We granted Darryl Mix’s application for discretionary appeal to determine whether the superior court erred in reversing a workers’ compensation award entered by the appellate division of the State Board. Because the findings of the Board were supported by some evidence, the trial court erred by finding otherwise. See OCGA § 34-9-105 (b).
Mix was injured on October 31, 1997, when the cement truck he was driving overturned. Mix sustained transverse process fractures at L2, L3, and L4. After substantially recovering from the compensable injury to his back, Mix was released to full duty. About five months after the rollover incident, Lawrence N. Reckles, M.D., evaluated Mix and issued a five percent permanent partial disability rating to the body as a whole. Two months prior to the evaluation by Dr. Reckles, Mix obtained an independent medical evaluation from Simon Portee, M.D., who issued a fifteen percent permanent partial disability rating. While examining Mix, Dr. Portee noted, “[p]ain to percussion over the lumbar-sacral spine. Pain elicited over interspinous ligaments when attempting to bend over.” Dr. Portee’s impression was “[l]umbar spine radiculopathy.” In assigning the disability rating, Dr. Portee used the American Medical Association Guide to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (4th ed.), Table 74, p. 111.
A review of Table 74 indicates that a 15% body as a whole rating is appropriate for patients with: (1) neurologic evidence of limb impairment, or (2) a 25-50% compression fracture or fractures of the posterior elements of a lumbar vertebrae disrupting the spinal canal. Mr. Mix, as you know, suffered transverse process fractures of L2, L3, and L4. These are fractures that do not disrupt the spinal canal and, hence, are more appropriately categorized as DRE Impairment Category II rather than Category III as Dr. Portee suggests.
Dr. Portee, however, assigned the higher rating because “[t]he patient exhibited and treatment notes documented clinical signs of radiculopathy and neurologic compromise.”
After considering the conflicting evidence and reviewing the medical records, the administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Mix had sustained a ten percent permanent partial disability. Upon determining that “a preponderance of competent and credible evidence in the record” supported that finding, the appellate division adopted the ALJ’s award as its own. The superior court, however, reversed the appellate division. The court decided that “no evidence in the record” warranted the award and that the facts found by the ALJ did not support it either.
1. Mix contends that the superior court committed reversible error by failing to properly apply the appropriate standard of review. We agree. On appeal of a workers’ compensation award, the superior court is authorized only to affirm, reverse, or, under certain circumstances, remand to the Board for further proceedings. Willis v. Holloway, 154 Ga. App. 3 (267 SE2d 795) (1980). Judicial review is restricted to the five statutory grounds delineated in OCGA § 34-9-105 (c). When a finding of fact made by the lull Board is supported by any evidence, it is conclusive and binding upon the superior court. Wesleyan College v. Mains, 207 Ga. App. 562 (428 SE2d 577) (1993).
Here, the sole issue was the percentage of permanent partial disability sustained by Mix. See OCGA § 34-9-263 (d). Mix offered evidence showing a fifteen percent disability while his employer and its self-insurer offered evidence suggesting a five percent disability. The employer contends that the impairment rating must be one or the other and cannot be averaged. The employer argues that the higher | disability rating was issued before Mix had achieved maximum medical improvement and should, therefore, be disregarded.
Opinions of medical experts are advisory only and may be I
2. In light of the above holding, we need not reach the other issues enumerated as error.
Judgment reversed with direction.