[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-11697 APRIL 18, 2012
Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY
________________________ CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 4:11-cv-00039-HLM
CHRISTOPHER ELLIS MILLER,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BARTOW COUNTY, GEORGIA,
a municipality,
CLARKE MILLSAP,
Bartow County Sheriff, in his
personal and professional capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(April 18, 2012)
Before BARKETT, PRYOR and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Christopher Ellis Miller, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals
the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action as frivolous
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
I.
Miller filed a complaint in the district court, alleging that the defendants,
Bartow County, Georgia, and Bartow County Sheriff, Clarke Millsap, violated his
constitutional and state rights by requesting Florida authorities to arrest him and
extradite him to Georgia on an unfounded charge of aggravated stalking. Miller
emphasized that the defendants failed to comply with applicable state and federal
statutes in requesting his extradition.
The district court sua sponte dismissed Miller’s complaint as frivolous
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). The court found that his complaint failed to
present a viable § 1983 claim against either Bartow County or Millsap because the
defendants were not “policymakers” for purposes of § 1983 liability, and Miller’s
conclusory allegations that he was injured by Bartow County’s custom or policy
failed to satisfy the pleading standards set out by the Supreme Court. As to
Miller’s § 1983 claim against Millsap in his individual capacity, the complaint did
not allege that Millsap personally participated in the events giving rise to the
instant lawsuit and contained only conclusory allegations regarding Millsap’s
liability as a supervisor. The court further found that Miller’s state law claims
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against Bartow County and Millsap (in his official capacity) were barred by
Georgia’s sovereign immunity. Moreover, “official immunity” barred Miller’s
state claim against Millsap in his personal capacity, as Millsap’s alleged actions
were discretionary, rather than ministerial, and Miller did not allege that Millsap
acted with ill will or actual malice. Finding Miller’s complaint to be frivolous, the
district court dismissed it without prejudice.
II.
We review for abuse of discretion a district court sua sponte dismissal of a
complaint as frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157,
1160 (11th Cir. 2003). A lawsuit is frivolous if it is “without arguable merit either
in law or fact.” Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation
omitted).
In his brief to this Court, Miller does not challenge any of the district
court’s actual findings as to why his complaint was frivolous. Therefore, he has
abandoned all arguments in this regard. See Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870,
874 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating that, although this Court construes pro se briefs
liberally, “issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed
abandoned”). Miller’s only claim on appeal is that the district court erroneously
failed to address the defendants’ alleged violation of various extradition laws, and
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he also notes that the court failed to address the application of Florida’s long-arm
statute. These contentions are meritless. The district court found Miller’s
complaint to be frivolous essentially because neither Bartow County nor Millsap
was a viable defendant and because Miller’s conclusory allegations did not
sufficiently establish liability. The questions of whether the defendants violated
any extradition laws or whether Florida’s long-arm statute applied were irrelevant
to the district court’s findings. Because the court had no reason to address these
matters, it could not have abused its discretion by failing to do so. Accordingly,
we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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