deed to A. OB. Smedley to the land, but of course he could acquire no greater title or interest in the land than they possessed. It is not shown that appellees knew of-his purchase or that he was misled to his prejudice by their action in the matter.
The court properly charged the mortgagees with the rental value of the land for each year after they went in possession of it, and allowed them credit for taxes and necessary repairs. Indeed, the proof shows that the houses on the place had been allowed to run down greatly. We do not deem it necessary to set out in detail the evidence with regard to the rents, taxes, etc. This is set out in the decree of the chancellor and an examination of the record leads us to the conclusion that the chancellor’s finding is correct. The chancellor held the mortgagee liable for a reasonable rent after he took possession of the mortgaged property. It is true that Smedley purchased the land from Lesser and entered into possession under his deed. He made certain payments thereunder which the chancellor credited on the mortgage indebtedness. Smedley acquired no greater rights than Lesser. He entered into possession under the direction of Lesser, and became his tenant. When he purchased from Lesser he only succeeded to his rights. The amounts charged against Lesser, including the payments on the purchase price by Smedley, only amounted to a reasonable annual rent for the property, and the evidence warranted the chancellor in finding that Lesser was indebted to appellees in the sum of $51.48.
It is further contended by counsel for appellant that after the sale by Lesser to Smedley, section 2754 of Kirby’s Digest, our betterment statute, applies, and they invoke the rule laid down in Green v. Maddox, 98 Ark. 397. We do not deem it necessary to decide this proposition. The rights of Smedley under the betterment statute are not before the court. The question is as to the rights of Lesser, and that case has no application to his rights.
It follows that the decree must be affirmed.