[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-10226 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
OCTOBER 7, 2009
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 08-00658-CV-5-CLS
SHEILA T. HARPER,
personal representative of the estate
Mitchell Vinson Harper, deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LAWRENCE COUNTY, ALABAMA,
a county organized and existing under the laws
of the State of Alabama,
LAWRENCE COUNTY COMMISSION,
a governmental entity organized and existing under the laws
of the state of Alabama, et al.,
Defendants,
GENE MITCHELL, an individual,
KENNETH MITCHELL, an individual,
MARY BROWN, an individual,
WILFORD JEROME REED, an individual,
KEVIN BLAKE ROBINSON, an individual,
Defendants-Appellants.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_________________________
(October 7, 2009)
Before MARCUS, WILSON and FAY, Circuit Judges.
FAY, Circuit Judge:
This appeal requires us to determine whether the district court properly
rescinded its order converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary
judgment. We must also determine whether the court properly denied Defendants
qualified immunity. After reviewing the record and the parties’ briefs, we
AFFIRM IN PART AND REVERSE IN PART.
I. FACTS
A. Background
The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint. On April 24, 2007
Mitchell Vinson Harper was arrested by Town Creek, Alabama police officer Joe
Fike for failing to appear in court on public intoxication charges. Fike transported
Harper to the Lawrence County Jail in Alabama1 where he was processed and
incarcerated by Kevin Blake Robinson, a night-shift jailer. As alleged, Harper did
1
Fike took Harper to Lawrence County’s detention facility because the city of Town
Creek does not maintain its own.
2
not receive an “appropriate or reasonable” medical examination and/or screening
upon admission to the jail.
According to the Complaint Harper was an alcoholic, and while in jail he
experienced severe alcohol withdrawal. He displayed symptoms of that affliction,
including hallucinations, slurred speech, incoherence, and difficulty walking.
Robinson and/or Wilford Jerome Reed, another night-shift jailer, contacted Fike
and informed him of Harper’s strange behavior. Fike informed one or both of
them that he (Fike) would contact Jerry Garrett (Town Creek’s police chief) about
Harper’s behavior, and that the Town Creek Defendants2 would make a decision
regarding Harper’s medical care. During a shift change Robinson and/or Reed
informed Tim Taylor, a Lawrence County day-shift jailer, of Harper’s behavior.
Moreover, inmates informed Taylor, Reed and Robinson of Harper’s strange
behavior, informing them that Harper was saying “crazy things,” was “talking off
the wall,” and was having trouble keeping his balance. Harper did not receive any
medical care and died of problems related to alcohol withdrawal in the Lawrence
County Jail on April 28, 2007, four days after his arrest.
Plaintiff Sheila T. Harper, the personal representative of Harper’s estate,
filed a two-count Complaint on April 14, 2008 against the following Defendants:
2
Plaintiff uses the term “Town Creek Defendants” to refer to Fike, Garrett, and the city
of Town Creek.
3
Lawrence County, the Lawrence County Commission, Lawrence County Sheriff
Gene Mitchell, jail administrator Kenneth Mitchell, jail administrator Mary Brown,
Taylor, Reed, Robinson, the City of Town Creek, Garrett, and Fike. See D.E. #1.
In Count I Plaintiff sued all Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate
indifference to Harper’s serious medical needs, as prohibited by the Fourteenth and
Eighth Amendments.3 In Count II Plaintiff sued all Defendants for negligence and
wantonness under Alabama state law for failing to provide medical treatment.4
B. Procedure
On May 6, 2008 Defendants Gene Mitchell, Kenneth Mitchell, Brown,
Reed, and Robinson filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) with attached exhibits.5 See D.Es. #27-28. In their
motion Defendants asserted the defense of qualified immunity to the section 1983
3
Plaintiff conceded that her section 1983 claims may only be brought under the
Fourteenth Amendment, as Harper was a pretrial detainee and not a prisoner. See D.Es. #36, 37;
see also, e.g., Andujar v. Rodriguez, 486 F.3d 1199, 1203 n.3 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Claims of
deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of pretrial detainees are governed by the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause rather than by the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause, which governs similar claims by convicted prisoners.”).
4
Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed a number of her claims: her section 1983 claims against
Kenneth Mitchell, Brown, Reed, and Robinson in their official capacities, and her state law
claims against Gene Mitchell, Kenneth Mitchell, Brown, Reed, and Robinson.
5
Although Tim Taylor is also employed by Lawrence County, he filed a separate motion
to dismiss the claims against him. See D.E. #49. That motion is not at issue in this appeal.
4
claims against them in their individual capacities.6 See id. Plaintiff filed an
opposition with her own attached exhibits. See D.E. #36. Defendants filed a
motion to strike Plaintiff’s response or, in the alternative, to convert their Rule
12(b)(6) motion to a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. See D.E. #42.
The district court granted the alternative requested relief and converted the
motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. See D.E. #44. The court
later rescinded that order, finding that “the current body of evidence simply is
insufficient to support a ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” See D.E. #66.
Analyzing the motion as a motion to dismiss, the court denied qualified immunity
on the section 1983 claims against Gene Mitchell, Kenneth Mitchell, Brown, Reed,
and Robinson. See id. Those Defendants appeal both rulings here - the court’s
decision to rescind its order converting their motion to dismiss into a motion for
summary judgment, and the denial of their qualified immunity. We address each
issue in turn.7
6
Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, “government officials performing
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “The
purpose of qualified immunity is to allow government officials to carry out their discretionary
duties without the fear of personal liability or harassing litigation.” McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d
1231, 1237 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation omitted). There is no question here that
Defendants were performing discretionary functions during their alleged unlawful conduct.
7
The only claims at issue in this appeal are the claims against the individual Lawrence
County Defendants in their personal capacities, claims against which those Defendants asserted
qualified immunity. See D.E. #70, Notice of Appeal (“The basis of this appeal is the denial of
5
II. DISCUSSION
A. Conversion of Motion for Summary Judgment Back into Motion to
Dismiss
Defendants claim that the district court erred in rescinding its order
converting their motion to dismiss to a summary judgment motion. We disagree.
It is permissible for a district court to rescind its own interlocutory order. See, e.g.,
Toole v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 235 F.3d 1307, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000) (“In this
case, the court’s order for a new trial was an interlocutory order, and therefore the
trial court had the power to revoke it and reinstate the judgment.”); Hardin v.
Hayes, 52 F.3d 934, 938 (11th Cir. 1995) (district court may reconsider and amend
interlocutory orders at any time before final judgment).
We review a district court’s reversal of its own interlocutory order for abuse
of discretion. See, e.g., Lanier Const., Inc. v. Carbone Props. of Mobile, LLC, 253
Fed. Appx. 861, 863 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[T]the district court’s denial of [the
plaintiff’s] motion for leave to amend the complaint was simply an interlocutory
decision . . . which the district court had ample discretion to reconsider.”); Sanchez
v. Triple-S Mgmt, Corp., 492 F.3d 1, 12 n.12 (1st Cir. 2007) (“[A]bsent a
particularly egregious abuse of discretion, district courts are free to reconsider their
interlocutory orders.”) (internal quotation omitted).
qualified immunity.”).
6
We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in rescinding its
order converting Defendants’ motion to dismiss to a summary judgment motion.
The court made clear when it did so that discovery was stayed, and that it did not
consider any evidence outside the pleadings when ruling on the motion as a motion
to dismiss. Further, the parties are not precluded from filing a summary judgment
motion in the future.
Defendants argue that it was not enough for the court to have declined to
consider the outside documents in ruling on the motion to dismiss - rather, it
should have excluded them pursuant to Rule 12(d).8 This argument has no merit.
A judge need not convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment
as long as he or she does not consider matters outside the pleadings. According to
case law, “not considering” such matters is the functional equivalent of
“excluding” them - there is no more formal step required. See, e.g., Jones v. Auto.
Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 917 F.2d 1528, 1532 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[I]f the judge
does consider . . . outside matters, i.e., if the judge does not exclude them, Rule
12(b) requires the judge to comply with the requirements of Rule 56.”) (emphases
added); see also, e.g., Austin v. Modern Woodman of Am., 275 Fed. Appx. 925,
8
Rule 12(d) provides, in pertinent part: “If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c),
matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be
treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.”
7
926 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e discern no reversible error [in the district court’s
refusal to construe the defendants’ motions to dismiss as motions for summary
judgment]. Although the parties’ motions had affidavits, the record demonstrates
that the district court did not consider matters outside the pleadings.”); Ware v.
Assoc. Milk Producers, Inc., 614 F.2d 413, 414 (5th Cir. 1980) (“Although Rule
12(b) provides that a 12(b)(6) motion shall be treated as one for summary
judgment when matters outside the record are presented to the court and not
excluded, in the instant case the express wording of the Order of Dismissal
affirmatively indicates that the district court did not consider the extra-pleading
matters.”).9
In sum, we find that the district court properly exercised its discretion to
reconsider and rescind its order converting Defendants’ motion to dismiss into a
summary judgment motion.
B. Denial of Qualified Immunity
The court analyzed Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims for deliberate indifference
to serious medical needs and determined that they were not subject to dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6) based on qualified immunity. With one exception, we agree.10
9
Under Bonner v. City of Pritchard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we
are bound by cases decided by the former Fifth Circuit before October 1, 1981.
10
“We review de novo a trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint on
qualified immunity grounds.” Long v. Slaton, 508 F.3d 576, 579 (11th Cir. 2007). “In
8
Rule 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The Supreme Court has clarified that to
satisfy Rule 8, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The
plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face,” to “nudge[] [the] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Id.
at 570.
However, this Circuit has tightened the application of Rule 8 in section 1983
cases where qualified immunity is at issue, like this one. In such cases, the
“heightened pleading standard” applies and “[s]ome factual detail in the pleadings
is necessary.” GJR Invs., Inc. v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1367
(11th Cir. 1998); see also Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1314 (11th Cir. 2008)
(“Under the heightened pleading requirement, the relevant facts must be alleged
with some specificity.”) (internal quotation omitted). The purpose of the
heightened pleading standard is for the plaintiff to provide facts with “sufficient
detail for Defendants to understand what alleged rights were violated . . . and
which of their actions allegedly violated those rights,” as well as “for the court to
reviewing a complaint, we accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and construe the
facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1357 (11th
Cir. 2003).
9
determine whether those facts indeed set out a violation of rights and whether those
rights were clearly established when these incidents occurred.” Amnesty Int’l,
USA v. Battle, 559 F.3d 1170, 1180 (11th Cir. 2009).
Here, Plaintiff brought claims for deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs against the individual Defendants employed by Lawrence County.
Specifically, she brought two different types of deliberate indifference claims:
those for “personal participation” against Gene Mitchell, Kenneth Mitchell, Brown,
Reed, and Robinson; and those for “supervisory liability” against Gene Mitchell,
Kenneth Mitchell, and Brown.11 Below, we analyze both types of claims to see if
the district court correctly denied Defendants qualified immunity.
1. “Personal Participation” Claims
As stated above, Gene Mitchell, Kenneth Mitchell, Brown, Reed, and
Robinson all asserted qualified immunity as a defense to the “personal
participation” section 1983 claims against them. This Circuit generally follows a
two-step analysis to determine if qualified immunity applies to any section 1983
claim. The first step is to determine “whether the [defendant’s] conduct amounted
to a constitutional violation,” and the second step is to “analyze[] whether the right
violated was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the violation.” Lewis v. City of
11
Plaintiff made clear which claims she brought against which Defendants in her
response to their motion to dismiss. See D.E. #36 at 11-21.
10
West Palm Beach, Fla., 561 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2009). “Whether a
constitutional right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the violation turns on
whether it would be clear to a reasonable [defendant] that his conduct was
unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic, 458
F.3d 1295, 1306 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation omitted). “We recognize
three sources of law that would put a government official on notice of statutory or
constitutional rights: specific statutory or constitutional provisions; principles of
law enunciated in relevant decisions; and factually similar cases already decided by
state and federal courts in the relevant jurisdiction.” Goebert v. Lee County, 510
F.3d 1312, 1330 (11th Cir. 2007).
a. Violation of constitutional rights?
To perform the first step of the qualified immunity analysis, we must
determine whether Plaintiff properly stated a “personal participation” claim for
deliberate indifference under the Fourteenth Amendment against Gene Mitchell,
Kenneth Mitchell, Brown, Reed, and Robinson. Specifically, Plaintiff must
sufficiently allege “both an objectively serious medical need and that a Defendant
acted with deliberate indifference to that need.” Burnette v. Taylor, 533 F.3d 1325,
1330 (11th Cir. 2008).12 To establish “deliberate indifference,” Plaintiff must
12
Defendants conceded that Harper suffered a serious medical condition.
11
demonstrate that Defendants (1) had subjective knowledge of a risk of serious
harm; (2) disregarded that risk; and (3) acted with more than gross negligence. Id.
She must also show that those Defendants’ conduct caused Harper’s injuries. See
Marsh v. Butler County, Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1028 (11th Cir. 2001).
With respect to the “subjective knowledge” component, we have stated that
defendants “must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn
that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [ ] must also draw the inference.’”
Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation
omitted). “[I]mputed or collective knowledge cannot serve as the basis for a claim
of deliberate indifference. Each individual Defendant must be judged separately
and on the basis of what that person knows.” Burnette, 533 F.3d at 1331.
Here, there are two main ways Plaintiff alleges Defendants knew of Harper’s
serious medical needs. First, Plaintiff claims that they “had full knowledge that
Harper was an alcoholic who would experience delirium tremens (DT’s) due to
alcohol withdrawal if left untreated,” because he had been arrested before and
placed in the Lawrence County Jail on various alcohol-related charges. Compl. at
8. She also alleges that during the course of one or more of his prior arrests Harper
“informed the defendants that he had a history of seizures due to alcohol
withdrawal.” Id. at 9. However, these allegations do not meet the Rule 8 standard,
12
much less the heightened pleading standard. Plaintiff did not offer any facts to
suggest why these Defendants in particular (a sheriff, two jail administrators, and
two jailers) would know of Harper’s specific medical history, nor did she offer any
specific facts regarding Harper’s past arrests. Moreover, even if those Defendants
did know of Harper’s history of alcoholism and/or past alcohol-related arrests, they
would still have needed to know that Harper was in serious need of medical
attention during the time period in question, April 24, 2007 to April 28, 2007. In
our view, Plaintiff does not “raise [her] right to relief above the speculative level”
in this instance. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Second, Plaintiff claims Defendants were aware of Harper’s condition
because of his symptoms and behavior at the jail. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges
that several days after his initial incarceration Harper was hallucinating, slurring
his words, physically weak, and incoherent. According to the Complaint, Reed
and/or Robinson told both Taylor and Fike that Harper was displaying erratic and
strange behavior. Compl. at 7-8. The Complaint also alleges that other inmates
informed Reed and Robinson that Harper was acting strangely, losing his balance,
and had urinated on himself. Id. at 9. Based on these allegations we hold that
Plaintiff adequately alleged Reed and Robinson had “actual knowledge” of the risk
of serious harm to Harper if left untreated. However, the Complaint does not
13
allege how the other three Defendants, Sheriff Gene Mitchell and administrators
Kenneth Mitchell and Brown, could possibly have had such actual knowledge.
Thus, the court should have dismissed the “personal participation” claims as to
those three Defendants based on qualified immunity, and we reverse the district
court’s order in that respect.
As explained above, Plaintiff must also sufficiently allege that Reed and
Robinson disregarded the risk of serious harm to Harper with conduct that was
more than negligent. “[O]fficials, to be liable [for deliberate indifference], must be
aware of a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmates and not take reasonable
measures to alleviate that risk.” Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1027. “Deliberate
indifference” can include “the delay of treatment for obviously serious conditions
where it is apparent that delay would detrimentally exacerbate the medical
problem, the delay does seriously exacerbate the medical problem, and the delay is
medically unjustified.” Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1259-60 (11th Cir. 2000)
(internal quotation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Reed and/or Robinson called Fike regarding
Harper’s strange behavior. Fike allegedly told one or both of them that he (Fike)
would contact Garrett about Harper’s behavior, and that the Town Creek
Defendants would make a decision regarding Harper’s medical care. Plaintiff also
14
alleges that Reed and/or Robinson told Taylor about Harper’s behavior at the shift
change. However, despite their awareness of Harper’s condition, neither Reed or
Robinson took any steps to actually secure immediate medical attention for Harper,
whose need for prompt treatment appeared dire. Thus, Plaintiff adequately alleged
that Reed and Robinson violated Harper’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.
b. Were Harper’s rights clearly established at the time?
In order to clear the qualified immunity hurdle for Reed and Robinson,
Plaintiff must also show that Harper’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment
were “clearly established” at the time they were allegedly violated. We find that
Plaintiff can clear this hurdle. This Circuit has stated that its prior cases
“established that a jail official who is aware of but ignores the dangers of acute
alcohol withdrawal and waits for a manifest emergency before obtaining medical
care is deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s constitutional rights.” Lancaster v.
Monroe County, Ala., 116 F.3d 1419, 1426 (11th Cir. 1997); see also id.
(“Morrison clearly established that sheriffs and jailers cannot place or keep a
chronic alcoholic in jail without any medical supervision, when the defendants are
aware that the alcoholic is suffering from a severe form of alcohol withdrawal.”)
(citing Morrison v. Washington County, 700 F.2d 678 (11th Cir. 1983)).
Thus, Plaintiff properly stated “personal participation” section 1983 claims
15
for deliberate indifference against Reed and Robinson, and the district court was
right to deny those Defendants qualified immunity. We therefore affirm the
district court in that respect.
2. “Supervisory Liability” Claims
Plaintiff also sues Gene Mitchell, Kenneth Mitchell, and Brown for
deliberate indifference in their capacity as supervisors. Because those Defendants
asserted qualified immunity to the “supervisory liability” claims against them, we
must again perform the qualified immunity analysis. That is, we must analyze
whether Plaintiff properly stated a violation of Harper’s Fourteenth Amendment
rights against those Defendants, and whether those rights were clearly established
at the time.
a. Violation of constitutional right?
Supervisory liability lies where the defendant personally participates in the
unconstitutional conduct or there is a causal connection between such conduct and
the defendant’s actions. There are three ways to establish such a causal
connection:
when a history of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on
notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails to do
so. Alternatively, the causal connection may be established when a
supervisor’s custom or policy . . . result[s] in deliberate indifference to
constitutional rights or when facts support an inference that the
16
supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that the
subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing
so.
Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360-61 (internal quotations omitted).13
Here, because there are no allegations in the Complaint regarding the
supervisors’ personal participation in the denial of Harper’s Fourteenth
Amendment rights, we look to whether Plaintiff has alleged a “causal connection.”
Although Plaintiff does mention “widespread” constitutional rights deprivations
(see Compl. at 16), it seems that the bulk of her facts against Gene Mitchell,
Kenneth Mitchell, and Brown allege “causal connection” based on their customs or
policies that resulted in harm to Harper. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that those
Defendants, who were responsible for the management and administration or
oversight of the jail, had customs or policies of improperly screening inmates for
alcohol withdrawal, improperly handling inmates addicted to alcohol or drugs,
delaying medical treatment and restricting access to outside medical providers in
order to save money, primarily using emergency medical treatment for physical
injuries only, and also failing to train jailers in identifying inmates with alcohol
dependency.
13
“The deprivations that constitute widespread abuse sufficient to notify the supervising
official must be obvious, flagrant, rampant and of continued duration, rather than isolated
occurrences.” Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation
omitted).
17
As factual support, the Complaint refers to an incident with Clyde O’Neal
Parker, who was also a pretrial detainee in the Lawrence County Jail. The Parker
incident is strikingly similar to this case - and occurred only one month before the
Harper incident. According to that complaint, Parker was taken into custody on a
DUI charge and did not receive a proper medical screening, which would have
revealed his alcoholism and potential for suffering from withdrawal. The
complaint states that Parker did in fact experience alcohol withdrawal but was not
treated at the jail - even though Parker’s wife informed jail personnel that Parker
was an alcoholic and would need emergency treatment. The complaint states that a
jailer informed Parker’s daughter that Parker would not receive medical care
because he was not “bleeding.” Parker was eventually released to family members
so that they could take him to a hospital for medical treatment. Parker ended up
suffering brain damage. The Parker complaint contains similar allegations against
the same three supervisory Defendants as the Harper Complaint - that they
maintained a custom or policy of improper medical screening, of burden-shifting
medical treatment onto other entities out of financial concerns and “denying or
delaying treatment for serious health conditions to save money.” Parker Compl. at
8. The Parker complaint also sues jailers Reed and Robinson.
In sum, given the Complaint’s factual detail about Harper’s incident and the
18
similar incident involving Parker just one month before, as well as the specific
allegations regarding the customs or policies put in place by the supervisors,
Plaintiff met both the Rule 8 and heightened pleading standards.14 Accordingly,
we hold that Plaintiff sufficiently alleged that the supervisory Defendants violated
Harper’s Fourteenth Amendment rights based on their customs or policies.
b. Were Harper’s rights clearly established at the time?
Gene Mitchell, Kenneth Mitchell, and Brown claim they are entitled to
qualified immunity on the “supervisory liability” claims because, even if Plaintiff
properly alleged they violated Harper’s Fourteenth Amendment rights, it was not
“clearly established” at the time that their alleged actions would be unlawful. This
is because, they argue, no factually similar case could have put them on notice of
the unlawfulness of their conduct.
Plaintiff does not point to any such factually similar case, and we were
unable to find one. However, as we explained above, the existence of a factually
similar case is not the only way to put officials on notice of the unlawfulness of
their conduct. Indeed, “[a] government official can be put on notice that his
actions will violate a constitutional or statutory right by . . . a legal principle
14
Plaintiff also offered allegations regarding the other two ways to establish a “causal
connection” - namely, the supervisors’ failure to train and the existence of “widespread abuse.”
Although we do not address those allegations substantively, we believe they satisfy the Rule 8
and heightened pleading standards as well.
19
announced by a decision from a court with jurisdiction over the place where the
violation of rights was committed.” Danley, 540 F.3d at 1313. In our view, our
prior pronouncements on the illegality of delayed or inadequate treatment for
alcohol withdrawal should have sufficed to put the supervisory Defendants on
notice. Specifically, the Lancaster and Morrison cases (see supra p. 15) should
have put any government actor on notice that delayed or inadequate treatment of
alcohol withdrawal would be unlawful. Those cases should also have put
supervisors on notice that policies or customs of delayed investigation into and
treatment of alcohol withdrawal would be unlawful as well. Thus, we affirm the
district court’s denial of Gene Mitchell, Kenneth Mitchell, and Brown’s qualified
immunity defense to Plaintiff’s “supervisory liability” claims against them.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court in all respects but one:
we reverse the court’s denial of qualified immunity to Gene Mitchell, Kenneth
Mitchell, and Brown on the “personal participation” section 1983 claims.
Accordingly, the order of the district court denying Defendants qualified immunity
is
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART.
20