[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-15451 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APRIL 27, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 00-00650-CR-PCH
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TAVARES ONTARIO WIGGINS,
a.k.a. Tavaris Wiggins,
a.k.a. Tavares Williams,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(April 27, 2010)
Before BLACK, HULL and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Taveres Ontario Wiggins, a federal prisoner convicted of a crack-cocaine
offense, appeals the district court’s denial of his pro se motion for a reduced
sentence, brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Wiggins relies on this
Court’s decision in United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2008) and the
Supreme Court’s decision in Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 128 S.Ct. 1581
(2008), to support his claim that carrying a concealed weapon does not constitute a
crime of violence for sentencing purposes. As such, he argues that he did not
qualify for the career offender enhancement in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, and thus his
sentence should be reduced under § 3582(c)(2).
We review de novo a district court’s conclusions regarding the scope of its
legal authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). United States v. James, 548 F.3d
983, 984 (11th Cir. 2008). Although a district court generally cannot modify a
term of imprisonment once it has been imposed, an exception lies in § 3582(c)(2).1
The policy statements provide that § 3582 encompasses challenges to the
application of only those Guidelines that have been retroactively amended; the
1
Section 3582(c)(2) states in relevant part:
[I]n the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based
on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing
Commission . . . the court may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering
the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)] to the extent that they are applicable,
if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the
Sentencing Commission.
2
district court must leave all other Guideline decisions unaffected. U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.10(b)(1); United States v. Bravo, 203 F.3d 778, 781 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[A]ll
original sentencing determinations remain unchanged with the sole exception of
the guideline range that has been amended since the original sentencing.”).
Here, Wiggins has not alleged a cognizable claim under § 3582(c)(2)
because his request for a reduced sentence relies on case decisions, not a
retroactive Guideline amendment. See United States v. Moreno, 421 F.3d 1217,
1220–21 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that because Booker2 is a Supreme Court
decision rather than a retroactive Guideline amendment, it does not provide an
independent basis for a motion that is otherwise not cognizable under
§ 3582(c)(2)); see also Bravo, 203 F.3d at 782 (holding that “[e]xtraneous
resentencing issues” are not cognizable in § 3582 motions, and must be brought as
§ 2255 collateral attacks to the sentence). Therefore, Wiggins is not entitled to
§ 3582 relief.
AFFIRMED.
2
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
3