Clark v. Union Pacific Railroad

Tom Glaze, Justice,

concurring. I agree with the result reached by the majority and have no doubts that, if this court were to hold otherwise, the voters’ intent, in approving Amendment 59, to equalize assessments and millage rates with respect to personal and real property taxes could never be achieved. To accept appellants’ argument that personal property should be subject to ad valorem taxes before this equalization process is achieved runs counter not only to the spirit and intent of Amendment 59, but also is in direct conflict with the Amendment’s wording. For example, Amendment 59 provides:

Provided, however, that the amount of revenues to be derived from taxable personal property assessed in the taxing unit for the base year, other than personal property taxes to be paid by public utilities and regulated carriers in the manner provided hereinabove, shall be computed at the millage necessary to produce the same dollar amount of revenues derived during the current year in which the base year adjustment or rollback of millage is computed, and the millage necessary to produce the amount of revenues received from personal property taxes received by the taxing unit, for the base year shall be reduced annually as the assessed value of taxable personal property increases until the amount of revenues from personal property taxes, computed on the basis of the current year millage rates will produce an amount of revenues from taxable personal property equal to or greater than received during the base year, and thereafter the millage rates for computing personal property taxes shall be the millage rates levied for the current year. (Emphasis added.)

In view of the foregoing language, I will briefly review the undisputed and relevant facts here which reflect how the provisions of Amendment 59 have been applied in School District No. 9 of Cross County since that Amendment went into effect. It is undisputed that, in the base year of 1982, the amendment of revenues derived from taxable personal property assessed in School District No. 9 in Cross County resulted in the collection of $323,200. In 1982, the millage rate on personal property was 49, or 32.5 more millage than that imposed on real property in the district. To produce the Amendment’s required same dollar amount of revenues collected from personal property taxes in 1982, the personal property millage rate in the district was adjusted downward to 45.4 mills. This adjustment narrowed the rate between personal and real property in the district to 28.9 mills. Specifically, the Cross County Assessor in 1983 collected $322,718 compared to the $323,200 received in the 1982 base year — which reflects the assessor’s efforts (as required under Amendment 59) to keep the current year (1983) revenues close to the same dollar amount collected in the base-year 1982.

In 1984, the collections resulting from the personal property millage was $324,604, which again was close to the same dollar amount the county collected from the district in base-year 1982. At the same time, the $324,604 amount was based on a lower millage rate which was adjusted down to 40.9. This lower rate and approximate same dollar amount was obviously due to an increase in the value of and the assessments on the personal property in the school district. This lower millage rate in 1984 further narrowed the gap between real and personal property rates to 24.4 mills.

The equalization process, which was being achieved in the school district, was impeded in 1985 because the voters in the district approved an additional three mill tax, which the county assessor imposed against both real and personal property in the school district. In doing so, the collections from personal property assessments rose to $351,531, or $28,000 more than the amount collected in base-year 1982. Obviously, the assessor’s decision to apply the new three mill rate against personal property in the district directly contravened the clear wording of Amendment 59, as I set out above. In addition, the decision to apply the new millage against both real and personal property slowed the process, which had been effected in the school district, of equalizing the rates between real and personal property.

Amendment 59 clearly imposes the duty to remove the illegal discrimination that exists between owners of real property and personal property. To impose new millages on both real and personal property unquestionably slows the process of equalizing the rates between the two. And, in counties where personal property assessments have actually gone down, equalization between the two types of property would never be achieved by adding new millages to both. For these reasons and those noted in the majority opinion, I believe the trial court’s decision should be affirmed.