FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
April 27, 2010
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
PUBLISH Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
MIDWEST CRANE AND RIGGING, INC.,
Petitioner,
v.
No. 09-9520
FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY
ADMINISTRATION,
Respondent.
Petition for Review of an Order from the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
(FMCA-2007-29184)
Kurt S. Brack of Holbrook & Osborn, P.A., Overland Park, Kansas, for Petitioner.
Sushma Soni, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (Tony West,
Assistant Attorney General, and Thomas M. Bondy, Attorney, Department of
Justice, Washington, D.C.; Robert S. Rivkin, General Counsel, Paul M. Geier,
Assistant General Counsel for Litigation, and Paul Samuel Smith, Senior Trial
Attorney, Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C.; and David K. Tochen,
Acting Chief Counsel, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, Washington,
D.C., with her on the brief), for Respondent.
Before KELLY, SEYMOUR and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge.
Midwest Crane and Rigging, Inc. (“Midwest”) petitions for review of the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (“FMCSA”) determination that it is
a “commercial motor carrier” subject to the agency’s jurisdiction. We deny the
Petition for Review.
I.
The Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC”) was initially the regulating
body for motor carriers. See Motor Carrier Act, Pub. L. No. 74-255, 49 Stat. 543
(1935). In 1966, Congress transferred this regulatory authority to the Department
of Transportation (“DOT”), see Department of Transportation Act, 89 Pub. L. No.
670, 80 Stat. 931, 939-40 (1966), which delegated it to the Federal Highway
Administration. See 49 C.F.R. § 1.4(c)(7) (1968); Darrell Andrews Trucking, Inc.
v. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 296 F.3d 1120, 1123 n.1 (D.C. Cir.
2002).
In 1984, in order to ensure public safety on the nation’s highways,
Congress enacted the Motor Carrier Safety Act (“MCSA”). 49 U.S.C. § 31501 et
seq. The MCSA, inter alia, enables the Secretary of Transportation to “prescribe
requirements for . . . safety . . . and standards of equipment of, a motor private
carrier, when needed to promote safety of operation.” 49 U.S.C. § 31502(b); see
also 49 U.S.C. § 31136(a)(1) (directing DOT to promulgate regulations to “ensure
that . . . commercial motor vehicles are maintained, equipped, loaded, and
operated safely.”). Pursuant to this authority, the DOT promulgated regulations
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that require commercial vehicles to be inspected at least once annually. See 49
C.F.R. § 396.17, revised by 73 Fed. Reg. 76794 (Dec. 17, 2008).
In 1991, Congress enacted the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing
Act. 49 U.S.C. § 5331. “The Testing Act embodies a congressional finding that
‘the greatest efforts must be expended to eliminate the . . . use of illegal drugs,
whether on or off duty, by those individuals who are involved in [certain
safety-sensitive positions, including] the operation of . . . trucks.’ Pub.L. 102-143,
§ 2(3), 105 Stat. 953.” E. Associated Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57,
63-64 (2000) (ellipses and brackets in original). 1 Pursuant to the authority of this
Act, DOT issued regulations requiring pre-employment testing for alcohol and
controlled substances. See 49 C.F.R. § 391.81 et seq.; id. § 382.101 et seq.; id. §
392.1 et seq.; see also Department of Transportation Drug Testing Regulations for
the Motor Carrier Industry, Procedures for Transportation Workplace Drug
1
The Act adds that “increased testing” is the “most effective
deterrent” to “use of illegal drugs.” [Pub L. 102-143] § 2(5). It
requires the Secretary of Transportation to promulgate regulations
requiring “testing of operators of commercial motor vehicles for the
use of a controlled substance.” 49 U.S.C. § 31306(b)(1)(A) (1994
ed., Supp. III). It mandates suspension of those operators who have
driven a commercial motor vehicle while under the influence of
drugs. 49 U.S.C. § 31310(b)(1)(A) (requiring suspension of at least
one year for a first offense); § 31310(c)(2) (requiring suspension of
at least 10 years for a second offense). And DOT’s implementing
regulations set forth sanctions applicable to those who test positive
for illegal drugs. 49 CFR § 382.605 (1999).
E. Associated Coal Corp., 531 U.S. at 64.
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Testing Programs, 53 Fed. Reg. § 47002, et seq. (Nov. 21, 1988).
In 1995, Congress abolished the ICC and transferred most of its
responsibilities to the Secretary of Transportation at DOT. See ICC Termination
Act of 1995, § 101, 109 Stat 803. With the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement
Act of 1999, 113 Stat. 1748, Congress transferred responsibility for motor carrier
safety within DOT to the newly created FMCSA. See 49 U.S.C. § 113(f); Dep’t
of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 759 n.1 (2004).
Among its statutory mandates, the FMCSA is responsible for prescribing
federal standards for safety inspections of commercial motor vehicles, see 49
U.S.C § 31142, and assigning safety fitness ratings to owners and operators of
commercial motor vehicles. 49 U.S.C. § 31144(b); 49 C.F.R. §§ 1.73(h), 385.9.
Towards that end, the FMCSA inspectors perform periodic on-site compliance
reviews, in which they assess points for regulatory violations and preventable
accidents. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 385.5, 385.7.
II.
The present petition for review stems from a dispute arising out of an
FMCSA compliance review in response to a complaint. Petitioner Midwest, a
Kansas corporation, leases construction cranes to contractors. At least sixteen of
its cranes are self-propelled by the truck chassis on which it is permanently
mounted. These self-propelled cranes travel in interstate commerce from the
storage yard to job sites, where they are used to hoist materials.
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Following the compliance review on April 19, 2007, the FMCSA issued a
notice of claim charging Midwest with violations of four Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Regulations (“FMCSR”) involving Midwest’s self-propelled cranes,
including failure to comply with regulations governing vehicle safety inspections
and drug and alcohol testing for drivers. The FMCSA proposed a $7,470 civil
penalty for the violations.
Midwest denied any violation of the regulations based on its theory that it
is not a “private motor carrier” pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 31502(b) and therefore its
self-propelled cranes are not subject to FMCSA jurisdiction. See FMCSA Order
at 2. Under the FMCSR, 49 C.F.R. 390.5, a “private motor carrier” is a “person
who provides transportation of property or passengers, by commercial motor
vehicle, and is not a for-hire motor carrier.” And as relevant here, a “commercial
motor vehicle” is “a self-propelled or towed vehicle used on the highways in
interstate commerce to transport passengers or property, if the vehicle [] has a
gross vehicle weight rating or gross vehicle weight of at least 10,001 pounds,
whichever is greater[.]” 49 U.S.C. § 31132(1)(A). Midwest argued that its cranes
“do not transport passengers or property” because each crane “is a unified device
that includes a transporting mechanism, not two separate devices, and that the
crane and its transporting mechanism operate as an integrated unit.” FMCSA
Order at 2.
The FMCSA rejected Midwest’s assertion, reasoning that
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in this matter, the prime purpose of the movement of the vehicles in
interstate commerce is to transport the crane apparatus, which was
permanently affixed to the vehicles, to and from job sites to perform
a commercial service. Enhancing the safety with which this
equipment may be transported should not remove [Midwest] from the
jurisdiction of the Agency charged with regulating the safety of
commercial motor vehicles. The units at issue in this proceeding
have Gross Vehicle Weight Ratings of from 56,000 pounds to
129,000 pounds, far more than the minimum 26,001 pounds required
to meet the definition of a commercial motor vehicle with regard to
alcohol- and drug-testing requirements, and the minimum 10,001
pounds required to meet the definition of a commercial motor vehicle
with regard to other FMCSR requirements. Clearly, self-propelled
cranes should not be removed from the Agency’s jurisdiction merely
because the cranes are permanently affixed to the vehicles on which
they reside. To allow these vehicles to remain outside the reach of
the safety arm of this Agency would put the motoring public at great
risk. Accordingly, self-propelled cranes are commercial motor
vehicles and [Midwest] is a private motor carrier subject to
FMCSA’s jurisdiction.
FMCSA Order at 8-9. Because the FMCSA also determined that the question
whether self-propelled cranes are subject to the FMCSR was unanswered at the
time Midwest’s alleged violations occurred, it did not impose any civil penalty on
Midwest for violating agency regulations.
III.
Midwest petitions for review. 2 The outcome of this case turns on the
meaning of the word “property” in 49 U.S.C. § 31132(1)(A) and the FMCSR. If,
as Midwest argues, the crane apparatus is not “property” within the meaning of
2
We have jurisdiction over this petition under 49 U.S.C. § 521(b)(9) and/or
the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2342(3)(A). See Br. for Resp. at 2, 16; see generally
MST Express v. Dep’t of Transp., 108 F.3d 401, 404-05 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(explaining applicability of judicial review provisions).
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the statute and the regulations, its conduct may be beyond the purview of the
FMCSA. Alternatively, if, despite Midwest’s affixation of the crane apparatus to
the vehicle, the crane apparatus still constitutes “property,” then the disputed
vehicles at issue here qualify as “commercial motor vehicles,” and Midwest is a
private motor carrier subject to the jurisdiction of the FMCSA.
Notably, although Congress routinely references the term “property” in
regulating the motor carrier industry, it has never defined the term. In cases of
Congressional silence such as this, the authorized agency – in this case the
FMCSA – possesses broad discretion in administering the law. See Valley Camp
of Utah, Inc. v. Babbitt, 24 F.3d 1263, 1267 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)). We
will defer to the agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute “if it is
reasonable in light of the text, the structure, and the underlying purpose.” Used
Equipment Sales, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 54 F.3d 862, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
Moreover, we accord “substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of its
own regulations.” Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994)
(citations omitted). But this principle of deference is not absolute. We need not
accept an agency’s interpretation if it is “unreasonable, plainly erroneous, or
inconsistent with the regulation’s plain meaning.” Lewis v. Babbitt, 998 F.2d
880, 882 (10th Cir. 1993) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Midwest has the burden to show that the FMCSA’s action was “arbitrary,
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capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” See
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); 49 U.S.C. § 521(b)(9); see also San Luis Obispo Mothers
for Peace v. United States NRC, 789 F.2d 26, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (en banc) (“the
party challenging an agency’s action as arbitrary and capricious bears the burden
of proof.” (citation omitted)).
Turning to the FMCSA’s interpretation of the meaning of “property,” we
note that it is consistent with the court’s analysis in Harshman v. Well Serv., lnc.,
248 F. Supp. 953 (W. D. Pa. 1964), aff’d per curiam, 355 F.2d 206 (3d Cir. 1965)
(affirming “for the reasons so well stated in the opinion of [the district court].”).
The plaintiff in Harshman argued that its cement-pumping equipment, which was
permanently mounted on a truck and transported in interstate commerce to job
sites, was not “property” within the meaning of the statute. Midwest’s argument
here is essentially the same: its self-propelled cranes, which are permanently
mounted on truck chassis that transport them in interstate commerce to job sites
and were operated from the truck cab, are not “property.” In rejecting a similar
argument, the court in Harshman reasoned:
It is fair to say that whenever those pump trucks moved in interstate
commerce, as they often did, the prime purpose . . . of such
movement was to transport the pumping equipment . . . to and from a
job site. Plaintiffs contend that there was no such “property”
transported by the trucks, since, by their view, the pumping
equipment has to be viewed as “unitized” in the truck itself. This
view I regard as highly unrealistic. The pumping equipment had
nothing to do with the mechanical function of the trucks. Had it not
been permanently affixed to the truck chassis, it is scarcely
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imaginable that plaintiffs would contest its classification in the
category of “property” for transportation. It was permanently affixed,
however, thereby enhancing the comparative safety with which it
could be transported on the public highways. It would be ironic in
the extreme if I were to interpret this laudable safety measure as
removing the defendant from the ambit of the Interstate Commerce
Commission’s power to regulate the safety of operations of carriers
in interstate commerce. The pumping equipment . . . carried on the
pump trucks did constitute “property,” was owned by the defendant,
and was transported in interstate commerce in furtherance of
defendant’s commercial enterprise.
Harshman, 248 F. Supp. at 958.
The FMCSA’s determination that the analysis in Harshman is analogous to
the situation here is not an unreasonable one. The record indicates that Midwest’s
self-propelled cranes are designed to operate, and do operate, in highway traffic
to transport property in the performance of a commercial function. Their size and
weight pose a significant risk to the safety of highway travelers. The FMCSA’s
exercise of jurisdiction over Midwest is consistent with the regulatory language,
as well as with Congress’s directive to make safety the agency’s “highest
priority.” 49 U.S.C. § 113(b). Affording deference to the FMCSA’s
interpretation of Title 49 and of its own regulations, see Valley Camp of Utah,
Inc., 24 F.3d at 1267, we are not persuaded that the FMSCA’s decision was
arbitrary or capricious. 3 We therefore reject Midwest’s argument that its crane
3
We do not consider Midwest’s and the FMCSA’s alternative arguments,
which were not advanced by the parties below nor addressed in the agency’s final
order. See Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 928 F.2d 966, 970 (10th Cir. 1991) (“The
general rule is that an appellate court will not consider an issue raised for the first
(continued...)
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apparatuses do not constitute “property” within the meaning of the relevant
statute and regulation, as well as its assertion that the FMCSA acted arbitrarily
and capriciously in asserting jurisdiction over Midwest.
Accordingly, we DENY the Petition for Review.
3
(...continued)
time on appeal.”).
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