[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
SEPT 2, 2008
No. 07-14547 THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 05-00132-CV-CDL-4
KIMBERLY M. ADAMS,
individually and on behalf of a class of persons
similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MONUMENTAL GENERAL CASUALTY COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
_________________________
Before WILSON, PRYOR and COX, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Monumental General Casualty Company appeals an order that granted its
motion to compel arbitration of a dispute with Kimberly Adams. Monumental
complains that the district court compelled arbitration under one contract instead of
two contracts. We dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
When she bought a truck, Adams entered a retail installment contract to
finance both the purchase of the truck and the premium for an insurance policy
from Monumental. The policy insured Adams for the difference between what she
would owe under the retail installment contract and what an insurer would pay for
the truck if the truck was damaged beyond repair. Adams paid the loan early.
Adams filed a lawsuit against Monumental for a refund of some of the
premium because she paid the loan early. The district court granted a motion filed
by Monumental to compel arbitration of the dispute under the Federal Arbitration
Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4, and to stay all judicial proceedings relating to the
transaction. Both the retail installment contract and the certificate of insurance
issued by Monumental included an arbitration agreement.
The district court concluded that the arbitration agreements contained in
both the retail installment contract and the certificate of insurance were
enforceable. The district court later denied Adams’s motion for reconsideration,
but the court modified its order to delete a sentence about the retail installment
2
contract as “unnecessary dicta”:
When the Court made that statement, it understood that Plaintiff was
relying upon the retail installment contract, which included the
arbitration clause, as an essential part of her claim. Plaintiff now
represents to the Court that the retail installment contract is not
essential to her claim in this case. If Plaintiff’s claim is not dependent
upon the retail installment contract, then that would affect the Court’s
analysis of Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration under the retail
installment contract. Accordingly, the Court hereby amends its July
17, 2007 Order by deleting that sentence which the Court considers to
be dicta.
The district court stated that it was not deciding whether arbitration of Adams’s
complaint was required under the retail installment contract.
We are required to examine our jurisdiction sua sponte. Finn v. Prudential-
Bache Sec., Inc., 821 F.2d 581, 584–85 (11th Cir. 1987). We review jurisdictional
issues de novo. AT&T Mobility, L.L.C. v. Nat’l Ass’n for Stock Car Auto Racing,
Inc., 494 F.3d 1356, 1360 (11th Cir. 2007).
We have no jurisdiction over this appeal because the district court
compelled arbitration. 9 U.S.C. § 16(b)(2). Section 16 governs the appealability
of interlocutory orders regarding arbitration, Conart, Inc. v. Hellmuth, Obata +
Dassabaum, Inc., 504 F.3d 1208, 1210 (11th Cir. 2007), and subsection (b)(2)
states that “an appeal may not be taken from an interlocutory order . . . directing
arbitration to proceed,” 9 U.S.C. § 16(b)(2). This section resolves this appeal.
Monumental argues that we have jurisdiction because the district court
3
denied as moot the right of Monumental to arbitrate under the retail installment
contract. Section 16 provides that “an appeal may be taken from (1) an order . . .
(B) denying a petition under section 4 of this title to order arbitration to proceed.”
9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B). We disagree with the notion that the district court denied
Monumental the right to arbitrate.
“[A] party cannot appeal a district court’s order unless, at the end of the day,
the parties are forced to settle their dispute other than by arbitration.” Augustea
Impb Et Salvataggi v. Mitsubishi Corp., 126 F.3d 95, 98–99 (2d. Cir. 1997). The
district court compelled arbitration of the parties’ dispute without deciding whether
arbitration was also available under the retail installment contract. When a district
court compels arbitration of a dispute under one contract and is silent about
whether another contract provides for arbitration of the same dispute, section
16(a)(1)(B) is not implicated. We also cannot afford Monumental any relief
without undermining the extant order to compel arbitration, which is unreviewable
under section 16(b)(2).
The appeal of Monumental is DISMISSED.
4