[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
AUGUST 7, 2008
No. 07-12248 THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
________________________
Agency No. A76-532-049
JOHN QUINCHIA,
Petitioner,
versus
U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
______________________
Petition for Review from a Decision
of the Board of Immigration Appeals
_______________________
(August 7, 2008)
Before ANDERSON, HULL and SILER,* Circuit Judges.
______________________________
*Honorable Eugene E. Siler, Jr., United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by
designation.
SILER, Circuit Judge:
John Quinchia, a native and citizen of Colombia, petitions for review of the
order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) upholding the decision of the
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) that Quinchia was ineligible for discretionary relief from
removal pursuant to § 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8
U.S.C. § 1182(h). Section 212(h) of the INA states that the Attorney General may,
in his discretion, waive removal under certain circumstances, but may not waive
removal for an alien who has not “lawfully resided continuously” in the United States
for seven years prior to being served with a Notice to Appear (“NTA”). The BIA, in
a non-precedential decision issued by a single member, dismissed Quinchia’s appeal
and affirmed the IJ’s finding that Quinchia lacked the seven years of continuous
lawful residence necessary to be eligible for a § 212(h) waiver. Because the non-
precedential BIA decision does not merit Chevron deference and there is a need for
“clear and uniform” guidance through precedential decisions, we GRANT the petition
for review, VACATE the BIA’s decision, and REMAND to the BIA to allow it to
issue a precedential decision interpreting § 212(h).
I. BACKGROUND
Quinchia entered the United States without inspection in 1992. In April 1997,
his United States citizen wife filed an immediate relative visa petition and he
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concurrently filed an application for adjustment of status. In January 1998, he
became a lawful permanent resident. In June 2002, Quinchia pleaded no contest to
a charge of burglary of a structure in violation of F.S.A. § 810.02(3) in Broward
County, Florida. In January 2004, he returned to the United States after a brief trip
abroad and sought admission as a lawful permanent resident at the Miami
International Airport. Due to his conviction, he was paroled into the United States.
The Department of Homeland Security served him with an NTA in May 2004,
charging him with removability based on his burglary conviction.
Quinchia admitted the allegations contained in the NTA, but argued that he
should be eligible for a discretionary waiver pursuant to § 212(h) because he had
lawfully resided in the United States for more than seven years. He argued that his
period of lawful residence began in April 1997 when he applied for adjustment of
status, not in January 1998 when he adjusted his status to become a lawful permanent
resident. The date on which he began to reside lawfully is critical because he was
served with the NTA in May 2004. If his period of lawful residence began in April
1997, then he attained the required seven years of residence before being served with
the NTA. On the other hand, if his period of lawful residence began when he was
granted adjustment of status in January 1998, then he failed to reside lawfully and
continuously for seven years before being served with the NTA. The IJ concluded
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that Quinchia could not show that he had lawfully resided continuously in the United
States for seven years. In a non-precedential decision issued by a single member, the
BIA dismissed Quinchia’s appeal.
II. ANALYSIS
“We review the BIA’s statutory interpretation de novo, but will defer to the
BIA’s interpretation of a statute if it is reasonable and does not contradict the clear
intent of Congress.” Jaggernauth v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 432 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir.
2005) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-44 (1984)).; see also Al-Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir.
2001). Pursuant to Chevron’s deference standard, “[w]hen a court reviews an
agency’s construction of the statute which it administers . . . [and] the statute is silent
or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether
the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron,
467 U.S. at 842-43. “In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction
of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of
an agency.” Id. at 844. The Supreme Court has also instructed that the “principles
of Chevron deference are applicable” to the BIA “as it gives ambiguous statutory
terms concrete meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication.” INS v.
Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424-25 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Against that background, the threshold issue in this case is whether Chevron
deference applies to the BIA’s single-member decision interpreting and applying INA
§ 212(h) to Quinchia’s appeal. We have not addressed the issue of whether we afford
Chevron deference to a non-precedential decision issued by a single member of the
BIA that does not rely on existing BIA or federal court precedent. We join the
Second and Ninth Circuits in holding that Chevron deference is not appropriate in
such circumstances. See Rotimi v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 55, 57-58 (2d Cir. 2007)
(holding that Chevron does not apply to a non-precedential, single-member BIA
decision construing INA § 212(h) because the BIA itself affords no precedential
value to the unreported decisions, the BIA is under a duty to provide “clear and
uniform guidance on the proper interpretation and administration of the [INA],” and
the relevant regulation states that the BIA shall provide such guidance through
precedent decisions (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)); Garcia-
Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006, 1011-14 (9th Cir. 2006) (employing similar
analysis to deny Chevron deference to a non-precedential BIA decision but
emphasizing that Chevron deference may apply where the non-precedential BIA
decision relied on, and was “compelled by” an earlier precedential decision). But see
Gutnik v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 683, 689-90 (7th Cir. 2006) (applying Chevron
deference to a single-judge, non-precedential BIA decision because “judicial
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deference to the Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the immigration
context” (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)).
While we have afforded Chevron deference where a single member of the BIA
summarily affirmed the IJ’s decision without opinion, see, e.g., Silva v. United States
Att’y Gen., 448 F.3d 1229, 1243 (11th Cir. 2006), these cases are distinguishable
because they rested on existing BIA or federal court precedential decisions and are
thus materially different. Here, however, the single member of the BIA did not rely
on any such precedent to decide whether an application for adjustment of status
begins the period of lawful residence.
Having decided that Chevron deference does not apply to the BIA’s
interpretation of INA § 212(h) in this case, we must now decide how best to dispose
of Quinchia’s petition. Two options exist. The first is to decide the issue ourselves
under the lesser level of deference enunciated in Skidmore v. Swift & Company, 323
U.S. 134, 140 (1944), which holds that a non-binding administrative interpretation
carries a weight “depend[ent] upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and
all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” See
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 237-38 (2001) (stating that Skidmore
remained intact after Chevron and that Skidmore deference applies when Chevron
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deference does not). The second is to remand the case to the BIA to permit it the
opportunity to interpret the statute in a precedential three-member decision. See
generally Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 185-86 (2006) (reversing a court of
appeals decision for failure to remand to the BIA for a determination of whether the
alien petitioners were eligible for asylum based upon membership in a particular
family); INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16-17 (2002) (“Generally speaking,
a court of appeals should remand a case to an agency for decision of a matter that
statutes place primarily in agency hands. This principle has obvious importance in
the immigration context.”).
In Rotimi, the Second Circuit declined to address a similar question about the
meaning of § INA 212(h)’s “lawfully resided continuously” requirement and
remanded to the BIA to give it an opportunity to provide a precedential interpretation
of “lawfully resided continuously.” 473 F.3d at 57-58. The Rotimi court followed
an earlier case in which the Second Circuit explained that remanding to the BIA to
obtain a first-instance statutory interpretation was appropriate because (1) the BIA’s
interpretation is entitled to deference, and thus any court interpretation “would be for
nought should the BIA subsequently reach a different, yet reasonable, interpretation
of [an] ambiguous provision”; (2) immigration cases often involve complex public
and foreign policy concerns with which the executive branch is better equipped to
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deal; and (3) the BIA has more relevant subject-matter expertise. Jian Hui Shao v.
Bd. of Immigration Appeals, 465 F.3d 497, 501-03 (2d Cir. 2006), cited in Rotimi,
473 F.3d at 58. We find this reasoning persuasive and we remand this case to the
BIA.
III. Conclusion
We GRANT the petition for review, VACATE the BIA’s decision, and
REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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